Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy: Themes and Implications

Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Of the University of Zurich
For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Accepted in the Spring Semester, 2018
On the recommendation of the doctoral committee:
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Zurich, 2019

For Talia Abu- a dear friend and a fellow Joyce-ian

Acknowledgements: Many individuals and institutions are owed a debt of gratitude for allowing me to complete this work. Chief among them are: the University of Zurich without whose generous *Forschungskredit Candoc* grant and institutional support, I would not have been able to work on this dissertation; Prof. H.J. Glock for his feedback, help, and for teaching me how to write; Prof. Paul Horwich for his encouragement and insightful criticism; Dr. Stefan Riegelnik for warmth, encouragement and helpful assistance; Dr. Catherine Herfeld for stimulating debates on philosophy of science; Mr. Fritz Senn for reminding me that there is more to nonsense than meets the eye; Dr. David Wörner and Mr. Lukas Winiker for endless conversations and fun; Mr. Pit Genot for providing an always critical yet sympathetic voice; the Department of Philosophy at the University of Zurich for always-fascinating workshops, lectures, conferences, and so on; The People of the City of Zurich for continuing their proud and noble tradition of offering homes to exiled madmen.

“Don’t just do something; stand there!”

-The White Rabbit

“But if I never start, then I can always stop, for my eternal starting is my eternal stopping… It is always difficult for philosophy and philosophers to stop… The point is that I do not stop now but stopped where I began.”

-S. Kierkegaard

“Philosophy hasn’t made any progress?—If someone scratches where it itches, do we have to see progress?”

-L. Wittgenstein

List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein's Work:[1]

AWL= *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935*

BLBK= *The Blue Book*

BRBK= *The Brown Book*

BT= *Big Typescript: TS 213*

CV= *Culture and Value*

L&C= *Lecture and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*

LFM= *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939*

LWPPO= *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions*

LWVC= *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*

NB= *Notebooks: 1914-1916*

OC= *On Certainty*

PG= *Philosophical Grammar*

PI= *Philosophical Investigations*

PI II= *Philosophical Investigations: Part II*/*Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment*

PO= *Philosophical Occasions*

PR= *Philosophical Remarks*

RFM= *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*

TLP= *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

VoW= *Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle*

WiC= *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951*

Z= *Zettel*

[1] See bibliography for complete citation.

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0 Introduction:

0.0 Philosophy Does Not Begin nor Can It End:

In many ways, Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of philosophy, philosophical methodology, and the ends of philosophical investigation are among the most difficult and widely contested features of his thought. Indeed, the TLP, and its self-condemnation of nonsense, and the PI, and its insistence that philosophy cannot advance theses while seeming to advance many theses, are prima facie metaphilosophical absurdities. Thus, to take a representative and apt remark from an otherwise sympathetic philosopher, "Wittgenstein's work is full of very general remarks about what philosophy is, such as philosophy should propound no theses, or at least none that could be questioned. This is… the weakest part of his work….indeed, it seems to me that his actual practice belies them" (Dummett (1978), 434).

This dissertation aims to offer an apt, coherent, and consistent interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of philosophy (hereby, for ease of reference, "metaphilosophy"). By doing so, it seeks to show that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical reflections are not the weakest part of his work, one that his own practice belies, and so on. Instead, my overall objective is to show that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical thoughts are, if anything, one of the most impressive, innovative, and profound features of his thought. Specifically, I argue that for Wittgenstein, both earlier and later, philosophy is best understood as a practice or activity. Further, pursuant to this, I also argue that the inherent result of this practice (when it is successful) is clarity. As it were, “to philosophize” is akin to an accomplishment verb and the end-state that it results in is clear thinking or understanding.[2] In turn, this implies that the philosophy is internally connected to clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding in the same way that construction of a house (when it is successful) is internally connected to a house. As it were, philosophy simply is the process whereby one comes to have clear thoughts or a perspicuous understanding.

Indeed, if this rather simple shift in emphasis from philosophy as a discipline to philosophy as a process (that may go on in a certain department in a university), is

[2] cf. Vendler (1957) for the original discussion of “accomplishment verbs”

correct, then the way that much metaphilosophical inquiry is conducted may be deeply problematic. Specifically, much as Duhem (1991)'s brilliant work, *The Aim and Structure of Scientific Theory,* on scientific inquiry begins with an assessment of the aims of scientific theory, the structures that best accord with these aims, and the methods that most fruitfully realize these aims, so too does metaphilosophical inquiry into the nature of philosophy (e.g. Williamson (2008), ix-x, 1; Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013), 1-16, for accounts that rely, implicitly or explicitly, on such a conception). One begins by examining the metaphilosophical goals philosophy has- e.g. obtaining objective theoretical knowledge- one then works out a structure that keeps the game running smoothly- e.g., a particular style of writing, a set list of canonical problems, schools, -isms, etc.- and a method- e.g., modal logic- to best realize this objective. Notice that such a view tends to judge philosophy not in terms of the inherent results the process but in terms of its ability to secure an external element like theoretical knowledge of, e.g., the truth predicate. In other words, philosophy is best understood in terms of something that is independent of, and external to, the philosophical process itself.

In contradistinction, if my thesis can be defended and elaborated properly, then the philosophical activity or investigations and clarity or understanding are internally related. Again, learning to do philosophy well is learning *how* to think clearly or understand perspicuously. If this is so, for Wittgenstein, philosophy does not begin when we stumble on an interesting puzzle or decide on some external goal, and then develop methods that accord with disciplinary standards, to solve it. Nor yet did philosophy begin when a mad bricklayer began accosting his social betters in the marketplace and demanding that they explain themselves in a way that shoemakers and mathematicians do. Rather, it "began" when speech and discourse began, when we became recognizably human beings, a political animal that needs to figure out how to live with others by making sense of each other and ourselves in a clear or understandable way.[3] In other words, philosophy does not "begin" at all at a point in

[3] The reader must forgive my euro-centrism here but, at least in the west, it seems to me that one cannot read either Book 24 of Homer's *Iliad* or *the Book of Job*, the earliest texts of Greek and Jewish culture, respectively, without recognizing deeply philosophical themes and moments. Socrates does it better in that he, like Wittgenstein, offers a method. However, the idea that we can "grow out" of our "endless adolescence" and learn to stop asking certain questions- i.e., Why is life so short? Why do good people suffer so much? Why do we die? Why do we live? Why Being at all?- is truly post-human in a horrifying sense. Suffice it to say, as chapter eight discusses further, these are not the "canonical questions" handed down to us by our noble tradition. However, I argue, Wittgenstein follows the mad bricklayer in his sarcastic rejection of pre-Socratic philosophy, which is to say, philosophy as a

time separate from language, understanding, thought, and so on. Instead, philosophy is 'internally' related to thought and understanding in such a way that clarifying one is doing the other well.

Furthermore, pursuant to this, a metaphilosophy that sees the philosophical activity or investigation and clarity as being internally related begins making sense of the odd way Wittgenstein uses both "philosophy" and "clarity." Specifically, and as discussed at length latter, Wittgenstein's conception of "clarity" is odd in that it is decidedly *unclear* what he has in mind. Indeed, if clarity is his metaphilosophical *aim*, something *external* to the philosophical activity, then he has left us rather in the dark what he is after. By contrast, if "clarity" simply is an internal feature of philosophy i.e., a conceptual correlate of the philosophical activity or philosophical investigations, this worry is obviated. Philosophizing does not so 'aim' at some external 'thing' called 'clarity.' Rather, philosophizing (when it succeeds) just produces clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding as an inherent result and end-state of the verb. Further, pursuant to this, "philosophy" itself comes to have two possible uses that nicely explicate Wittgenstein's rather Janus-faced use of "philosophy" as both a deleterious cause of confusion *and* as the only way to avoid confusion (cf. TLP 3.324 & TLP 4.112; PI § 111 & PI § 133). On the one hand, the sort of "philosophy" Wittgenstein praises, is precisely the process whose inherent results are clear thoughts or perspicuous understandings. Indeed, this explains why Wittgenstein is so insistent that philosophy produces no knowledge (cf. TLP 4.111) and should not put forward theses (cf. PI § 128). Philosophy is an activity, or method, and is, 'in itself,' barren in exactly Socrates's sense. As it were, it is a midwife that helps to birth other people', discipline's, etc., thoughts. On the other hand, the sort of "philosophy" Wittgenstein denigrates, call it 'robust philosophy,' is both confused and causes confusion. It is confused in that it believes that the activity of philosophy is best understood in terms of some goal that has "nothing to do with philosophy" (TLP 6.53), e.g., knowledge, theories, and so on. It confuses because, in this quixotic quest, to reach these goals, robust philosophy ends up making claims that simply do not function properly, and leads itself into ever-murkier water.

In sum, I argue in this dissertation that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy proffers an account of philosophy that emphasizes the process, and the inherent end-result of

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research program (cf. Popper (1958) for this view of the pre-Socratic philosophy. cf. Lakatos (1980), for what I mean by "research program").

the process, clarity. In other words, what Wittgenstein tries to teach us are not particular facts, theses, dogmas, etc., but a method (or set of them) that can engender clear thinking. Further, if this is so, then in a deeply important sense, Wittgenstein attempts to salvage Socrates's insight that philosophy is dialogical and that it does not 'aim' at anything but coming to think clearly or understand perspicuously what we are saying or doing. In sum, and to tease the reader with a quote we return to in the end, "I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV p. 28). The "as" here is best read *not* in terms of style but in terms of practice. One does not write poetry for any sort of external goal and, similarly, one does not do philosophy for to reach an external goal.

To support this thesis, this dissertation divides into two parts. Part I examines four fairly popular attempts to read Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks in an 'robust' manner- i.e., to read Wittgenstein as though he adduces a set and external metaphilosophical goal and produces a method to achieve it. I begin with alternative interpretations for two related reasons. First, Wittgenstein's remarks are often so gnomic or truncated that properly making sense of them, and their argumentative structure and point, demands interpretation. Indeed, as a famed quip has it, there are as many interpretations of what Wittgenstein is up to as there are readers of Wittgenstein. By beginning with some salient subset these interpretations[4], I can make sense of both how people have tried to read Wittgenstein as well as the insights and errors these readings cause. Indeed, such a method, surely allows me to read Wittgenstein's work in a far more nuanced way than I otherwise would. Second, as Aristotle says (e.g., *Topics* 100b21), one should begin with the opinions of the wise before one proceeds on to one's own account. I take this Aristotelian attitude to be laudatory and seek to emulate it.

My goal in Part I is two-fold. One, I aim to show that such an 'robust' interpretations are not viable. Specifically, I argue that the four interpretations I consider of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in terns of an external metaphilosophical goal and a set method to reach it, face insuperable problems- ranging from exegetical tensions to metaphilosophical incoherencies. Two, I attempt, for each position, to salvage the valuable insights these interpretations have. Indeed, if my account of

[4] Even here, I am well aware of excluding many readings that are interesting, viable, and so on. One does what one can.

Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy proves to be viable, such recognition and an attempt to redeploy features of other interpretations, other ways of understanding, is of paramount importance to doing philosophy well (cf. Z § 460).

Part II elaborates an interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy that views philosophy as a process. Specifically, I begin from the nearly undeniable premise that, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is always sui generis and cannot be made into, e.g., a of scientific research. However, I further argue that this difference, far from leading Wittgenstein to disparage philosophical investigations as worthless, empty of value, nonsense, and so on, causes Wittgenstein to put forward a compelling defense of philosophy against the onslaught of positivism and a culture of scientism. In effect, I argue that Wittgenstein aims to defend the idea that not all abstract reflection can or should cash out as pragmatic theory construction, true propositions, set goals and apt means, and so on. As it were, thinking clearly and understanding perspicuously, though perhaps not as high minded as building theories and obtaining knowledge, as still critical and the philosophical activity is critical for engendering them.

0.1 Chapter-by-Chapter Guide:

Chapter one examines the therapeutic account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. By "therapeutic account" I have in mind any account that ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of alleviating or excising philosophy by addressing underlying disquiets, nonsense, and so on, that engenders it. I examine six prevalent positions grouped along two parameters. These are: the texts that the interpreters focus on- specifically TLP-focused, mixed, PI-focused; the target of the philosophical therapy the interpretation imputes to Wittgenstein- pure, which sees all philosophy as stemming from a form of personal psychic abnormality, and moderate, which sees philosophy as being generated by a myriad of complex factors that may not reduce to the individual. I argue that each position is unworkable for various reasons. I then argue that the therapeutic account, on the whole, is unworkable as it is unable to align Wittgenstein's supposedly philosophical-as-therapeutic method with his assumed metaphilosophical goal. In other words, there just is no way for a rational and argumentative philosophical methodology to address the irrational disquiets or

nonsense that engender philosophy. Succinctly, if philosophy is nonsense, then so are Wittgenstein's replies to it.

Chapter two examines an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. This account also ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of removing philosophy. However, antiphilosophy denies that Wittgenstein's method is appropriately thought of as "philosophical," i.e., learnable, principled, rational, etc., at all. Instead, it casts Wittgenstein as a rhetorician (or sophist) who uses clever wordplay to convince us that "philosophy" should be abandoned. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's "method" need not be coherent, philosophical, logical, and so on-it merely needs to do the job, by hook or by crook. To buttress such an odd account, I also examine how one might attempt to make sense of the difference between philosophy and rhetoric/sophistry. I then argue that this antiphilosophical account cannot be sustained as an interpretation of Wittgenstein for many reasons.

Chapter three examines an anti-theoretical interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Again, this account ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of removing philosophy. However, the anti-theoretical account denies that this is because philosophy is engendered by nonsensical ‘claims,' psychic disquiets, dangerous rhetoric, and so on. Instead, the anti-theoretical account imputes to Wittgenstein the view that philosophy cannot ‘deliver the goods’ it has promised us. More specifically, philosophy is incapable, for various reasons examined further, of obtaining objective theoretical knowledge of the topics it investigates. In turn, and granting that the goal of philosophy is such knowledge, to continue plugging along after one realizes that it cannot return the desired results is irrational. Pursuant to this, the anti-theoretical account ascribes to Wittgenstein a philosophical methodology that has two related components. One, Wittgenstein makes the trivial and common sense assumption that natural science has the best claim to have gained objective theoretical knowledge about the phenomena it studies. Two, Wittgenstein adduces several trivial differences between philosophical investigation and scientific research that should make us deeply skeptical that the former can gain objective theoretical knowledge. I close by arguing that the anti-theoretical account tries to ascribe to Wittgenstein two distinct endgames that grow out of this realization and that both endgames fail.

Chapter four discusses the grammatical account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Unlike the other three accounts, this account ascribes to Wittgenstein a positive metaphilosophical goal in addition to his negative goal of removing,

alleviating, and so on, the sort of nonsense that academic philosophy may engender. To wit, it imputes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of discerning and displaying the normative interdependencies that obtain within our conceptual-linguistic schemes and are underwritten by constitutive rules and, ultimately, normative practices. Pursuant to this, it imputes to Wittgenstein a descriptive methodology that is, at base, an incredibly sophisticated form of connective analysis- i.e., a way of systematically exploring the connections that the nodes within our conceptual schema have with one another (cf. Strawson (1993), 17-29). Further, as we, shall see, such an account, unlike the former three, is sensitive to the distinction between this sort of proper philosophy-as-connective-analysis and the problematic academic sort. I then argue that the grammatical account is unable to articulate how, exactly, one describes normative features of grammar in such a way that the descriptions are still normative.

Chapter five begins to develop an alternative account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. It focuses on the earlier Wittgenstein and the metaphilosophical points of the TLP- specifically, TLP 4.11-4.116. I argue that, for earlier Wittgenstein, the philosophical activity is clarifying thoughts and, further, that without philosophy, cloudy and indistinct (cf. TLP 4.112). I examine how this clarification works at some length. I close by arguing that such a metaphilosophy does emphasize the philosophical process and reflect on how this affects other aspects of earlier Wittgenstein's thought.

Chapter six discusses later Wittgenstein's attack, on a central set of preconceptions at work in the TLP in, i.e., PI § 89- §108. Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein both attacks the TLP's philosophy of logic, and the way it underwrites the clarificatory activity of philosophy that the TLP puts forward. Pursuant to this, I also discuss later Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic. Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein reconceives of the nature of representation along far more pragmatic lines.[5] I further argue that this reconception has substantial implications for the relationship between logic and language.

Chapter seven turns to later Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology. This emerges from and continues to investigate Wittgenstein's pragmatic account of representation. Specifically, I focus on the descriptive methodology Wittgenstein

[5] I have in mind an account of representation similar to, e.g., Giere (1999).

utilizes in the PI. I argue that, later for Wittgenstein, the key features he aims to describe are the frameworks for descriptions we rely on (roughly, the terms or parameters by which we describe some phenomenon or other). I also argue that his descriptive methodology is indirect in that it does not so much describe frameworks for description as exhibit them in "models" or "objects of comparison" (PI § 130). Finally, I argue that this insistence on description is, far from being a crippling metaphilosophical stricture, a simple acknowledgment that first things come first. Specifically, I argue that both explanation and interpretation assume the adequacy of a prior description and that Wittgenstein's focus is elaborating what "adequacy" means.

Finally, chapter eight examines what I take to be later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks proper, i.e., PI § 109-133. I briefly remind the reader of some themes discussed in chapter five- precisely how the TLP conceives of meaning. Next, I discuss later Wittgenstein's assault on the TLP's view of meaning as well as later Wittgenstein's reimagining of meaning as use. From there, I examine in some detail the links between use and understanding. Next, I discuss how understanding and philosophy, for later Wittgenstein, relate. Specifically, I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is the process by which we restore understanding after a breakdown has occurred. I further argue that the sorts of breakdowns in understanding that Wittgenstein has in mind are not primarily generated by robust philosophy. Instead, they are simply consequences of how human beings are and the sorts of things they do. Finally, I close by briefly reflecting on what sort of "peace" Wittgenstein sought for philosophy as well as how philosophical the philosophical activity, and the resultant clarity, can dissolve philosophical problems.

If my argument for a metaphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein that stresses the philosophical process proves to be apt, then my thesis is well supported. To remind the reader, my thesis is that the philosophical activity or philosophical investigation has the inherent result of clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding. As it were, philosophy is Socratic- a way of learning to think or understand more clearly.

0.2 Dialectics of the Dissertation- Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic and Clarifying Accounts:

With my thesis in view- i.e., that the philosophy processes (when they succeed) has the inherent result of clarity- and the layout of the chapters in view, I now want to outline the overall dialectical interrelationships between the eight chapters that compose the two parts of this work.

To begin, let us examine how the first four chapters that make up part one interrelate. Chapter one aims to demonstrate that the attempt to ascribe to Wittgenstein an argumentative and philosophical method to address the irrational and non-philosophical causes of philosophy cannot align properly. Succulently, if philosophy is nonsense, then so too are Wittgenstein's replies to it. Chapter two considers one way of removing this tension. Specifically, it proffers a reading of Wittgenstein that rejects the thought that he has a principled and philosophy method. As it were, he does reply to nonsense with nonsense or, better put, to one kind of rhetoric with a different kind of rhetoric. Chapter three considers the other way of removing the tension. Specifically, it proffers a reading of Wittgenstein that accepts that philosophy's semantics are in good working order. It then imputes to him a view that Wittgenstein aims to demonstrate not that philosophy is nonsense, but that it cannot fulfill its promise. Finally, chapter four closes by considering an interpretation that is distinct from the above dialectic in that it ascribes to Wittgenstein a positive metaphilosophical goal. To wit, it imputes to Wittgenstein the goal of conceptual cartography.

For each chapter in Part I, I argue that there are insuperable difficulties, ranging from willful exegetical distortions to metaphilosophical incoherencies. The upshot of this progression is that such failures, across several fairly independent interpretations of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, should make us wary of viewing Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as proffering an extrinsic view of philosophy- i.e., as best viewed in terms of set goals and specific methods.

Part II begins elaborating a metaphilosophical view of Wittgenstein that stresses the philosophical process. In other words, it argues that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy is not akin to scientific research in that whereas the later has set goals and specific methods, the former does not. Instead, philosophy is a conceptual correlate of clear thinking or understanding in such a way that thinking clearly or understanding perspicuously just is learning to carry out the philosophical activity or investigation.

Chapter five begins with the TLP. I begin here because, as later Wittgenstein notes, the PI can only be seen "in the right light only by contrast with and against the

background of my older way of thinking" (PI *preface* p. 4). I focus on TLP 4.11-4.116 and argue that, for the TLP, philosophy and clarity are internally related in such a way that doing proper philosophy simply results in clear thinking. I also flag various assumptions and preconceptions that the TLP relies on to establish this connection between thought and language. Chapter six begins to examine why later Wittgenstein repudiated many of the TLP's assumptions and preconceptions. Specifically, it focuses on his reject of the TLP's constitutive conception of logic in PI § 83- §108. It argues both that Wittgenstein' rejects this constitutive conception and that this problematizes the way the TLP's philosophical process. It further argues that, in the PI, Wittgenstein has a far more pragmatic conception of how representation or description works. Chapter seven develops the pragmatic account of description further. It focuses, specifically, on the role of description as a methodological feature of philosophical investigation as well as why this role is of such paramount importance for later Wittgenstein. Finally, chapter eight relies on insights from chapter six and seven to proffer an interpretation of the most explicit metaphilosophical remarks in the PI- i.e., PI § 109- §133. I argue that, though the philosophical activity of the TLP is recast and modified as philosophical investigations for the PI, the idea that the philosophical activity (when it succeeds) results in clarity is unchanged. Specifically, I discuss how, for later Wittgenstein, philosophical investigations are internally related to understanding in the same way that the TLP related thought in clarity. I briefly explore some implications.

Thus, the aim of Part II is showing that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is best viewed in terms of process. For Wittgenstein, to reiterate, "to philosophize" is conceptually akin to an accomplishment verb and the inherent end-state of the verb is clarity. I the close with a conclusion that briefly considers the implications of such a view for Wittgenstein scholarship, broader philosophy, and the role that philosophy can and should play in the intellectual world.

Part I

"How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world? Through the life of knowledge" NB p. 81e

"The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in" Z § 16

1 Therapeutic Metaphilosophy:

This chapter discusses several interrelated interpretations of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in terms of therapy. The characteristic feature that these interpretations share is that they all ascribe to Wittgenstein the same metaphilosophical goal. To wit, each account assumes that Wittgenstein aims to cure, or at least alleviate, the intellectual "disquiet" (e.g., PI § 111), "torment" (e.g. PI § 133), "cramps" (e.g. BlBK p. 1), etc., that are betoken philosophical problems. However, each interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a different methodology to achieve this goal. Indeed, this heterogeneity is to be expected as there "is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were" (PI § 133). Further, it is critical that each interpretation, despite their overall agreement on the metaphilosophical goal, be considered on its own terms as each is unique exegetically, philosophically and metaphilosophically.

In this chapter, I argue that each interpretation of therapy I consider, as well as the overall philosophical-therapeutic program, suffers from a grave problem. To wit, it is opaque, for each and all, how a therapeutic interpretation can adequately align Wittgenstein *philosophical* methodology with his *therapeutic* goal. To begin, I offer a rough taxonomy of several popular therapeutic interpretations in section 1.1. In section 1.2 a, c, e, g, i, I develop each interpretation individually and on its own terms. In sections 2 b, d, f, h, j, I offer criticisms of each of these individual interpretations. In section 3, I pull back and note three common features all of the interpretations share as well as problems with each feature. Finally, I close by arguing that the aim of alleviating mental cramps and the ascription to Wittgenstein of an undeniably *philosophical* methodology engenders a profound tension that the therapeutic interpretation cannot resolve. In turn, this sets the stage for chapter two as antiphilosophy rejects the ascription of anything "philosophical" to Wittgenstein.

1.0 A Partial Taxonomy:

This section proffers a partial taxonomy of several popular therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein. To reiterate, however, each therapeutic interpretation

of Wittgenstein agrees that Wittgenstein's overall metaphilosophical goal is alleviating cramps or disquiets that betoken philosophical problems. First, I lay out why such a taxonomic approach is necessary. Second, I offer some criteria to organize the various interpretations into a coherent structure. Finally, I offer a taxonomy guided by these criteria that places the interpretations into this structure. I note here that this taxonomy is not exhaustive.[6] However, I focus on interpretations that are both most clearly therapeutic and influential in Wittgenstein scholarship.

To begin, there is considerable variation within therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein. This is for several reasons. First, the various therapeutic interpretations often present themselves in rather negative and oppositional terms rather than positive and programmatic ones. Indeed, a therapeutic reading "is a kind of constraint on a reading, rather than a reading" (Conanat and Diamond (2004), 78). However, such constraints leave open a wide field of possible readings. Second, there is considerable disagreement between therapeutic interpretations about how to understand Wittgenstein's diachronic development. Indeed, both 'how many Wittgenstein(s)?' and 'which Wittgenstein(s) are therapist(s)?' are answered differently by different interpretations. Pursuant to this, third, there is considerable disagreement about what elements of the *Nachlass* accurately reflect Wittgenstein's philosophy. For example, Baker (2006) continues the Baker & Hacker tradition of drawing extensively from the *Nachlass* whereas Cavell (1979), 3, explicitly rejects such an approach. Finally, and most critically, fourth, there is the question of what a proper therapeutic methodology actually entails. For example, Mulhall (2007) views the link with Freud and psychoanalysis to be key whereas Kuusela (2008) does not.

In turn, granting these divergences between interpretations, a clear taxonomy is needed for three reasons. First, the force and nature of an objection will change from interpretation to interpretation. For example, a passage from the *Nachlass* may problematize a point Baker makes but will leave Cavell untouched. Second, if the therapeutic-philosophical methodology varies between interpretations, clearly keeping them apart is critical. For example, emphasizing or ignoring psychoanalysis drastically alters what sort of method Wittgenstein is thought to utilize to address disquiet. Third, without a clear taxonomy of various interpretations, one runs the risk

[6] For example, I do not discuss Stern (2004), e.g., 40-55, and a "Pyrrhonian" interpretation not because I do not find such an interpretation interesting but because it tends to read the role of philosophy in a somewhat different way than the interpretations I examine.

of equivocating between them. In turn, this means that a rational reconstruction of an interpretation or a criticism of it may miss the mark.

To avoid these worries, I offer a taxonomy of readings that relies on two criteria to organize the various therapeutics interpretations. The first criterion focuses on what parts of Wittgenstein's writings should count as philosophical works. This criterion offers three categories for Wittgenstein's writings. These are TLP focused, mixed, and PI focused. I note that the mixed position tends to view Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* as a "hypertext" in Stern (1994)'s sense. The other criterion focuses on the origin and status of philosophical problems. This criterion offers two categories. These are pure therapy and moderate therapy. Pure therapists see philosophical problems and confusions as always betokening some preventable and deleterious mistake. In effect, philosophy is always the product of some wrong turn that we could have avoided. Also, pure therapy sees the cause of this error in overtly psychological terms and caused by the individual herself. By contrast, the moderate view of therapy sees philosophy as inexorably linked to some feature that cannot either be reduced to the individual or her will-to-confusion. Various sub-types of moderate therapy emphasize different features that are responsible for philosophy, as we will see. However, what is critical is that the confusions that engender philosophy cannot simply be cashed out as mistakes due to psychological abnormality.

Thus, there are six possible positions. For each, there are specific philosophers whose interpretations fall into it as well as specific philosophical-cum-therapeutic methodologies it ascribes to Wittgenstein. See figure 1.

Type of Therapy:	**Textual Basis:**	**Philosopher(s):**	**Method:**
Pure	TLP	Conant & Diamond	Elucidatory
Moderate	TLP	Zemach et. al.	Functional
Pure	Mixed	Baker	Psychoanalytic
Moderate	Mixed	Kuusela	Comparative
Pure	PI	Mulhall	Transference
Moderate	PI	Cavell	Genetic

Figure 1.

1.1 Filling in the Taxonomy and Criticisms:

In the last section, I offered a clear taxonomy of various therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein as well as the specific thinkers I engage with who fall into each category. This section proffers a rational reconstruction of each of the six therapeutic interpretations in sections 1.2a, c, e, g, i, k. For each, first, I lay out the preconditions and assumptions the methodology rests on. Second, I then examine the nuts-and-bolts of the methodology. Third, I discuss how it links to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of alleviating philosophical craps. After each reconstruction, I offer specific criticism of the interpretation in section 1.2b, d, f, h, j, l. I note here that these criticisms range from specific exegetical points to metaphilosophical ones.

1.1.a Pure Therapy- TLP:

To begin, the Pure Therapy-TLP interpretation of Wittgenstein is perhaps the most developed, systematic, and programmatic of the therapeutic interpretations. Though many philosophers have contributed to refining and developing this interpretation, I focus on two in particular.[7] These are Conant and Diamond. I focus on these philosophers for two reasons. First they offered the first interpretation along these lines and so are touchstones for all subsequent elaborations. Second, they are deeply interested in nailing down the basic requirements of such an interpretation.

Granting this focus, pure therapy-TLP ascribes to Wittgenstein an elucidatory methodology. In effect, this elucidatory methodology assumes that the TLP is made up of two distinct kinds of points. These are frame-propositions, e.g., methodological notes about how to elucidate metaphysical-ly sounding[8] nonsense "claims," and faux-propositions, e.g. metaphysical-ly sounding nonsense "claims" that we are meant to elucidate and expose as nonsense (e.g., Conant (2000), 100 fn 102; Diamond (1995), 19). In turn, by learning how to expose the faux status of faux-propositions, Wittgenstein achieves his metaphilosophical goal by teaching us how to "see through" metaphysical-ly sounding nonsense that we are tempted by for psychological reasons and so alleviate the intellectual cramps such nonsense engenders. First, I examine the

[7] E.g., Goldfarb (2012), Ricketts (1996), Read & Hutchison (2000), and so on.
[8] It is a very interesting question what exactly distinguishes "x-ly sounding" nonsense from "y-ly sounding" nonsense as, prima facie, Dadaist poetry and Hegel are rather different. This question will occur at several points in the chapter.

conception of "nonsense" that underwrites this elucidatory methodology. Second, I examine how the elucidatory methodology works. Finally, third, I proffer an account of how this elucidatory methodology does, in fact, achieve Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal.

To begin, a critical feature of pure therapy-TLP is its conception of "nonsense"- both metaphilosophically and exegetically. Metaphilosophically, pure therapy-TLP maintains that philosophical "problems" are always a consequence of being taken in by nonsense. Indeed, "[w]hen we attempt to formulate these [philosophical] problems [they] are to be recognized as *Unsinn*" (Conant (2000), 197). Thus, the real source of philosophical "problems" is our psychological tendency to confuse nonsense with senseful points. Exegetically, pure therapy-TLP insists that any viable reading of the TLP must meet two conditions. First, "that it [the interpretation of the TLP] does not take those propositions of the *Tractatus* about which Wittgenstein said, at 6.54, that they are to be recognized as 'nonsensical' to convey ineffable insight. The second feature is a rejection of the idea that what such a recognition requires on the part of a reading of the *Tractatus* is the application of a theory of meaning that has been advanced in the body of the work" (Conant and Diamond (2004), 47). Thus, pure therapy-TLP must not "chicken out" and should realize that most of the points of the TLP as nonsensical (e.g., Diamond (1995), 194). In short, nonsense both causes philosophical "problems" and nonsense is key to reading the TLP correctly. However, we have yet to discuss either what nonsense is or how it comes about. Let us turn to this.

As to what nonsense is, pure therapy-TLP insists that *all* "nonsense" is "real nonsense, plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as corresponding to an ineffable truth" (Diamond (1995), 181). This is because pure therapy-TLP insists that a string is nonsensical iff "some determination of meaning has *not* been made" (*ibid* 106). Pursuant to this, such a nonsense string does not express semantic content, cannot enter into deductive and inferential relations, is not propositionally structured, and, most critically, is, from a logical point of view, identical to any other nonsense string (e.g., Conant (1991), 342-54). Indeed, a string like "The world is all that is the case" (TLP 1) and a string like "piggly wiggle tiggle" (Diamond (2000), 151) are both nonsense *in the same way* in that *both* lack a meaning determination. Granting this, we turn to how nonsense comes about. Unsurprisingly, all nonsense comes about in the same way and is due to a string that "contains a word to which, in its use…, no

meaning has been given" (Daimond (1995), 197). Indeed, "[h]is [Wittgenstein's] point is that we don't know how to render the sentence 'Socrates is identical' into the symbolism because, as it stands, we don't know what sentence (if any) it is… [but] we can simply stipulate something adjectival for the word 'identical' to mean here" (Conant (1989), 259). Thus, the sole factor responsible for all nonsense is the failure to assign meanings to our terms and all nonsense arises from this failure. Let us call this conception of nonsense "monistic" in that there is only one factor responsible for nonsense and, relatedly, only one kind of nonsense, from a logical point of view.

However, this may strike us as counter-intuitive. Consider "Caesar is a prime number" and "piggly wiggle tiggle." These strings seem very different from each other. Indeed, a reader may insist that the former betokens a category mistake in that "Caesar" refers to a general and "____ is a prime number" is satisfied by natural numbers. Pursuant to this, the Caesar string is nonsense not due to meaning privation but due to the "clash" of trying to force the open sentence to accept an object of a different logical type. On this reading, "Caesar" has certain internal logico-syntactic features that allow it to concatenate with some open sentences (e.g. "___ is merciful") and not others (e.g. "____is a color"). In turn, this undermines monistic nonsense.

The pure therapy-TLP reading answers this objection by insisting on a radicalized version of the context principle. Specifically, the above paragraph assumed that "Caesar" or "___ is a prime number" can each be correctly assigned a meaning independently of the context of the total proposition and "such a mistake is one's tendency to think one already knows what 'Vienna' [or 'Caesar'] means taken all by itself and outside the context of a propositions" (Conant (2002), 399). However, "when we ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, we unwittingly end up looking for the meaning in what Frege wants to teach us to recognize as the realm of the psychological" (*ibid*). For example, assume that "Caesar" has the logico-syntactic properties of a proper name independently of a proposition. Granting this, is "Napoleon is no Caesar" still fair employment? If it is, then it seems as though the logico-syntactic internal properties of Caesar are not those of a proper name. If it is not, then we must maintain that "Napoleon is no Caesar" is nonsense, despite appearances. In either case, something has gone awry.

With this conception of monistic nonsense in view, we can examine how it links to the elucidatory methodology that pure therapy-TLP ascribes to Wittgenstein. The central, and most critical, quote that for the interpretation is TLP 6.54:

> "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he as used them… to climb up beyond them"

To begin, pure therapy-TLP insists that the "nonsense" Wittgenstein indicates is monistic. In other words, the points in the TLP that Wittgenstein refers to here are not, from a logical point of view, distinct from "la lu le." Clearly, this interpretation has radical implications. Chief among them is that it dissolves many of the supposed "riddles" and exegetical "puzzles" that the TLP supposedly "sets up." For example, the picture theory of meaning, the saying/showing distinction, logical atomism, etc., are all monistic nonsense and so, quite literally, cannot be interpreted in any way (e.g. Diamond (1995), 179-204; Conant (1989)). Indeed, these "thoughts" are more akin to *Finnegans Wake* than philosophy. However, this seems to leave the pure therapists in a bind. If all the points of the TLP are monistic nonsense, how can they claim that there is any sort of philosophical methodology at work in the TLP at all? Indeed, how can they even claim to *read with understanding* the TLP it in the first place?

To resolve this, we must "notice that what Wittgenstein says in 6.54 is not: '*all* of my sentences are nonsensical' (thus giving rise to the self-defeating problematic Geach has nicely dubbed Ludwig's self-mate). Section 6.54 characterizes the way in which those propositions which serve as elucidations elucidates… which sentences are (to be recognized as) nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate" (Conant (2002), 457 fn 135). Notice that this quote, somewhat implicitly, brings into play a distinction between the kinds of points in the TLP. On the one hand, there are faux-propositions that we are meant to elucidate. In other words, we are meant to expose that a faux-proposition like "[a] sign is what can be perceived of a symbol" (TLP 3.32) is, in fact, faux. The point fails to have a proper meaning assignment and so does not express semantic content, is not a proposition, and so on. However, critically, on the other hand there are frame-propositions. These are "instructions concerning the nature of the elucidatory aim and method of the work" (Conant (2002), 457 fn 135). In other words, a frame-proposition, like TLP 6.54, the *preface*, etc., are meant as instructions or methodological notes that help the reader understand Wittgenstein's elucidatory methodology as he applies it. Indeed, "it [the TLP] is not a textbook" (TLP *preface* 1), exactly because it is a work or exercise book, and "[p]hilosophy is not a body of

doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112), namely, the activity of exposing the faux status of faux-propositions.

In turn, the elucidation of faux-propositions by relying on the instructions Wittgenstein offers in the frame-propositions *is* Wittgenstein's methodology, according to pure therapy-TLP. In other words, we use the method the frame-propositions put forward to expose the faux status of faux-propositions in the TLP. Indeed, "Wittgenstein's aim in the *Tractatus* is to lead philosophers from original 'disguised' piece of nonsense [i.e., faux-propositions] … through this network of (apparent) logical relations to some more patently nonsensical (pseudo-) consequences" (Conant (1991), 346). Thus, in a rather interesting sense

> "[t]he only correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing… and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (TLP 6.53)

is carried out. In effect, Wittgenstein writes the faux-propositions that he assumes a metaphysician wants to say and then he elucidates them in such a way that its faux status is exposed and we see them as univocal nonsense. Notice, critically, that this method rests on an "attempt to enter into the philosopher's illusion of understanding and explode it from within" (Conant (1991), 346). To enter into the illusion, we must have an "imaginative identification with the utterer of nonsense… [and then] we are able to go on successfully on our own and correctly anticipate the (apparent) logical relations that he will imagine obtain between the nonsensical string in question and other (pseudo-)propositions" (*ibid*). To explode it from within, Wittgenstein forces us to realize that "no assignment of meaning to it [a faux-proposition] will satisfy you. There is not some meaning you cannot give it; but no meaning… will do; and so you see that there is no coherent understanding to be reached of what you wanted to say" (Diamond (1995), 198). In sum, the elucidatory method begins by identifying with the speaker who, enthralled in her philosophical illusions, offers faux-propositions or else takes faux-propositions as significant metaphysical points. It then proceeds to "play along" with the speaker and, by employing apparent logical deductions, ersatz-inferences, etc., explodes the faux-propositions from within.

In turn, pure therapy-TLP claims that this method reaches Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of "dispel[ing] philosophical illusions, [which] will

themselves also turn out to be nonsensical" (Conant & Diamond (2004), 79). In effect, this result of this method is that it undoes "our attraction to various grammatical well-formed strings of words that resonate with the aura of sense. The silence the book wishes to leave us in at the end is one in which nothing has been said and there is nothing to say… It is silence the silence represented by the book as a whole" (Conant (1991), 344). In short, Wittgenstein uses his method to help us realize that the points put forward in TLP, and philosophical "problems" more generally, are monistic nonsense. This realization dissolves the "problems" as they are not problems at all. So all we are left with is "our own sense of deprivation" (Conant (1991), 337).

1.1.b Pure Therapy-TLP: Criticism:

The pure therapy-TLP interpretation has at least four deeply problematic features. First, it directly conflicts with Wittgenstein's discussions of the TLP. Second, it does not offer a principled way to distinguish between frame-proposition and faux-proposition. Third, it is unclear how various aspects of pure therapy-TLP interrelate. Finally, fourth, the methodology it imputes to Wittgenstein is suspect.

First, it is rather striking that Wittgenstein's discussions of the TLP do not conform to the pure therapy-TLP's account. Indeed, Wittgenstein seems to take his own supposedly faux-propositions as *real* attempts make assertions, arguments, etc. Indeed, Hacker (2001), 126-140, offers example after example where Wittgenstein seems to be "taken in" by his own faux-propositions and discusses them without the sort of irony one might expect. For example, it is rather difficult to deny that Wittgenstein took the "color exclusion problem" very seriously (PO 29-35; see Hacker (1986), 108-113, for a reconstruction). However, if this is *not* really a problem as it is just monistic nonsense, it is unclear why Wittgenstein would respond to the 'problem' in the manner he does. Further, pursuant to this, we can add a simple point. If pure therapy-TLP is correct, it becomes rather unclear why Wittgenstein would return to philosophy or modify any of his previous thought. Indeed, it is unclear what "modifying nonsense" entails.

The second problem with pure therapy-TLP has been forcefully pointed out by Schonbaumsfeld (2007), 93-96. To wit, it offers no principled way to distinguish between frame-propositions and faux-propositions. Indeed, "[t]here can be no fixed

answer to the question what kind of work a given remark [in the TLP] within the text accomplishes [e.g. if it is frame or faux]. It will depend on the kind of sense a reader of the text will (be tempted to) make of it" (Conant (2002), 458, fn 135). Further, Conant & Diamond (2004), 67-8, argue explicitly that there can be no general criteria to distinguish what points are faux and which are frame. This leaves much to chance and individual psychology. Worse, it may engender a reading that is deeply ad hoc. Consider "[a] proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition I know the situation it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me" (TLP 4.021). Schonbumsfeld argues that, on the pure therapy-TLP view, this point seems to be half-faux and half-frame, a rather odd result.

The third is that it is unclear how faux-propositions, the elucidatory methodology, and the aim of excising the urge to do philosophy, relate. Specifically, we focus on two critical problems. One, it is unclear how the act of "imaginative identification with the utterer of nonsense" (Conant (1991), 346) can be understood. This identification is critical in that it is what allows us to work with a faux-proposition in such a way that its faux status is exposed to the utterer. Indeed, since faux-propositions are monistic nonsense, and so are neither about anything nor propositionally structured, the only guidance we have to make pseudo-deductions, draw on ersatz-inferential relations, and so on, is this identification. However, what is, and how do we preform, this "imaginative identification"?

Prima facie, either the "imaginative identification" depends solely on the reader and how she appreciates the author of the TLP or it does not. If identification depends solely on the reader, then there does not seem to be any way to restrict the possible identifications one can have with the author of the TLP. For example, there is no reason that I cannot identify with the author of the TLP as I do with authors of great modernist poetry like Eliot.[9] However, this identification problematizes the pure therapy-TLP interpretation entirely. Succinctly, one does not read poetry to learn a philosophical methodology; poetry is not at all concerned with pretending to make pseudo-deductions; poetry does not rely on ersatz-inferential relations. Further, pursuant to this, the response we have to the nonsense of TLP shifts drastically. For example, the nonsense of the last line to *The Wasteland*, "*Shantih, Shantih, Shantih*"

[9] Gellner (2005), 8-9, originally noted, flippantly, a similarity between Eliot's Wasteland and the TLP. However, today some serious and interesting research has emerged that seeks to relate the TLP to modernism in literature (see Anat (2015),13-27; Skorupski (2017))

should not lead us to try to expose the faux status of the string but reflect on a certain haunting echo. Similarly, a claim like "[i]t is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical but *that* it exists" (TLP 6.44), if read poetically, may not be a mere fodder for elucidation but may aim to have a certain poetic affect on us. Further, such a poetic identification, if it needs to support itself at all, can note that the opening motto from Kürnberger as well as the rhyme in TLP 7 should be read as critical frame-propositions that instruct us to understand the work as poetry. Alternatively, if there is some non-reader-dependent criterion that tells us how to identify with Wittgenstein imaginatively, we need to be told what the criterion is and how it functions. Pure therapy-TLP offers neither. Further, it is reasonable to assume that such non-reader-dependent criterion for imaginative identification with Wittgenstein will allow us to distinguish between faux- and frame-propositions. However, this flatly contradicts pure therapy-TLP.

Two, it is simply unclear how the elucidatory methodology can dissolve a philosophical problem at all- as Glock (1991) & (2004 b) argues with great force. Specifically, it seems is though the sole criterion for success of the elucidatory methodology is that we loose interest in a philosophy "problem." However, drugs, lobotomies, etc., achieve this as well. Are they, then elucidatory?

Finally, the fourth problem concerns the methodology it ascribes to Wittgenstein. One important note that Conant (1989) and Diamond (1995), 179-203, make is that the pure therapy-TLP enables us to read Wittgenstein as adhering to the only correct method in philosophy (cf. TLP 6.53). In effect, his faux-propositions function as stand-ins for the metaphysical-ly sounding stuff he assumes philosophers say and his frame-propositions help us work through it and expose it as monistic nonsense. However, this has three problems. One, Wittgenstein runs the risk of "infecting" healthy people with metaphysical-ly nonsense. Indeed, by speaking for someone, Wittgenstein may involve that someone in philosophy, exactly the illness he seeks to eradicate. Two, Wittgenstein was opposed to exactly this sort of an authorial procedure. Thus "Kierkegaard's writings are teasing and this is of course their intention, although I am not sure whether the exact effect they produce on me is intentional…[T]here is something in me that rejects this teasing… The idea that someone uses a trick in order to make me do something is unpleasant" (LWPPO p. 62). Though I think this misunderstands Kierkegaard, the key point here is that Wittgenstein was critical of such "teasing." Three, Wittgenstein fails to respect and

acknowledge his possible conversation partners. To some extent, this is a corollary of one and two. In effect, by writing a book of trick faux-propositions that Wittgenstein places in the reader's mouth, he presupposes some privileged position since he himself, supposedly, already sees through the nonsense. And this undermines the therapist's insistence that their reading respects the conversation partner.

1.1.c Moderate Therapy-TLP:

The moderate therapy-TLP position is more inchoate than the pure therapy-TLP. Furthermore, as we shall see, if the position is correct, expressing what it is after in language is fundamentally impossible. Ergo, a certain amount of vagueness, metaphorical or poetic speech, etc., is simply a necessary correlate. First, I paint, in broad strokes, what moderate therapy-TLP is and the methodology it ascribes to Wittgenstein. Second, I examine its functional account of nonsense. Finally, third, I adumbrate how this functional nonsense achieves Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of removing cramps.

To begin, moderate therapy-TLP assumes that the mystical, the nonsense one deploys in the face of it, and the silence that one is forced to when encountering it, are the keys to the book (e.g., TLP 6.44; Zemach (1964); Fronda (2010)). Further, it assumes, as all great mystics tell us, that this experience of the mystical is something so powerful and profound that all problems- be they philosophical, personal, professional, etc.- are annihilated by this moment. Indeed St. Thomas notes, after his mystical experience, that he "can write no more. All that I have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me" (reported in Butler (1991), 29-30). Finally, moderate therapy-TLP assumes that this mystical experience is the single most important thing a person can endure and that trying share it is critical. Granting this, the methodological role of Wittgenstein's points, especially the points that touch on this mystical experience, in the TLP is to "get us to adopt a mystical point of view" (Morris & Dodd (2007), 16). In turn, if we adopt the mystical point of view, the supposed 'problems' of philosophy, along with all other problems (cf. TLP 6.5), are nullified in light of this mystical experience. However, how can Wittgenstein- or anyone else- assist us in taking up such a view? The answer, again in deep harmony with mystics, is to use nonsense in a very particular sort of way. Thus,

"nonsense" is critical to making sense of Wittgenstein's methodology and his attempt to lead us to the mystical. Let us examine this.

To begin, moderate therapy-TLP assumes a monistic account of nonsense that does not "suggest there is something that lies outside of language" (Ackinstein (2009), 92). In other words, a nonsensical point lacks semantic content and so cannot be said to be *about* anything, convey any insight, generate category mistakes, etc. All nonsense is simply nonsense. However, moderate therapy-TLP insists that "[t]o say that nonsense sentences may be 'illuminating' is to say that they may play a *role* in prompting enlightenment; and their doing this does not commit us to thinking of nonsense as making a kind of sense" (Morris & Dodd (2007), 6- emphasis mine). In other words, moderate therapy-TLP insists that the null semantic content of a nonsensical string and the function of the string are two completely different matters. The what-is-said nullity of content for a nonsensical utterance gives me, as yet, no handle on what the utterance does. In other words, the *function* of mystical nonsense is *not* to transmit information, to assert the ineffable, etc., but to, e.g., provoke someone, to call their attention somewhere, etc. For example, assume that "Ahhh! Ohh!" is nonsense in that it has no semantic content. However, it *can* function as, e.g., an expression of pain, a sign of epiphany, a cry for attention, and so forth. In each case, the function of the nonsense shifts even as the content remains invariant and null. Thus, "[f]or the very reason, that a bit of language is *nonsensical,* it is still possible to go on *using* it" (NB p. 50-emphasis mine)).

However, there are two possible objections to this view of functional nonsense. One, from pure therapy-TLP, is to insist that, from a strictly logical point of view, function drops out of consideration and nonsense is still monistic. This is, perhaps, strictly speaking true. However, moderate therapy-TLP maintains that, for Wittgenstein, the mystical is intrinsically connected to a deeply subjective experience, and so the point falls rather flat. Indeed, the mystical and experience are held together in such a way that the representational-cum-logical-cum-linguistic form cannot convey or capture them. As it were, the experience is *beyond* thought itself.[10] Two, it

[10] There is a vital connection with Schopenhauer (1969), 429-30. However, there is also a lurking mistake. For example, Glock (1999), 42-37, is quite right to chastise Schopenhauer and his odd idea that we can do some sort of 'metaphysics' on this experience. But correcting this error does not prevent one from ***seeing*** experience itself as fundamentally non-propositional and so outside representation full stop. In other words, we cannot talk about, think about, let alone do metaphysics of any kind, with this experience. Strange as it sounds, we have an experience we cannot really understand- again, a point common for mystics- see, e.g., *The Cloud of Unknowing* for a beautiful articulation.

may be objected that this functional view imputes too much of later Wittgenstein's concern with use into the TLP. However, earlier Wittgenstein also notes the importance of use. Thus "[i]n order to recognize the sign in the sign we have to attend to the use" (NB p. 18), "[i]n order to recognize a symbol by is sign we must observe how it is used with sense" (TLP 3.326), "the essence of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus it also does not matter if the words *used* are true or false or *nonsense*" (LWVC p. 117- emphasis mine), etc. Thus, it is not prima facie unimaginable that the nonsense one utters in the face of the mystical has a function that is different in kind than Diamond's function for "piggly wiggle tiggle"- e.g. giving an example of nonsense to a philosophical audience. Pursuant to this, a mystic might well utter "piggly wiggle tiggle" to, e.g., engender a mystical experience. In sum, Wittgenstein's nonsense, though void of semantic content as all nonsense is, is "doing something *other* than, communicating truth. Wittgenstein is not using the text to communicate a final conclusion to his readership… Rather… he knowingly produced an incoherent text… for a decidedly non-alethic purpose" (Morris & Dodd (2007), 14).

Granting that there is a distinction between content and function, and allowing that the function of a nonsensical string is a different matter than the null content of the string, we now turn to *how* Wittgenstein's nonsense functions to call our attention to the mystical. The most plausible account of this function is in terms of a negative and positive role. Negatively, moderate therapy-TLP insists that "philosophy can contribute [something]… distinctive and valuable- namely, not discursive expression [i.e., propositional or senseful] of mystical insight but a way of making a clearing in which insight becomes possible. Perhaps, even, *only* philosophy can do that" (Skorupski (2017), 17). Indeed, "the business of the *Tractatus* is that of getting us to see something that escapes philosophy, because philosophy is always concerned to say something… The crucial difference is that whole philosophy aims to produce thoughts and propositions… mysticism involves a certain kind of experience: a feeling… mysticism provides us with knowledge *of an object, acquaintance*-knowledge" (Morris and Dodd (2007), 17). In effect, ideally, philosophy helps clear the ground. It does this in two interrelated ways. First, it attempts to make a point that is very old yet worth making again. To wit, mixing facts with the transcendental, reality with substance, truth with acquaintance, thought with experience, etc., is

deleterious. Wittgenstein seeks to undermine this in a manner akin to the dialectic of apophatic theology (e.g., Fronda (2010), and Atkinson (2009), 123-36, both explore this point[11])- by "asserting" nonsense, "negating" that nonsense, and, by doing so, trying to break language itself. Second, pursuant to this, the role of the nonsense is to undermine language and thought in the face of the mystical. In effect, the worst thing one can do to try to experience the mystical is thinking about experiencing the mystical. In turn, this casts Wittgenstein's functional nonsense as a sort of Zen riddle[12] that is meant to exhaust the intellect and so clear the way for the mystical.

The positive aspect of the nonsense Wittgenstein deploys in the face of the mystical is much more difficult to flesh out. To begin, it is critical to note that "feeling the world *as* a limited whole is something different from feeling *that* it is a limited whole…. Ordinarily speaking, we may allow that feeling something *as F* involves a (possibly indefinite) number of feelings *that*, but we are likely to insist that feeling something *as F* is at least prior to all those (possibly indefinite) propositional elaborations" (Morris & Dodd (2007), 16). Notice, first, that this accounts, to some extent, for why Wittgenstein links the mystical to experience and feeling rather than thought and propositional articulation (e.g., TLP 5.552, 6.45). And, indeed, such an account of even normal experience being prior to, and richer than, propositional elaboration is fairly in line with folk intuitions, can be given rigorous philosophical form in certain branches of phenomenology[13], and is something Wittgenstein notes explicitly. Thus:

> "If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I have studied the stove as one among many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove *it* was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it" (NB 83)

Thus, even a stove, when contemplated properly, is richer than language. Pursuant to this, second, it is critical to note that the TLP, Wittgenstein, and nothing else, can "give" one a mystical experience- again a common theme in apophatic theology.

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[11] The locus classicus for apophatic theology is Pseudo-Dioynesus (see, e.g, Pseudo-Dionysus (1988), 133-43). For example he "asserts" that G-d is a shimmering darkness, using two contradictory predicates in an attempt to "deconstruct" language itself.

[12] Perhaps the best collection of Zen poems and sayings is McCandless and Oryu (2000)

[13] see, e.g., Husserl (1970), 379-84, Heidegger (2002), Merleau-Ponty (2012), 1-66, Marion (2002), 7-70.

Indeed, “[m]y [Wittgenstien’s] work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one” (*letter to von Ficker*). Thus, the “insight that can only be shown are very specific… His [Wittgenstein’s] focus is on the meaning of life, what makes life worth living, our relation to existence. *This* cannot be put in the words… The point is that what is in each case said to be the object of the respective experience conflicts with the normal requirements for something to be its object” (Skorupski (2017), 19-20). Thus, the best that can be done is to “say nothing… and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he has failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions” (TLP 6.53).

In any case, moderate therapy-TLP insists that Wittgenstein uses nonsense to aide us in accessing the mystical. If he is successful, and if we encounter the mystical for ourselves, Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical goal is achieved because we see that the cramps and discomforts we face are straws. So all we can say is "[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (TLP 7).

1.1.d Moderate Therapy-TLP: Criticism:

Moderate therapy-TLP suffers from three problems. First, it is unclear at several critical points in the argument. Second, it is not completely clear how functional nonsense works. Third, it engenders several exegetical issues.

First, moderate therapy-TLP is underdetermined at several critical points. Indeed, as Ramsey's famous quip has it, if you cannot say it, you cannot whistle it either. For example, it is not clear how the negative function of nonsense is supposed to work. Precisely, how does reflection on the TLP's nonsense breakdown the intellect and so clear the ground for this sort of mystical experience? Matters are, if anything, worse for the positive role of nonsense. If the mystical experience is so sui generis, it is unclear how we can even talk around it.

Second, pursuant to this, it is unclear how functional nonsense works with the mystical. Specifically, if moderate therapy-TLP assumes a monistic account of nonsense, then undoubtedly any nonsensical utterance by a mystic that assists someone in having a mystical experience is fair. However, it is unclear both by what

criteria a mystic can determine if a nonsensical utterance will do this and how the receiver of this nonsense can react to it in such a way that she encounters the mystical.

Third, exegetically, it is unclear how to engage with the TLP properly. For example, Morris & Dodd (2007), 13-18, christen their view a ‘no truths at all view' However, it then becomes unclear how one "reads" and "understands" the points that make up the TLP. By assumption, these nonsensical points are not propositional in that they have no semantic content. However, if they lack semantic content, can we still be said to read them with understanding? Further, Morris & Dodd, Skorupski (2017), Fronda (2010), and so on, all seem to believe that part of the negative function of Wittgenstein's nonsense as a sort of reductio argument against philosophy. However, how can nonsense provide grounds for any sort of argument?

1.1.e Pure Therapy- Mixed

Pure therapy-mixed is an interpretation of Wittgenstein that stresses the interconnectedness and diachronic consistency of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal and method to alleviate philosophical cramps. Pursuant to this, it draws freely from all of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* to properly frame, elaborate, reconstruct, and so on, various elements in Wittgenstein's canonical works. For this position, I focus on the work of the later Baker as he is a very sophisticated proponent of the view.

With this focus in view, pure therapy-mixed maintains that the key to understanding Wittgenstein's methodology is not a proper interpretation of nonsense per se. Indeed, "the interpretation of the term ‘nonsense'… is no less distracting than the old one [i.e., the rise of Kripkenstein] was for anyone seeking philosophical benefit" (Baker (*Unpublished Review*), 1). Rather, making sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology depends on what Baker takes to be the critical analogy between Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis. In effect, much as Freud's "talk-cure" (e.g., Baker (2006), 205), helps an analysand come to terms with her neurotic compulsions and odd behaviors, so too does Wittgenstein offer us a philosophical "talk-cure" whose aim is to expunge our neurotic compulsion to do philosophy. Indeed, as we shall see, Wittgenstein's methodology is best read as a re-application of the psychoanalytic methodology to philosophical problems (e.g., Baker (2006), 205-222). In turn, pure therapy-mixed assumes that such a psychoanalytic method will achieve

Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim of removing cramps in the same way that Freud's "talk-cure" alleviates the symptoms of the analysand. First, I examine how pure therapy-mixed links together psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology. With this linkage in view I, second, elaborate how Wittgenstein's philosophical-as-psychoanalytic method is thought to work on the conversation partner. Third, I discuss how this achieves Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal.

To begin, a critical facet of pure therapy-mixed is that it stresses a profound analogy between Wittgenstein's methods and Freud's methods. Indeed, "[p]sychoanalysis is… a model for developing a distinctive for of intellectual therapy (‘our method')" (*ibid* 179). Pursuant to this, "this therapeutic method is radically different from established procedures of conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy" (*ibid*). Indeed, it is a "revolutionary programme" (*ibid*).

To support this critical analogy, pure therapy-mixed proffers four reasons to accept a relevance and influence of psychoanalysis on Wittgenstein's methodology. First, it claims that Wittgenstein has "[a] distinctive conception of philosophical problems is conspicuous in these texts [in VoW roughly 1931-36]. They are described in strong psychological connotations" (Baker (VoW *preface*), xxxviii). Indeed, philosophical problems are "not regarded as abstract puzzles that stand in need of solutions… Rather, they are individuals' troubled states of mind" (Baker (2006), 212). Granting this, and assuming that a goal of psychoanalysis is relieving troubled states of mind, the linkage between the two is fairly clear as both methods aim to quiet similar psychic disturbances. Second, it notes that "there was a definite phase [i.e., 1931-1938 AD or so] of Wittgenstein's thinking in which close comparison with Freud's methods informed his own conception of philosophical investigations" (Baker (2006), 155) and, further, that "[a]rguably, it [psychoanalytic methods] continued to dominate his later work" (*ibid* 201 fn 3). Though the footnote is hedged, it is critical to notice that almost a third of Baker (2006) is devoted to elaborating this analogy. Further, several parts of the work explicitly rely on this analogy to interpret parts and sections of, e.g., the PI (e.g., *ibid,* 49 fn 19, 132, 13, etc.).[14] In an external key, the oft-quoted "[t]here is not a single philosophical method, though there are methods, different therapies, as it were" (PI § 133-box)[15] and "[t]he philosopher treats a

[14] Hacker (2007) makes this same point in far greater detail.

[15] A reader may demur here and note that “different therapies” seems to imply that the entire analogy is misguided, as there are clearly non-psychoanalytic kinds of therapy. Baker (2006), 201 fn 9, notes that

question; like an illness" (PI § 255) can be cited to support this sort of linkage. Third, Wittgenstein seemed to stress his indebtedness to Freud. For example, "Freud was one of the few authors he [Wittgenstein] thought worth reading. He would eagerly speak of himself- at the period of these discussions [ca. 1919-1938]- as a 'disciple of Freud' or a follower of Freud" (reported by Rhees in L&C, p. 41), "[a]ll of this [i.e., the abuses of psychoanalysis] doesn't detract from Freud's extraordinary scientific achievement" (*Letter to Malcolm* 1945), and so on. Finally, fourth, pure therapy-mixed broadens what should count as part of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. For example, Wiasmann's essay *How I See Philosophy* "is very closely based on material that Wittgenstein dictated to Waismann during the period 1931-35" (Baker (2006), 179) and so can be used to help interpret and clarify Wittgenstein's thought. Indeed, Baker often moves seamlessly between Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* and Wiasmann's works (*ibid passim*). Granting this broader scope for the *Nachlass*, and assuming that Baker is right to see Waismann as an acolyte of Freud and a slavish disciple of Wittgenstein, an analogy is fair. Thus, pure therapy-mixed offers four reasons to accept to the analogy between psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's methodology.

Granting this link between psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's methodology, I now examine how we can use the former to make sense of the latter. First, Wittgenstein's philosophical method does not aim to expose univocal nonsense or foster a mystical experience. Instead, it seeks to "allay worry or disquiet" (Baker (2006), 165). Indeed, "[w]hat we need to clarify… [is] what motivates a particular individual to say obviously puzzling things… We try to get him to direct attention to his own motivation. He needs to work out why he feels driven to say what he does. What is pathological in his thinking is not the deviance of his philosophical utterances from everyday speech-patterns, but the unconscious motives which give rise to his behavior" (*ibid* 208). Further, these "intellectual disquiet (Unruhe), sometimes even terror or anxiety (Angst)… arise from intellectual obsessions, compulsions, or 'neuroses'" (*ibid*, 146). Indeed, philosophical therapy should be "addressed more to the will than to the intellect (CV 17)" (*ibid* 136). Clearly, the parallel with psychoanalysis is on full display. In each case, the goal is uncovering the unconscious motives that drive someone to say or do odd things. Pursuant to this, in both cases,

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there are indeed "many different conceptions of therapy….But this is not the conception of therapy which informs HISP [Wiasmann's *How I See Philosophy*]!" Thus, the devil is how much weight should be given to Wittgenstein circa 1931-938 when reading Wittgenstein post 1938. Again, it seems to me that Hacker (2007) is quite right that Baker puts a great deal of weight it.

this uncovering is focused more on latent drives and the will than on consciousness per se. However, this leaves us with two open questions. To wit, how do we target the will or unconscious? Pursuant to this, how does our therapeutic intervention alter it?

Unsurprisingly, the answers come from psychoanalysis. First, much as ordinary psychoanalytic practices analyzes only one person at a time, so too Wittgenstein's "[t]herapy must be individualized" (Baker (2006), 181). In other words, "Wittgenstein's enterprise is essentially person-relative, and it centres on the dynamics of somebody's thinking, not on the geometry of thoughts" (*ibid* 68). Indeed, such disquiet is always "somebody's mental disturbance" (*ibid* 210). Further, "dissolving the patient's problem must respect his freedom; it makes no sense to foist the diagnosis on him against his will" (*ibid*, 165). Indeed "[t]he criteria of success in giving perspicuous representation are strictly relative… Adequacy must be judged with reference to the elimination of a particular person's not knowing his way about a particular situation" (*ibid*, 43). In other words, Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is entirely person-relative. There are no general criteria we can rely on to determine if some particular philosophical problem has been aptly addressed and dissolved. The conversation partner alone determines if some contribution of the philosopher is apt. In sum, therapy is completely person-relative and a contribution has hit the mark only if the analysand accepts it.

Second, pursuant to this, much as psychoanalysis insists that a therapeutic contribution to a conversation is helpful only if it is recognized by this particular analysand to be helpful (e.g., Freud (1989), 28-41), so too does Wittgenstein. For example, "'grammar' is invented and voluntary; it is freely negotiated with one's interlocutor or audience, and it owes its authority to free acknowledgement. 'The grammar of our language' is subject to each individual's decisions about how to use his own words… only recognition, acknowledgment, or decision determines what something means for me" (Baker (2006), 196)." Thus, not only is the aptness of a contribution on the part of a philosopher person-relative, so too is her Wittgensteinian therapeutic method. Again, the sole criterion for the success of an appeal to grammar is the consent of the conversation partner. As Wittgenstein notes "[f]or only if he acknowledges it [i.e., a helpful contribution] as such, is it the correct expression (*psychoanalysis*)" (BT § 87 p. 303-italics mine). In other words, the aptness of our therapeutic attempt to bring to light her will and unconscious depends solely on her

recognizing that it does so. Thus, we work only on a particular person and require her consent at each stage of therapy.

Third, both psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's method aims to bring about a particular form of self-knowledge.[16] Indeed, Freud's famous motto is "where id is, there shall ego be" (Freud (1990 a), 100). Echoing this, Wittgenstein's method brings about "self-knowledge:… [by giving] him [a conversation partner] a better understanding of his own ways of thinking and speaking" (*ibid* 148). Further, this self-knowledge is "tak[ing] notice of prejudices, dogmas analogies, and pictures that have unconsciously shaped his own thinking. Full self-understanding is attained to the extent that these are traced to their deeper roots in certain very primitive and pervasive pictures... The patient's becoming conscious of his own prejudices, analogies, etc., will deprive them of their power to work mischief; he will be freed from the spell they cast on his thinking" (*Ibid*, 154). In other words, it is when a person "acknowledges the analogy I'm presenting as the source of his thought" (BT § 87 p. 303) that she comes to see the latent picture, anxiety, etc., driving her into philosophy. In turn, this recognition of the source of her will-to-philosophy allows her to obviate it. Thus, we work on a person, with her consent, to uncover the sources of her unconscious drives to do philosophy.

Thus, for both psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology, a person-relative version of therapy is utilized whose aim is to uncover the latent and unconscious sources of disquiet. In other words, both insist that we focus not so much on the semantic content of utterances as on the person uttering them and her mental state. Notice that this conception of therapy transforms the role of a philosophical therapist. A philosophical therapist's job is not to discuss, debate, etc. philosophical claims, questions, abstract theories, etc. Instead, her role is helping alleviate "deep disquiets, feelings of discomfort, torments, irritations, conflicts" (Baker (2006), 213). Moreover, the means she can deploy to facilitate this can vary from pointing out analogies, highlighting biases, uncovering assumptions, and so on. However, in all cases, the sole criterion of the aptness of the philosophical therapist's intervention is if it assuages the disquiet is the conversation partner herself. There is nothing external to

[16] Arguably, such self-knowledge is a positive goal. Without going too far afield, or too deep into Freud, I would argue that this self-knowledge is more a restoration of sanity than a gain per se. Regardless, I bracket this.

the conversational exchange such as grammar, nonsense, etc., which a philosopher can appeal to. Instead, only the agreement of the conversation partner will do.

In turn, if Wittgenstein's philosophical-as-therapeutic methodology works, the philosophical problem is dissolved in the same way that Anna O's inability to drink water dissolved after she realized that her aversion to water stemmed from her seeing a dog drink out of a glass (e.g., Freud (1989), 1-23). In both cases, recognition of the source of the neurosis obviates the symptoms it produces. Indeed, what occurs is "not merely a change of opinion, but a kind of conversion" (Baker (2006), 35). Moreover, "[w]hat is required is a kind of conversion… or re-education" (*ibid* 287). We become aware of the unconscious drives that cause our problematic habits. This awareness gives us control over them. So since we have control, we can stop doing philosophy when we want to (cf. PI § 133).

1.1.f Pure Therapy-Mixed: Criticism:

Pure therapy-mixed has at least three problems. First, there is how the disquiet, the philosophical problem, and the proposed therapy relate. Second, there is how this method casts the conversation partner herself. Third, there is the exegetical gerrymandering pure therapy-mixed brings into play.

First, it is unclear how pure therapy-mixed relates together philosophical problems, philosophical therapy, and disquiet. Let us examine each combination.

To begin, let us examine how a philosophical problem and disquiet relate. The critical issue with this relation is that it is unclear what mechanism accounts for the mental disturbance manifesting itself as a philosophical problem. This is in marked contrast to psychoanalysis, which, for better or worse, does claim to provide a framework that explains how a symptom relates to a latent mental cause. For example, Anna O's symptom, i.e., her inability to drink water, was caused by her seeing a dog drink from a glass, feeling guilt at not informing her friend, and disgust at the dog's behavior. By helping Anna O recover this memory of the dog, Freud dissolved the symptom as Anna O's awareness of the memory gives her control of her neurosis. Regardless of what one thinks about this explanation, there is a reasonably intuitive relationship between the symptom of water avoidance and the repressed memory of the dog drinking from a friend's glass. Indeed, for Freud, a critical task of

psychoanalysis is explaining how a symptom and a disquiet relate. In contrast, Baker does not give, and cannot claim to follow Wittgenstein and give (cf. PI §109), an account of the mechanism that causes a mental disquiet to manifest itself as a symptomatic philosophical problem. In turn, it becomes unclear both what is unique to philosophical problems as one can feel torment about a problem in physics, anxiety over a romantic rendezvous, etc., and how to properly isolate a philosophical problem that requires treatment from other problems. Further, it becomes unclear if a latent mental disturbance has any relationship with the philosophical problem at all.

For the therapy and philosophical problem relation, the philosopher's role is problematic. Prima facie, the role of the philosopher is as follows. The conversation partner puts forward a philosophical claim or question, and then the philosopher offers some sort of reconstruction that brings to light the latent mental disquiet causing it. However, it is unclear what guides the philosopher's reconstruction of the problem. By what criteria can she know that some reconstruction will be apt, especially if the sole criterion in play is the acceptance of the conversation partner? Worse, if the conversation partner's acceptance is the sole criterion of a successful reconstruction, then, in principle, she may always reject any and all reconstructions. Worst, however, is the fact that the conversation partner may accept a "reconstruction" that has no comprehensible relationship to the problem at all. In other words, a conversation partner may accept that an unrelated utterance like "I have to go" is, somehow, the correct reconstruction of her problem concerning, e.g., the nature of the truth-predicate. Indeed, it seems like the philosophical therapist must accept the utterance is a correct reconstruction, even if she does not know why it is.

For the therapy and disquiet relation, matters are completely opaque. Baker claims that "bringing to consciousness things of which he [the conversation partner] was partly or wholly unconscious and tracing things to their origins or roots [is a critical feature of the method]. Disorders are held to disappear once full self-knowledge is attained" (Baker (2006), 153). However, it is unclear how this process of bringing about self-knowledge and the underlying cause relate. As noted above, for Freud, a symptom and a disquiet are tightly connected. In turn, uncovering the disquiet that causes the symptom via the talk-cure, dissolves the disquiet as the disquiet can find a healthier expression. In contrast, it is unclear what sort of self-knowledge Baker has in mind and how engendering it relates to the disquiet. This is partly because we have no idea of the mechanism that manifests a disquiet as a

philosophical problem symptom. However, prima facie, it is also partly due to a divergence between philosophical problems and self-knowledge. Indeed, how does even a tormenting question about truth relate to a childhood experience or repressed drive? Pursuant to this, how does self-knowledge affect the disquiet?

The second problematic aspect of pure therapy-mixed is that it casts the conversation partner in a rather odd light. Baker writes that "[t]reament is targeted on a person, someone who is, by his own lights, sick and unhappy" (*ibid* 152). In therapy, this is a crucial point. Ideally, therapy begins with the acknowledgment by the analysand that she cannot keep living the way she is. However, this sort of view of philosophy misfires in three very distinct ways. One, for the majority of philosophers, both historical and contemporary, the analogy with deep unhappiness is rather odd. Rarely does philosophy cause the sort of existential dread Baker has in mind. In turn, this means that philosophical therapy passes by much traditional philosophy. Two, for the few that do have existential dread in relation to philosophy, the assumption that they want to be cured is simply not attested to in their writings. Indeed, they would likely view Baker's therapy as a way to re-normalize them into a society they see as nothing but illusory. Indeed, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, etc., all prided themselves on the discomfort their engagement with philosophy caused them. Three, it is not the case that philosophy as Wittgenstein practiced it in his lectures (e.g., LFM, LWVC, etc.), is akin to psychoanalysis in this sense. Philosophy does not begin with a confession on the part of the conversation partner that her life has become impossible. Instead, it emerges from attending to what a person says and showing why such an assertion is problematic. Far from admitting an illness, Turing, say, is quite confident in his conception of mathematics (see LFM *passim*). It is precisely this confidence that Wittgenstein addresses rather than a self-confessed confusion.

The third aspect concerns pure therapy-mixed exegetical account. Specifically, it may be plausible that from 1930-36, Waismann was a faithful disciple of Wittgenstein and that, ergo, Waismann's turn to Freud was merely him following his master. However, extending this already tentative assumption beyond 1936, and into the PI, is problematic for two reasons. One, it is well known that Wittgenstein repudiated Waismann, both intellectually and personally (e.g. Shanker (1996), 13). And it is critical that this break came at almost the same time as *the Brown Book* and the language game method were coming to prominence in Wittgenstein's thought. To assume a tentative harmony between Wittgenstein and Freud, mediated by Waismann,

without argument, after a profound methodological shift on Wittgenstein's part, strains credulity. Two, Wittgenstein's own relationship with psychoanalysis was not nearly as straightforward as Baker makes it seem. As Bouveresse (1995) convincingly argues, Wittgenstein was deeply skeptical of Freud's theoretical discussions of his own methodology for reasons strikingly similar to our above to objections. Specifically, without more than a just-so story about how a latent cause, a symptom, the talking cure, and healing relate, too many wheels idle (*ibid* 22-42).

1.1.g Moderate Therapy- Mixed:

The representative we consider for this position is Kuusela (2008). This is because Kuusela is the most articulate version of such a view. The philosophical methodology Kuusela ascribes to Wittgenstein is perhaps best called "comparative therapy" in contrast to either psychoanalytic therapy or the insistence on nonsense. Comparative therapy ascribes to Wittgenstein a methodology that engenders "seeing the connections" (e.g., PI § 122). Specifically, Wittgenstein adduces several different, and often orthogonal, modes of presenting the rules for the use of language. In turn, these different modes of presentation ameliorate philosophical problems and confusions by showing the problems to be dependent on one way, among others, of looking at things. To take an example Wittgenstein often returns to (e.g. TLP 3.323, PI § 558), one might become so fixated on the rules that determine the use of "is" in identity statements- e.g. "2 and 2 is 4"- that one falls into complete confusion when it appears in its predicative role- e.g. "John is nice." By reminding us that "is" has two distinct roles, and is governed by two different sets of rules, Wittgenstein helps us realize that is no real problem with “is” at all. Thus, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim of excising philosophy is met by showing that the problems that constitute philosophy do not arise from nature, reason, grammar, etc., but from a particular, and optional (from a logical point of view), way of thinking about things. First, I briefly discuss both Kuusela's exegetical strategy and his assumptions. Second, I give an account of how Kuusela frames the evolution of Wittgenstein's methodology focused specifically on what Kuusela calls Wittgenstein's "turn" (Kuusela (2008), 120-132 & (2005)). Third, I elaborate this turn in terms of comparative therapy and how Kuusela frames the interrelations between an object of comparison, a philosophical problem,

clarification, and culture. Finally, I discuss how comparative therapy achieves Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal.

To begin, let us examine Kuusela's exegetical approach and assumptions. First, Kuusela writes that "I make wide use of Wittgenstein's Nachlass… his notebooks, manuscripts, [etc.]" (Kuusela (2008), 13). Hence, he is mixed. Second, Kuusela ascribes to Wittgenstein the key, and diachronically consistent, insight that there must be a "difference between true and false factual statements and expressions of exceptionless necessity" (*ibid* 3). Indeed, Wittgenstein "preserves the…distinction between philosophy and science. Whereas metaphysics is conceived as an… 'superfactual' investigation, philosophy for Wittgenstein is a conceptual investigation" (*ibid* 103). Thus, the empirical/conceptual distinction is diachronically consistent in Wittgenstein. Indeed, this distinction is critical for making sense of how Wittgenstein can offer alternative modes of presentation without thereby flying in the face of, e.g., a physics that insists that cheese does not randomly change its weight (cf. PI § 142). Third, Kuusela focuses mainly on "Wittgenstein's later work, from the early 1930s onward" (*ibid* 8). However, fourth, Kuusela thinks that making sense of later Wittgenstein's methodology should not depend on an analogy between him and Freud or Waismann. Rather, we should see "Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a novel attempt to achieve the aims of the Tractatus" (*ibid* 8-9) and "whatever was correct in the Tractatus seems incorporated in Wittgenstein's later philosophy" (*ibid* 10). In other words, for Kuusela, properly articulating Wittgenstein's methodology should rely, as much as possible, on the internal evolution of Wittgenstein's thought.

Thus, understanding how Wittgenstein's thought changed from the TLP to the PI is critical to properly frame his later methodology. Let us examine how Wittgenstein's thought evolved and how his methodological turn works. For Kuusela, earlier Wittgenstein insists that all language is "analyzable into truth functional combinations of elementary propositions and ultimately into pictures of states of affairs, where such pictures consist of [simple] names that stand for simple objects" (*ibid* 60). However, Kuusela argues that this should not be taken as Wittgenstein adducing a theory of language that falls prey to a self-application paradox. Rather, Wittgenstein attempts to "draw the reader's attention to certain logical distinctions she already recognizes in her use of language but that are not clearly reflected in the ordinary symbolism [of natural language]" (*ibid* 63. See also Kuusela (2011)). Thus, the TLP is a "method of philosophy as a critique of language… [which relies] on its

readers' pre- or non theoretical capacity to distinguish sense from nonsense" (Kuusela (2008), 24). Indeed, the TLP is "not a matter of making true/false statements about anything…. Rather, philosophy is not engaged in theoretical assertions at all. Its task consists solely in clarification or clear expression of what can be said" (*ibid* 99). Philosophy is, thus, the activity of translation of ordinary sentences into a concept-script governed by logical syntax (e.g., *ibid*, 55-64; Kussela (2015)). In turn, the exceptionless necessity Wittgenstein seeks to distinguish from scientific generalizations manifests itself in the concept-script itself. And this removes philosophical problems by displaying what a philosopher tries to say clearly in the concept-script. Thus, for earlier Wittgenstein, the translation method dissolves philosophical problems by showing them to be parts of the script.

However, according to Kuusela, later Wittgenstein realized that there are still metaphysical assumptions embedded in this script-based approach. To wit, the method of translation assumes: "(1) there is only one complete analysis of a proposition that terminates in simple names, that (2) all propositions can be analyzed in this way and that (3) all logical confusions can be clarified through such an analysis" (*ibid* 99). In turn, these assumptions have "a metaphysics of language built into its conception of the method of logical analysis" (Kuusela (2008), 100). Moreover, the mistake is that "a particular conception of propositions was turned into a metaphysical thesis about what propositions must be" (*ibid* 105). Indeed, the author of the TLP inadvertently projected his "mode of presentation onto the object of investigation" (*ibid* 109).

Granting this, Wittgenstein's turn, and his novel methodology of comparative therapy, arises as he corrects the latent projection. Indeed, the "turn constitutes a strategy for avoiding metaphysical projection of the forms of presentation on the objects of investigation in the guise of statements about necessary truth" (*ibid* 111). To see this more clearly, it is imperative to keep in mind that Wittgenstein insists that "'musts' and ‘cans' of metaphysical statements indicate rules for the use of an expression" (*ibid* 103). Notice that this re-imagining of the role of necessary statements leaves the distinction between the conceptual and the empirical intact. Indeed, "a statement of rules [for the use of expressions] does not describe anything in making a true/false claim" (*ibid* 115). Notice also that the linkage between necessary statements, rules, and the use of expressions, begins to explain how philosophical problems may arise. Thus, "propositions that express such inclinations or temptations

[e.g., putting forward a necessary statement as a metaphysical truth] indicate the root of philosophical problems" (*ibid* 44). This is because we often take these seemingly metaphysical propositions as, somehow, describing the deep structure of the world rather than seeing them as rules. Notice, finally, that the TLP's key mistake is this. It takes a definition of "proposition," say, as an essential feature of propositions rather than as a statement of rules concerning the use of "proposition" (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 96-132).

However, it is critical to note that a statements of rules "do not tell us anything about actual language use, and as soon as a rule is claimed to be descriptive of actual language use, the problem about the status of the philosopher's statements arises. The question is, what allows one to say that… language must be used in such and such a way [e.g., in conformity to a statement of rules Wittgenstein offers]…is not a philosophical or metaphysical thesis about language?" (*ibid* 119-120). In other words, Wittgenstein's statements of rules are not empirical claims about how language works, metaphysical statements, or descriptions of inherently normative rules that constitute language. Indeed, a statement of rules "does not constitute a claim about a necessity pertaining to language use" (*ibid* 145). Furthermore, it does not assert that "this is how language must be used unless one wants to deviate from its actual and normal use" (*ibid* 117). In sum, a statement of rules "abandons all such claims about language use" (*ibid* 136). Rather, a statement of rules offers a "prototype… on which other cases may be modeled and which, in this capacity, forms to basis for a way of conceiving those cases and a mode of presenting them" (*ibid* 123).

In turn, this prototype takes us to the heart of Wittgenstein's new methodology as a prototypical "example should be comprehended as an object of comparison" (*ibid* 124). Let us scrutinize this. First, an "object of comparison is not used to make empirical statements about any particular objects" (Kuusela (2008), 125). Second, an object of comparison is a way "of conceiving objects of investigation" (*ibid* 132). Third, an object of comparison highlights "both the similarities and the dissimilarities between the model [i.e., the object of comparison] and the actual use" (*ibid* 155). Fourth, the point "of Wittgenstein's introduction of… objects of comparison… is to eliminate a source of philosophical problems" (*ibid* 145). Finally, fifth, an object of comparison achieves this by "the articulation of an alternative mode of presenting language use or facts that allows us to get rid of the problems and confusions one fell into" (*ibid* 257). Thus, Wittgenstein's comparative therapy relies on putting forward

different objects of comparison, or ways of conceiving the objects one investigates, to show that philosophical problems are an outgrowth of one particular, and not exclusive, exhaustive, etc., way of thinking. In other words, by offering a viable alternative way of conceptualizing some object, Wittgenstein dissolves philosophical problems by showing that they arise in only one conceptualization.

However, such a comparative therapy faces a serious objection. To wit, if Wittgenstein's objects of comparison are not empirically factual, metaphysical, or normatively constitutive of actual language use, how do they relate to language and philosophical problems at all? What enables an object of comparison to function as a viable alternative way of thinking to our current one if it is but a whimsical product of the philosopher's imagination? Indeed, "does this not mean that philosophy becomes an idle game of coining possible… ways of looking at things?" (Kuusela (2008), 238).

To address this objection, Kuusela puts forward two additional features of comparative therapy and how it uses the objects of comparison. First, they must be problem-relative. Second, they must be culture-relative. Let us examine each.

First, Kuusela notes that Wittgenstein "characterizes philosophical problems as arising from, or as the expressions of, misunderstandings concerning language" (*ibid* 17). Pursuant to this, "[p]hilosophical clarification addresses cases where it is not clear how to characterize and understand the use of expressions" (*ibid* 253). In other words, comparative therapy only begins once confusion has emerged and the goal of philosophy is to reach "complete clarity… understood as the complete disappearance of particular philosophical problems" (*ibid* 81. Cf. PI § 109). In turn, "[c]larification… is not a matter of imposing an alleged standard of correct language use on the interlocutor… but clarifying the interlocutor's language use to her on the basis of her own criteria" (*ibid* 79). And, critically, an object of comparison "qualifies as a clarification only insofar as it actually clarifies something. ‘To clarify', one might say, is a success verb" (*ibid* 247). In other words, Wittgenstein's objects of comparison are "instruments employed to dissolve actual philosophical problems that particular people have" (*ibid* 250). Thus, an object of comparison, or an alternative way of looking at the objects one is investigating, is not a mere idle fantasy but a tool designed explicitly to address a particular philosophical problem. Further, it is an apt tool only if it clarifies that problem. Thus, objects of comparison "gets its light- that is to say, its purpose- from the philosophical problems" (PI § 109) and this partly removes the worry that a philosopher offers mere fantasies.

However, the relativization of an object of comparison to a problem is not enough to make sense of comparative therapy. This is for two related reasons. One, it seems as though any contribution to a philosophical exchange- from "I have to go" to reading Tagore at people- can function as an object of comparison. Indeed, if the sole criterion that determines if an object of comparison relates to a problem is that the former clarifies the later, anything that clarifies is apt. Two, the emphasis on clarity and particular problems quickly collapses into a Baker-style person-relative therapy. In effect, if the only person who can determine if some object of comparison clarifies is the interlocutor, then clearly she, and only she can determine if a contribution to the exchange is apt. In turn, if clarification is person-relative, it is unclear why we should restrict ourselves to objects of comparison at all. If jumping up and down, somehow, clarifies for a person, then this too should count as an apt method.

This leads us to the second feature of Kuusela's account of how comparative therapy uses objects of comparison, a form of culture-relativity. To begin, he insists that philosophical problems should not be "taken as merely psychological peculiarities of individuals" (Kuusela (2008), 44). Rather, they depend on the "intellectual backgrounds, i.e., the convictions that provide a background for the problem and constitute a context in which it is to be resolved" (*ibid* 249). Indeed, "[t]he proper object of philosophical therapy in Wittgenstein are tendencies of thinking that lead to the adoption of philosophically problematic. They are… expressions of broader *cultural dispositions* embedded in human life" (*ibid* 44- emphasis mine). Further, "[p]hilosophical questions are posed in the language or languages spoken by those involved in the philosophical discussions and these languages have a historically contingent existence." (*ibid* 77) Indeed, this "conception of philosophical problems as historical [and cultural] phenomena has an important bearing on how one should understand the significance of philosophical work" (*ibid* 273). Thus, a philosophical problem and the way of thinking that gives rise to it are not so idiosyncratic products of a particular individual's neurotic mind. Rather, they arise from a particular cultural milieu. In turn, this means that the relationship between a philosophical problem, understood as an expression of a cultural tendency, and an object of comparison can be related in a far less capricious way. In effect, an object of comparison relies on a shared cultural background to play a clarificatory role in a philosophical exchange. Thus, though the relationship between a philosophical problem and an object of comparison is not internal- i.e., there is no necessary

conceptual relationship between them- it is not arbitrary in the sense that a shared and tacit cultural background is assumed that guides the philosopher, and her conversation in partner, in accepting certain objects of comparison as clarificatory. For example, offering a particular interpretation of scripture in the 11th century AD may have effectively dissolved a philosophical problem then and today probably won't. In turn, Wittgenstein's "conception of philosophy arises as response to problems in a philosophical tradition in which he operates and gets its significance from its contrast with this tradition. Thus, were the tradition different, things that needed saying might be different too" (*ibid* 273).

In turn, this cultural-relativity gives Kuusela the resources to answer the above to objections. The danger of person-relativity is avoided by simply insisting that a philosophical problem is not psychological but cultural. In turn, this means a focus on the will and re-education falls rather flat. The danger of any sort of contribution to the exchange doing potentially clarificatory work is not avoided but mitigated. In effect, what restricts the range is the shared cultural milieu. Thus, an object of comparison depends on the problem it is put forward to dissolve and a shared tacit cultural background that partly determines what the interlocutor accepts as clarificatory.

In turn, this comparative methodology reaches Wittgenstein's goal by removing "a certain compulsion to continue doing philosophy" (*ibid* 50). In effect, by presenting someone with a viable object of comparison, or a different way to think about the objects of investigation, the philosophical problem dissolves because the alternative obviates the seeming intractability of the problem. In other words, an object of comparison helps us learn our way about (cf. PI § 123) by reminding us that the particular way we are looking at things is optional and that others exist.

1.1.h Moderate Therapy-Mixed: Criticism

We focus on three objections to Kuusela's account. First, there is the assumed relationship between a philosophical problem, a cultural tendency, and comparative therapy. Second, there is the problem of how Kuusela relativizes objects of comparison to philosophical problems and culture. Third, there is the question of the philosophical discussion itself.

First, recall that Kuusela insists that a philosophical problem arise in part from a cultural tendency. However, granting this assumption, I argue that comparative therapy is either unable to address the root cultural cause of the problem or else philosophical problems and culture cannot relate in the way Kuusela claims.
The inability of comparative therapy to address the root cultural tendency is best seen by contrasting comparative therapy with proper historicism. Specifically, I have in mind Lukacs (1972), 83-222, and his attempt to clarify how philosophical concepts emerge from economic structures. To begin, proper historicism agrees with Kuusela that philosophical problems are, at base, generated by contingent historical-cultural-economic settings.[17] However, historicism further argues that the only way to dissolve a philosophical problem is to modify this cultural setting. Indeed, it is somewhat unclear how else to deal with a philosophical problem engendered by culture except by changing the culture. Thus, to remove a philosophical problem, it is not enough to merely present a different way of thinking about things. Instead, one must offer a different way of doing things- i.e. "[p]hilosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx (1998), 570). However, Kuusela cannot endorse proper historicism as it flatly contradicts Wittgenstein who claims philosophy "leaves everything as it is" (PI § 124) and that "a reform [of language or perhaps culture] for a particular practical purposes… may well be possible. However, these are not the cases we are dealing with" (PI § 132).
Alternatively, Kuusela might insist that offering a new way of thinking can dissolve a philosophical problem while leaving the cultural substratum intact. However, it is quite opaque how this works. Indeed, the most plausible way to make sense of this is to argue that a philosophical problem is not generated by a cultural tendency in the first place. However, this quickly leads to the grammatical account, discussed in chapter four. Regardless, such a perspective simply abandons the supposed relationship between a philosophical problem and culture.

The second objection is focused on how Kuusela attempts to relativize objects of comparison to philosophical problems and culture. Recall that Kuusela insists that an object of comparison should be explicitly constructed with an aim at clarifying particular philosophical problems. He argued that this mitigates the worry that objects of comparison become idle ways of looking at things that do no real work. Also,

[17] Kuusela (2008), 273, notes that some philosophical problems may be universal or transcultural. However, he gives no information about how to identify these, and so I bracket this.

recall Kusela also insisted that "to clarify" is a success-verb and a conversation partner decides if the clarification is apt. In turn, however, this threatens to collapse into person-relativity as the sole criterion for clarification is the conversation partner. Indeed, "grammatical investigation allows for demonstrations of inconsistencies only insofar as the interlocutor acknowledges each step of the demonstration" (Kuusela (2008), 245). To prevent this collapse into person-relativity, Kuuela also insists we should assume that the philosopher and the conversation partner share a cultural background that partly frames (not conceptually per se) what should do clarificatory work. In turn, this background is thought to give both a tacit sense of what sort of objects of comparison can do the clarificatory work. However, this raises a host of issues- e.g., how does one individuate a shared culture, what occurs when two people do not share this culture, etc. For example, an object of comparison that aims to clarify skepticism about other minds taken from Lacan will strike many analytic philosophers as unhelpful and many critical theorists as apt. Conversely, a discussion of the ‘grammar' of "pain" will strike many analytic philosophers as apt and many critical theorists as unhelpful. Does this mean the two groups are from different cultures? Further, if a Lacanian object of comparison does clarify for the critical theorists, it seems like it must be apt. In turn, this seems to imply that if I find reading the labels on food-products a suitable object of comparison that helps clarify the truth-predicate, then it too is apt. Thus, the position does collapse into person-relativity and is faced with the objections given in section 1.2f.

The third problem is the way Kuusela's account frames a philosophical discussion. In effect, if a statement of rules is simply a fabricated object of comparison that an interlocutor is free to accept or reject and that can work only if the interlocutor feels it clarifies, then the relationship between comparative therapy and traditional philosophy becomes, at best, tentative and hard to understand. For example, Kuusela claims that a philosopher's contribution to an exchange "do not function… as premises in a deductive argument. Rather, the last inference is replaced by something of the form ‘you admit this and you admit that, so would you admit this too? If you do, would you not agree that there is an inconsistency?' In conceptual investigation there are demonstrations of inconsistencies only in this latter, clarificatory sense" (Kuusela (2008), 245). Such a conception of a philosophical discussion raises both an exegetical and a metaphilosophical worry. Exegetically, Wittgenstein insists that "philosophizing is: rejecting false arguments" (BT §87 p.

303). It is unclear what "rejecting false arguments" means on such a catholic view of discussion. Moreover, Wittgenstein also insists that pat of his method is based on “the calm ascertaining of linguistic facts” (BT § 92 p.316). Suffice it to say, it is rather unclear what “facts” means here if Wittgenstein is simply inventing his rules. Metaphilosophically, it seems to imply that a philosopher must accept any contribution that a conversation partner makes to a conversation, on pain of being dogmatic (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 215-64). Such a view is problematic for two reasons. One, as Glock (1991) notes, it renders comparative therapy and traditional philosophy incommensurate. If a philosopher cannot even point out internal inconsistencies in the view of her conversation partner, it is unclear why we should call her activity philosophy at all. Two, it infantilizes the conversation partner. To see this, assume that it is partly constitutive of an assertion that its direction of fit is word-to-world. In other words, the truth or falsity of the content of an assertion has to do with the way the world is rather than some subjective features of the asserter. Pursuant to this, part of pointing out inconsistencies in a conversation partner’s claims, noting that something she said is unsound, and so on, are simply taking her utterances as assertions whose content depends on the way the world is and not how she feels (or whatever). Also assume that, for Kuusela, a philosopher cannot point out inconsistencies, note that some utterance is unsound, and so on, as this is ‘unfair’ to the conversation partner. From this, it follows that a philosopher cannot treat the conversation partner as an asserter who is making assertion since the contributions of the conversation partner are not assessed in terms of their truth or consistency at all. Granting this, the philosopher deprives the conversation partner of her right to be wrong. Clearly this infantilizes her as we refuse to take her words seriously- i.e., as assertions whose content’s truth depends on the world.

1.1.i Pure Therapy- PI

For pure therapy PI, we focus on Mulhall (2007) and, to some extent, (2001). However, note that Mulhall claims that "the primary preoccupation of this essay is that of critically evaluating the philosophical illumination that might be gained by attempting to transfer this originally Tractarian distinction between resolute [i.e., pure therapy-TLP] and substantial readings to the context of Wittgenstein's later

philosophy" (Mulhall (2007), 12). Thus, the text may simply be an experiment to see what such transference enables. Circumspect readers should keep this in mind. Regardless, as one would expect, pure therapy-TLP and pure therapy-PI have a fair amount in common. Specifically, both maintain that the sole cause of philosophical "problems" is that we are taken in by metaphysically sounding nonsense. Further, both also maintain that nonsense is monistic in that it is always caused by meaning privation and that there is only one kind of nonsense from a logical point of view. From here, the methodology Mulhall imputes to Wittgenstein is that of exposing monistic nonsense by demonstrating that philosophical "problems" fail to have assigned meaning to certain terms. In turn, exposing this nonsense reaches Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of excising philosophy by showing that philosophical "problems" are, in reality, just monistic nonsense. First, I examine how pure therapy-PI argues that monistic nonsense is the only sort of nonsense in the PI. Second, granting this, I examine later Wittgenstein's methodology of uncovering meaning privation in philosophical "problems." Finally, I link this methodology to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim.

To begin, pure therapy-PI argues that the sole cause of a philosophical "problem" is that it is, in reality, monistic nonsense. To understand this clearly, it is necessary to engage with and disable, an alternative reading of the PI that ascribes to the text additional kinds of nonsense. Indeed, much as pure therapy-TLP began by arguing that monistic nonsense is the only conception of nonsense operative in the TLP, so too must pure therapy-PI establish this for the PI. Such a not-just-monistic-nonsense reading of the PI maintains that "nonsensicality is the result of the speaker attempting to conjoin intelligible words in unintelligible ways (conjunctions which violate their grammar, as opposed to violating their logical syntax)" (*ibid* 9). In other words, assume that the meaning of an expression is determined by constitutive rules for its use. Non-monistic nonsense arises when I attempt to use an expression in a way that does not accord with these constitutive rules. Let us call this form of non-monistic nonsense, "grammatical nonsense."

To establish that grammatical nonsense is not viable, Mulhall focuses on the private language discussion (roughly PI § 243- § 315). This focus is apt as, especially in these sections, Wittgenstein seems to "to lay down the law" (Mullhall (2007), 19) and his grammatical statements seem to tap "into a given, impersonal, source of authority" (*ibid* 66). Specifically, a grammatical nonsense reading of these sections

maintains that "Wittgenstein shows that, given the meaning of words in the interlocutor's penultimate sentence [i.e. '[t]he individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations' (PI 243)], the idea of a private language that he attempts to construct out of them must be nonsensical or incoherent, a violation of grammar. § 244 unfolds the grammar of 'referring' and 'sensation'; §246 and § 253 remind us of the grammar of 'privacy' of 'sensation… [And the goal is] showing that the private linguist cannot legitimately appropriate them [e.g. 'referring' 'sensation' 'privacy']'" (*ibid*, 18) In short, "grammar is a limitation on our capacities for speech and thought—that it deprives us of something" (*ibid* 10). As it were, we cannot use expression e in a way that contravenes the rules that govern the use of expression e.

With this in view, pure therapy-PI offers three arguments that aim to show that grammatical nonsense is not viable. First, Mulhall claims that "Wittgenstein does not assert that his interlocutor's questions [claims, etc.] are nonsensical- unintelligible, a violation of the bounds of sense" (Mulhall (2001), 117). In other words, exegetically, if Wittgenstein accepts the existence of grammatical nonsense, we should expect to find points where later Wittgenstein cites a grammatical rule to his interlocutor and declares her pseudo-assertions out of bounds. However, Mulhall argues that Wittgenstein does not do this. Indeed, an overriding focus of Mulhall (2007) is showing exactly this. Regardless, it is prima facie defensible that Wittgenstein's way of engaging with the possibility of a supposedly private language does not readily reduce to simply citing rules.

Second, pure therapy-PI argues that grammatical nonsense is problematic because it places a philosopher in a privileged position she has no right to assume. In turn, this "amounts to failing to take one's interlocutor seriously—failing to acknowledge her" (*ibid* 83). Indeed, grammatical nonsense is predicated, according to pure therapy-PI, on "philosophical illusions—in particular, the illusion that our everyday understanding of language… is in need of the support or authority of a philosophical theory" (*ibid* 7). Pace this, however, pure therapy-PI insists that grammar, and the charge of nonsense, "can have authority over the sceptic [or interlocutor] only if he freely acknowledges it does so" (*ibid* 83). This is for several reasons. One critical one is the following. Pure therapy-PI insists that many terms in natural language are multifaceted in such a way that a uniform account of the rules that govern their use is inherently problematic (e.g., Mulhall (2007), 118). For

example, Mulhall (2007), 44-46, following Cavell (2002), 238-67, notes that the verb "to know" has several independent and non-epistemic uses (e.g., confessional, emphatic, etc.). Granting this, consider someone who says, during her daughter's funeral, "only I know my pain!" This use of "to know" does not betoken a grammatical nonsense so much as a non-epistemic use of "to know." However, trying to establish that this is so in a non-contextual way that relies solely on examining constitutive rules that govern the use of "to know" is rather hard to make out. Thus, the primary point is that an expression in natural language may have several closely related though irreducible and non-uniform uses. And assuming that there is one core use is something Wittgenstein takes pains to warn us away from (e.g., PI § 23).

Third, pure therapy-PI maintains that grammatical nonsense rests on an inherently flawed conception of grammar itself. Specifically, Mulhall claims that grammatical nonsense rests on the assumption that there is a "predetermined structure of grammatical rules" (Mulhall (2001), 58). In turn, this assumption of a predetermined structure of rules casts grammatical nonsense as rather like trying to play football with a hockey stick. Pace this, pure therapy-PI offers two interrelated arguments against this predetermined view of grammar. One, it stresses that natural language has a flexibility and projectability that does not readily reduce to rigid and predetermined rules (Mulhall (2001), e.g., 52-118 & (2008), e.g., 96-111). For example, the constitutive rules that governed "mouse" in the 1950s were surely something like "the word ‘mouse' applies correctly to furry small rodents." However, a coterminous feature of its use was that the animals it correctly applies to typically have long tails. Later, an engineer, Bill English, began to apply "mouse," based on this conterminous feature, to a computer part (e.g., English (1965)). This casts doubt on our ability to properly isolate out a constitutive rule from a conterminous feature. Two, Mulhall insists that "grammatical investigations [are]… simply deploying our everyday capacity… that can equally be claimed by any competent speaker" (*ibid* 10). This quote implies that knowing the grammar of a language is basically the same as knowing how to speak and understand the language. Granting this, however, the function of both grammatical nonsense and reminders becomes problematic. For grammatical nonsense, it is unclear what it means to claim that someone both already knows the rules and then unwittingly fails to follow them. Indeed, if she speaks and understands the language in question, how does she lose track of this ability? For the function of a reminder, Mulhall notes that a grammatical nonsense account sees a

reminder as reminding us of "the limits of sense, and thereby identify a region or domain that lies beyond those limits, from which we are excluded" (Mulhall (2007), 9). However, if we already know the grammar, what are we reminding the person of (*ibid* 60)? How has she fallen into nonsense if she speaks the language just fine?

Thus, pure therapy-PI argues that any conception of nonsense apart from monistic nonsense is untenable in that the most plausible form of non-monistic-nonsense does not work. Granting this, let us turn to the philosophical methodology it imputes to later Wittgenstein. To begin, pure therapy-PI claims that "Wittgenstein tries to imagine, and then tries out, certain ways of giving meaning to the constituent terms of the interlocutor's formulations" (Mulhall (2001), 18). In other words, the methodology aims to "inhabit the sceptic's [or philosopher's] perspective" (Mulhall (2007), 83) and expose it as unimaginable. Notice that, like pure therapy-TLP, pure therapy-PI invokes imaginative identification with the speaker of nonsense.

However, pure therapy-PI is far more precise and specific about what enables such imaginative identification as well as how such identification helps uncover monistic nonsense. For what enables the identification, pure therapy-PI understands the imaginative identification in psychoanalytic terms. Indeed, imaginative identification is "therapeutic in purpose; hence it is concerned with understanding the complex desires, intentions, fantasies and confusions that find expressions in the interlocutor's contributions… Hence, our involvement in such dialogues necessarily involves us in a mode of psychological undertaking" (Mulhall (2001), 56). Further, pursuant to this, such a psychoanalytic account of imaginative identification is person-relative. Thus, "an analytic treatment could be deemed to reach closure… only with the patient's acknowledgment of the correctness of the analyst's interpretation" (*ibid* 92). Further, though Mulhall offers three glosses as to how to understand this sort of imaginative psychoanalytic identification (e.g., Mulhall (2007), 89-95), he focuses on one in particular. This "psychoanalytic model of philosophical questions [that]… suggest the mutual imbrication of philosophy and the everyday… and its model for therapeutic treatment would correspondingly put in question the authority otherwise invested in the analyst over the patient" (Mulhall (2007), 92). Pursuant to this, the account stresses "not only transference, but counter-transference: the drives and impulses at work in the patient, and so his understanding of his analyst, are just as much at work in the analyst's understanding of his patient and their relationship" (*ibid* 92). In other words, the philosopher and the interlocutor are related by an imaginative

identification with each other that relies on transference and countertransference. In sum, I imaginatively identify with the utterer of monistic nonsense, she imaginatively identifies with me, and this mutuality is what enables me to help uncover nonsense.

For how the imaginative identification uncovers monistic nonsense, pure therapy-PI claims that once we have imaginatively identified with each other, we can begin to show a speaker that "her utterances hover between two very different possibilities of sense or meaning without ever actualizing either. Once the necessity of separating out those two possibilities is made clear to her, she will see that there is nothing here to be said—no claim of the kind she took herself to be making" (Mulhall (2001), 42). In other words, we work together to try to imagine what her claim means by, e.g., embedding it in a language-game (cf. PI § 1 & § 2). If this embedding cannot be achieved, the seeming claim of the interlocutor does not have a unique sense (Mulhall (2007), 111-123 & (2001), 55-58). Thus, she has failed to assign to it a meaning and it is monistic nonsense. However, it is imperative to realize that this method of exposing nonsense requires the consent of the conversation partner to function. Indeed, "the ordinary language philosopher is at the mercy of his opponent, in that a test of the pertinence of his criticism must be whether those to who it is directed" (Mulhall (2007), 84).

In turn, this methodology of imaginative identification does, in fact, fulfill Wittgenstein's goal of alleviating a philosophical problem. In effect, we help the person come to see that her philosophical "problem" is monistic nonsense by helping her try (and fail) to imagine what it might mean. In turn, she should realize that the problem is nonsense and so frees herself from its torment.

1.1.j Pure Therapy-PI: Criticism:

Pure therapy-PI has at least three problems. First, there is the question of the supposed link between imaginative identification and psychoanalysis. Second, there is the question of respect for and acknowledgement of the conversation partner. Third, there are the problems with person-relativity.

The first problem is the nature of psychoanalysis as Mulhall envisions it. To begin, Mulhall attempts to interpret "[t]he philosopher treats a question; like an illness" (PI 255) in a psychoanalytic way so as to avoid the unpleasant thought that

"philosophy itself is essentially diseased- a pathology of human culture, something that purely and simply damages the realm of the ordinary" (Mulhall (2007), 91). Indeed, such a "diseased" reading has the consequence that "the best of all possible worlds would be one in which the [philosophical] question never put down roots" (*ibid*). However, Mulhall is also wary of a purely psychoanalytic reading in that such a reading casts the philosopher in a problematic light. Specifically, within a psychoanalytic context, it is undeniable that an asymmetric relationship between analyst and analysand emerges. Indeed, though very muddy, I think Lacan (1991)'s basic point is that the analysand must believe that the analyst can help restore her to sanity. Without this assumption, the therapeutic exchange breaks down. To avoid this asymmetric dynamic, and the very carefully constructed contexts it brings with it (i.e., a silent office, a therapist who may never talk, etc.), Mulhall stresses counter-transference. In effect, the reciprocity between the philosopher and the interlocutor emerge because of transference and counter-transference. The problem, though, is that this stress belies the psychoanalytic model under almost any gloss. Indeed, Freud writes that "*the problem* of counter-transference… [t]heoretically… much easier to solve... One must… always recognize one's counter-transference and overcome it." (Freud's letter to Fitcher (2003), 112-emphasis mine). Thus, for Freud, counter-transference is not a precondition of proper analysis but a hindrance to it, pace Mulhall. Matters are made even more difficult to understand as Mulhall also claims that a philosophical-psychoanalytic counter-transference based methodology assumes that "the idea of treatment are continuous with the disease under treatment" (Mulhall (2007), 93). Suffice it to say, Freud was not a ‘hysterical' woman and Lacan not a victim of the holocaust. Thus, the insistence on equality between philosopher and interlocutor undermines the very preconditions for psychoanalysis to function. Succinctly, a analysand must assume that her analyst can help her and Mulhall, at least implicitly, denies this by denying the asymmetry it carries with it.

The second problem emerges naturally from this- to wit, the role of the interlocutor for pure therapy-PI. Pure therapy-PI stresses that the philosopher and the interlocutor are on equal footing. Indeed, such emphasis on equality is part of why pure therapy-PI finds grammatical nonsense untenable. The philosopher has no access to the constitutive rules that determine the use of terms so that she can declare some claim on the interlocutor's part to be (grammatical) nonsense. This insistence on equality may be a laudable in most contexts. However, it is undermined by an

assumption that pure therapy-PI is committed to. To wit, pure therapy-PI necessarily assumes that all philosophical "claims" are vitiated by monistic nonsense. However, this, if anything, places the philosopher in a far more unequal position than either traditional philosophy or other accounts of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy (be they moderate therapeutic or otherwise). In effect, the philosopher necessarily assumes that the content of talk about possible words, or about God, or any other philosophical "claim," really just is monistic nonsense. As it were, the philosopher knows that the interlocutor's "claims" are not about what she thinks they are about as monistic nonsense is not “about” anything. Suffice it to say, such an assumption, and the related focus on the questioner, is the height of arrogant disrespect.

Following from this, third, it becomes opaque how this method and philosophy relate at all. This criticism was noted for both pure and moderate therapy-mixed. In effect, the philosophical question, the questioner and her psychology, and the contributions of a philosopher cannot be aligned in such a way that they have any bearing on philosophy. The lack of an internal relationship between problem and answer make the entire exchange opaque. Simply put, we do not know why a conversation partner tries to utter monistic nonsense, how our ‘imaginative identification’ can help, or what role *philosophy* is supposed to play in this sort of therapy.

1.1.k Moderate Therapy-PI:

The thinker we engage with here is, in many ways, the most complex and challenging of all the therapists- Cavell. These difficulties arise for many reasons including Cavell's commitment to a unique version of metaphilosophy, his refusal to separate out style from thought, and his engagement with “heterodox” thinkers. As much as possible, I bracket these concerns. First, I discuss the interpretation of the nature of, and origin of, philosophical problems that Cavell imputes to Wittgenstein. Second, I examine how this ascription leads to Cavell's claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is genetic. In other words, it aims to trace philosophical problems back to their source and offer an alternative way of responding to them. Finally, third, I discuss how this genetic therapy aligns with the metaphilosophical aim of removing a philosophical problem and so returning us to the ordinary.

To begin, Cavell imputes to Wittgenstein a unique account of the nature of philosophical problems. There are several interconnected aspects of this account. First, Cavell insists that Wittgenstein is "not led to philosophical reflections from his own voice… but from, as it were being accosted. The accosting is by someone Wittgenstein cares about and has to take seriously" (Cavell (1996 a), 263). In other words, a philosophical problem is ‘external' in that it does not arise either as a normal practical problem or emerge from the complex dynamics of a scientific research program and its investigation of nature. Instead, something provokes philosophy.

Second, this account of the ‘externality' of philosophical problems is partly a ramification of the metaphilosophy Cavell has and imputes to Wittgenstein. Specifically, Cavell assumes that "philosophy is best viewed not as a set of problems but as a set of texts. This means to me that the contribution of a philosopher… to the subject of philosophy is not to be understood as a contribution to… a set of given problems" (Cavell (1979), 3). This textual conception carries with it several critical aspects. One, part of the difference between a philosophical problem and other problems is that the former depends on texts. Two, texts, reading, a reading, and readers hang together in a complex and interdependent way. Though this nexus is critical to Cavell, he does not, as far as I am aware, develop it systematically in a single work. However, partly following Rudrun (2013), 1-24, a critical thought is that reading is a form of responsiveness on the part of the reader to the text. Indeed, "reading seems to tell me what kind of understanding or interpretation I might aspire to" (Cavell (1979) 363). Furthermore, the text simply does not exist independently of a reader responding to marks on a page in a particular way. In turn, three, this means that a philosophical problem depends on a specific sort of response that a philosopher has with a text. Four, texts are to be understood in the broadest sense to include oral discussions (Cavell (1979), 5), bodies (*ibid*, 363-4), etc. Indeed, "[s]ome philosophers are able to make about anything into a philosophical text" (*ibid* 4). Finally, five, one critical feature for something- a situation, a book with marks, etc.,- to become a text in Cavell's broad sense is that it calls for and depends on a reading. Though difficult to fully articulate, the idea is reminiscent of Heidegger (Rudrum (2013), 246, points this out).[18] To use a well-worn example, when the hammer is fine, we happily hammer along. We do not think about the hammer, how to use it, its physical

[18] Cavell (1979), 240-243, hints at this point.

properties, and so on. Indeed, here we see "a way of grasping [a hammer]… which is not an interpretation" (PI 201). Then, the hammer breaks, and we are suddenly struck by it as a brute physical object. When this happens, we begin "reading" the situation and trying to understand what has happened, what went wrong, etc. The situation of a breakdown provokes a reading precisely because it runs against our normal expectations, ways of doing things, etc. I note here that I follow Cavell in using both text and reading in these wide ways. In sum, a philosophical problem depends on a philosopher responding to a text, i.e., a situation that disrupts or breaks our expectations, in a particular manner.

Third, responding to a text philosophically and thereby generating a philosophical problem, means responding to it in a testing manner conditioned by doubt. Indeed, a "philosopher appealing to everyday language turns to the reader not to convince him without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, against himself" (Cavell (2002), 95). Furthermore, this accounts for why a mark of a great philosopher is her ability to insert a question, to raise a doubt, etc., in a novel way. In turn, this means that a philosophical response is always of danger of collapsing into skepticism. Further, given that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim is removing these philosophical problems, it also means that his "teaching is everywhere controlled by a response to skepticism" (Cavell (1979), 7). In sum, a philosophical response is a form of testing against a background of doubt, and this is always in danger of collapsing into skepticism.

Finally, fourth, and most critically, a "philosopher's originating question –e.g. '(How) do (can) we know anything about the world?'…- is a response to… a real experience which takes hold of human beings" (*ibid* 140). Cavell's discussion is quite convincing here (*ibid*, 129-246 but especially 135-54). The process has four phases, it seems to me. To begin, one, imagine that one meets a friend and as carefully as possible-e.g., ensuring that the lighting is good, that one writes with deliberateness, etc.- one writes down her phone number. Later, one calls the number, and it turns out to be wrong. Two, this error demands a 'reading' in that one usually gets phone numbers right in such situations. So what went wrong here? How could I have gotten this wrong? Three, one possible reading is philosophical. Such a reading moves from the local failure, e.g., the miswritten phone number, to questions concerning my entire cognitive relation with the world, e.g., the veridical status of any of my perceptions. As it were, if I was wrong in such an ideal context, how can I be sure that I am *ever*

right? And this reading makes the situation into a philosophical text. Less metaphorically, one might respond to this rupture with the ordinary in a philosophical and questioning way, as discussed above. Four, this text quickly produces a host of intractable philosophical problems. Thus, one asks what epistemic standards and safeguards I relied on to justify my belief to have written the number correctly? If I had claimed to know my friend's number, does this imply that knowledge if inherently fallible? Did I really know my friend's number or did I just believe I did? If the later, what marks the difference between knowing and believing? Moreover, given that I cannot ‘step outside my head' and record my friend's number ‘independently' of my auditory perception, am I really justified in believing these perceptions? And so on.

Thus, for moderate therapy-PI, a philosophical problem is a particular response to a situation where something goes wrong. This response is defined by testing as against a background of doubt. Also, very quickly, this testing leads one to the profoundly uncomfortable problem that we have no justification for assuming that we have reliable access to an external world, to the thought that the supposed stability of the world may not really exist, etc.

From here, moderate therapy-PI imputes to Wittgenstein a genetic methodology to ameliorate these skeptical philosophical problems. This genetic therapy begins by assuming that "'What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' (116)… Why does that help?... my suggestion, essentially, was: It shows us that we did not know what we were saying, what we were doing to ourselves" (Cavell (2002), 62). For example, a person who says "I doubt the existence of material objects" seems to have assumed she knows the concept ‘material objects' so that she can doubt the existence of the things that ‘fall under' the concept. However, this attempt to doubt material objects while maintaining that the concept of ‘material objects' is fine, quickly implodes on itself, according to moderate therapy-PI. Either the skepticism is forced into a higher gear wherein the doubter is no longer sure of the semantics of her doubt. Moreover, when this occurs, moderate therapy-PI says "that when the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air what vanishes was already air, revealing a non-scene of destruction" (Cavell (1991), 69). Alternatively, the skeptic is reminded of something she already knows, something that she forgot that led her to her confusion. To wit, she is reminded that the concept ‘material object' and her expression "I doubt the existence of material objects" depend on her having learnt a language. In turn, in "learning language, you

do not merely learn the pronunciations of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the ‘forms of life' which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do" (Cavelll (1979), 177). And this learnt language brings into play certain stable features, responses, etc., that need to ordinarily be in place for words to do what they do. In other words, error, a break with our normal expectations, etc., only make sense granted that, ordinarily, things move along smoothing (e.g., OC *passim*). In the case of skepticism, the concept ‘material object’ presupposes a host of practices and uses that engender the meanings of the term. Further, these uses presuppose that there are material objects we handle in certain ways. Granting this, Wittgenstein, according to Cavell, aims to remind us that our supposed doubt concerning material objects presupposes material objects to get going in the first place.

Thus, the genetic methodology returns to the origin of the philosophical response and seeks to show that such a response must both "be the investigation of a concrete claim if its procedure is to be coherent [e.g. we start with miswritten telephone numbers, wax balls, etc.]; [and that] it cannot be the investigation of the concrete claim if its conclusion is to be general [e.g., the philosophical response that calls all knowledge claims into question]; Without the coherence it would not have the obviousness it has seemed to have; without the generality is conclusion would not be skeptical" (*ibid* 2002). In other words, and more abstractly, genetic therapy attempts to show that a philosophical response always distorts the context in which the situation occurs. We respond philosophically only when we repress the contextual features and things we already know. In turn, this repressed context enables a sort of generalization from particular cases to a grand philosophical claim. Indeed, "[i]t is difficult not to exaggerate in philosophy" (BT § 89 p.309). Further, by pointing this repressed context out, genetic therapy aims at the "breaking of such control [e.g., a philosophical response to a problematic situation] is the constant purpose of the later Wittgenstein… [it is] intent upon unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of self-impositions which we have not assessed (PI § 108) or fantasies.. which we cannot escape (PI § 115)" (Cavell (2002), 72). Indeed, in this key, "Wittgensteinian methods… [are] an effort to free ourselves from philosophy's chronic wish to instill our words with, or require of them, magic… by reminding us of ordinary cases in which words have their genuine effect" (Cavell (2005 b), 295). In other words, what a philosophical response forgets is that words mean only given our ways with them and

the contexts these presuppose. And this means that the words cannot mean properly within a rarified philosophical "context."

In turn, genetic therapy reaches Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim of ameliorating a philosophical problem by returning with it to its root source. It then examines not so much the problem as the situation that provoked it. And it seeks to remind the philosopher that her reaction to the situation, her framing the situation as a text that generates the problem, distorts and represses the context she finds herself in. In turn, ideally, the reminders that moderate therapy-PI offers to the philosopher help her control and moderate her response. Indeed, though there is "there is no absolute escape from (the threat of) illusions and the desires constructed from them… no therapy for this in the sense of cure for it" (Cavell (2002), xx), reminders can help " to free the human being from the chains of delusions [e.g., a particular philosophical problem]" (Cavell (2005 a), 293). In sum, by showing that a particular response is, at least partly, optional, we gain control of it and alleviate philosophical disquiet.

1.1.l Moderate Therapy-PI: Criticisms:

The version of moderate therapy-PI described above, and ascribed to Cavell, has two problems we focus on. First, there is the problem of the relationship between the original situation that provokes philosophical text, a philosophical response/problem, and therapy. Second, there is the question of the ordinary and the end(s) of philosophy.

The first problem is how a problematic situation, a philosophical response or reading the situation as a philosophical text, a philosophical problem that emerges from this response, and genetic therapy relate. Specifically, genetic therapy is unclear as to how Wittgenstein's methodology manages to address and dissolve a philosophical problem. This has two aspects. One, moderate therapy-PI is unclear about how the origin and structure of a philosophical problem relate. Two, moderate therapy is unclear about what is uniquely philosophical about its genetic therapy. Let us take each in turn.

One, a critical lacuna in moderate therapy-PI is that it fails to account for the relationship between the origin of a philosophical problem and the structure that a philosophical problem has. Without an account of this relationship moderate therapy-

PI runs the risk of committing a genetic fallacy. To see this clearly, let us grant to moderate therapy-PI that philosophy begins as a particular response to a problematic situation or break with the ordinary. One writes a phone number carefully and with all possible care, and it is still wrong. Then one is lead to respond with deep doubt concerning, e.g., the veridical nature of our senses. In turn, moderate therapy-PI assumes that this response, this reading of the situation as a philosophical text, engenders a philosophical problem- i.e., external world skepticism and a demand for apodictic knowledge. Notice, critically, a vital mark of this philosophical problem, and others like it, in Wittgenstein, is that they concern essence, necessity, or exceptionless generality. The philosophical problem that emerges from the incorrect phone number manifests itself as a demand for airtight, infallible, and apodictic x that cannot be wrong or doubted. However, moderate therapy-PI is utterly unclear as to why philosophical problems have this unique structure. Succinctly, why do we jump from doubt, a philosophical response, to a demand for apodictic certainty, the form of a philosophical problem? In turn, such a lacuna may doom genetic therapy as it does not really engage with a philosophical problem per se. In other words, the focus on how a philosophical problem emerges holds in abeyance what the problem actually asks after, what a solution would be, and, most importantly, the structure of a philosophical problem within Wittgenstein. Moreover, this is a genetic fallacy in that it assumes understanding the origin is the same as understanding the problem. Indeed, Cavell notes that "[a]ccepting the ‘thing-world' is just accepting the world, and what kind of choice do we have about that? (I don't say there isn't one)" (*ibid*, 242). This parenthetical comment shows that Cavell seems to admit that the genetic story he offers still does not quite deal with the philosophical problem properly.

Two, it is somewhat unclear what is distinctively *philosophical* about a philosophical genetic therapy. Indeed, Cavell notes that "to know what constitutes its [the PI's of the TLP] criticism would be to know what constitutes philosophy" (Cavell (1979), 3), knowledge Cavell thinks we do not yet have. I find this metaphilosophical honesty deeply laudable. Indeed, I cannot help but agree with Cavell that today, nearly 2500 years later, we still are not quite sure what a mad bricklayer was doing when he accosted aristocrats and demanded that they explain themselves in a manner akin to shoemakers or mathematicians. In turn, this leads Cavell to ascribe philosophical reflection to, e.g., movies (cf. Cavell (2005 b), 61-82), Shakespeare (cf. Cavell (2002), 267-356), Freud (cf. Cavell (2005 a)), and so on.

However, and very much in the spirit of Wittgenstein, our inability to give an airtight definition of what philosophy is, in some set of unified, reified, necessary and sufficient conditions, does not thereby mean anything should count as philosophical (e.g., P §I 67). In other words, noting that "philosophy" is a family resemblance term is not the same as claiming that "anything goes!" Further, Wittgenstein insists on that certain features are "not philosophy; but it is its raw materials" (PI § 254) and is quite keen to distinguish at least one field of research, i.e., science, from philosophy (PI § 109). Thus, using Freud, films, Shakespeare, etc., as raw materials to help develop and grapple with a philosophical problem is *not* the same as treating them as a philosophical per se, any more than looking at the history of science gives, without ado, lessons for philosophy of science. Indeed, history and Freud can sharpen our swords and help remind us of salient facts as we do philosophy- e.g., pace a whole tradition in philosophy of mind, my mental states may be opaque to me; pace positivism, there is no magical method that all science always uses and that, somehow, the dastardly Catholic church managed to suppress for a period of around 1000 years. However, these points are not philosophical in themselves exactly because they do not relate to philosophy correctly- they are raw materials *for* philosophy than philosophy itself. To ignore this distinction is deleterious for two reasons. One, it makes it unclear why there are, in fact, certain forms of response that count as philosophical and some that do not. Indeed, even in supposedly "extreme" cases, it is critical to note that Derrida deconstructs philosophers and not phonebooks and Foucault's archeology focuses on knowledge and not fashionable footwear whereas Katie Perry sings fun pop music and Iago manipulates people. The former two count as philosophy and the later two are, at best, raw materials for it. By not minding the gap between raw material and philosophy, moderate therapy-PI may just cease to be philosophical at all. Two, pursuant to one, moderate therapy-PI threatens to let in far too much. As with Baker, Kuusela, and Mulhall, the danger is that showing someone a Katie Perry music video may count as a genetic philosophical intervention (if it, e.g., helps someone get a handle on her bad habits by reminding her that she has a body) just as much as careful reflection on Frege's writings. Thus, there is no principled way to designate some responses as philosophical, others as not, and pursuant to this, to maintain any difference between philosophy and raw materials.

The second problem is Cavell's rather odd fetishization of the ordinary. To begin, for Cavell, a philosophical problem emerges as a response to a break in the

ordinary or a problematic situation that we do not typically come across. Indeed, "[a] philosophical problem has the form: I don't know[19] my way about" (PI 123). In this sense, there is a deeply interesting alignment between Wittgenstein and many other thinkers in philosophy. For all, a moment of wonder, of being struck by something unordinary, is the moment that begins philosophy. However, whereas most other thinkers[20] valorize the extraordinary, Cavell insists that Wittgenstein lionizes the ordinary. Frustratingly, however, Cavell is terribly vague on what he means by the ordinary. I follow his lead in trading on intuitions more than nailing what "ordinary" means. In all cases, what is critical for Cavell that there be a sharp distinction between the ordinary and philosophy since, without this, the entire point of philosophical therapy is lost. Indeed, Wittgenstein aims at "reminding us of the ordinary cases in which words have their genuine effect, a process that invites disappointment, since on its first approach it seems to deprive us of, rather than to give us, something precious" (Cavell (2005), 295). I take this, in part, to mean that Wittgenstein aims to deflate our sense of the extraordinary- to return us to the normal.

However, imputing to Wittgenstein this valorization of the ordinary in Cavell's sense seems to misfire in at least two ways. One, the PI does not seem nearly as committed to the ordinary as Cavell makes it out to be. To begin, Wittgenstein tell us that "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI *preface* 4). Simply put, it is unclear why Wittgenstein would want to do this by Cavell's lights. For Cavell, philosophy emerges as a flawed response to a break in the ordinary. Moreover, the point of philosophical therapy is dissolving this flawed response. In contrast, this quote seems to mean that Wittgenstein, far from wanting to dissolve philosophy, wants to provoke it. Further, consider Wittgenstein's extraordinary examples- e.g., robotic shopping trips (PI §1), tribes who speak only in tongues (PI § 528), reading-machines (PI § 156), meaning-blindness (e.g. PI II xi § 261),lions speaking (PI II xi § 327), having a soul (e.g. PI II iv § 22). None of these are ordinary, yet Wittgenstein seems to utilize them exactly to remind us how extraordinary our life with language is. A reader may object that these extraordinary examples are meant as 'objects of comparison' that help bring the ordinary into view. This may be true but it does not

[19] The German verb, kennen, is much closer to the English "know by acquaintance" or "be familiar with" than to propositional "know that"
[20] See, e.g., Plato Theaetetus, 155c-d, Aristotle Metaphysics, 982b.

seem to help Cavell as even such objects of comparison threaten to disrupt the ordinary and provoke philosophy. Finally, consider Wittgenstein's insistence that "[m]an has to awaken to wonder- and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again" (CV p. 53); "[t]his running against the walls of our cage [i.e., trying to speak about absolute matters like ethics] is perfectly absolutely hopeless…. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and would not for my life ridicule it" (PO p. 44), and so on. Suffice it to say, these are odd things for a champion of the "ordinary," in Cavell's sense, to say.

Two, and more pressing for Cavell, is that Wittgenstein simply seems to reject the binary opposition between ordinary and not. For example, the joking builders (PI § 42) can be read as beginning from a language game that has rigidly defined ordinary bounds. Yet Wittgenstein himself raises the possibility of a "violation" of this supposedly rigid bound and the sort of playful response it might engender. Indeed, "[a]nd is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them—as we go along" (PI § 83). Part of what Wittgenstein seems to be stressing here is a feature that Cavell is at once deeply attuned to (cf (Cavell (1979), 168-190) and seems to disable in this context. To wit, we project our words and practices into new contexts in novel, dare I say, extraordinary ways. Indeed, if ordinary means stock or standard use or usage in some intuitive sense, Cavell's own account seems to run counter to it. However, if ordinary does not mean stock, then it is entirely unclear how to understand the dichotomy in the first place. Further, Wittgenstein himself seems to anticipate exactly this when he notes that "[d]oes everything that we do not find conspicuous make an impression of inconspicuousness? Does what is ordinary always make the impression of ordinariness?" (PI § 600). Answering this question negatively obliterates the distinction between ordinary and philosophical, as Cavell draws it, and so problematizes the very idea of therapy. Indeed, "[d]on't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense" (CV p. 56). I take this quote, partly, to mean that the fanatical insistence that we stop doing philosophy, that we accept the ordinary and stop talking nonsense, does not interest Wittgenstein.

1.2 Therapy- Common Motifs and Common Criticisms:

In closing, I pull back from the fairly fine-grained analysis of possible therapeutic interpretations and address therapy itself. First, I discuss three common threads that run through all of these various sub-types. Second, I present a criticism of each thread.

Though heterogeneous, there are obvious common threads all the therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. First, a philosophical problem or question is not as essential as the questioner. Indeed, the emphasis on the person rather than the philosophical points is a critical facet of therapy. Second, therapy argues that its method gives the conversation partner the respect and acknowledgment she deserves. Indeed, the standard hostility to "standard" or "substantial" accounts of Wittgenstein, and "tradition philosophy" more generally, is predicated on precisely this. Whereas the standard readings place the philosopher in a privileged position as someone who can distinguish between sense and nonsense, the therapeutic reading abdicates this ability and, by doing so, respects the conversation partner. Third, there is an irreducible analogy between illness and therapy, on the one hand, and philosophy and therapy, on the other. In turn, the most likely way to cash out this analogy is to argue that since philosophy is some sort of departure from the ordinary course of life, it is akin to a sickness. So the goal of philosophical therapy is returning the conversation partner to the normal course of life.

The first feature, the focus on the questioner, leads to several problems we outlined in various ways above. However, the core feature is that it becomes opaque how a philosophical problem, a person, and a philosophical therapy relate. The target of a philosophical therapy is supposed to be the latent elements- be they psychic, cultural, etc.- that generate the problems. However, this implies that the therapy need not have anything to do with the problem, specifically the (seeming?) semantic content the problem expresses. In turn, there are three critical difficulties with such a view. One, if the therapy and the problem do not relate, is there any meaningful way to restrict the former? Is drugging someone, lobotomizing her, reading Joyce at her, etc., all apt ways to address her problem? Two, it is unclear both why and how the disquiet or disturbance relates to the philosophical problem and its structure. For example, it is unclear how "psychic torment" engenders specifically philosophical

problems[21] or vice versa. Three, such therapeutic responses may merely pass philosophy by in the night. Indeed, if a therapist is not at all concerned with the content of a philosophical utterance, there is no apparent relation between the therapy a therapist offers and the philosophical problem that, somehow, it is directed towards.

The second feature, the respect for the conversation partner, undermines itself in a rather striking way. The philosopher is instructed to never argue with, contradict, point out an inconsistency of, etc., the conversation partner. However, it seems that this simply means we do not take the various talkings of the conversation partner to be assertions or "problems" at all. Indeed, the therapeutic metaphor works against respect for freedom at this juncture. A psychoanalytic therapist is not concerned with the content of an analysand's talkings as she is viewing the talkings as symptoms that manifest something else. In turn, and granting that assertion and truth are deeply interconnected, it is right to say that the analysand does not make "assertions" in therapy at all. Further, a psychoanalytic therapist does not aim to refute, argue with, ferret out, etc., the truth of her analysand's takings. Instead, she seeks to notice, and call the analysand's attention to, recurring patterns, things her talking elides, etc. This may be fine in a therapeutic setting. However, behaving as though someone's words literally do not mean what she claims them to mean, treating her assertions, not as assertions but symptoms of mental disquiet, etc., clearly does not valorize the freedom of the conversation partner. In point of fact, it infantilizes her. Further, far from placing the philosopher in a more reciprocal relationship or even placing the philosopher below the conversation partner, therapy inscribes an even more asymmetric relationship that privileges the philosopher. The interlocutor is denied the ability to make assertions in the first place- the height of disrespect. Indeed, since she cannot be wrong with her talkings, she also cannot be right with them (cf. PI § 202). Succinctly, she is denied the right to be wrong. Moreover, this, far from betokening a liberal stance, is a form of intellectual imperialism where the philosopher knows the conversation partner's “problems” are really disquiets.

The third feature, the link between philosophy and illness, is the most problematic. A constant temptation in psychology is to correlate "sanity" with

[21] Indeed, the therapeutic conception may suffer from an even deeper problem here. It strains credulity to claim that, since my mother was mean to me as a child, I started doing social epistemology or that because I suffer from anxiety attacks and I do modal metaphysics. Even in extreme cases like Kierkegaard, I do not think it is apt to claim, nor do I think he would claim, that his probably clinical depression *caused* him to do philosophy. As best, his depression caused him to break off his engagement and philosophy was, to some extent, an attempt to make sense of this.

"normal" and "normal" with "how people usually act" (the deleterious effects of this have been pointed out by, e.g., Weisstein (1969), Foucault (1989), and Hacking (2002)). In modern psychology, this link is explicitly rejected, and the DSM V refuses to use terms like "sane" at all. Instead, a critical criterion for "ill" in contemporary psychology is the failure of a person, by her own lights, to live her life in the manner she wants. In contrast, it is unclear what makes philosophy an illness other than that fact that it is not ordinary or normal. Indeed, no principled reason to consider philosophy as akin to illness has been offered, as most philosophers do not admit that they cannot go on living and the few who are so tormented would rather die than give up their relentless questioning. In turn, this indicates that the only reason philosophy is an "illness" is that it is not something the woman-on-the-street or the man-about-town concerns themselves with.[22] Not only is the problematic for the same reasoning correlating "sanity" and "normal" in psychology is problematic, but it also refuses to engage with philosophy at all on its own terms. Indeed, if philosophy is a sickness, why should anyone concern themselves with it but the tragic few who are infected?

1.3 The Key Uptake:

To summarize, the problem with a therapeutic metaphilosophical interpretation is that it cannot adequately align Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal and his supposedly therapeutic methodology. It ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of excising or mitigating philosophical problems. It then attempts to ascribe to him a method that therapizes these questions away. Moreover, as we have argued at length, the problem is that this method and the philosophical problems cannot align properly. Therapy quickly becomes sui generis and distinct from philosophy. In turn, this makes it opaque how a therapeutic method and a philosophical problem can have anything to do with one each. In sum, the metaphilosophical aim therapy imputes to Wittgenstein- i.e., excising philosophical problems- and the metaphilosophical methods of various forms of therapy (e.g., working through nonsense, psychoanalysis, genetic, etc.) do not align properly. The method misses the goal, and so the account is not viable by its own lights.

[22] Especially later Wittgenstein is quite careful here- he stresses an *analogy* between philosophical problems and illness rather than conflating the two (e.g. PI § 133- box, PI § 255)

1.4 Summary:

This chapter has sought to give a principled taxonomy that does not elide the very real differences between various conceptions of what "therapy" could mean as a metaphilosophy for Wittgenstein. Then, for each sub-type, it offered specific criticisms. Finally, it used this data to prescind certain assumptions that are common to each sub-type and criticize these. However, the critical problem is that, as the game stands, there just is no right way to relate a philosophical problem to the therapeutic intervention that supposedly addresses it.

However, critically, notice that this objection is predicated on the assumption that there are such things as distinctly philosophical "problems." Further, it also assumes that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology for addressing them is philosophical- i.e., it is a reasoned intervention that is coherent, principled, and, one assumes, above all, argumentative. Succinctly, it assumes that Wittgenstein can reply to nonsensical philosophy with a senseful methodology based on reasoned arguments. We have argued that this cannot be so- there is no way to relate a senseful methodology to nonsense. The next chapter examines a view that explicitly rejects this. To wit, it argues that Wittgenstein's responses to philosophy are just as ‘nonsensical’ as the nonsense they address themselves to. Indeed, it ascribes to Wittgenstein the fundamental realization that there is, in point of fact, no difference between rationality and rhetoric, sense and nonsense, logic and wordplay, truth and power, philosophy and sophistry, etc. In other words, it casts Wittgenstein as an antiphilosopher.

2 Antiphilosophical Metaphilosophy:

This chapter discusses a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein as an antiphilosopher. Such a discussion emerges quite naturally from the failure of a therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein. Specifically, both interpretations agree on ascribing to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of alleviating or completely excising philosophy. However, there is a critical methodological difference. To see this clearly, recall that, e.g., pure therapy-TLP is confronted with a problem. To wit, if the TLP is nonsense, how can we learn a method (or anything else) from it. Indeed, Conant notes that "Geach has dubbed this problem… *Ludwig's self mate:* how are we to understand an author who attempts to illuminate through a philosophical treaties those very matter which he says cannot be illuminated?" (Conant (1996), 270). The solution that the pure therapists offer to this conundrum is that "Wittgenstein says in §6.54 is not: '*all* of my sentences are nonsensical' (thus giving rise to a self-defeating problematic)… Section 6.54 characterizes the way in which those propositions which serve as elucidations elucidate…. Question: *Which* sentences are (to be recognized as) nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate… Not every sentence of the work is (to be recognized as) nonsense. For not every sentences serves as an elucidation. Some sentences subserve the elucidatory aim of the work by providing the framework within which the activity of elucidation takes place" (Conant (2002), 457 fn 135). In other words, pure therapeutic readings of the TLP maintain that there are frame-propositions, i.e., methodological instructions for how to expose the faux-status of faux-propositions. Further, the methodology that these frame-propositions aim to teach us is properly *philosophical*. This is because, among other things, the method depends on a philosophical thesis concerning the nature of nonsense (i.e., that it is monistic and caused by a failure of meaning assignment) and presents a rational, coherent, consistent, etc., way of showing that the meaning assignment has not occurred. Moreover, this sort of bifurcation between nonsense, psychic disquiet, and so on, that betoken philosophical problems and Wittgenstein's attempt to address and redress it with some learnable, philosophical method, is pronounced in pure therapy.

Pace this, antiphilosophy, with due irony, accuses especially pure therapy of "chickening out." Simply put, antiphilosophy maintains that in Wittgenstein there are

no frames, no learnable methods, and so on, that can be called “philosophical” in Wittgenstein’s work at all. Instead, Wittgenstein offers us a novel form of rhetoric that pragmatically persuades us to abandon philosophy. As we shall see, such persuasions do not depend on Wittgenstein’s beliefs about philosophy, a learnable and rational method, particular theses about nonsense, and so on. They only depend on Wittgenstein’s desire to convince us to abandon philosophy. In turn, this shifts antiphilosophy’s focus. Indeed, antiphilosophy is far more interested in "not what is said but the effect of what is said" (Badiou (2011), 152). Pursuant to this, the “method” Wittgenstein relies on aims at “[d]efacing the image of philosophy as primarily propositional, discursive and theoretical… the antiphilosopher shows that the ‘truths’ of philosophy to be externally motivating and not self grounding” (Givenc (2015), 85). Finally, though counter-intuitive, this focus on the pragmatic affects of even monistic nonsense strings may be defensible. For example, consider the US army’s utterance “hooah!” This utterance is clearly monistic nonsense- i.e., no meaning assignment has been made. However, the utterance can have the pragmatic affect of, e.g., motiving US army soldiers to die or kill in a coming battle. Thus, the affects of an utterance can plausibly be distinguished from the semantic content (or lack thereof) that it has.

In turn, the self-mate is not avoided but celebrated. The point of Wittgenstein’s works, under an antiphilosophical reading, is not to teach us anything at all. Instead, Wittgenstein’s works are meant to persuade us to abandon philosophy- by hook or by crook. However, such a position is somewhat hard to make sense of, prima facie. In section one, I sketch in a schematic and general way what an antiphilosophical metaphilosophy is and how it works. With this in view, section 2.1a, c, d, examine three attempts to ascribe an antiphilosophical stance to Wittgenstein. Specifically, it considers such an ascription for a TLP focused view, a mixed view, and a PI focused view, respectively. This nicely parallels the taxonomy I developed for therapeutic interpretations. In section 2.1b, d, e, I criticise each. In section three, I pull back and note several characteristic features of these antiphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein as well as the problems with each. Finally, I close by arguing that such a reading cannot be sustained. In turn, this sets the stage for an anti-theoretical reading interpretation of Wittgenstein.

2.0 What is Antiphilosophy?

In this section, I discuss what antiphilosophy is. To begin, I set the stage. I define what "antiphilosophy" is as well as discussing why certain positions should not be counted as antiphilosophical. Second, I consider a master metaphilosophical argument that is designed to show that antiphilosophy is not a viable metaphilosophical position and note that any antiphilosophical position must reply to this objection. Third, I consider what features we should expect an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein specifically to have.

To begin, prima facie an "antiphilosophical" position is a position that argues against philosophy. However, this is clearly not sufficient to distinguish antiphilosophy as either a unique metaphilosophical position or as a specific metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. It is not a unique metaphilosophical position in that such a characterization includes, e.g., a radical scientism that claims, "philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge" (Hawking (2010), 3), a sort of common sense 'don't care' indifference, and so on, as antiphilosophical. It is not a unique reading of Wittgenstein in that the versions of therapy discussed in chapter 1, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy discussed in chapter 3 and aspects of the grammatical account in chapter 4 would all count as "antiphilosophy" as they each take Wittgenstein to argue against philosophy in some sense or other. To rectify this, I add two more interdependent criteria to determine if a position counts as "antiphilosophical." These are that: antiphilosophy must be, above all, rhetorical; antiphilosophy addresses itself to a philosophical audience. Let us take each in turn.

First, an antiphilosophical position is purely rhetorical. To begin, "[c]lassical rhetoric, the art of speaking well- that is, the art of speaking (or writing) persuasively- was concerned to study the discursive ways of acting upon an audience, with a view to winning or increasing its adherence to the theses that were presented to it for its endorsement" (Perelman (1979), 43). Notice, one, that this definition of rhetoric has nothing to do with truth, justification, belief on the part of the speaker, and so on. Indeed, a rhetorician may put forward a claim, e.g., "Mexico will pay for the wall," that he knows to be false. Two, the sole goal of a rhetorician is convincing an audience to adopt some p. This p may motivate the audience to do something or else

cause them to adopt a (possibly false) belief. Three, pursuant to one and two, it is not the belief of the rhetorician that matter but her desire to convince some audience to adopt p. Four, for a rhetorician, anything goes in principle. Bursting into tears, yelling incoherently, gesturing wildly, and so are, are all fine "methods" provided that they move an audience to adopt p. In sum, antiphilosophy is against philosophy *rhetorically* and should be understood in terms of the desire of a rhetorician to convince her audience that philosophy should be abandoned rather than her beliefs about philosophy, her "method," and so on.

Second, though in rhetoric anything goes in principle, rhetoric is pragmatically constrained by the audience that it addresses. For some audiences, bursting into tears may be a powerful tool to convince them to adopt p whereas for others, a (possible fallacious) argument is required. Pursuant to this, antiphilosophy takes itself to have a very specific audience and so its rhetoric is constrained in very important ways. To wit, an antiphilosophical position is one that seeks to convince a *philosophical* audience to abandon philosophy. In turn, this means that antiphilosophical rhetoric often appears to be standard philosophy- complete with (possibly fallacious) arguments, (possibly pseudo-) deductions, and so on. Indeed, the best antiphilosophical rhetoric is nearly indistinguishable from philosophical discourse.

To bring this further into view let us examine our three conditions in relation to Gorgias and his amusing text *On Nature or Concerning What is Not*[23] (Gorgias (2012), 23-39). In this text, Gorgias produces a set of utterance designed to convince us that *nothing exists* (i.e., that no objects, properties, relations, and so on, obtain in the actual world)[24], that if something exists, we cannot know it, and that if we could know it, we would not be able to communicate this knowledge of it. First, the text is clearly against philosophy in that, assuming that philosophy has something to do with conveying truth or knowledge to people, Gorgias seeks to cut the legs out from under it. Second, it may be that Gorgias is incapable of believing that *nothing exists* as it is rather probably that Gorgias ran into existing things all the time- i.e., people, the marketplace, tables, and so on. Such an inability to believe that nothing exists,

[23] This gloss makes "antiphilosophy" and "sophistry" nearly synonymous. In this, I part ways slightly with, e.g., Badiou (2011), 138-39, Bosteels (2008), 156, who argue that a critical distinction between the two is the "act." I find their conception of "act" to be a gross misreading of Kierkegaard's "truth as subjectivity" and so do not follow them.

[24] The reader might demur and worry that "Nothing exists" is a strange pre-Fregean abuse of a quantifier. Horwich (1975) provides an interesting possible formalism of "Nothing" as a nominal expression and interested readers should see this work.

however, does not prevent him from putting forward his utterances. Moreover, it is clear that Gorgias is involved in a "preformative contradiction" in that if language cannot communicate truth, and Gorgias believes that "nothing exits" is true, then he cannot communicate it. Far from bemoaning this, Gorgias plays with it in a rather delightful rhetorical manner. In both cases, it is clear that what is relevant here are not Gorgias's beliefs but his desire to convince his audience. Third, consider that "[s]ome scholars make Gorgias a profound thinker… others treat *What is Not* as a serious and witty *reductio*… others again take it for a rhetorical *tour de force*… I do not know what Gorgias intended me to think" (Barnes (1982), 173). Barnes's note implies that he, a great classicist, has no principled way to distinguish Gorgias's text from a properly philosophical one. As it were, Gorgias's antiphilosophical rhetoric is so well crafted that it is indistinguishable from, e.g., the Eleatics and their claim that "being is one." Indeed, if we adopt "the way of opinion" (Parmenides (1987), 85), then Parmenides's radical monism is about as counter-intuitive as Gorgias claim that nothing exists.

In turn, these three criteria do distinguish antiphilosophy as a unique metaphilosophical position as well as a possibly interesting particular reading of Wittgenstein. It is a unique metaphilosophical position in that it is not concerned with truth, propositional attitudes, justification, argument, etc., but, rather, with persuasive techniques and pragmatic affects. In turn, this distinguishes antiphilosophy from both radical scientism and common sense 'don't care' views. For radical scientism, it is reasonable to assume that Hawking's position stems from his belief that science has superseded philosophy. Further, Hawking surely took such a claim to be justified by, e.g., the stunning success of science, and took himself to be conveying an important truth, e.g., the death of philosophy, to his audience. Similarly, my mother's common sense being against philosophy arises from her belief that philosophy is impractical and her knowledge of the job market. Further, she voices her position (rather often) because she takes herself to be conveying the truth that philosophy does not pay bills. In contrast, antiphilosophy's emphasis on pure rhetoric and pro-attitudes rather than reasons and propositional attitudes distinguish it from these positions. Indeed, for antiphilosophy, what matters is not what is said but *how* it is said (i.e., its pragmatic affects) and not what a speaker believes but what she desires to convince us of.

An antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein is also distinct from other accounts discussed in this thesis. Specifically, an antiphilosophical reading of

Wittgenstein is neither concerned with features that engender philosophy- e.g., monistic nonsense, irrational analogies, semantic confusion- nor with a "principled philosophical method" thought to govern Wittgenstein's responses- e.g., a frame-propositions, reminders that expose the flawed analogies, grammatical statements that reflect our normative linguist-conceptual schema. Instead, it is concerned with the pragmatic affects of Wittgenstein's utterances on his philosophical audience. Consequently, it will focus on style rather than meaning, persuasive techniques rather than "method," and so on. Furthermore, and more critically, an antiphilosophical interpretation steadfastly refuses to ascribe to Wittgenstein any sort of "insight" into the nature of philosophy or the desire to "communicate" such an insight to us. To reiterate, rhetoric does not require belief, justification, insight, truth, and so on, it only requires that the speaker desires to convince an audience and is clever enough to pull it off. Finally, antiphilosophy insists that the salient question when reconstructing Wittgenstein's texts is not *what did he believe* but *what did he desire to convince us of*.

Thus, a reading of Wittgenstein is antiphilosophical only if it meets the following three conditions. First, it must view Wittgenstein's utterances as being against philosophy. This assumption is shared by (most) metaphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein in the literature. Second, it must view this "being against philosophy" in purely rhetorical terms. In other words, Wittgenstein desires to convince us with his rhetoric to abandon philosophy. His beliefs, the truth of his views, the supposed insights he has, and so on, are irrelevant for a proper interpretation. Third, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein must see Wittgenstein's rhetoric as pragmatically constrained by his explicitly *philosophical* audience. Further, antiphilosophy is often more specific here and takes Frege and Russell as key audience members. Granting this, antiphilosophy expects to find, and does find, odd sorts of logical formalisms that may or may not go anywhere, strange comments on key concepts like *truth*, *reference*, *name*, *description*, and so on.

Granting this conception of antiphilosophy, it is important to notice that, far from being the eccentric creation of 'postmodernists,' antiphilosophy or sophistry have been with philosophy at least since Plato. Further, it is clear that finding some means of distinguishing Socrates's talkings and Gorgias's talkings was critical to Plato and his conception of "philosophy" as a noble and enlightening endeavor concerned with conveying the truth rather than a base and banal one concerned

merely clever use of words to convince audiences to do or believe whatever I would like them to (e.g., *Protagoras* (336b), *Gorgias* (502e), *Phaedrus* (257c-279c)). Moreover, it seems to me that neglecting antiphilosophy or sophistry today is not viable as more radical intellectual circles employ a sophistical rhetoric to cast aspersions of philosophy rather often- e.g., "philosophy is just what dead white, cis-gender, straight, European, racist, imperialist, men thought about things and it systematically represses, suppresses, and silences, marginal Others in the name of some ghostly and ghastly 'thing' called 'Reason' that is either purely instrumental as in economics or else smuggles in cultural/historic/class-based/etc. norms into the picture."[25] Such claims are ignored at one's peril as Bloom (1987), 313-335,'s admittedly biased history of the academy in the sixties shows. Regardless, it is unsurprising that ancient philosophy has a master metaphilosophical argument designed to show that antiphilosophy is untenable.

The mater argument[26] begins with the assumption that an antiphilosophical position is one that argues against philosophy rhetorically. However, the argument notes that "to argue against" is left critically under-defined in this characterization. The master argument than assumes that arguing against something can be done in a rational manner or a non-rational manner. On the one hand, if it is done in a rational manner, then the master argument notes that antiphilosophy should give reasons to object to philosophy, that these reasons are best though of as beliefs on the part of the antiphilosopher, that these reasons make up the arguments antiphilosophy proffers against philosophy, that these arguments are well within the purview of logic, and so on. Granting this, the master argument also notes that this conception of argument as giving reasons is simply dialectics as Aristotle characterizes it (e.g., *Topics* (I.2 101a25-101b4)). This being so, two problems emerge for antiphilosophy. One, what does the yeoman's work is not the rhetoric but the reasons. In turn, this means that the emphasis on rhetoric, the pro-attitude of desire on the part of the speaker, and so on, are not viable. Two, it renders antiphilosophy conceptually incoherent in that by

[25] I should note that there is a kernel of truth to this that I find deeply interesting and worth keeping in view. This is perhaps most clearly seen in Chomsky's famous debate with Foucault (Chomsky & Foucault (2005)) wherein each time Chomsky attempts to move from "hard-wired range of ethical positions" to a specifically western conception, Foucault offers historical examples that show that the western conception is predicated on violence and contingent biases. Regardless, today, the sort of glib "check your privilege" way such claims are used is simply sloppy and would have been abhorrent people like Foucault, Derrida, and so on.

[26] This argument has several similarities to Aristotle (F 51 R3)

giving reasons to be against philosophy, antiphilosophy is dialectical, and this makes it simply a part of the philosophical science as Aristotle conceives it. In turn, it is simply unclear what "against" means.

On the other hand, the master argument goes on, if antiphilosophy does not argue against philosophy in a rational manner, then the emphasis on rhetoric makes good sense. Indeed, what is doing the work is the antiphilosopher's use of her words to cast aspersions on philosophy. If this is so, then it is safe to assume that antiphilosophy is not dialectical, as it is not interested in giving reasons to be against philosophy, debating with philosophers, and so on. However, it then becomes unclear why a philosopher should engage with an antiphilosopher's rants at all. Indeed, if a critical aspect of philosophy is dialectic, the giving and taking of reasons, and antiphilosophy steadfastly refuses to give and take reasons, it is unclear if antiphilosophy has anything to do with philosophy. Worse, however, it is unclear what, if anything, can "justify" an antiphilosophical "position" or set it apart from idiosyncratic preferences, bizarre personal bias, and so on. Indeed, if antiphilosophy refuses to give reasons, it is unclear how it can possibly be anything more than emoting. In turn, this justifies philosophy's indifference to antiphilosophical invectives, as they do not really "argue against" philosophy, any more than, e.g., Katie Perry's music "argues against" philosophy. Furthermore, ignoring an antiphilosophical "position" makes perfect sense as it is of no interest to philosophy though perhaps it is of interest to biographers or sociologists.

Thus, succinctly, if one gives reasons to be against philosophy, one is still doing philosophy as dialectic and the "anti" part of antiphilosophy becomes rather hard to make out. Conversely, if one does not give reasons to be against philosophy, it is unclear why philosophy should engage with rants that do not concern it and the "philosophy" part of antiphilosophy becomes problematic. In either case, such a metaphilosophical position proves to be unworkable. Properly speaking, one cannot *argue against* a position based *solely* on *rhetoric.*

There are several possible ways to meet such a challenge. My personal favorite comes from Pyrrhonism and its use of the Agrippa trillemma to cast doubt on how reasons and arguments relate. Regardless, it is quite clear that any antiphilosophical position must meet the challenge and convince us that it is both coherent in its own right and that it is something philosophy must address. As we shall see, the antiphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein we consider each

ascribe to Wittgenstein fairly similar strategies to meet this metaphilosophical master argument. Succinctly, Wittgenstein persuades us that philosophical discourse does not really have anything to do with truth, is not justified, and so on. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein convinces us that there is no tenable divide between philosophy and antiphilosophy. As it were, a banal reading of Plato has it right- the *only* difference between Socrates and Gorgias is that the former was too stupid to get paid.[27]

Granting this, let us close by discussing the features an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein will bring in its wake. To remind the reader, an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein is an interpretation of Wittgenstein that sees him as arguing against philosophy to a philosophical audience rhetorically. To reiterate, this rhetoric has nothing whatever to do with truth, insight, method, justification, and so on, but merely on Wittgenstein's desire to convince. Granting this, there are four interdependent features that an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein should bring into play. (a) Wittgenstein's texts should persuade us that there is no sharp distinction between reason and rhetoric. This is necessary to avoid the master argument given above. (b) Wittgenstein's texts should cast aspersions on philosophy and, ergo, be against philosophy. (c) Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's rhetoric should aim to convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else (d) A critical feature of proffering an apt interpretation of Wittgenstein's texts is discussing how and why he desires to replace philosophy rather than his beliefs about philosophy.

2.1 Antiphilosophical Accounts of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy:

With this in view, we can examine what an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein is and how it functions. I focus on three such attempts to view Wittgenstein as an antiphilosopher. These are: Antiphilosophy-TLP in Badiou (2011); Antiphilosophy-Mixed in Gellner (2005); Antiphilosophy-PI in Marcuse (1991) & Russell (1959) & (2005). First, I present each author's attempt to impute and sustain an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, and taking our cue

[27] The dialectical complexities of Plato's arguments, and the 'esoteric games' he is fond of, especially in his middle works, etc., are outside the scope of this dissertation. Regardless, it is important to keep in mind that, prima facie, Plato bangs on rather often about Socrates *not getting paid* and this, somehow, distinguishing him from sophists (e.g., *Apology* 19d, *Euthydemus* 304b-c, *Hippias Major* 282b-3, etc).

from the end of section 2.0, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein imputes the following to Wittgenstein's texts: (a) the texts attack the idea of a principled distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, reasoned arguments and clever ploys; (b) the texts cast aspersions on philosophy; (c) the texts attempt to persuade us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else; (d) a key focus for an interpreter of Wittgenstein should not be on Wittgenstein's beliefs but his desires. I use (a)-(d) to structure sections 2.1a, c, e. Second, I argue against particular aspects of this ascription in 2.1 b, d, f.

2.1.a Antiphilosophy-TLP:

An antiphilosophy engagement with the TLP has been developed by Badiou (2011) and it is on his account I focus. Under this antiphilosophical interpretation, the TLP is not a cogent set of propositions connected by admittedly gnomic arguments nor yet is it a workbook consisting of frame-propositions and faux-propositions. Rather, it is a rhetorical assault on philosophy as well as an attempt to convince us to abandon the supposed "problems of philosophy" and consider instead the "problems of life" such as the good will (cf. NB p. 79-80 TLP 6.423 & 6.43). Let us examine how this reading works in terms of the four antiphilosophical features listed above.

(a) To begin, Wittgenstein must defuse the metaphilosophical master argument by arguing that there is no sharp divide between reason and rhetoric. For Badiou, Wittgenstein defuses this challenge by claiming that the supposed links between dialectic, reason, and argument, belief, and so on, fail to obtain in philosophy. Thus, "for Wittgenstein philosophy, in the final instance, cannot be reduced to its discursive appearance, its propositions, its fallacious theoretical exterior" (Badiou (2011), 75). Indeed, "[p]hilosophy is divested of all theoretical pretentions, not because it would be an embroidery of approximations and errors- which would still be conceding too much to it- but because its very intention is vitiated: 'Most of the propositions and questions found in philosophical works are not false but nonsense' ([TLP] 4.003)" (Badiou (2011), 77). Badiou takes TLP 4.003 as critical evidence for an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein conception of philosophical discourse. To further buttress this, Badiou claims that "[p]hilosophy is not even a form of thinking… [as] 'A thought is a proposition with sense' ([TLP] 4)"

(Badiou (2011), 77). Thus "philosophy, then, is a non-thought… [Furthermore] [p]hilosophy is a sick and regressive non-thought because it pretends to present nonsense that is proper to it within a propositional and theoretical register" (*ibid*). Thus, for Badiou, the TLP proffers a view of philosophy that decouples the supposed links between philosophy, truth, dialectic, and so on. As it were, sick non-thoughts have nothing to do with giving and taking reason.

(b) Granting this, Badiou then ascribes to Wittgenstein a rhetorical attack on philosophy. To begin, for Wittgenstein, a philosophical claim is supposed to be both "true and necessary… which say a point of the real. The paradigm of such propositions can be found in mathematics" (Badiou (2011) 133). In other words, and given a standard reading of the TLP (cf. 2.1-2.223), a philosophical claim attempts to be true in that it is isomorphically related to an actually obtaining state-of-affairs (i.e. the propositional 'picture' matches a fact cf. TLP 2.222). Moreover, such a claim also attempts to be necessary in that the pictured state-of-affairs cannot fail to obtain. However, Badiou goes on, Wittgenstein seeks to persuade that, in fact, such a link between truth and necessity is deeply problematic. Thus, "[w]e finally discover necessity [in the TLP]: that of the truth of certain complex propositions… called a tautology" (Badiou (2011), 128). From here, "[b]ut of what necessity is this [i.e., a philosophical claim/tautology] the necessity? Evidently, it is not a necessity of the world, or in the world. And this is for the good reason that tautologies say nothing of the world" (*ibid* 129). In other words, if a proposition is necessary, it is senseless, i.e., a limiting case that does not picture states-of-affairs at all (e.g., TLP 4.461). Conversely, if a proposition is true, then it can be false as the state-of-affairs it pictures need not be the case (e.g. TLP 1.21, 2.0271). If this is so, then the philosophical claims are not workable and Wittgenstein has gone some way in casting doubt on them.

Notice that both (a) and (b) are reasonably common interpretations of the TLP, albeit with odd flourishes. However, when we turn to the rhetoric Wittgenstein deploys to convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with 'the problems of life,' matters are more interesting.

(c) Badiou argues that Wittgenstein uses his rhetoric to convince us to replace philosophy with "the problems of life." To do this, Wittgenstein's rhetoric relies on "[t]he metaphor of sickness [that] is never absent from this plan [to put forward alternative rhetoric], and it certainly comes through when Wittgenstein speaks of

‘nonsensical'" (Badiou (2011), 77). The use of "plan" here is very telling. In effect, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein insists that his (in)famous distinction between sense and nonsense is not a philosophical one but a rhetorical one aimed to convince us to replace philosophy with the problems of life. To bring this into view, consider that Wittgenstein seems to operate with two distinct notions of nonsense These are: (1) that nonsense is "[a]n immediately understandable property" (*ibid* 119); (2) that nonsense is "[a] substantial possibility for the combination of objects" (*ibid*). This claim seems borne out in the secondary literature- specifically the war between the classicists, who tend to view (2) as the key notion, and the new Wittgensteinians who deny that (2) is coherent (see chapter 1.2a). Indeed, an equivocation concerning “nonsense” seems positively encouraged by Wittgenstein who writes both that “all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand are in perfect logical order” (TLP 5.5563). and that “[i]n everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification ” (TLP 3.232) that this provokes “the most fundamental confusions… (the whole philosophy is full of them)” (TLP 3.324). However, if the sense/nonsense distinction is philosophical, this equivocation is unacceptable (e.g., Badiou (2011), 107-121). In turn, this should show us that the distinction is rhetorical and that the equivocation may, in fact, help Wittgenstein convince us of something. Indeed, in rhetoric, it is "not what is said but the effect of what is said" (*ibid* 152) that matters.

Granting this, what does Wittgenstein deploy the sense/nonsense distinction to convince us of? Badiou argues that Wittgenstein uses it to forward his "strategic goal to subtract the real (what is higher, the mystical element) from thought" (*ibid* 107). In other words, Wittgenstein uses the rhetorical sense/nonsense distinction to convince us that "the ‘problems of life' is intrinsically different from any scientific or theoretical figure. It is subtracted from the authority of propositions and sense" (*ibid*, 79). In turn, the pragmatic affects of Wittgenstein’s rhetorical use of the sense/nonsense distinction should be to force us to confront the problems of life in a non-philosophical manner. Indeed, "[t]here will be two types of such an act. One, which is infrascientific and nonsensical because it attempts to bend non-thought by force into philosophical propositions, is the philosophical sickness proper. The other, suprascientific, silently affirms non-thought as ‘touching' of the real" (*ibid* 79). Thus, Wittgenstein’s rhetoric persuades us both that ‘the problems of life’ are critical (e.g.

TLP 6.4-7) *and* persuade us that philosophical thoughts concern them are 'nonsense.' In turn, this should force us to abandon philosophy and adopt 'the problems of life.'

(d) This leads us to the most novel, and, from my perspective, least interesting feature of Badiou's antiphilosophical reading of the TLP. Given that one is interpreting Wittgenstein antiphilosophically, a reconstruction of his thought should focus *not* on what Wittgenstein believes, holds to be true, etc., *but* on his desire to denigrate philosophy. Indeed, this makes sense of Badiou's use of "plan," "strategy," etc. But what is this motiving desire? To begin, Badiou claims that Wittgenstein "constantly exhibited [himself] as an existential singularity" (*ibid* 87). Indeed, Wittgenstein needed to "to announce and practice an active salvific break in one's own name only" (*ibid* 88). And the point of this antiphilosophical rhetoric in the TLP is so that Wittgenstein can "speaks in his own proper name, and he must show this 'proper' as a real proof of his saying" (*ibid* 87). Indeed, Wittgenstein's "aim of living up to the dignity of their antiphilosophical act, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are absolutely devoted to… show this solitude" (*ibid* 90). The supposed link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is crucial for Badiou (*ibid* 73-92- over a third of the first part of the work). In effect, Badiou attempts to impute to Wittgenstein's biography the same megalomaniacal obsessions he imputes to Nietzsche. Badiou sees both as rhetorical masters who seek to exhibit their skills to prove their greatness (e.g., *ibid* 79, 87). Granting this admittedly problematic link, and admittedly rather opaque account, Badiou then claims that the rhetoric of the TLP is put forward to "bear witness to his [Wittgenstein's] act [and the TLP] is merely its negative preparation" (*ibid* 157). In sum, Wittgenstein puts forward the TLP's rhetoric out of his desire to show his act- e.g. that this is who he is and where he stands and he can do no other.

2.1.b Antiphilosophy-TLP: Criticism:

As mentioned above, (a) and (b) are relatively common in several interpretations of the TLP. Specifically, aspects of point (a) are addressed in chapter 1.2a and b and aspects of (b) are addressed in chapter 3.1. Ergo, I refer the reader to these. Instead, I focus on (d) and (c) as these critically interconnect for Badiou. Let us take each in turn.

(d) There are several objections to the way Badiou attempts to read Wittgenstein's life and its relation to the TLP. First, exegetically, he relies on a slip-shot methodology that claims to "clarify" the TLP with biographical notes that ignore dates, times, situations, etc. For example, Badiou makes much of Wittgenstein's confession in 1936 to his friends (see Badiou (2011), 155). At the very least, granting that Wittgenstein rejected much of the TLP at this time, it is opaque if this act can shed any light on his older work. Indeed, we are often given decontextualized anecdotes (e.g., *ibid* 73, 87, 95, 151-157) with no clear ordering or set of relationship either with each other or the TLP. Then we are told that this somehow explicates the TLP. Suffice it to say, I, at any rate, have no idea how true Badiou's tales of "Wittgenstein, the rhetorician" are to Wittgenstein. And, in all cases, it certainly does not help illuminate the TLP as far as I can tell.

Second, analogically, the link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is entirely speculative and predicated more on Badiou's need to fit Wittgenstein into the same antiphilosophical position as Nietzsche. Indeed, Badiou takes Nietzsche as the paragon of antiphilosophy and then attempts to force Wittgenstein to conform to the Nietzschean model (Badiou (2011), 73-92). In turn, this supposed analogy causes Badiou to misread or ignore large parts of the TLP willfully. For example, Wittgenstein's admission that he is "conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible [for clearly presenting the thoughts of the TLP]… May others come and do it better" (TLP *preface* 4) is unthinkable within the Nietzsche-ian framework that emphasizes "greatness" and the duty of genius. Further, this analogy causes Badiou to interpret TLP 6.54 in a manner that is far more problematic than either the classical or pure therapy-TLP reading. Badiou needs TLP 6.54 to emphasize Wittgenstein rhetorical grandeur. However, this is just not supported.

Third, philosophically, Badiou does not explain the interdependence between biography and philosophy. Though I am willing to grant that there may be such a linkage and this linkage may somehow be critical (cf. Cavell (1994)), without explicitly articulating the conceptual interdependencies, one is left with oddly ad hominem attacks combined with commentary. Finally, metaphilosophically, Badiou says he "feels a certain (philosophical) embarrassment for having to adopt a biographical procedure" (Badiou (2011), 151). Would to God he had followed the angels of his better nature here and passed biography over in silence.

(c) We now examine Badiou's more interesting claim. To wit, that Wittgenstein's sense/nonsense distinction is rhetorical and designed to persuade us to abandon philosophy and replace it with the problems of life. Such a rhetorical reading may, in fact dissolve certain exegetical puzzles about the TLP that plagued other interpretations. Pace the pure therapeutic readers, there simply are no "frame-propositions" and so we should be unsurprised that we cannot find any. Pace the classical readers, there is no principled philosophical theory in the book and so we should not be surprised to not find it. However, the rhetorical gloss of the sense/nonsense distinction faces some objections.

First, exegetically, it is both antithetical to Wittgenstein's avowed intention as well as deeply problematic for any attempted interpretation of the book. For Wittgenstein's intention, he tells us that "the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me to be unassailable and definitive" (TLP *preface* 4). One can read the "thoughts" in question as indicating frame-propositions and Wittgenstein's method or the "thoughts" as the sort of theory the TLP offers. However, for Badiou, neither reading will do as Wittgenstein's points have nothing whatever to do with truth, belief, and so on. Consequently, Badiou might insist that this is just so much more rhetorical maneuvering. However, this fails to sit well with the very biographical data Badiou (mis)represents. To wit, and as Monk (1991), 28-168, shows, such duplicity, and dishonesty would have horrified Wittgenstein. Thus, ascribing to Wittgenstein such a duplicitous procedure simply misfires. For interpretation, two key questions come to the fore that plague antiphilosophical interpretations generally. One, how Wittgenstein's rhetoric has the pragmatic affects it does is woefully underdetermined. Indeed, it simply is not clear how the rhetorical utterances Wittgenstein puts forward can manage to convince anyone of anything, especially if they are pushed as far as Badiou wants them to be. Two, it is unclear how to engage with the points in the TLP at all. Indeed, the self-mate mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, raises its head here. How do we read with understanding, interpret, etc., the TLP at all if Badiou is right?

Second, philosophically, it seems to grossly misunderstand why Wittgenstein places the strictures he does on language in the TLP. For Badiou's reading, it is imperative that Wittgenstein began with the aim of subtracting the problems of life from philosophical discourse and that the sense/nonsense distinction is merely a rhetorical means to this end. Pace this, however, I think Russell is quite right that

Wittgenstein's "attitude [towards the mystical or problems of life]… grows naturally out of his doctrine in pure logic, according to which the logical proposition is a picture… of the fact, and has in common with the fact a certain structure… but the structure cannot itself be put into words, since it is a structure of words" (TLP *Introduction,* xxiii). Further, the emergence of the mystical in the NB speaks to this as well. Though why this is so, how the mystical relates to the TLP points, etc., are areas that are deeply contested, the primary point is that Wittgenstein did not decide that the problems of life needed to be sectioned off from thought and then developed a rhetoric to achieve this.

Third, metaphilosophically, Badiou's account fails to take seriously enough Wittgenstein's insistence on philosophy as an activity that aims at clarity (TLP 4.111-116). More specifically, and as argued in chapter five, clarity and the philosophical activity that the TLP tries to teach us are importantly linked. However, a critical problem for a rhetorical reading of the TLP is that it is unclear how rhetoric can achieve this. Indeed, assuming that prima facie rhetoric and sophistry aim at un-clarity and intellectual obfuscation, this linkage is deeply problematic. Thus, ascribing rhetorical means to foster clarificatory ends is strikingly odd.

2.1.c Mix-Antiphilosophy:

The account of mixed antiphilosophy we consider is Gellner (2005). As with Badiou, Gellner takes Wittgenstein to be using rhetorical ploys to both disabuse us of philosophy and to adopt a different view (*ibid* 1-44). In Gellner's case, the view Wittgenstein tries to convince us to adopt is a sort of quietist acceptance of common sense and the world (e.g., *ibid* 106). However, Gellner's account is equivocal concerning both (a), the rhetoric Wittgenstein deploys to convince us that there is no sharp break between philosophy and rhetoric and (b), the sorts of attack Wittgenstein launches against philosophy. I flag these equivocations when they arise and present both possible readings.

(a) Again, Wittgenstein must defuse the metaphilosophical master argument by arguing that there is no sharp divide between philosophy and rhetoric. To remind the reader, such a maneuver is necessary because, if philosophy, dialectic, truth and so on, relate in a certain way, then antiphilosophy in general, and as an interpretation of

Wittgenstein in particular, is conceptually incoherent or not worthy of consideration. For Gellner, Wittgenstein's rhetoric "demolishes reason in philosophy by depriving sustained reasoning not merely of any ontological, but also of all informative, critical and evaluative functions. Its job, it says, is to describe how language works… to pass judgments is something extra-philosophical" (Gellner (2005), 291). In other words, according to Gellner, Wittgenstein persuades us that reasons (and, relatedly, truth, justification, etc.) do not play any role in philosophy. However, Gellner's account becomes equivocal in that he seems to ascribe to Wittgenstein two very kinds of rhetoric that aim to 'demolish reason' in philosophy. First, there is what I term the 'semantic gloss.' Under this gloss, Wittgenstein's rhetoric attempts to persuade us that philosophy is too 'sick' a (pseudo-) discourse to have anything to do with reasons, dialectic, support, and so on. Indeed, the semantic gloss echoes Badiou in claiming that Wittgenstein "exclude the kinds of expressions which are responsible for these difficulties [e.g. philosophical 'problems'] as *meaningless,* as violating the limits of meaning" (*ibid* 6). Indeed, "(Old) philosophy is somehow the pathology of language: philosophical problems arise from a misunderstand of language; philosophical theories misuse language" (*ibid* 48). Granting this, it is clear that a philosophy, truth, etc., have little to do with one another, as meaningless utterances do not have anything to do with truth, justification, etc. Second, there is what I term the 'domesticate gloss.' Under this gloss, Wittgenstein's rhetoric persuades us that philosophy does not have access to verification-transcendent truth, absolute reason, and so on. Thus, Wittgenstein's "*Philosophical Investigations* is both a completion and a denial of the *Tractatus*. It is a completion of it in this sense: it takes over the doctrine that nothing can be said outside a proper language game; nothing can, for instance, be said about its general conditions or its relation to reality" (*ibid* 106). In other words, Wittgenstein's ploys are not about "this world [e.g., trying to make claims independently of language]. Linguist philosophy tries to make us… take the world for granted and to think only about the oddity of philosophy emerging in it, rather than to think philosophically about it. It tries to make us do so by sheer dogmatic insistence" (*ibid* 128). Notice also that the domesticated gloss is only antiphilosophical provided that one grants Gellner's prior metaphilosophical assumption that (real) philosophy should have access to verification-transcendent truth, absolute reasons, and so on (e.g., *ibid* 52), a point we return to in 3.1c.

(b) Next, Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein a form of rhetoric that is designed to cast aspersions on philosophy. However, again, Gellner equivocates between the semantic and domesticated gloss. For the semantic gloss, Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein a rhetoric that persuades us that "rival contentions [in philosophy]… can be *devoid of meaning*" (Gellner (2005), 5). This is because such contentions violate "the limits of meaning, even though they had not violated any of the initial rules of notation or 'grammar.'…*meaning* is a notion which can be used to exclude rival doctrines, and… blesses that which it does cover" (*ibid*, 6). Thus Wittgenstein persuades us that philosophical contentions, positions, arguments, etc., are meaningless and so not to be taken seriously. For the domesticated gloss, Gellner claims that Wittgenstein's rhetoric convinces us that "the contents of those particular kinds of discourse, 'forms of life', 'language games' which you happen to favor… the validity of the content is thus ensured; as language-in-general (which includes this particular language game) is viewed naturalistically, as de facto custom and is validated by the claim that language is the measure of all things" (*ibid* 25). In other words, Wittgenstein convinces us that philosophy does not have access to verification-transcendent truth, absolute reason, and so on. Again, such a view is antiphilosophical only if one grants Gellner's metaphilosophical assumption.

(c) Gellner's account of both how Wittgenstein convinces us to abandon philosophy and what he seeks to replace it with are far less equivocal. Specifically, Gellner interprets Wittgenstein as proffering an ideology designed to render philosophy obsolete and replace it with a sort of quietist acquiescence in common sense (e.g., *ibid* 1-44). First, I define what an ideology is for Gellner. Next, we examine Wittgenstein as an ideologist and how this ideology disabuses us of philosophy and leads us to passively accept the world as we find it.

For Gellner an ideology is a "systems of ideas… [that] undergo[es] a Stendhalian crystallization…[Further, an] ideology is a system of ideas with a powerful sex appeal" (*ibid* 2). To begin, let us explicate "Stendhalian crystallization." One plausible reading of "crystallization" is that an ideology is a reified system of ideas that one simply applies to any and all problems (also see *ibid* 395-8). Pursuant to this, the internal structure of an ideology, e.g., how it links various concepts together, is not modified or updated based on new evidence, exposure to the world, etc. The "Stendhal" part is drawn from a quote from Stendhal's essay *On Love* that opens *Words and Things* (Gellner (2005), 1). The quote discusses how a twig, a

commonplace thing, is transformed into an object of beauty and admiration. A plausible interpretation of this is that an ideology is a way of transforming truisms into something that seems profound. The "sex appeal" can be interpreted as claiming that an ideology is a prefabricated system that does not arise from the complex interdependencies of research, theory, evidence, etc. Rather, the system is prefabricated to address an already-given cultural worry and make it go away (e.g., *ibid* 24-25). For example, Gellner (1991) maintains that both Islam and Marxism are ideologies in that both are prefabricated systems that cannot be refuted, refined, developed, etc., that both transform truisms (e.g., "one should be kind to orphans!" "the rich have all the money!") into "deep truths", and both are explicitly designed to address social problems rather than arising from research.

With this in view, let us examine Gellner's interpretation of Wittgenstein as an ideologist. First, the crystalline condition of a reified system is met in both the earlier and later Wittgenstein. For earlier Wittgenstein "found its [the TLP's] conclusions beyond doubt or challenge, and was not inhibited by any modesty from saying so" (Gellner (2005), 8). This seems apt. Indeed, Wittgenstein does seem to think that no modification to the system adumbrated in the TLP is possible (e.g., TLP *preface,* 4). For later Wittgenstein "rules [of language] were given by nothing more or less than actual linguistic custom. Validation [e.g., justification for some practice] was still achieved- but it was now much broader and more permissive…. The norms and practices it [language] observed in so doing legitimated themselves, and neither required nor allowed any other kind of validation" (*ibid* 13). The point here is that the reified system of thought that the later Wittgenstein adduces cannot be wrong.

The Stendhal condition for earlier Wittgenstein is attested to by the fact that "[a]ny humanist intellectual can make observations such as that the world of the happy is different from that of the unhappy… [However] [w]hat is quite unique was the joint presenting presentation of both these elements [ethical truisms and technical-logical points dressed up as ontology], as one unity" (*ibid* 11). In effect, ethical truisms and technical math are fused together in such a way that both appear to be very profound. For the later Wittgenstein, the Stendhal condition is met by moving from the truism that we do act and talk in certain ways to the claim that "all customs and norms, simply in virtue of being part of natural language… are built into our language, as well as validating our principles…. Ordinary speech, and the entire corpus of custom of which it is part, are a self-justifying system that neither permit

nor need external validation" (*ibid* 15). Again, Gellner sees a set of truisms like "this is what simply what I do" (PI § 217) transformed into a deep truth. For both the PI and the TLP, however, the most critical truism-into-deep-truth transformation Gellner ascribes to both earlier and later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is the claim that "nothing can be said outside a proper language… One cannot speak outside of speech" (Gellner (2005), 106). We return to this in a moment.

Finally, the "sex appeal" is identical in both earlier and later Wittgenstein. To wit, Wittgenstein designed his ideology to address "certain pervasive problems. The serious ones … arise independently [of philosophical research]… [They are] (1) the problem of validation [roughly, how can we justify our cultural practices] (2) the problem of enhancement [roughly, how do we 'save' values from science] (3) the issue of its [philosophy's] own professionalization" (Gellner (2005), 3). Thus, a set of cultural difficulties, not pure research, motivates Wittgenstein to develop a prefabricated system. Thus, for Gellner, Wittgenstein self-consciously puts forward an ideology rather than makes assertions that can be true or false. This ideology cannot be wrong, it transforms truisms into deep truths, and it is designed to explicitly address cultural problems.

In turn, this ideology, if it is accepted, replaces philosophy with a sort of passive tolerance of whatever happens to be the case. This is a direct ramification of the fact that we cannot 'speak outside of speech.' In effect, since there is no meaningful way to compare, examine, discuss, etc., the various 'language-games' we play, we should just accept them as they are. Indeed, "[t]he Wittgensteinian view of our conceptual schemes and languages is [that we are]… too involved in them to be able to change them without confusion, and they are too accidental and contingent to be worth changing" (*ibid* 165). Further, granting that we have neither the ground nor need to change anything, we had best accept that "*the world is what it is*" (*ibid* 144). Thus, Wittgenstein's ideology convinces us to accept "this world… [It] tries to make us… take the world for granted and to think only about the oddity of philosophy emerging in it, rather than to think philosophically about it. It tries to make us do so by sheer dogmatic insistence" (*ibid* 128).

(d) This still leaves us with the question of the relationship between Wittgenstein and his ideology. In other words, what desire caused Wittgenstein to put forward his ideology? First, Gellner engages in some very odd armchair sociology of philosophy to try to answer this properly (*ibid* 300-342). In effect, Gellner claims that,

sociologically, philosophy had been so outshone by the natural sciences that some new defense or apology is needed to maintain philosophy is worthwhile (*ibid* 15-19). Wittgenstein's prefabricated and reified system was partly designed, according to Gellner, to address this (*ibid* 26-29). However, Gellner also indulges in biographical speculation to account for why Wittgenstein puts forward such an ideology. Thus, we are told that "both [Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy] sprang from a reaction to pan-logism.… in both cases the reaction was a doctrine stressing involvement… and the essential-ness of idiosyncrasy" (*ibid* 309-10). It is striking that Gellner adduces such a comparison and stresses the need to exhibit idiosyncrasy (demonstrating one's "existential singularity" as Badiou said). We are also told that Wittgenstein's biography shows an "authoritarian, capricious, messianic and exclusive characteristics of Wittgenstein's practice" (*ibid* 318) and this is linked to "Wittgenstein's messianism" (*ibid* 339) and his "totally infallible Delphic procedure [of being so vague that no refutation was possible] (*ibid* 204). In sum, for Gellner as Badiou, Wittgenstein's aims to show his greatness through his rhetoric.

2.1.d Mix-Antiphilosophy: Criticism:

Gellner's antiphilosophical interpretation suffers from several problems. First, I discuss various problems (a) and (b) and the rather uncertain status of what, precisely, Gellner takes Wittgenstein to be up to. Then I examine the unequivocal antiphilosophical features that Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein in (c) and (d), respectively.

(a) & (b) To begin, recall I argued that Gellner equivocates between a semantic and domesticated gloss on Wittgenstein's (supposed) philosophy. However, this equivocation is deleterious as it leads Gellner to confuse two distinct lines of attack and offer criticisms that misfire. Let us begin with the domesticated gloss. Recall that, for the domesticated gloss to be antiphilosophical, Gellner needs to make the metaphilosophical assumption that real philosophy has access to verification-transcendent truth, absolute reason, and so on. However, this assumption is historically wrong and philosophically problematic. It is historically wrong because, under most interpretations of Kant and German Idealism, the commitment to verification-transcendence is jettisoned and replaced by, e.g., the bounds of possible

experience (see, e.g., Braver (2007), 33-139). In turn, if Gellner's assumption is correct, Kant and Hegel should count as antiphilosophical. Suffice it to say, this ascription strains credulity. Philosophically, the antiphilosophical ascription is deeply problematic as it is clear that Kant, Hegel, and, by charity, Wittgenstein, can and do offer principled and cogent reasons and arguments to reject verification-transcendence in philosophy. In turn, this renders the 'antiphilosophical' ascription opaque.

The semantic gloss seems more promising and aligns Gellner and Badiou. This interpretation cast Wittgenstein's rhetorical attacks on philosophy as trying to convince us that the utterances of philosophy are meaningless and so not worth engaging with. However, the key problem with this interpretation is that it exposes the shallowness of Gellner's own understanding. In effect, the problem with philosophy is not that it attempts to 'speak outside of speech' or 'stand back from our language games.' Instead, the problems are that its utterances are *meaningless*. However, this means that many of the moves Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein, and Gellner's criticism of Wittgenstein, do not make much sense as the key concern is not *how* claims are true or false but *if* an utterance is meaningful in the first place.

Thus, Gellner's discussion misfires. If the domesticated gloss of Wittgenstein is correct, Wittgenstein is best thought of as an antirealist and not an antiphilosopher. In turn, this means that Wittgenstein can and does give reasons for his position, arguments, and so on. However, it then becomes unclear why we should ascribe to him a rhetorical ideology at all. Conversely, if the semantic gloss of Wittgenstein is correct, Gellner's discussion misses the mark entirely. It is not that Wittgenstein convinces us that we cannot 'speak outside of speech.' Rather, he convinces us that philosophy literally is bereft of meaning and so says nothing whatever. In either case, Gellner's account misfires.

(c) Let us now examine Gellner's ideological reading of Wittgenstein. Unlike (a) and (b), this claim suffers from far less equivocation. Recall that Gellner characterizes ideology as a reified system that transforms truisms into deep truth and is prefabricated to account for already existing problems. With respect to the earlier Wittgenstein, Gellner does have prima facie justification for this reading. Earlier Wittgenstein offers a reified system that seems to transforms ethical truisms into deep truths, and seems prefabricated in that it aims to ameliorate cultural anxieties like the fate of the mystical in a scientistic world. However, the devil is very much in the details, details Gellner very much ignores. Against prefabrication, it is important to

notice that Wittgenstein's thought in the NB and proto-TLP do not seem motivated in the way Gellner asserts they are. Wittgenstein did not set out to re-enchant the world. As with Badiou, the key problem with such a rhetorical ascription is that it does not take Wittgenstein's philosophical logic seriously enough. Certainly, the mystical is an odd place to end up but this is due to his philosophical logic, not his religious proclivities. The charge of truisms can be met by noting that context matters much more than Gellner implies. Certainly anyone can claim things like "what we cannot talk about, we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7). However, it is what underwrites this claim that makes it interesting. That being said, the charge of reification seems apt and attested to in Wittgenstein's self-critique of the TLP (see, e.g., PI § 113 & § 114).

In any case, Gellner's ascription of ideology to the later Wittgenstein and the PI badly misfires. First, pace reification, a remarkable feature of the PI is its utter flexibility and responsiveness. Wittgenstein seldom silences a voice with a quip about the meaninglessness of her words, let alone a charge that she is not speaking "normally." Rather, he constantly and constructively engages with odd claims, objections, and so on, and tries to make sense of them- a point stressed in chapter 8.5. Pace truisms, again, Gellner ignores context and the critical role of 'truisms' in Wittgenstein. Suffice it to say, Wittgenstein does not simply assert banalities as a means of ending conversations. Rather, he arrives at seeming truisms after careful work. Finally, pace addressing some cultural problems, it simply does not seem to be the case. Indeed, though the PI does certainly have broad implications, Wittgenstein does not seem terribly concerned with "fixing culture."

(d) The sociological and biographical motives that Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein are the most problematic. The key problem for Gellner's sociology is that it is unmoored from anything like empirical data (see Gellner (1995), 301-95). Consider, for example, Gellner's claim that Wittgenstein "denies the legitimacy to certain questions, doubts… which in our hearts we know full well to be legitimate" (*ibid* 306). I am not sure what empirical methods allowed Gellner to peer into hearts as no survey data is given to justify this sweeping claim. His biographical notes on Wittgenstein are, if anything, even more unhinged and less empirical. For example, Geller justifies his claim that Wittgenstein has "authoritarian tendencies" (*ibid* 318) with reference to Malcolm (2002). This is deeply problematic as Malcolm writes that "Wittgenstein sat in a plain wooden chair… he said things like 'I'm a fool!', 'You

have a dreadful teacher!', 'I'm just too stupid today.'" (*ibid* 25). Suffice it to say, this is not normally how authoritarians talk. Wittgenstein's "hatred of opposition" (Gellner (1995), 37-8) is justified based on Robertson (1977), 23, who writes that "[w]e [he and Wittgenstein] had a rather simulating discussion." Again, a stimulating discussion is not normally the result of talking with a fanatical dogmatist. Gellner also cites Popper (1976), 124, to buttress his claims. However, what actually happened between the two great philosophers is a deeply contested matter (see Edmonds & Eidinow (2002), 1-5). Thus, Gellner's claims are either under-determined by evidence or flatly contradict it.

2.1.e Antiphilosophy-PI:

The antiphilosophy-PI interpretation is drawn from Marcuse (1964) and Russell (1959). As with the previous two interpretations of Wittgenstein, antiphilosophy-PI takes Wittgenstein to attack philosophy rhetorically. Further, Wittgenstein then seeks to replace philosophy with a sort of comfortable numbness and avoidance of thought. Indeed, antiphilosophy-PI claims that later Wittgenstein grew "tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary" (Russell (1959), 161).

(a) An antiphilosophical reading of the PI needs to avoid the metaphilosophical master argument. It does so by claiming that philosophy should concern "itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with different ways in which silly people can say silly things" (Russell (1959) 170). Furthermore, "[t]he desire to understand the world is… an outdated folly" (*ibid* 162). This stems from the "a curious suggestion… that the world of language can be quite divorced from the world of fact… [and] that assertions are compared with assertions… and that we can never compare reality with propositions" (*ibid* 161). Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein "sets up a self-sufficient world of its own, closed and well protected against the ingression of disturbing external factors" (Marcuse (1964), 182). Granting this, Wittgenstein meets the metaphilosophical master argument by claiming that philosophy should not really aim at truth, dialectic, and so on. Rather, it should simply proffer fabricated toy models that do nothing so much as spin idly.

(b) Antiphilosophy-PI then claims that Wittgenstein's rhetoric casts aspersions on philosophy. To make sense of this rhetoric, antiphilosophy-PI claims that one key assumption Wittgenstein makes is that "common speech is good enough, not only for daily life, but also for philosophy" (Russell (1959), 178). Indeed, "there is an unalterable right way of using words and… no change is to be tolerated however convenient it may be" (*ibid* 179). In turn, this means that "[t]hinking is not only pressed into the straitjacket of common usage, but also enjoined not to ask and seek solutions beyond those that are already there" (Marcuse (1964), 178). Interestingly, both Russell and Marcuse do not discuss why Wittgenstein should be thought to hold such an odd premise. Regardless, from here, Wittgenstein's cast aspersions on philosophy by simply noting that it 'talks weird.' Though the "argument" is a bit of a travesty, the guiding thought seems to be: premise1- if a discourse is respectable then, by definition, it relies on normal, common speech; premise2- Philosophical discourse distorts normal, common speech. Ergo, philosophy is not respectable. Thus, Wittgenstein "provide[s] intellectual justification… [for] the defamation of alternative modes of thought which contradict the established universe of discourse" (*ibid* 173). Thus, Wittgenstein casts doubt on philosophy by "debunking of transcendent concepts; it [Wittgenstein's philosophy] proclaims as its frame of reference the common usage of words, the variety of prevailing behavior" (Marcuse (1964), 171) and, by so doing, "it militates against intelligent non-conformity" (*ibid* 174). In sum, and in a terse and simple way, since philosophers talk weird, all Wittgenstein has to do is point out this glaringly obvious fact and this casts their talk into doubt.

(c) The question of how Wittgenstein's rhetoric aims to convince us to abandon philosophy and what he puts forward as a replacement are, perhaps, the most worked out of all the antiphilosophical positions discussed. To begin, if we accept the argument given in (b), that language that is different from common usage is inherently problematic, then philosophy is indeed problematic. Granting this, antiphilosophy-PI ascribes to Wittgenstein a two-stage process to convince us to replace philosophy with worthless games with words. One, Wittgenstein stresses "[t]he therapeutic character of philosophic analysis is strongly emphasized… Wittgenstein… proclaimed it as the renunciation of all theory" (Marcuse (1964), 183). Indeed, the entire point of Wittgenstein's thinking is to invent the "useless 'discovery'… that 'gives philosophy peace so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question'" (*ibid* 183-4). Further, "adherents of WII

[Russell's term for later Wittgenstein] do not bother with any kind of justification" (Russell (1959), 162). Thus, at stage-one, antiphilosophy-PI agrees with pure therapy (see chapter 1.2a, e, i), that Wittgenstein attempts to therapize away philosophy. However, somewhat implicitly, antiphilosophy-PI also offers a replacement for philosophy. Specifically, antiphilosophy claims that Wittgenstein wants to replace philosophy with a new 'form of inquiry' that is "at best, a slight help to lexicographers and, at worst, an idle tea-table amusement" (*ibid*). For example, Wittgenstein "offers us Wittgenstein's endless language game with building stones… [holds in abeyance] the speakers and their situation... They are x and y, no matter how chummily they talk. But in the real universe of discourse x and y are 'ghosts.' They don't exist; they are the product of the analytic philosopher" (Marcus (1964), 198). I take these to mean that, for antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein seeks to replace philosophy with idle games with words.

(d) Finally, let us examine what motivated Wittgenstein to adopt such a view. To begin, the antiphilosophy-PI account is markedly different from the previous two antiphilosophical accounts. Specifically, antiphilosophy-PI views later Wittgenstein's desire not in terms of the need to demonstrate an "existential singularity" but stemming from intellectual exhaustion. Thus Wittgenstein "seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary" (Russell (1959), 161). Indeed, Wittgenstein's rhetoric "exhibt[s] a sado-masochism, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labor does not issue in scientific, technical, or like achievements" (Marcuse (1964), 173). Thus, Wittgenstein's rhetoric is due to intellectual collapse. He wanted to stop doing philosophy and invented a way to stop.

2.1.f Antiphilosophy-PI: Criticism:

Antiphilosophy-PI is somewhat more clear than antiphilosophy-mixed in that it consistently ascribes to Wittgenstein antiphilosophy. Let us consider each point.

(a) The key problem with how antiphilosophy-PI claims that Wittgenstein belies the metaphilosophical master argument is that it simply does not work. Recall that the master argument claim that if one gives reasons to be against philosophy, then one is still doing philosophy and the "anti" part of "antiphilosophy" is problematic

whereas if one does not give reasons to be against philosophy, then philosophy has no reason to take the emoting seriously and the "philosophy" part of "antiphilosophy" falls out. Antiphilosophy-PI attempts to meet this by claiming that philosophy has nothing to do with truth, justification, and so on. However, even if we grant the assumption that Wittgenstein views philosophy as something for which one can truly say that 'there is no outside the text,' this still does not make the relationship between a reason a position moot. As it were, certain texts can function as reasons for other texts and certain texts cannot, unlike in pure rhetoric.

(b) For antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein casts aspersions on philosophy by simply pointing out that philosophy talks funny when compared to normal speech. This attack has several problems, however. Exegetically, it does not track the PI. To begin, Wittgenstein not dismiss voices because they put forward absurd objections- e.g., "'But in a fairy tale a pot too can see and hear!'" (PI § 292). Indeed, Wittgenstein also offers strikingly odd talkings in his own voice- e.g., "[g]iven the two concepts 'fat' and 'lean', would you be inclined to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday was lean…? I want to use *these* words (with their familiar meanings) *here*" (PI II xi § 274). Whatever else PI II xi § 274 does, it seems to undermine antiphilosophy-PI's claim that Wittgenstein thinks that talking funny is something that should make us skeptical of philosophy.

Philosophically, neither Marcuse nor Russell offer any good reason to either accept the premise that 'talking funny' and 'not respectable' are deeply related or to ascribe this premise to Wittgenstein. For the assumption that 'talking funny' and 'not respectable' are related, there is a rather old argument to belie this. To wit, scientists and poets talk funny and it strains credulity to assume that this means that a statement like "quarks have six flavors: up, down, strange charm, top, and bottom" or "he sang his didn't and he danced his did" are, somehow, not respectable. For ascribing the premise to Wittgenstein, there are several key problems. One is that Wittgenstein notes that the "results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense" (PI § 119). It is rather unclear what Wittgenstein thinks we discover if simply pointing out that philosophy talks funny is enough.

Finally, metaphilosophically, if casting aspersions on philosophy is really as simple as pointing out that it talks funny, we should expect to find in the PI a sort of lazy indifference to 'funny sounding' philosophical problems and a rather trite methodology of 'reminding' people that they do not normally talk that way. Pace the

lazy indifference, Wittgenstein notes that that "[t]he problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; are as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language" (PI § 111-underlining mine). Thus, Wittgenstein himself notes that these problems are not trivial matters but are as important as our lives with and in language. Further, Wittgenstein's method in the PI does not reflect such a lazy attitude.

(c) Concerning both how Wittgenstein persuades us to abandon philosophy as well as what he tries to replace it with, matters are problematic for antiphilosophy-PI. Clearly, Wittgenstein's persuasions only work if we accept the odd premise given in the last paragraph- i.e., that since philosophy talks funny, it is not respectable. I argued that we have no reason to do so.

The claim that Wittgenstein aims to replace philosophy with a sort of idle amusement is problematic on two fronts. First, the charge only makes sense if we adopt Marcuse and Russell's strong metaphilosophical assumptions concerning what makes philosophy different from tea-time games. Specifically, both assume that real philosophy and science share the same goal of gaining objective non-trivial theoretical truth. [28] Further, both impute to real philosophy a methodology akin to science- namely theory construction to access such truths. Finally, both view philosophy as worthwhile, i.e., as not a mere parlor game, only provided philosophy is constructing theories to access these truths. Granting these metaphilosophical, it is almost trivial that Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy cannot construct theories (cf. PI § 109) is tantamount to transforming philosophy into an idle game. However, both Marcuse and Russell studiously avoid Wittgenstein's discussion of *why* philosophy and science are different in kind, how this problematizes 'theory construction' in philosophy, and why the goal of objective theoretical knowledge is a non-starter, points discussed at length in chapter 3. Suffice it to say, without engaging with Wittgenstein's discussions, Russell and Marcuse beg the question against him by simply insisting that *philosophy is theoretical.*

(d) The last point, the desire Wittgenstein had that accounts for why Wittgenstein put forward his rhetoric, is at once the clearest and the least tenable of

[28] There are, of course, deep differences between them (see, e.g., Russell (1959), 184, and Marcuse (1964), 144-169). However, both clearly think that using theory to obtain non-trivial objective knowledge about aspects of the world is critical in proper philosophy.

the three antiphilosophical positions. For antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein is an exhausted thinker, and his antiphilosophical rhetoric amounts to intellectual euthanasia. That being said, the problem is that such an assumption does not track Wittgenstein. The accounts of his lectures during this time show not a tragically used up thinker, but someone passionately investigating (see, e.g., LFM, BlBK, BRBK, etc.). Wittgenstein is not the tragic wreck antiphilosophy-PI sees him as.

2.2 Antiphilosophy and Wittgenstein:

This section pulls back and examines why an antiphilosophical ascription to Wittgenstein is problematic. To begin, I examine the reliance on biography and desire to make sense of Wittgenstein's thought in (d). Next, I examine (c), the claim that Wittgenstein persuades us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else. Then, I turn to the rhetorical aspersions antiphilosophy claims Wittgenstein uses to attack philosophy in (b). Finally, I briefly discuss the metaphilosophical master argument and how Wittgenstein avoids it in (a).

Against (d), recall that antiphilosophy assumes that desire on the part of a speaker is a critical feature of antiphilosophy. This is based on the note that the beliefs of a rhetorician, what she knows, her justifications, and so on, and what she utters rhetorically, do not correlate. Granting this, so the story goes, to reconstruct a rhetorical position, it is necessary to consider what the rhetorician is trying to convince us of with her rhetoric and not what she believes, knows, and so on. There are problems with this interpretive strategy in general and as it concerns Wittgenstein specifically. In general, it is unclear how desire and reconstruction of arguments relate. It is simply not enough to cite biographical information about Gorgais, Lacan, Wittgenstein, etc., and suppose that this, somehow, gives 'insight' into their rhetoric. However, it is unclear what else is required to make biography and desire relate to reconstruction. In a related key, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for example, is a powerful discussion of rhetoric that does not invoke, and has no need to invoke, the desire of a rhetorician. Indeed, to tropes Aristotle studies, his considerations of how different ploys affect different audiences, etc., have nothing to do with desire. Thus, it is unclear what work desire is supposed to do and how it relates to reconstruction. The problem with using this strategy to reconstruct Wittgenstein emerges naturally from

this. None of the antiphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein we considered give us any principled way of connecting their often ad hominem notes on Wittgenstein's life with his position and how they claim to interpret it. Indeed, this strategy is bedeviled by the simple fact that there is no describable way to link biography and philosophy together in the way antiphilosophy attempts to.

Against (c), the claim that Wittgenstein self-consciously uses rhetoric to convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else, things simply do not pan out. For the TLP, Wittgenstein writes that "the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive" (TLP *preface* 4). Needless to say, this insistence on truth is out of place for a rhetorical reading. For the PI, Wittgenstein notes that part of his writing it was to correct "grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book [the TLP]" (PI *preface* 4). Again, if the TLP is mere rhetoric, it is hard to understand how philosophical criticisms could cause Wittgenstein to revise it at all. Furthermore, in all cases, Wittgenstein notes that "Kierkegaard's writings are teasing and this is of course their intention, although I am not sure whether the exact effect they produce on me is intentional…[T]here is something in me that rejects this teasing… The idea that someone uses a trick in order to make me do something is unpleasant" (*LW Public & Private Occasions*, 62). If we take 'teasing' as antiphilosophical ploys, clearly Wittgenstein rejects this method.

For (b), Wittgenstein's use of rhetoric to attack philosophy, an antiphilosophical reading quickly falters. To begin, it is imperative, for an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein, that Wittgenstein casts aspersions on philosophy in purely rhetorical terms. In other words, Wittgenstein's attacks on philosophy are little more than polemics. However, this simply discards the force of Wittgenstein's claims as well as why we should read Wittgenstein at all. For Wittgenstein's work, casting his remarks as rhetorical gestures against philosophy is incapable of appreciating their internal structure, power, and relationship with philosophy. For example, and as noted in section 3.1a, b, c, and d, a stunning thing about the mystical and the silence in the TLP is that Wittgenstein *arrives* at it via *philosophical* arguments; he does not simply begin by screaming that everyone should shut their mouths. For reading Wittgenstein, if his 'discussions' are, in reality, little more than invectives against philosophy, it is unclear why we should concern ourselves with him. Whatever he is up to, it has nothing to do with philosophy.

Against (a), the entire debate between philosophy and antiphilosophy turns on Plato's insistence that philosophy is a truth seeking and truth conveying enterprise whereas antiphilosophy is not. However, it is unclear if truth is the best way to distinguish between philosophy and antiphilosophy/sophistry. This is for two reasons. One, it is unclear what sorts of criteria can let us know that someone is *really* seeking truth or trying to convey it, a point that caused Plato much consternation. Two, such a distinction may assume an inflated concept of truth- i.e., that truth is a robust property, that there are truth-makers and truth-bearers, and so on. However, such an inflated concept of truth faces some problems- both in itself (cf. Horwich (1998 a)) and as a reading of Wittgenstein (cf. PI §136). Thus, it may be that relying on truth to differentiate philosophy and antiphilosophy is not the best way to go.

2.3 The Key Uptake:

This chapter has both discussed what antiphilosophy is metaphilosophically as well as how one may ascribe such an antiphilosophical position to Wittgenstein. Metaphilosophically, a position is antiphilosophy only if it argues against philosophy to a philosophical audience using rhetoric. Relatedly, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein focuses on his rhetorical style, desires, and the pragmatic affects of his remarks rather than their meaning, a philosophical method, and so on. I argued that such a reading misfires in all sorts of ways. Thus, though perhaps there is something to antiphilosophy as a possible metaphilosophical position, it certainly does not function as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.

2.4 Summary:

In this chapter, I have offered an account of what an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy entails. First, I discussed the nature of antiphilosophy and argued that a position is antiphilosophical only if it argues against philosophy to a philosophical audience on purely rhetorical grounds. Then I examined three attempts to read Wittgenstein under these lights. I argued that each faces some deep problems. Finally, I discussed an antiphilosophical Wittgenstein in a more coarse grained manner. I argued that such a reading is not workable.

3 Anti-Theoretical Metaphilosophy:

This chapter examines a third metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein- an anti-theoretical one. In many respects, this position is the other way of resolving the instability inherent in the therapeutic conception of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Recall that the therapeutic position ascribes to Wittgenstein the goal of excising or ameliorating philosophy. It further claims that philosophy is linked to nonsense, psychic disquiets, etc. Finally, therapy ascribes to Wittgenstein learnable and explicitly philosophical methodologies that addresses and redresses the nonsense, psychic disquiet, etc., and so remove philosophy. Much like antiphilosophy, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy finds such a mixed position untenable.

To begin, the anti-theoretical interpretation of Wittgenstein agrees with both the therapeutic and antiphilosophical interpretation that Wittgenstein's key metaphilosophical goal is removing philosophy. However, it maintains such a project should not depend on nonsense, rhetorical ploys, semantic confusion (i.e., not understanding the meanings or combinations of certain terms) etc., at all. Indeed, an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher "need not, and should not, assume that the trouble with philosophical questions and theories is our unwittingly having lapsed into *nonsense.* For he [an anti-theoretical philosopher] can suppose, much less contentiously, that their true defect is *irrationality*" (Horwich (2013), 149). Rather, the real problem with philosophy is that it is pragmatically confused- i.e., it attempts to employ the method of scientific theory construction designed for natural phenomena to features that are decidedly non-naturalistic. Pursuant to this, an anti-theoretical interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a thoroughly philosophical methodology designed to expose the flaws of such an attempt to use scientistic theories in philosophy and demonstrate that such an attempt can never lead to objective theoretical knowledge. In turn, if such a method works, and if one grants the assumption that the real business of philosophy is (trying to) theorize in a manner akin to science, one sees that philosophy is indefensible as philosophy's theories do not work properly. Thus, philosophy as philosophical theorization is globally flawed and to keep doing it is irrational. Thus, philosophy should be abandoned.

This chapter unfolds the anti-theoretical interpretation more carefully. I focus, specifically, on the account given by Horwich, e.g. (2012), and Hutto, e.g., (2005 a). First, I examine how anti-theoretical metaphilosophy interprets the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. I argue that it attributes to Wittgenstein the diachronically consistent metaphilosophical goal of revealing that theory construction is untenable in philosophy. However, I also note that anti-theoretical metaphilosophy imputes to Wittgenstein a drastic methodological shift. Second, I discuss how anti-theoretical metaphilosophy interprets Wittgenstein's mature philosophical methodology and how this methodology does, in fact, achieve his goal of demonstrating that theory construction is not viable within philosophy. Finally, third, I examine two possible metaphilosophical endgames that an anti-theoretical interpretation may ascribe to Wittgenstein. These are an end-of-philosophy response (e.g., Horwich (2016)) in section 3.2a, and a form-of-life response (e.g., Hutto (2005 a), 216-221) in section 3.2c. However, I also argue, in 3b and 3d, respectively, that these endgames are not viable interpretations of Wittgenstein. Consequently, there is something amiss in the anti-theoretical account.

3.0 Diachronic Consistency- A Tragic View:

This section examines anti-theoretical metaphilosophy's claim that Wittgenstein's goal of proving that theory construction is not viable in philosophy is diachronically persistent and stable feature of his metaphilosophical thought. However, I also discuss how Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology to achieve this goal went through a reasonably drastic revision from the TLP to the PI. Specifically, as we shall see, the TLP is a "tragic" text precisely because it attempts to ban theory in philosophy on the basis of a philosophical theory. First, I set the stage. Next, I, very briefly, present the metaphysics and philosophy of language that both Hutto and Horwich ascribe to the TLP. As we shall see, the TLP's metaphysics and philosophy of language do render theory construction unworkable within philosophy. Third, granting that there are no theories in philosophy, I examine what the anti-theoretical metaphilosophical account thinks that the TLP is trying to do. Finally, I consider why the anti-theoretical account claims that the TLP fails. In turn, this leads naturally to our account of Wittgenstein's mature methodology.

To set the stage, an anti-theoretical reading of Wittgenstein maintains that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim is diachronically invariant. In other words, Wittgenstein, earlier and later, seeks to prove that theory construction is not viable within philosophy. Thus, "the *Tactatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* represent improved expressions of one and the same hyper-deflationary insight" (Horwich (2005), 171). Pursuant to this, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy ascribe to the TLP a "tragic reading"- i.e., that earlier "Wittgenstein prohibits philosophical theorizing on the basis of a philosophical theory!" (Horwich (2012), 103). Under the tragic reading, we must keep in mind that the TLP "attempts at elucidation not as theory, without suggesting that they succeed in being such" (Hutto (2005 a), 101). In other words, though earlier Wittgenstein attempts to ban theory, this attempt fails precisely because his conception of elucidation relies on a theory. Pursuant to this, later Wittgenstein's critical move is to jettison the problematic anti-theoretical theory of the TLP and, by doing so, present the anti-theoretical insight consistently. Let us examine the inner workings of this account.

To begin, both Horwich and Hutto accept large parts of the classical reading of the TLP. Specifically, for both, Wittgenstein's points in the TLP are neither faux-propositions in the manner of pure therapy-TLP discussed in chapter 1.2a nor rhetorical ploys as presented in chapter 2.2a. Instead, at its core, the TLP proffers a "representational and referential view of language" (Hutto (2005 a), 97). The referential aspect is best understood in terms of the TLP's metaphysics combined with a particular conception of the denotation. For metaphysics, the TLP "makes a series of metaphysical claims, presented as obvious, including (a) that there is a stock of basic entities (‘objects'), the ultimate constituents both of our world and of all merely possible worlds; (b) that certain combinations of these entities actually exist, forming atomic fact; and (c) that all other facts that make up the real world are constructed… on the basis of these logical ones" (Horwich (2012), 76). Further, these ‘objects' are "indivisible, [and] necessarily-existent… [They] may be combined with a variety of other basic objects to make a variety of atomic facts- where the possibility of a given combination depends on the intrinsic nature of the objects…. [Thus,] [a]n atomic fact is then a purely logical combination of such entities" (*ibid*, 78-79). In other words, Wittgenstein's ‘objects,' in virtue of being the sorts of objects they are (their logical type) have certain internal properties that determine what sorts of concatenations that they can enter into. In this key, Hutto's metaphor of legos is quite helpful (Hutto

(2005 a), 67 & 222-25). Specific legos can concatenate with some legos and not others, in virtue of the type of lego they are. It is in this sense that simple "objects fit into one another like the links of a chain" (TLP 2.03).

From here, and granting that these ‘objects' exist in this manner, a simple name- i.e. the terms one ends up with at the ground floor of logical analysis (e.g., NB 50)- denotes one of these objects. Thus, "each [simple] name refers to a simple ‘object'" (Horwich (2005), 160) and, thus, simple names are "correlated with objects" (Hutto (2005 a), 60). In turn, this correlation of simple names and ‘objects' ensures that the names have the same internal properties of the ‘objects' they refer to. In other words, the simple names denote the ‘objects' in such a way that the former mirrors the internal properties of the later. Thus, a simple "name means an object. The object is its meaning" (TLP 3.203). Notice, however, that these simple names do not as yet represent anything.

To fill in this lacuna and account for the representational aspect of language, we should note that an "elementary proposition ‘depicts' a possible ‘atomic' fact" (Horwich (2005), 160). This is because the simple names that constitute an elementary proposition can "act as proxy for the elements they depict in the state of affairs in question… It is this feature that underwrites the possibility of representing the world accurately or inaccurately by means of a picture" (Hutto (2005 a), 58). Indeed, it is exactly because simple names in elementary propositions and ‘objects' in atomic facts "ultimately share the logic form of what is depicted" that the concatenation of one can represent the concatenation of the other (*ibid* 59). Notice that a few other features flow from this.

First, an elementary proposition, thus construed, is inherently bipolar. In effect, since the "general for of a proposition is: this is how things stand" (TLP 4.5), any elementary proposition will represent a possible atomic fact that can be either true or false, depending on how the world is. Second, this in no way tells us if some elementary proposition is, in fact, true or false. To establish this, we must see if the actual atomic fact that obtains is matched or fails to match the picture the elementary proposition shows us (e.g., TLP 2.21). Third, "nonsense" is not monistic and includes, in addition to signs that have not been assigned a referent (e.g. "ksldj"), ill-formed formulas. In effect, since "[t]o represent a fact, a proposition cannot simply be a conglomerate of words… They [the words] must be put together in the right way" (Hutto (2005), 68). Fourth, complex propositions "will be logically determined by the

truth values of elementary propositions" (Horwich (2012), 84). In other words, a logical operator like '&' does not refer to some logical object but is a short hand for arrangements of truth-values between propositions- e.g. '&' is the configuration (TFFF) (TLP 4.211 & 5.134. Also see Horwich (2012), 87). In turn, fifth, "each legitimate [complex] proposition is the result of successive application of the usual logical operators to elementary propositions…. Thus he is able to do what… he said he was aiming to do: namely 'to set a limit to thought, or rather, not to thought but to the expression of thoughts'" (Horwich (2012), 87). In other words, any legitimate complex proposition is simply an iterated application of logical operators to elementary propositions. Seventh, these logical operators allow for logically true (tautologies) or false (contradictions) complex propositions that are limiting cases of representation and so are senseless.[29]

In turn, these features account for how the TLP attempts to ban any sort of theory construction in philosophy. To see this, assume that "philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its base" (NB p. 106). From this, a philosophical theory is best construed as a theory of logic. However, such a viewpoint assumes that "metaphysically speaking, the subject matter of logic had to be purely factual. Logical forms and principles… were just facts about the world, although quite general ones… [In turn, a] direct consequence of regarding logic to have a factual status is… to treat it as legitimate that quarry for metaphysical theorizing and speciation… like any other factual domain" (Hutto (2005 a), 30). Thus, much as physics utilizes theories to investigate the quantum realm, philosophy can utilize a theory to figure out, e.g., what sorts of logical forms there are. Indeed, Russell seems to think in this manner when he notes that in logic one can discover "a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo, not another member of our former species but a new species" (Russell (1956), 226).

Pace this, according to the anti-theoretical interpretation, the TLP attempts to show that such an understanding of logic is grossly flawed and problematic for a host of interconnected reasons. For our purposes, the critical note is that the TLP maintains that "logic is inherent in the very fabric of thought and cannot exist independently" (Hutto (2005 a), 42). Further, "logic cannot inform us about the world…tautologies do not represent any possible state of affairs" (*ibid* 43). Indeed, "there can be no

[29] Technically speaking, senseless propositions do not picture anything. Indeed, on orthodox construals of logic, this is quite right as "John is nice or it is not the case that John is nice" and "5 is prime, or it is not the case that five is prime" end up being, logically equivalent.

science of logic, for it lacks a subject matter of its own that can be properly articulated" (*ibid*, 45). Thus, a key problem with such a factual construal of logic, and the related assumption that theory construction can play a role is that it takes logic to be about things and different from language, thought, and reality, in a way it is most decidedly not. As it were, there is no real room for a "theory of logic" as logic is constitutively connected to thought, language, and reality itself (i.e., "My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world" NB p. 79).

With this in view, we can attempt to make sense what the TLP is trying to do. In other words, if the TLP does not present us with a theory of logic, then what does it take itself to do? To begin, "legitimate philosophical activity must be confined to conceptual clarification and the disillusion of pseudo-problems" (Horwich (2012), 77). It attempts to achieve both goals by presenting "us with an alternative notation, designed to discourage our tendency to treat Russellian notation as if its symbols for logical constants named objects" (Hutto (2005 a), 47). Indeed, anti-theoretical philosophy argues that the TLP is meant to "be merely clarificatory elucidations… those elucidations are merely pointers designed to remind us of that we ought already to know. In this respect, Wittgenstein specifically contrasts them with the kind of factual statements that are meant to typify the corpus of the natural sciences" (Hutto (2004), 134). In other words, the TLP is not put forward as a theory of logic, a set of faux-propositions, or rhetorical ploys. Rather, the hope is that philosophy becomes "nothing but clarification of our thoughts on particular occasions, achieved by means of elucidation" (Hutto (2005 a), 77).

Tragically, however, this hope could not be realized. Specifically, this laudable attempt to merely elucidate what we already know is spoiled by a robust and substantial metaphysics combined with an insistence that language's only purpose is representing. Further, both are underwritten by a mythologized account of how denoting works. Indeed, both Hutto (2005), 100-27, and Horiwch (2012), 96-104, point out that it is precisely these aspects of the TLP that are attacked in the PI. To see this clearly, notice that "[t]he Tractatus meta-philosophy involves the following sequence of ideas:

(1) Philosophical questions are provoked by confusion

(2) Therefore they articulate pseudoproblems which can at best be eliminated and not solved

(3) Consequently, no philosophical explanations, theories or discovers are possible

(4) Philosophical confusions originate in misunderstandings about language

(5) To be more specific, such confusions arise because of the considerable distance between the superficial forms of certain propositions and their ultimate analyses in terms of fundamental primitives. For example, ‘The F is G' should be analyzed, following Russell, as '$\exists$ x (Fx & (y) (Fy→x=y) & Gx).' This distance can be so great that we can easily fail to appreciate a statement's real meaning. (Horwich (2005), 164).

(1)-(4) seems like claims that may not depend on a "theory" in a problematic sense. However, (5) is deeply problematic. Notice, first, that (5) relies on the heavy-duty aspects of the TLP- it presupposes that a proposition can be analyzed into simple names, that these refer to ‘objects', that the surface grammar of the sentence may fail to present the true structure of a proposition properly, and that Russell's way of analyzing is fundamentally the correct method to uncover the real propositional form. Indeed, even more problematically, these assumptions make up a fairly robust and substantive theory of language and, pursuant to this, a theoretical account of what nonsense is. Thus, paradoxically, "Wittgenstein prohibits philosophical theorizing on the basis of a philosophy theory" (Horwich (2005), 163). In turn, such an odd account betokens "a further and deeper threat of incoherence within Wittgenstein's position- one that would not be relieved by a show/say distinction, even if such a thing could be made out" (*ibid*).

However, much as Dante's journey through hell would bring him, eventually, to heaven, so too does the failure of the TLP end in a viable, robust, and consistent metaphilosophical method in the PI, according to the anti-theoretical account. Explicitly, the critical move is rejecting (5) and the latent theory it carries with it. Further, to support this claim, the anti-theoretical account stresses that Wittgenstein's rejection of (5) accounts for why the PI attacks the points in the TLP it does. Thus, Wittgenstein takes pains to show that the denoting relation between simple names and ‘objects' is mythical in his earlier work (e.g., PI § 1- § 15 &, esp, § 40- § 45. See also Horwich (2012), 97-8; Hutto (2005 a),104), that language cannot be reduced to its representational aspect (e.g., PI § 114 see also Horwich (2012), 96-7; Hutto (2005 a),

97), that the conception of ‘objects' as eternal and simple cannot be made sense of (e.g., PI § 40 see also Horwich (2012), 98-99, Hutto (2005 a), 105-106). In other words, though the TLP is tragic, the play is not yet over. It is to the second act we now turn.

3.1 Later Wittgenstein's Consistent Method Against Theory:

With this in place, we can examine how later Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology achieves his metaphilosophical aim without presupposing any theory of its own. However, this may seem slightly paradoxical.[30] To wit, can Wittgenstein put forward a consistent philosophical methodology that does not rely on a theory in the first place? First, I examine the arguments that the anti-theoretical account puts forward to answer this question. With this done, second, I turn to the methodology that the anti-theoretical account ascribes to Wittgenstein. I argue it has three steps. Third, granting that this method is successful, I argue that Wittgenstein has problematized the role of "theory" in philosophical investigations because science and philosophy are simply different in kind. In effect, science is simply too different from philosophy and any analogical extension of “theory” from one to the other is inherently problematic.

To begin, the idea of an anti-theoretical methodology may strike the reader as something of a contradiction in terms. Indeed, it seems plausible to argue that methodology presupposes theory and, pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of showing that theory is out of place in philosophy will always fall prey to a profound, internal incoherence. To meet this challenge, we need to define "theory" in a more specific manner. An apt definition is that "by a theory, Wittgenstein has in mind a hypothesis about some non-evident reality- an attempt to unearth facts that are not out in the open, that cannot be discerned merely from looking in the right direction" (Horwich (2012), 64). Notice, first, that such a definition of theory does not seem to count as a theoretical claim by its own lights. Indeed, when contrasted with, e.g., the logical positivist view of a “theory” as an uninterpreted syntactic system of propositions that gains content only by correlation with propositions given in an observational vocabulary (e.g., Feigl (1970)), the anti-

[30] Indeed, a case can be made that Wittgenstein succumbs to the ‘myth of mere method’ (e.g. Glock (2017)).

theoretical definition of “theory” looks positively intuitive. Further, *Merriam-Webster American English Dictionary* defines "theory" as "a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain a phenomenon-the wave theory of light." Thus, this conception of "theory" is a rather standard everyday one rather than a technical term of art. Second, it is also important to note that a claim not being theoretical does not ipso facto mean that it is "indisputable. For even phenomena that are perfectly open to view, may, for a variety of reasons, not be noticed and therefore be disputed" (Horwich (2012), 64). Granting this fairly intuitive, and non-theoretical, conception of "theory," it is possible to offer a non-theoretical methodology to show that philosophical theorization is problematic. What is critical, however, is that this methodology must not utilize any sort of theoretical terms, assumptions, etc. Instead, it must draw solely on descriptions of things that lay open to view, utilize reminders, and so on. In sum, the methodology must conform to what Wittgenstein says in PI § 108- § 35.

With this in view, we turn to the methodology that the anti-theoretical account ascribes to Wittgenstein. As we shall see, this anti-theoretical methodology relies on common sense to remind us both that philosophy is different in kind from science and that, pursuant to this, any attempt to redeploy "theory" from science into philosophy, misfires. This methodology consists of three interrelated moves. First, Wittgenstein reminds us of features that are obviously in play within scientific research where “theory” is utilized properly. These features, as we shall see, do not depend on specialized knowledge but on rather truistic claims like "science rests on observation" or "science explains phenomena." Second, Wittgenstein elaborates these claims in a common sense way. For example, "if science rests on observation, then the observed elements are the sorts of things we can see, slam, poke, etc." Third, Wittgenstein points out that philosophical investigation lacks these features, for common sense reasons that are obvious and open to view. In particular, there are four features of scientific research and theory construction that the anti-theoretical account of Wittgenstein focuses on. These are: (a) the nature of data and observation; (b) the role of explanation; (c) the idea of convergence on method, theories, knowledge, etc.; (d) the possibility of radical revision.

I note here that I avoid many critical, and critically interesting, debates in philosophy of science concerning, e.g., the nature and role of explanation, the complex interdependencies between theory, observation, raw and treated data, and so

on, and assume a "common sense" view that most educated non-scientist would agree to. Though this does grossly simplify and misconstrue many critical aspects of science[31], assuming a common sense view is grits to anti-theoretical metaphilosophy's mill. I should also note that this anti-theoretical criticism "targets a certain traditionally dominant form of philosophy that, although self-consciously not scientific, is shaped by the theoretical goals and methods of reasoning that closely resemble those the sciences. I'll be calling it ‘T-philosophy' to suggest ‘traditional' and ‘theoretical'" (Horwich (2015), 130). Further, T-philosophy " t-philosophical theories are not scientific, they are scientistic" (Horwich (2012), 24). In other words, T-philosophy attempts to put forward theories that are analogically akin to scientific theories. I follow Horwich in using T-philosophy for the specific target. We return to the scope of this in section 3.3a, b. Finally, note that the anti-theoretical account is "not straightforwardly exegetical. That is to say, I am less concerned to establish my interpretation is the correct one" (Hutto (2005 a), 2). Indeed, its aim is "not to offer an interpretation of his [Wittgenstein's] notoriously cryptic pronouncements but a sympathetic development of them" (Horwich (2016), 2).

(a) One critical feature of scientific practice is the role of data and observation. From a common sense perspective, science "gets its hands dirty" and the scientific method begins with observation. We consider two interconnected components of this. First, observation and the data derived from it is not "from the armchair." Instead, it is a posteriori. Second, these data constrain theoretical speculation. This is particularly stressed from a common sense perspective. If a scientist puts forward a pet theory, and an observation conflicts with it, it is on the scientist to modify or drop her theory.

Granting this construal of data and observation, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy reminds us that t-philosophy has no plausible candidate that meets these conditions and, ergo, does not make observations and has no data in any sense akin to science. First, from a common sense perspective, we do not observe possible worlds like we do penguins, we do not see conceptual connections like we do carbon reactions, etc. Pursuant to this, since observation is a non-starter, the most likely

[31] I should stress that I find many of the views I outline here untenable from a philosophy of science perspective. For example, the idea that "data" floats in the world in a pre-theoretic state (e.g. Longino (1990), 38-61, for a significant criticism), the idea that if a theory conflicts with evidence, we drop the theory (e.g., Lakatos (1980), for how deleterious this assumption would be if implemented), the assumption that there is THE scientific method that is trans-historic and applicable to everything from quantum physics to macroeconomics (Feyerabend (2010), for a powerful criticism).

candidate to play the role of data in T-philosophy are "so-called intuitive judgments- for example, that planets must be located in space and time… Such facts play the role that in science is played by the observed data" (Horwich (2012) 3). However, such philosophical "data" is "not scientific. Instead of sensory perceptions [or other a posteriori evidence], one relies upon basic a priori convictions (so-called 'a priori intuitions')" (*ibid* 25). Indeed, such a reliance on a priori intuition seems to simply assume that these intuitions are veridical, universal, trans-cultural, and so on. However, critically, there is "considerable disagreement in our intuitions" (Hutto (2005 b), 4). Further, "our linguo-conceptual practices, and the basic a priori commitments associated with them, are extremely messy" (Horwich (2012), 35). This is partly because "our concepts exhibit a highly theory-resistant complexity and variability. They evolved, not for the sake of science and its objectives, but rather in order to cater to the interacting contingencies of our nature, our culture, our environment, our communicative needs and other purposes" (Horwich (2015), 292-93). Granting this, it is rather doubtful if an intuition can play the role of "data" at all. If there are considerable variations culturally, historically, interpersonally, and so on, no reason to assume a deep unity (and good reasons to assume a lack of unity- e.g. PI § 23 & § 24), no public and intersubjective access and means to "calibrate" intuitions, etc., it is opaque why we should call them "data" in the first place. Worst of all, however, the assumption that intuition has a veridical relationship with the world is itself rather problematic.[32]

A possible retort to this is that scientific data is very messy as well. This is true. However, it is imperative to keep in mind that in science, the messiness of data is dealt with in a particular set of ways. Ideally, a scientist "looks for, and often finds, simplicity at some deeper level… the superficial facts [e.g., the apparent messiness of the data] are then explained as the causal products of simply underlying laws in combination with messily varied spatio-temporal array of particular circumstances" (Horwich (2012), 36). Further, this finer-grained level often relies on "postulat[ing] an underlying unobservable realm in which simple regularity really does hold- And, by combining this segularity [sic] with an ineliminably messy array of extraneous factors he aims to explain all the observed phenomena" (*ibid*, 37). This is not a viable methodology when one is dealing with features that are not spatio-temporal or causal.

[32] Djordjevic (2018), though as ever long-winded, argues this point passably well.

Further, though science does exclude outliers, it does so in a principled and public manner (e.g., statistically analysis, keeping track of ceteris paribus assumptions, and so on). In contrast, T-philosophy has the habit of "allowing simplicity to trump data—but with no attempt to explain how those data could be mistaken" (*ibid*, 46). In other words, in T-philosophy, a T-philosopher does not so much deal with the messiness of her data as gerrymander in such a way that she excludes it.

Second data constrains theories in science. Bracketing many niceties and sticking to a common sense conception, if a scientist puts forward a theory, and the data conflicts with this theory, then the scientist needs to modify or abandon the theory in light of the data. By contrast, this feature is hard to make sense of with respect to T-philosophical intuitions and theories. Indeed, "[i]s this idea really plausible [for a priori intuitions and T-philosophy theories]? For example, consider a parallel worry about using proofs and arguments to settle issues of substantial philosophical concern objectively… the success of the proof and its putative refutation were built into the reception of the premises that supposedly enable us to draw our final conclusion… the success of proofs involves making practical decisions; it is never the result of a purely objective process" (Hutto (2005 a), 198). For example, consider "Parmenides' argument for a monistic account of Being…. Parmenides was aware of the common view that things change, even though he denied it (his first premise) whereas Aristotle based his counter-argument on accepting it [i.e., the common intuition] that things change" (*ibid* 197-8). It is critical to note here that Parmenides's arguments did not confute Aristotle's intuition in the way that data constrain a theory. Granting this, we should be "suspicious of the idea that there could be an identifiable independent standard against which to assess the correctness" (*ibid* 199). In other words, intuition does not properly constrain a T-philosophical theory construction. We are as likely to dispute an argument, as we are to give up an intuition.

(b) Another common sense feature of science is that it offers explanations. Again, sticking with common sense, there are two features of this. First, science often explains a complex phenomenon by reducing it to some more basic elements and their regular connections and interactions. Thus, a "common and fruitful scientific practice" explains "the characteristics of whole systems in terms of the properties of their parts and how those parts are arranged with respect to one another" (Horwich (2016), 135). Further, this reduction allows us to see those seemingly desperate phenomena are all

simply different configurations of the lower level elements and connections. Indeed, "[s]ubstantial gains in simplicity are often achieved… because a plethora of complex systems… turn out to be construed by different arrangements of relativity few common parts" (*ibid*). Thus a scientific explanation unifies desperate phenomena by showing that they all reduce to the same basic common parts and regularities. Second, from a common sense perspective, a scientific explanation has something to do with experiments and so, probably, with causes.

Granting this common-sense view of explanation, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy maintains that all both features are not mirrored in T-philosophy. To work in reverse order, second, a T-philosophical explanation does not depend on experiments and has very little to do with causes, from a common sense perspective. A reader may demur and insist that, e.g., the current push toward xphi and its use of a posteriori methods in philosophy undermine this common sense claim (e.g., Knobe & Nichols (2007), 3-14). Critically, though, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy notes "this complaint would be inappropriate since there has been no suggestion here that "philosophy" can't be properly applied to empirical projects. The claim was merely that there is a traditional and still prevalent conception of the subject (T-philosophy) which requires a priority and this is the conception that was Wittgenstein's target" (Horwich (2012), 23). In other words, though xphi, say, might be empirical, it is exactly because it is empirical that it should not count as "T-philosophy."

Furthermore, and to defend this common sense perspective in a less terminological manner, it is quite clear that one does not build a machine to test possible events in metaphysics, one does not construct 'painting colliders' to study the 'beauty-ions' that paintings emit in aesthetics, and so on. Relatedly, common sense can also make a simple note about T-philosophical education itself. To wit, there are no T-philosophy labs in universities, T-philosophical methods rarely emphasize statistics at an undergraduate level, T-philosophers are normally not trained to conduct experiments, and so on. Thus, the claim that T-philosophical explanation does not have to do with experiments or causes seems prima facie defensible.

For explanation as unification, however, matters are not as clear-cut. Indeed a T-philosopher may argue that, in point of fact, T-philosophical explanations do just this. For example, she may point out that T-philosophical research has shown that much of the desperate and complicated stuff we do with and in natural language can be explained/reduces to a unified truth-theoretical semantics. Further, she may point

out that we have made progress here- showing, e.g., that the subjunctive mood can be assimilated into such a theory. Alternatively, a T-philosopher may note that conceptual analysis aims to do precisely this- explain a complex notion like "knowledge" in terms of more basic parts like "truth" "justification" and "belief." Let us, again, work in reverse order. For conceptual analysis, such a reductive account has been supplemented and revised, powerfully, by Strawson's (1992), 17-28, and connective analysis. In other words, illuminating our conceptual network is not best thought of reduction of "complex ideas" to "simple ideas" or analyzing terms into independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but mapping out interconnections between ideas or terms (cf. PI § 67). Further, as Glock (2017 b) notes, connective analysis needs to be mindful of inherently "contested concepts" (98) as well as sensitive to the interplay between empirical and conceptual (*passim*). Granting this supplemented conceptual analysis, it is not at all clear if an impure connective analysis aims at the sort of reductive explanation that common sense, for better or worse, imputes to science.

For the logical unification, the devil will be in what, precisely, such unification enables. Though such a logical unification will certainly be rigorous and rely on sophisticated mathematical logic, "what is the point of rigour without relevance?" (Horwich (2013), 22e). For example, Ptolemy's system of epicycles-within-epicycles-on-top-of-more-epicycles[33] is certainly is far more mathematically complex and sophisticated than Copernicus's system and Ptolemy does unify the motions of the heavenly spheres into a single framework. However, as Copernicus notes, "[o]n the contrary, their [acolytes of Ptolemy's system] experience was just like some one taking from various places hands, feet, a head, and other pieces, very well depicted, it may be, but not for the representation of a single person; since these fragments would not belong to one another at all, a monster rather than a man would be put together from them. Hence in the process of demonstration or 'method,' as it is called, those who employed eccentrics [i.e., epicycles] are found either to have omitted something essential or to have admitted something extraneous and wholly irrelevant" (Copernicus (2003), 10). Copernicus's point here, and a valuable lesson from the history of science more generally, is that byzantine complexity often

[33] Indeed, Alfonso the X wryly noted that, commenting on the Ptolemaic system's rather obscene use of epicycles, "had I been present at the Creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."

betokens ad hocery, not progressive unification. Indeed, such complexity need not be read as revealing unity but as gerrymandering our formalism. Succinctly, progressive unification is not identical to monster-making. Furthermore, this point is especially aligned with common sense. When an account becomes too complex, intricate, "sophisticated," people often, and rightly, claim to smell a rat.

(c) The third feature of science is that the scientific community converges on acceptable theories, methods, results, and so on. From a common sense perspective, convergence has two interdependent features. First, the more advanced a science is, the more the scientists agree with one another. Indeed, from the perspective of common sense, a striking feature about the physics community, say, is broad agreement on seemingly startling claims. Further, common sense also notes that for less advanced sciences like sociology, this agreement does not seem to be as pronounced. Second, pursuant to this, scientists working in more advanced sciences tend to work in the same sorts of way. They use the same machines, methods, the same fancy-Dan math, talk in the same weird technical jargon, and so on.

When we turn to T-philosophy, neither of these conditions is met. Indeed, "[e]ventual rational convergence is an item of faith" (Horwich (2012), 43). First, clearly, philosophers do not agree, even on the most basic assumptions, methodologies, "theories," etc. This intuition of common sense can be borne out in two ways. One, one needs only open a philosophy journal to see how widely disagreement and debate spread, even concerning seemingly basic elements. Two, on sociological grounds, Chalmers (2015) notes that no proposed answer to a core philosophical question has reached universal acceptance. For example, external world skepticism is still considered a challenge by 18% of analytic philosophers. Kant's scandal, it seems, has yet to be adequately addressed. In sum, this lack of agreement is perhaps most clearly seen in a joke my mother, a paragon of common sense, is very fond of. To wit, "what do you get when you put two philosophers in a room? Three opinions."

Second, a striking feature of philosophical investigation is that there simply is no agreement about what constitutes an apt or proper method, a set, and standardized jargon, etc. Perhaps this can most clearly be seen on philosophy's inability to establish a "canon" of paradigmatic thinkers whose methods and jargon philosophers should emulate. Thus, is Hegel's dialectical logic best viewed as a the dying gasp of Aristotelian logic mixed with an unhealthy dose of obscurantism (e.g. Russell (1967),

730-746) or as genius methodology so far ahead of its time that formal logic is only just now catching up with it (e.g., Brandom (2008), *passim*, Priest (1989))? Is phenomenology as Heidegger conducts it merely dissimulation of pseudo-intellectual nonsense (e.g., Carnap (1932)) or is it a powerful way of bringing out the importance of embodiment and situationality (e.g., Druyfus (1992), *passim*)? And so on. Further, even when one restricts attention to one particular current in philosophy- "analytic philosophy"- one finds exactly this pattern repeated. Is the renaissance of metaphysics the best bet we have to make philosophy, finally, scientific as, e.g., Williamson (2008), 278-292, argues or is it a horrible degeneration and retreat from the most important insights of early analytic philosophy as, e.g., Hacker (1996 b), 228-73, claims? Worst, however, when viewed in these lights, philosophy is even more problematic than pre-paradigmatic science. For example, the "electricians," despite their acrimonious theoretical disagreements, at least agreed on their target (e.g., Kuhn (2012), 14-18). By contrast, it is unclear what the proper target of philosophy is. Indeed, the bemusement common sense feels when philosophy cannot provide an adequate self-definition betokens this.

(d) The final feature common sense imputes to science is that it is potentially radically revisionary. This can be seen in two interdependent ways. First, common sense knows that science often replaces, root and branch, one research program with another. For example, Newton replaced Aristotle, Fodor et al. replaced Skinner, chemistry replaced alchemy, etc. Second, common sense accepts that science can revise its own opinions concerning various matters. Indeed, part of why the supposed religion/science debate is so heated is precisely because, though it seems as though life is designed, most educated people accept that biology has proven it is not.

This is, perhaps, the most debatable point that the anti-theoretical methodology raises against t-philosophy. Indeed, Wittgenstein, in particular, is very sensitive to the fact that grammatical-cum-philosophical statements and empirical statements can shift (Glock (1996 a) provides a nuanced account). In any case, granting that these sorts of conceptual revisions are possible, "why shouldn't philosophy simply proceed after the fashion of science? Put simply, if we are open to the possibility of radical change in our scientific conceptions, then why shouldn't we also think that philosophy can deal with its troubles in this way?" (Hutto (2005 a), 207). Indeed, if we can replace "philosophy" with some more progressive program in the same way Newton's physics replaced Aristotle's, perhaps the above worries can be

obviated. Philosophy the day after tomorrow, after such a revolution, may outgrow it seemly eternal infancy and, at last, find the sure path to science.[34] However, critically, "[w]ith respect to such [T-philosophical] matters, there is no possibility of conceptual revision because they cannot be fully conceptually framed. Here there is no question of revision. With respect to the most fundamental issues, those of meaning, mind and logic… change is not an option. To change our 'minds' or our 'logic' would not be merely a conceptual alteration… it would be nothing short than a complete change of our form of life" (*ibid* 214). This is partly because "our fundamental concerns cannot be addressed by empirical investigation… there is no justification when we hit bedrock that forms the very foundation of our practices" (*ibid*). In other words, the features that T-philosophy addresses are different in kind than those of science (cf. PI § 109, TLP 4.111). It seems that part of this inability to radically revise comes from our inability to drop "the manifest image" and still rely on concepts like "persons", "solid objects," and so on (e.g., Sellars (2007), 369-86). For example, it is unclear what would be left over in, e.g., action theory, ethics, or political philosophy, if we revised the concept "person" in light of an eliminative neuroscience. And, more importantly, it becomes opaque what such a brave new world with no people in it, would even look like. Revising the concept "person" ramifies far more quickly and deeply than revising Aristotle's theory of the heavens, say. And, in any case, it isn't clear if we can drop less fundamental features of the manifest image. Indeed we still say "sunset."

In turn, these four reminders give Wittgenstein a set of very good, and very common sense, reasons to repudiate "theory" in T-philosophy. Indeed, being reminded of the presence of the four features discussed above in science, and Wittgenstein pointing out their obvious lack in T-philosophy, should lead us to view "philosophical theory" as something of a misnomer (e.g., Horwich (2016), 13, & Hutto (2005 b), 10). In effect, scientific research is just too different from philosophical investigation to support the assumption that we can analogically reposition "theory" from its scientific home into a T-philosophical one (cf. PI § 116). Succinctly, granting that science and T-philosophy are different in kind, there is very little reason to expect any analogy from one to the other will be apt. However, notice

[34] This hope is something of a leitmotif in certain metaphilosophical circles. If we can just work harder (e.g., Williamson (2007), 278-92), be more Frege-an (Dummett (1981), discard the metaphysics of the stone age (e.g., Russell (1913)), etc., we will find the sure royal road to science.

that this inability to construct theories in philosophy gives us, as yet, no direct guidance on what to do with philosophy per se. In other words, once we realize that we cannot have theories in philosophy, what should we do with philosophy? Is there anything salvageable in philosophy or should it be abandoned completely by all but intellectual historians? It is to these questions we now turn.

3.2 Two End Games:

Granting that the above two sections are correct- that Wittgenstein had very justifiable, and non-theoretical, reasons to object to theories in philosophy and that Wittgenstein held this anti-theoretical metaphilosophy throughout his career- we now turn to the positive ramifications. In other words, if T-philosophy cannot offer us theories, be scientific, etc., what can it do correctly? Here, anti-theoretical philosophy can legitimately impute to Wittgenstein two distinct answers. One of these, the end-of-philosophy account, answers this in a wholly negative way. In effect, what Wittgenstein has put before us should lead us to conclude that T-philosophy is entirely irrational. Granting this, and further assuming that T-philosophy is the "traditionally dominant form of philosophy " (Horwich (2015), 130), the best we can do is "deconstruct" failed attempts at T-philosophical theory construction and then, eventually, just walk away. T-philosophy is a non-starter, and it is irrational for us to keep plugging along after Wittgenstein's intervention. I discuss this in section 3.3a and criticise it in 3.3b. The other, a form-of-life account, answer that what we should start doing from here is a form of philosophical anthropology. In this endgame, we happily accept that theories are out of place and the T-philosophy is moribund. However, the form-of-life account reimagines the role of philosophical investigations along wholly descriptive lines. In other words, just because philosophy cannot do theories, it is not eo ipso irrational or useless. There are other things it can usefully do. I discuss this in section 3.3c and criticise it in 3.3d.

3.2.a Horwich's End Game: The-End-of-Philosophy:

Horwich ascribes to Wittgenstein a unique endgame. To bring this into view, it is best to ask what led us to begin to attempt to do something as obviously

problematic as T-philosophy as well as why T-philosophy has continued, despite these open to view defects. For Horwich, the critical answer to both questions is irrationality. Indeed, "the trouble with philosophical theories and questions is [not] our having unwittingly lapsed into nonsense. For he [an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher] can suppose, much less contentiously, that their true defect is irrationality… their objectionable feature is not meaninglessness. It's that the commitments… are ill-motivated and facilitate nothing worthwhile… we have no good reason to embrace those commitments" (Horwich (2010), 149). Further, this irrationality causes confusion and is exactly what gives life to attempts at theorization in T-philosophy. Indeed, all T-philosophical theorization "is prompted by confusion rather than ignorance. In such cases, had we been thinking properly, we would have been able to tell that, initial appearances to the contrary, no fact is implicitly indicated, no fact is at issue" (Horwich (2012), 171). Granting this, "the uncomfortable truth is that paradoxes [e.g., T-philosophical problems] are blameworthy confusions in us, not bizarre features of the world; and so, instead of marveling at them… we ought to be trying to understand where we have gone astray [i.e., what irrational commitments we have]" (*ibid* 47).

Let us examine this more closely. First, I discuss how, for Horwich, Wittgenstein puts forward an account of the vicious dynamic at play between confusion, irrationality, and attempts at T-philosophical theorization. Second, I briefly touch on Horwich's micro-methodology that aims to break this dynamic and to expose specific T-philosophical theories as irrational, confused, and so flawed root and branch that they should be abandoned. Finally, I consider what, if anything, is left of philosophy after we have excised our confusions, returned to sanity, and left theorization behind in philosophy.

To begin, Horwich notes that the "fundamental source of this irrationality is scientism" (Horwich (2015), 137). Indeed, it is exactly this "science worship" that leads us to try to apply the methods of science to a field that is decidedly non-scientific. Further, this point is exegetically well attested to in Wittgenstein. Indeed, Wittgenstein's invectives against "science-worship" and our culture's rather odd need to "explain" everything in "scientific" terms, is well documented (e.g., NB p. 51, TLP 6.4321, PO p. 125, PR *preface*, and so on). To quote a passage Horwich returns to

often[35], "[o]ur craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws…. Philosophy constantly see the method of science before them are and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics [or T-philosophy] and leads the philosopher into complete darkness" (BlBK 18). Further, if the work done in chapter 3.1 is compelling, Wittgenstein is quite right to condemn this form of scientism as irrational. Indeed, T-philosophical investigation is simply too different in kind from scientific research for us to hold out any hope that the latter can fruitfully inform the former. In sum, T-philosophy is not science, we know it is not science, but we insist on trying to emulate science because *we really like science!* This is irrational.

In turn, this irrational preconception generates the confusion Horwich mentioned above.[36] Though Horwich is rather vague on what sort of confusion he has in mind, the most apt gloss is that he has in mind a sort of pragmatic confusion. By "pragmatic confusion" I mean we attempt to achieve a goal using a method that runs cross-purposes to it. For example, I may attempt to reach my goal of buying a new computer by walking to a hardware store. Since the hardware store does not sell computers, my goal and method come apart and I confuse myself and everyone else in the process. Notice also that pragmatic confusion is distinct from "semantic confusion"- i.e., not knowing what certain terms mean or various sorts of category mistakes.

In terms of T-philosophy, Horwich thinks T-philosophy's purported goal is gaining objective theoretical knowledge of various "phenomena [that] strike us as puzzlingly non-naturalistic- as peculiarly hard to place within the vast network of objects and properties bearing spatial, temporal, causal, and explanatory relations to one another" (Horwich (2016), 3). Moreover, the method that T-philosophy then attempts to rely on to gain knowledge of the phenomena is "'scientistic': that is to say… methods that lie behind them are inspired by, and modeled upon, those of empirical sciences. The object, as in science, is deep truth… fundamental principles that will explain relatively superficial facts" (Horwich (2012), 24). In other words, T-

[35] e.g. Horwich (2012), 20 fn 1; (2015), 137; (2016), 19.
[36] "Confusion" is something of a motif in his metaphilosophical reflections. See Horwich (2004:, 163-171); (2010: 149-52); (2012: vii-xv & 1-18 [through the entire book elaborates this]; (2013); (2015).

philosophy attempts to employ scientific theory to explain decidedly non-naturalistic features of the world. Horwich notes, rightly from my perspective, that this misalignment of using methods designed to handle the natural world for problems that are different in kind than natural scientific ones, misfires (e.g., Horwich (2012), 21-44). In turn, this misfiring generates deep pragmatic confusion. In other words, much as the goal of buying a computer and the method of walking to a hardware store (*because we really like hardware stores!*), will misfire, and cause confusion on the part of the shopper and the salesperson, so too do the attempts at building theories in T-philosophy.

Finally, the pragmatic confusion that our irrational preconception produces ends up reinforcing T-philosophy in a perverse way. To see this clearly, it is best to reflect on how our irrational need to rely on the methods of science for decidedly non-scientific problems, causes us to willfully distort both what the "methods of science" are as well as the target of investigation. Specifically, T-philosophy insists that an apt T-philosophical theory "must have a certain generality and depth" (Horwich (2012), 21). Both "generality" and "depth" are critical, so let us take each in turn.

For "generality," T-philosophy assumes that the various phenomena T-philosophy examines should have some lower level simplicity and unity. For example, recall in 3.1 that T-philosophy insisted, despite historical evidence, sociological surveys, interpersonal variation, and so on, that our supposed a priori intuitions are unified, trans-cultural, veridical, etc. T-philosophy makes this problematic assumption exactly because it wants to apply a "scientific" methodology that shows "a plethora of complex systems, each one tending to behave somewhat different from the others, often turn out to be construed by different arrangements of relatively few parts" (Horwich (2016), 7). However, this simply parodies the methods of science. In effect, a scientist does not begin by stipulating that, despite appearances, apples falling, moons orbiting, and tides coming in, are really governed by the same simple laws. Rather, she arrives at this insight. As it were, simplicity in science is an ideal end, not a pre-assumed pre-condition for scientific research. Indeed, the ever witty and ever insightful Duhem makes exactly this point (Duhem (1982), 7-18). In contrast, T-philosophy has the "policy- allowing simplicity to override data" and "recalcitrant intuitions are blithely deemed incorrect" (Horwich (2012), 37) since it is opaque how to use the scientific methodology of arriving at simplicity for non-natural targets. In other words, rather than dealing with data that

problematize the generalizations it makes, T-philosophy ignores most of them. As it were, whatever does not fit the T-philosophy theory is "wrong," "irrational," obscene," "purposefully contrarian," or, worst of all and heaven help us, "French." Thus, T-philosophy insists that its theory and the generalization the theory enables are not wrong; rather, most of the data is wrong. The sad irony of this is, perversely, that the recalcitrant data that a T-philosopher is willing to accept strikes her as grits to her mill. Indeed, as she deals with the acceptable recalcitrant data, her T-philosophy theory becomes ever more "sophisticated"- e.g., baroque, technical, byzantine, incorporating ever more indices, characters, and so on. Moreover, this monster-making, ad hocery, and gerrymandering strike the T-philosopher as a sign of the fruitfulness of her theory rather than a death knell.

For "depth" matters are, if anything, worse. To begin, targets for T-philosophical theorization are chosen because they "strike them [t-philosophers] as peculiarly pervasive, fundamental rich, and idiosyncratic." (*ibid*, 22). In turn, it is exactly these seemingly interesting, rich, idiosyncratic, etc., features that warrant a T-philosophical theory. So it is the point of a T-philosophical theory is to explore exactly these features. Notice here that there is a circularity afoot- we need T-philosophical theories for these phenomena because they are interesting and cry out for explanation and since these phenomena are interesting and cry out for an explanation, we need T-philosophical theories. Pace this, Horwich thinks the proper response is to deflate this seeming depth. To take his favorite, and powerful, example, consider truth.[37] It seems striking that: '<electrons are negatively charged> is true iff electrons are negatively charged'; '<Mr. Spock is Vulcan> is true iff Mr. Spock is Vulcan'; '<Sally is kind> is true iff Sally is kind.' Indeed, if we relax the propositional requirement, we may even be able to say '"The Nothing noths" is true iff the Nothing noths' and even '"Kaloo Kalay no work today" is true iff Kaloo Kalay no work today.' This seems shocking. The truth predicate applies to our best theories, fiction, psychological dispositions, and maybe even Heidegger and nonsense. However, all these examples show us is that truth is a device for generalization, and the "depth" it has is wholly exhausted by the schema '<p> is true iff p.' Indeed, demanding something more, some depth to the truth predicate is not only unwarranted

[37] See, e.g., See Horwich (1998 a) *passim*

but also patently wrong-headed.[38] One reason for this is that every attempt to give voice to this "depth" runs into insuperable problems fairly quickly. In any case, for our purposes, notice the circle that clearly emerges here. '<p> is true iff p' cannot exhaust the truth predicate because we want a rich and robust T-philosophical theory to explain it. Since we want a rich a robust philosophical T-theory to explain the truth predicate, it cannot simply be exhausted by '<p> is true iff p.' Also, the irrational commitment, the insistence that there must be more to it than this, is what provokes T-philosophical attempts at theorization. Further, it is irrational in that we do not know what this "more" really consists of and why we should want it. However, again, this insistence on depth has the sad irony of reinforcing T-philosophy.

Thus, the attempt to construct theories in T-philosophy, despite the apparent and open to view differences between T-philosophy and science, arises from an irrational will-to-science. In turn, the attempt to utilize (or ape) the methods of scientific research for decidedly non-scientific problems gives rise to confusion. Moreover, this confusion and the irrational commitment to scientism lead T-philosophy to distort both the target of her investigation and parody the methods of science. Further, all these combine in a perverse dynamic way and lead to the "conjuror's trick" (PI § 308) that get T-philosophical theorization going and keeps it going, despite clear difficulties and problems.

In closing, for Horwich, one key distortion that a T-philosophical theory relies on, and that make us forget their irrationality and keep going with them, is "a perverse exaggeration of linguistic analogies" (Horwich (2012), 19). In turn, these exaggerations are engendered by "the T-philosophers' demand for simplicity [which causes]… them to unreasonably overstretch the 'analogies between different regions of language'" (Horwich (2016), 5). Indeed, "the mistakes of perverse overgeneralizations… the fundamental source of this irrationality is scientism" (Horwich (2015), 137). This tendency to make deeply problematic analogies can be seen at each stage in the above, and they reinforce each other in a deeply problematic way. A T-philosopher begins by making a strange analogy between T-philosophy and science- i.e., her scientism. She then makes a confused analogy between the role of scientific theory- i.e., depth and generality- and her own use of theory. Moreover, this

[38] Horwich (1998 a) is the most sustained elaboration. However, Horwich (2010: 1-13) is a very apt introduction.

confused analogy reinforces her irrational commitments as the "queerness" (e.g., depth) of her target and her constant ad hoc modifications (e.g., her generalizations) strike he as evidence that she is on to something.

With this in view, the question becomes how we can disrupt this vicious dynamic. Horwich then claims that "the aim of a reasonable philosophical methodology should be… to expose the irrational overgeneralizations from which they [confusions] emerge" (Horwich (2012), 19). In other words, the best we can do is "deconstruct" these flawed T-philosophical theories. However, it is imperative that each T-philosophical theory is "deconstructed" on its own terms so that the irrationality that gives rise to it can be seen clearly. Thus, Horwich proffers a micro-methodology designed to expose the "conjuror's trick" for particular T-philosophical theories. Specifically, Horwich ascribes to Wittgenstein an 8-step procedure to expose, for individual T-philosophical attempts at theory, their inherent irrationality. Though the details of this procedure, and its application to various T-philosophical theories, need not concern us in detail[39], what is critical for us is threefold. First, the aim of the procedure aims to make clear the irrationality of the T-philosopher's initial commitments and, relatedly, her tendency to rely on perverse analogies between distinct domains. For example, a T-philosopher might irrationally assume that "[j]ust as the predicate ‘is magnetic' designates a feature of the world, magnetism, whose nature is revealed by quantum physics…so it seems that ‘is true' attributes to a complex property, truth" (Horwich (1998 a), 2). Second, the procedure should expose the impasses that the T-philosopher ends up in. For example, it should make clear why there have been "various attempts to analyze truth… [that] have been made over the last two thousand years or so…. [And why] none of these ideas has won general acceptance" (Horwich (2010, 2). Finally, third, this procedure should then function as a "strategy of (self-)persuasion" that make us "appreciate that any such theoretical response is wrong headed" (Horwich (2012), 53). In effect, the procedure aims to convince us, based in part on the non-theoretical dis-analogies between scientific and philosophical investigation, in part on the charge of the irrationality against the commitments to generality and depth, and in part on the 8-step procedure itself, that the game of T-philosophy is irrational, engenders confusion, and should be

[39] Readers interested in a fine-grained account of the 8 step procedure should see, in particular, Horwich (2012), 50-55.

abandoned. Though such a procedure is not an airtight reductio, the hope is that these criticisms will convince us to abandon attempts at T-philosophical theorization.

With all this in view, we can ask what is left of philosophy after these voluntary irrational commitments are excised and theory set aside. To begin, Horwich notes that Wittgenstein assumes an "extreme pessimism about the potential of philosophy- perhaps tantamount to a denial that there is such a subject" (Horwich (2015), 134). This pessimism need not be theoretical- especially granting that philosophy is "notorious for its perennial controversies and lack of decisive progress- for its embarrassing failure, after over two thousand years, to settle any of its central questions" (Horwich (2012), 34). However, the denial of 'philosophy' itself is more exciting and what we focus on.

To bring this out clearly, let us begin by examining the exchange between Horwich (2013) and Williamson (2013) on precisely this point. Williamson claims that if this anti-theoretical metaphilosophy is correct, then "90% of philosophy is a waste of space, while the remaining 10% consists of the praiseworthy demolition of the 90%. Horwich does not explain why the taxpayers should be expected to fund a branch of the academy with this structure" (Williamson (2013), e7). In his reply, Horwich attempts to address this point directly. Specifically, he tries to offer "some plausible explanations of why someone endorsing my argument might not advocate the closing of Philosophy Departments" (Horwich (2013), 25e). First, Horwich notes that "T-philosophy is still going strong, and the Wittgensteinian critic might well prefer that its practitioners be rationally persuaded to abandon it rather than starved out" (*ibid*). However, this note is problematic for two reasons. One, an anti-theoretical philosopher will stress that "some people enjoy tiddlywinks, others golf, and others bungee jumping- and why not?- so some will be simply fascinated by this or that branch of philosophical theory…. But the objection to such theorizing I have been exploring… is that… there appears to be no objective reason to desire true theoretical belief in a priori philosophy. For what is discoverable will contribute neither to successful deliberation nor to significant understanding. As long as there is no illusion on this point… let him [the T-philosopher] carry on" (Horwich (2012), 44). Granting this, it seems to me Williamson is quite right to insist that enjoying tiddlywinks, or philosophy, and asking taxpayers to fund departments whose sole goal is letting people satiate this odd fancy, are very different things. Indeed, it is not implausible that taxpayers would insist that a department of tiddlywinks should be 'starved out.'

Two, the pragmatic confusion I ascribed to Horwich above may belie this response. Specifically, pragmatic confusion seems to be something that is needs to be exposed and corrected only once and further persistence in the activity manifests willful irrationalism.[40] For example, once I realize that hardware stores do not sell computers, I do not go back to hardware stores to try to buy computers, on pain of willful irrationality. Granting this, if Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical arguments are as powerful as they appear, it may be that the T-philosophical game has already ended. In this case, it is unclear what more an anti-philosopher can plausibly do for the mad who persist in T-philosophy. As it were, what T-philosophers are doing is glaring irrational and very little can help to correct them after Wittgenstein's interventions. If this is so, again, Williamson is right to point out that taxpayers would be unhappy to fund the endeavors of these odd people, especially that their activities have been shown to be irrational already.

Second, Horwich notes that "like me, she [someone who is anti-theoretical metaphilosophically curious] may think that the critique is correct but not be sure that it is. So she may well find it reasonable to wish for continued reflection on the issue" (Horwich (2013), 25e). This is striking, as it seems to accept that if the account Horwich has adumbrated proves to be correct, Williamson is right that there may just be no such thing as 'philosophy' anymore. In other words, once the irrationality of T-philosophical theory construction is seen for what it is, there may just be nothing left to do.

A third move is to stress that "refined critical techniques in which some philosophers are peculiarly expert can be valuably applied in other fields" (*ibid*). In other words, T-philosophy may have some instrumental value as, e.g., a tool to explicate and clear up some other field. However, there are two critical issues with this instrumental gloss. One is that it is unclear why a T-philosopher is uniquely positioned to provide such a service as this. For example, if explication and the logic of justification are always post hoc reconstructions from the field, it is not terribly clear what work they can do for that field.[41] Two, Horwich notes that "work in empirical semantics, in the foundations of quantum electrodynamics, in evolutionary

[40] In contrast, semantic confusion may simply be part of language if viewed diachronically, a point we discuss briefly in chapter 4.0f

[41] It is precisely this debate that, in philosophy of science, Lakatos (1980) and Feyerabend (2010) had. The real question turns on if a rational reconstruction exposes the real rational underpinnings of a field or simply rationalizes it.

biology, and in the history of ideas" (Horwich (2012), 23) are, properly speaking, not T-philosophical in the first place. However, this leaves proper T-philosophy in a very odd place. For example, a historian who reflects on her methods and aims is, one suspects, not doing T-philosophy but historiography or some form of philosophy of history that is not in the purview of T-philosophy at all.

A final reply to Williamson is that we may explore "other intellectual activities legitimately called 'philosophy.'… In particular, there's the popular Quinean conception… as flagrantly a posteriori and continuous with the sciences" (Horwich (2013), 25). This response has two problems. One, however plausible such a Quinean move may be, it is clearly an anathema to Wittgenstein, earlier (TLP 4.111) and later (PI § 109). In turn, this means that it is not a viable option provided one is concerned with elaborating, exegetically interpreting, following in the footsteps of, etc., Wittgenstein. Two, the move to a Quinean conception of "philosophy" may seem fine until we recall that Horwich's anti-theoretical metaphilosopher already considered, and explicitly rejected, this option. Thus "[i]t does seem clearly wrong to think of Russell's logical atomism, Leibnitz's monadology, McTaggart's account of time, or Rawls' theory of justice in that way [i.e., some sort of naturalized philosophy]… [Further] is Quine's view correct? His web-of-belief model, in so far as it purports to cover commitments of every kind, is not especially plausible. It works nicely as an account of how scientific opinions evolve. But many of our beliefs- such as those about logic, right and wrong, numbers… are not constrained by observation in the way the model would imply… [t]here is no good reason to expect epistemology in general to coincide with epistemology of science" (Horwich (2012), 24).

In sum, it does indeed seem that when the aforementioned procedure is used, when Wittgenstein's micro-methodology that relies on the 8-step procedure to expose the inherent irrationalities that drive t-philosophical theory construction is applied, "we will not be left with any positive theory or new understanding. The net result will be simple that we have cured ourselves of a particular tendency to get mixed up" (Horwich (2012), 6). In short, as Horwich notes, "most of us have been interested in philosophy only because of its promise to deliver precisely the sort of theoretical insight that Wittgenstein argues are illusory… if he turns out to be right, satisfaction enough may surely be found is what we can still get- clarity, demystification and truth" (Horwich (2015), 138). Thus, the endgame is that we expose irrationality and then walk away. Philosophy comes to an end.

3.2.b Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy:

Horwich's endgame can be problematized along three interrelated lines. First, there is the scope of T-philosophy. Second, pursuant to this, there is the question of what irrationality is. Third, there is the question of the end-of-philosophy and Wittgenstein. Let us examine each in turn.

First, recall Horwich tells the reader that the target of Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical criticisms is T-philosophy. However, such a specific target runs some reasonably substantial risks. One, there is the worry that it implicitly assumes what it should instead prove- i.e., that doing philosophy is always tantamount to trying to build quasi-scientific theories. Indeed, per definition, this is precisely what T-philosophy is (e.g., Horwich (2016), 130-31). However, it is an open question if this is the best way to characterize the majority of philosophy.[42] In turn, this problematizes both the terms by which Horwich criticizes philosophical practice as well as the profoundly pessimistic endgame he ascribes to Wittgenstein. For the former, if some school of philosophy is not attempting "the construction and defense of important philosophical theories" (Horwich (2012), 21), the entire dialectic outlined in section 3.1 and 3.2a falls flat. Succinctly, if you are not trying to build a theory that emulates science, the anti-theoretical metaphilosophy passes you by like a ship in the night. For the latter, if there are viable alternatives that are doing genuine philosophical investigation but repudiate the "will-to-science" that characterizes T-philosophy, the situation may not be nearly as bleak as Horwich's endgame makes it out to be. Indeed, perhaps Williamson is right that taxpayers would be deeply unhappy to pay people to ape science and then pay other people to show that this aping fails. However, it seems to me that a taxpayer might be happier to pay for a philosophy that attempted to understand and facilitate cross-cultural interactions hermeneutically, that systematically examined possibly problematic assumptions about rationality in economics, that attempted to think through the implications of contemporary physics for our place in the universe, etc. Though Horwich might claim that the middle, and certainly the last, fall outside the scope of T-philosophy, this is fodder for the point. If

[42] To be a bit fairer, sometimes Horwich does vacillate on the scope of his criticisms- e.g. Horwich (2012), 22-23) & (2015),130). That being said, especially given how much he emphasizes the 8 step procedure that assumes that almost all philosophical positions are irrational in such a way that the procedure can expose their irrationality and the charge that history has not progressed, it seems that his scope is very broad.

T-philosophy is defined in such a narrow way, it is unsurprising that anti-theoretical philosophy has such radical implications.

Two, pursuant to this, there are viable alternatives that, though not T-philosophical, strike me as being decidedly philosophical. For example, outside of analytic philosophy, there are several approaches that are openly hostile to T-philosophy and that are, nonetheless, themselves philosophy. Consider, for instance, that "[o]n our view, theory of knowledge [a term Husserl played with, in this early work, for phenomenology], properly described is no theory. It is not a science in the pointed sense of an explanatorily unified theoretical whole… The theory of knowledge has nothing to explain in this theoretical sense, it neither constructs deductive theories nor falls under any…. Its aim is not to explain…but to shed light on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws" (Husserl (2001 [1901]), 98) Notice how in this quote, from 1901 AD, Husserl seems to have anticipated and explicitly rejected T-philosophy. The goal of phenomenology is not "the construction and defense of important philosophical theories" (Horwich (2012), 21). Rather, the goal is pure phenomenological description of experience itself. And this tradition, despite various modifications, has continued to insist on the rejection of theory (Marion (1998), 4-40). Further, within analytic philosophy, there have always been individuals, schools, etc., that are both doing philosophy and are decidedly skeptical of T-philosophy. For example, so-called "ordinary language philosophy", logical positivism, Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Feyerabend, and even aspects of the works of seemingly paradigmatic examples of T-philosophers like Putnam (e.g. Putnam (2005), 23-27, for a nuanced engagement with Levinas and ethics), all fall outside T-philosophy. Indeed, as I argue in Part II, Wittgenstein himself may best be read as putting forward a non-T-philosophical version of philosophy (cf. PI § 126). Finally, and granting the above, the question of what “theory” really means itself becomes pressing. Though Husserl, Strawson, and so on, are engaged in a form of abstract reflection, it is unclear if this reflection is relevantly analogous to “theory” in, e.g., physics. Indeed, Husserl, Strawson, and so on, do not seem to be trying to make predictions, offer explanations in the causal-mechanistic sense, reduce complex phenomena like our experience or our conceptual schema to lower parts, and so on. If this is so, it may be that the anti-philosophical criticism simply misframes these thinkers. As it were, there does not seem to be a reason to assume that all abstract reflection is even roughly synonymous with theory construction in science.

Three, following from one and two, Horwich's conception of T-philosophy runs the risk of either being anachronistic with respect to the history of philosophy or else having a problematic lack of specificity. This charge depends on what "theory" really amounts to for the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher. On the one hand, an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher may stress the (failed) attempt to analogically redeploy "theory" from the natural sciences to philosophy, as discussed in section 3.1. In turn, this stress gives "theory" an intuitive meaning as well as making very good sense of why attempting to apply scientific theory construction to decidedly unscientific phenomena leads to pragmatic confusion. However, this makes it difficult to understand how we can ascribe T-philosophy to Plato, Aristotle, and so on, without being anachronistic as they simply did not have a robust science that they could emulate in terms of "theory." Furthermore, if one grants the admittedly whiggish historiographical assumption that modern empirical science began with Galileo throwing stuff off of towers around 1638 AD, clearly the lion's share[43] of philosophical abstract reflection cannot be considered T-philosophical as they simply had no conception of a "scientific theory" that they could seek to emulate. On the other hand, an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher may stress that a "theory" is the sort of abstraction reflection that "must have a certain generality and depth. They must organize, unify, and explain common-sense commitments- and have the potential to correct them. And they must be initially controversial- deriving credibility… from their possession of theoretical virtues such as internal coherence, compatibility with what is known, and explanatory power" (Horwich (2012), 21). However, such a characterization of "theory," without the scientistic analogy, has three problems, or so I argue. One, without the scientistic analogy, certain terms in the characterization becomes rather underdetermined. For example, "generality," "organize," "explanatory power," and so on, are rendered unclear. Related to this, two, certain common sense boundary lines begin to break down. For example, religion, epic poetry, and so on, each seem to organize, explain, offer depth and generality, and so on. However, prima facie, there seems to be a distinction between the abstract reflection that goes on in poetic texts (or religious parables) and the sort of theory building that physics gets up to. Three, even granting such a definition, there are philosophers who would still object to it, as we noted in two.

[43] More than 80% if one assumes philosophy began with Thales.

In sum, the real danger with T-philosophy as Horwich defined it is that it is too narrow to take in all philosophy and too engineered to do the work Horwich needs it to do to sustain his rather sweeping condemnation of philosophy as well as his pessimistic endgame. However, I note in closing that there is, indeed, a particular tradition that Horwich has in his sights and that, from my perspective, Horwich does show to be flawed- root and branch. To wit, and as we would expect from Wittgenstein (e.g., TLP 6.53, PI § 116, etc.), much contemporary metaphysics is T-philosophical in precisely the sense Horwich discusses. To bolster this further, it is striking that van Frassen (2004), 1-30, also singles out specifically analytic metaphysics as a gross parody of scientific methodology and attacks it on grounds that are stunningly similar, in several respects, to Horwich.[44] Granting this, Horwich's assault on T-philosophy provides a great service to contemporary philosophy. To wit, trying to develop odd theories about impossible worlds, arguing about how a property gets instanced in an object, and so on, simply goes wrong.

Second, there is Horwich's reliance on his charge of irrationality as the real failing of philosophy. This worry harmonizes well with my aforementioned concerns about the proper scope of T-philosophy. To begin it seems as though the anti-theoretical end-of-philosophy account is committed to the assumption that everyone from Parmenides to Parfit is guilty of the same sin, irrationality. Indeed, only such a broad scope can justify such a pessimistic endgame. The account further claims that this irrationality is always engendered by scientistic preconceptions. However, Horwich's metaphilosophical discussions are strangely silent on what, exactly, "irrationality" means. Further, it is not clear that such a condemnation is open to view in the same way that the dis-analogies between science and philosophy are open to view. Specifically, the heterogeneous and disparate sorts of philosophical positions, arguments, methods, goals, and so on, seem to belie the obviousness of the assumption that any and all philosophical positions are irrational in the same way- i.e., by being scientistic. Finally, and most critically, it is not clear that such a charge falls back on common sense in the way that the dis-analogies did. Indeed, for common sense, the claim that irrationality is a ramification of scientism is somewhat odd. This is only compounded by the promiscuity of our everyday ascriptions of irrationality to, e.g., theories, actions, beliefs, people, assumptions, and perhaps even

[44] In personal correspondence, van Fraassen has also stressed to me that much of "Continental" philosophy should be taken seriously and is unscathed by his criticism of analytic metaphysics.

moods and emotions. However, let us assume that some concept of "irrationality" has been worked out that can support the broad scope of the charge.

Granting this, I argue that such a concept of "irrationality" that can substantiate the rather sweeping claim that all philosophy is irrational rests on T-philosophical assumptions concerning irrationality or the scientistic nature of philosophy. If this is so, then the charge of irrationality cannot be deployed in such a sweeping manner without, itself, resting on T-philosophy. In turn, ironically, this means that the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher who ascribes irrationality to all T-philosophical theories bases her condemnation on a T-philosophical theory of rationality. To prove this, I argue that any account of irrationality robust enough to support the ascription of irrationality to all philosophy brings into play generality and depth in exactly the T-philosophical way.

For generality, recall that a T-philosophical theory begins with the unwarranted assumption that disparate and heterogeneous phenomena are unified at a lower level. In turn, this assumption makes sense of why a T-philosophical theory is required. Specifically, the goal of a T-philosophical theory is to give us objective theoretical knowledge of this deeper level unity. Finally, this preconceived unity often leads a T-philosopher to dismiss or ignore (most) problematic data and deal with the subset she accepts in decidedly ad hoc ways.

This pattern fits the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher's charge of irrationality in a rather striking way. First, the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher begins with the assumption that all philosophy from Socrates to Sartre is scientistic and so irrational. Further, she makes this assumption exactly because it ensures that both her global and micro-methodology function properly as criticisms. For the global method of reminding us of the difference between philosophy and science, it is clear that the method only works provided that the abstract philosophical reflection is relevantly similar to theory construction. Without this, the anti-theoretical methodology and the philosopher's reflections pass each other by. For the micro-methodology, things are even more explicit. Horwich notes that the 8-step method assumes "the idea that philosophical problem areas tend to share the same abstract structure" (Horwich (2012), 50). One, notice what underwrites this assumption of a structural similarity between philosophical problem areas is exactly the generalized claim that *all philosophy is scientistic*. Two, such an abstract structure allows the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to hold in abeyance the particular content of specific philosophical

theories. Indeed, since their structures are the same, the 8-step method can work on each in a nearly algorithmic fashion.[45] Three, notice too that this ability to abstract from specific content of individual philosophical theories is the only way to properly ground the sweep of anti-theoretical metaphilosophy's condemnation of philosophy. Four, exegetically, the claim seems to conflict directly with Wittgenstein who notes that there is not one form or structure of philosophical problems and that each may require its own sort of engagement (cf. PI § 133). Regardless, the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher's uses of these methods are then meant to return the non-trivial, objective, and, ironically, theoretical in Horwich's sense (i.e., interesting, non-trivial, corrective, etc.) result that philosophy is irrational. Finally, this assumption about the irrationality of all philosophy leads the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to gerrymander, dismiss, and so on, recalcitrant data. This can be seen in two ways. One, philosophers who work in theoretical semantics, the foundations of physics, and so on, are set aside (e.g. Horwich (2012), 23). Further, it is a safe bet that people like Kierkegaard or Diogenes the cynic are also best ignored. Two, the assumption that the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher does not need to deal in-depth with the content of specific philosophical theories is problematic as it easily lends itself to assuming what it should prove- i.e., that the content of the philosophical theory is scientistic.

For depth, recall that T-philosophical theories rely on strangely and viciously self-justifying circle. In effect, we need a philosophical theory because we assume that the phenomena in question is uniquely interesting for philosophy and the phenomena is uniquely interesting for philosophy because it seems amenable to theories. Again, this tracks the relationship that the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher sets up between philosophy and scientism remarkably well. The anti-theoretical metaphilosopher assumes that all philosophy is scientistic so she can deploy her methods and prove it to be irrational. Since the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher wants to use her methods and prove philosophy to be irrational, she assumes that it is scientistic.

Thus, prima facie, the charge of irrationality, and the assumption about scientism and philosophy, falters. Notice, in closing, three additional things. One, the irrationality charge can easily lead the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to begin

[45] I should note that Horwich mentions, at several points, both that his applications of the 8-step method are, at best, illustrative examples (e.g., Horwich (2012), 54 fn 26) and that the application may not be nearly as mechanical in practice. However, without a sustained example, it is rather hard to know how 'non-mechanical' a real application would be.

explicit theorization herself. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to turn to, e.g., Bayensianism, and try to work out some more substantial notion of rationality. Clearly, such a move is deleterious. Two, these arguments are mooted if one restricts one scope to analytic metaphysics or any other philosophical position that is explicitly trying to emulate from science in terms of theories. Simply, if the philosopher is explicit in her attempt to emulate science, then this is not hidden and the criticisms in 3.1 and 3.2a work without ado. It is only when we insist that a non-explicitly-T-philosopher is, really, a T-philosopher, that things become unclear. One can say many things about Kierkegaard or Feyerabend. However, convicting either of some odd scientism strains credulity. Three, tellingly, Wittgenstein himself avoids such sweeping claims and focuses instead on specific philosophical problems and exposing the unique irrationality for each.

Third, there is the question of the aims of philosophy and Wittgenstein. To begin, it seems that if philosophy is taken as T-philosophy, Horwich's point stands. However, it seems that we have good reason to deny the assumed synonymy between philosophy and T-philosophy. In any case, the specific end-of-philosophy endgame, i.e., that we should abandon philosophy, seems to rest on an implicit argument that Wittgenstein would have, rightly, objected to as ceding far too much to the scientistic tendencies he struggled against (cf. PR *preface*). Specifically, and in an admittedly simplified manner, the underlying argument for the end-of-philosophy is the following: 1- the only rational and useful sort of abstract reflection is scientific theory construction; 2- philosophy cannot do scientific theory construction. Ergo, philosophy is irrational and useless. This simply cedes to scientism the claim that all abstract reflection is either scientific theory construction or else useless and irrational.

Pace this, Wittgenstein objects along several lines. One, he points out that the reduction of abstract reflection to scientific theory construction is simply not viable. Thus, consider "Man has to awaken to wonder — and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again." (CV p. 5); "[s]cientific questions may interest me, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions have that effect on me" (*ibid* 91); "[p]hilosophy is not one of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.111); "[a] hypothetical explanation will be of little help to someone, say, who is upset because of love.- It will not calm him" (PO p. 123); "[t]he importance of grammar is the importance of language" (BT § 88 p. 305); and so on. In each case, Wittgenstein calls our attention to a form of reflection that can be abstract but cannot be made into

science without faltering. Indeed, reflections on life, love, death, the meaning of Being, etc., are notorious exactly because they seem impervious to scientific theorization. Further, though there has been a fashionable attempt, since at least the logical positivists, to argue that this shows the questions are not worthwhile, such a dismissive attitude horrified Wittgenstein (e.g., LWVC p. 68-69, PO p. 37-44). Two, this linkage presupposes that the only sorts of problems that demand reflection are scientific. Pace this, "[a] philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.'" (PI § 123). We return to this at length in Part II of this dissertation. For now, notice that one does not learn one's way about in, e.g., a foreign city by trying to construct a theory defined as "a hypothesis about some non-evident reality- an attempt to unearth facts that are not out in the open, that cannot be discerned merely from looking in the right direction" (Horwich (2012), 64). Indeed, though it is best to try to learn one's way about by reflection- e.g., paying attention to where one has been, hunting actively for landmarks, etc.- it simply will not due to try to unearth hidden facts. Finally, three, and most critically, Wittgenstein himself notes that "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI *preface* 4e). For the end-of-philosophy view, this point is rather hard to make sense of. If philosophy is synonymous with T-philosophy and that is always irrational, why does Wittgenstein want to start anyone off doing it? Indeed, it seems that "thinking" is a form of reflection and, whatever Wittgenstein has in mind, clearly it does not reduce to scientific theorization.[46]

3.2.c From Forms of Logic to Forms of Life:

Hutto proposes a rather different response to the inability to construct theories in philosophy than Horwich's end-of-philosophy account. To wit, Hutto proposes that Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical account should lead us re-conceive philosophy as a field whose goal is to describe the forms of life. First, I discuss Hutto's claim that "the office once performed by logical form [in the TLP] was assumed by forms of life [in, e.g., the PI]- the latter becoming his new metaphor for that which is the limit of all

[46] If this is right, it is striking how correct Braver (2012), 119-172, to call attention to the fact that both Heidegger and Wittgenstein were swimming against the current and trying to defend a form of reflection that is not scientific and, in Heidegger's more extreme case, is not 'logical'.

possibility and sense-making" (Hutto (2005), 108). Second, I attempt to characterize these forms of life that limit possibility and sense-making. However, as we shall see, this is rather difficult as Hutto takes forms of life as properly primitive. Finally, third, I examine what positive uptake that a descriptive philosophy predicated on describing forms of life could have. I note that this positive uptake is *indirect* in that Hutto maintains a distinction between the results of such descriptions and what we can do with them after we have them.

To begin, Hutto claims that "[t]he 'fundamental thought' of the *Tractatus* is still driving later Wittgenstein only in a new context… that signs can mislead by obscuring the true working of our language" (*ibid*, 106). Recall that, for the anti-theoretical "tragic" reading of the TLP, part of the work of the TLP is attempting to re-present what we already know and presuppose in our practice of language use. Though this goal is vitiated, ultimately, by Wittgenstein's reliance on an anti-theoretical theory, Hutto takes this goal of re-presentation to be critical. Indeed, "what is fundamental to our practices is something that can only make itself manifest in and through those practices and activities" (*ibid* 112). Thus, what the PI attempts to re-present is "not just to the *use of words* but also the practices that surround them" (*ibid* 117). As we discuss more fully in a moment, how this re-presenting works is rather hard to fully explicate. Regardless, for Hutto, the goal of the PI is not to put forward theories but re-present the practices that ground our sense-making practices and account for what we take to be possible. Moreover, the complex interdependencies of these practices, and the uses of words that interpolate with them are forms of life. Thus, the PI attempts to re-present the form of life to us and, by doing so in a perspicuous manner, clarify various features of the workings of language that we elide or occlude. Notice that this is still not 'positive' in that this re-presentation is best construed as *reminding* us of things we already rely on. In effect, we are already involved in our form of life and Wittgenstein simply seeks to foreground this.

With this in view, we can attempt, as best we can, to talk around the form of life. This is because "the idea of a form of life cannot be explicated. It can provide no conceivable boundary. It… is the very ground of all inquiry: the basis of all saying and doing" (*ibid* 111). In other words, the concept of a form of life, so central to Hutto's subsequent discussion, is properly primitive and so cannot itself be explicated further. However, Hutto does offer a few characteristics of the form of life. First, we

are told that "forms of life… govern 'the bounds of sense' and must remain outside the scope of the explicable, strictly sayable or articulable. Neither logic nor grammar can make any pronouncements as they are transcendental to the limits of sense" (Hutto (2004), 138). Thus, one characteristic of the form of life is that it governs the bounds of meaningful discourse. Second, this 'bounds of sense' depends on "a whole range of activities, mutually fixed by our nature and that of the world" (Hutto (2005), 109). In other words, whereas the TLP had rigidly distinguished sense from nonsense based on the assumed representational theory of language, the PI rejects this. However, as we discuss more latter, how these activities manage to fix the bounds of sense is rather hard to articulate. Third, pursuant to this, "Wittgenstein was clearly not trying to use them [e.g., logical or life forms] to make philosophical pronouncements about 'what there is' or 'what there must be.' Both remain outside the scope of the explicable, sayable or articulable" (*ibid* 110). Indeed, "we cannot anticipate the limits of what is sensible to say by appeal to logical form or forms of life since neither are substantial notions- we can only explore such possibilities from *within*" (*ibid* 111- underlining mine). Thus, the claims Wittgenstein puts forward in the PI should not be read as propounding a sort of a priori bounds of sense. Rather, this must be established by working through examples. Relatedly, what must be taken as given is the forms of life we already rely on to speak, do human being things, and so on (cf. PI § II xi 235). Fourth, pursuant to this, Kant and Wittgenstein "are concerned with issues concerning the bounds of such that it makes it look as if Wittgenstein's grammar could be a substitute for Kantian *synthetic a priori* categories. But the key difference… is that… logical form [or a form of life] says nothing [and so] could not be equated with Kantian categories if these are regarded as defining a positive limit to the bounds of sense" (Hutto (2004), 143- underlining mine). In other words, logical or life forms are not deployed by Wittgenstein as fixed and stable a priori categories that allow one to police the bounds of sense. Indeed, what Hutto seems to object to is the "synthetic" in Kant's "synthetic a priori." The sorts of claims Wittgenstein's make are reminders of things we already rely on, not claims that "go beyond" what is already there. Furthermore, for Hutto, forms are oddly negative notions- indeed Hutto claims that they are empty and say nothing. However, fifth, these empty forms of life also enable a particular sort of description. Again, the basic thought here is that a form- logical or life- must be tacitly presupposed to begin using language, describing, etc., at all. And, due to this very fact, all we can hope to do is re-present aspects of it.

Finally, sixth, the later Wittgenstein sought to re-present the form of life by utilizing reminders. These reminders are neither "speculative nor hypothetical, nor does it *tell* the audience anything new about the state of the world, for without the requisite background knowledge already in place such an example would be pointless" (Hutto (2005), 123). Rather, Wittgenstein uses reminders to, for example, point out "our training or its background, or at least some aspects of these. This is what it means to re-educate philosophers- to help them find their way home" (*ibid* 124). Thus, a point about the forms of life should remind us of something we know.

Clearly, this project of reminding us, via re-presentation, of our forms of life is different in kind than theory construction as discussed in section 3.1. We already have access to the form of life and so data and observation fall out of the picture, such re-presenting does not explain anything, the idea of converging on theories, data, etc., is out of place, and revision is rather hard to make sense of, prima facie.

With this primitive form of life, we can turn to what philosophy should rightly be. Specifically, there is a negative and a positive ramification. The negative ramification is that proper philosophy reminds T-philosophy that any attempt at theorization of the form of life is untenable. This is due, partly, to the disanalogous features discussed in section 3.2. However, just as Horwich noted that T-philosophy emerges from irrationality, Hutto maintains that T-philosophy emerges from trying to talk about the properly primitive. In effect, a T-philosophical theory is, at best, a futile attempt to explicate features of our forms of life (cf. PO p. 44). However, since the form of life is necessarily primitive, such theorization transgresses the bounds of sense and is, ergo, nonsense. Moreover, the role of a reminder is to help the T-philosopher realize she has violated the bounds of sense and abandon her claim.

The positive upshot is more challenging to articulate. To reiterate, such a positive upshot is indirect in that it depends on how we use the results of philosophical investigation. To begin, Hutto writes that he wants "to resist the attendant thought that Wittgenstein's approach eschews anything constructive in the sense of positive" (Hutto (2005), 217). Indeed, "[p]hilosophy is good for more than freeing us from false pictures and breaking our bad habits of thoughts. Wittgenstein's reminders…are primarily assembled for the purposes of removing confusions about what troubles us to enable us to get a clear view of the matter" (*ibid* 218). Thus, Wittgenstein's reminder based "procedure, *but not its aim* is therapeutic…In so clarifying fundamental matters he is no quietist. Having united these knots, he does

not advocate silence on important matters" (*ibid* 219). In other words, Wittgenstein's therapy is the means he uses to his end goal, engendering clarity. And this clarity, in turn, may *indirectly* help foster change or give insight into viable conceptual possibilities. To see how such clarity can foster change, it is critical to note that, for Hutto, a given conceptual schema that we find ourselves in is "subject to diachronic development" (Hutto (2005), 201). Granting the thought that our conceptual schema evolves and changes, it may turn out that, "[f]or example, in exploring ethical possibilities we will need to assess the kinds of lives they will engender if adopted and what sorts of people we wish to become…. Asking… 'What is justice?' is not a question about essences but a prelude to change" (*ibid* 220). In other words, by describing our current conceptual schema, we, ipso facto, describe the possible modifications to it that it can sensibly have. Further, figuring out these possible modifications is "guided by analogies relating to their current understanding… Indeed, over time, this was how new ideas on these topics began to take root" (*ibid*). Thus, by describing how our conceptual schema and form of life currently work, we ipso facto describe the sorts of modifications it makes sense to make. As it were, Socrates's haranguing Euthyphro may lead the latter to develop a different account of what "pious actions" are.

3.2.d Forms of Life, Silence, and The Mystical:

Hutto's positive account suffers from three problems. First, several of his claims are difficult to harmonize with Wittgenstein. Second, the primitive status he ascribes to a form of life and its interconnections with our sense-making practices and the bounds of sense, are difficult to make sense of. Finally, third there is Hutto's inability to avoid quietism, despite his best efforts.

The first problem is that many of Hutto's remarks are rather difficult to square with Wittgenstein. One, the primitive and unsayable status Hutto ascribes to the forms of life is problematic. Wittgenstein, in an admittedly gnomic way, does talk about our forms of life (e.g., PI § 19, 23, 241; OC § 358). Indeed, to presage a bit, many commentators (e.g., Hacker (2001), 74-97; Glock (1996 c)), including Hutto, manage to say a great deal about what cannot be said. Two, the role of "grammar" is held in a strange sort of abeyance in Hutto's account. Specifically, it is rather unclear

what Wittgenstein is after when he talks about “the grammar of our concepts,” or “grammatical investigations” as these, prima facie, do seem to function as fixed features of our language. Three, Wittgenstein insists that “[p]hilosophizing is: rejecting false arguments” (BT § 87 p. 302). Whatever else this quote may mean, it clearly goes beyond the thought that, in philosophy, all we can or should do is re-present the forms of life.

Second, Hutto’s account insists that the forms of life as inherently primitive and inexplicable notion and then seems to rely on it to ground other aspects of his philosophical project, specifically the bounds of sense and our sense-making practices. However, it is opaque both how the bounds of sense and form of life relate and what role a form of life plays in our sense-making practices. Let us examine this further.

To begin, for Hutto a critical role of the form of life is that it establishes a bounds of sense such that it can help us determine if some supposed ‘claim' is senseful or nonsense. However, such a claim seems prima facie odd. If the form of life is already given and already in play, and all we can do is re-present it, it becomes unclear how it can sustain a charge of “nonsense.” Further, pursuant to this, a major charge Hutto makes against a T-philosophical claim is that they fall on the wrong side of this boundary and so are confused. However, Hutto is rather salient about how a form of life manages to establish and maintain bounds of sense. We consider three plausible interpretations of how a form of life establishes and maintains the bounds of sense. These are a strong interpretation, a weak interpretation, a piecemeal interpretation. I argue that each is problematic. Let us examine each in turn.

A strong interpretation sees the bounds of sense as directly dependent on forms of life. In effect, much as my biology limits me from breathing underwater, so my form of life limits me from sensefully making certain ‘claims.' Furthermore, the strong interpretation casts the form of life as something ‘hard-wired’ into the sort of animal I am, the sort of brain/mind I have, etc. Indeed, what prevents me from making certain claims ‘sensefully’ are certain brute facts about how I am built as an organism. Granting this, for the strong interpretation, the bounds of sense is simply an explication of what my form of life can and cannot do. However, Hutto notes that "the idea of a form of life… can provide no *conceivable* boundary" (Hutto (2005 a), 111). Thus, a strong interpretation is a non-starter.

A weak interpretation of the relationship between the bounds of sense and forms of life argues that, properly speaking, the form of life does not issue any bounds of sense at all. Indeed, such a reading seems encouraged by the Hutto quote given above. In effect, the form of life underwrites everything so fundamentally that even mistakes, confusions, seeming nonsense, and so on, still presuppose it. Further support for the weak interpretation of the forms of life can be taken from the fact that sense-making practices are radically contextual and seem able to make sense even of seeming gibberish. However, granting this, there are two problems. One, it is unclear why T-philosophical theories should be condemned as confused in the first place. In effect, if the 'bounds' of sense are this indeterminate and porous, and if the form of life is this flexible and open ended that it can potentially make sense of everything, it simply is not clear why we should rule T-philosophy out of bounds. Two, pursuant to one, it is unclear why we should talk about a 'bounds of sense' at all under the weak interpretation.

The third interpretation, which Hutto seems to favors, is a piecemeal interpretation that sees the bounds of sense as dependent on our sense-making practices (e.g. Hutto (2005 a), 48). The most plausible account of this piecemeal interpretation is that forms of life underwrite our sense-making practices and then these practices establish the bounds of sense. More fully, we assume things about our form of life. In turn these assumptions underwrite our sense-making practices. Critically, these practices are best understood as being made up of 'success verbs.' If the practices succeed on marks or sounds, we have sense and if not, we have nonsense. In turn, this gives rise to the bounds of sense. However, Hutto stresses that sense-making practices are inherently contextual, pragmatically mediated, occasion sensitive, and so on (e.g., *ibid* 111). Ergo, let us bring our sense-making practices into view by considering a concrete example.

Imagine that we find some arabesque marks in an abandoned temple. We begin by assuming features of our forms of life- for instance that written language has a finite and invariant set of graphemes that recur in systematic patterns. From there, we engage in sense-making practices- e.g., we examine the arabesque marks and see if they have repeated graphemes arranged in a systematic pattern. If they do display these features, our sense-making practices may lead us to infer that the arabesque marks are some form of written language and we may begin trying to translate them in a host of ways. If they do not display these features, we may conclude that the

marks are not a written language but, e.g., a decorative motif for the temple. The result of these sense-making practices will be a bounds of sense that determines if the arabesque marks should be treated as a written language or a decorative patterns. Notice, further, that this bounds of sense emerged from how we engaged with the arabesque marks as well as background features of our own forms of life, e.g., that written English has a set of graphemes that repeat regularly in systematic patterns.

Granting this, there are at least four critical problems with such an interpretation. One, sense-making is hopelessly underdetermined and so context dependent, occasion sensitive, and so on, that it is simply unclear if it can do any philosophical work. Hutto may reply that this is a virtue of his account. Indeed, our sense-making practices do vary, we engage with artifacts in a myriad of different ways, and so forth. However, if this is so, then it is simply unclear if any sort of abstraction or generalization is possible concerning the bounds of sense specifically. For example, some people claim to make sense of *Finnegans Wake*, some claim to make sense of Lacan, and some claim to make sense of quantum electrodynamics. It is simply unclear if, and how, any of these claims can be examined, assessed, and so on, in a non-person relative way. As it were, the only person who knows if sense making succeeds is the individual who engages in it. However, this quickly deteriorates into a TLP-esque solipsism (e.g. TLP 5.62) wherein I am the only language user, the locus of sense, and everything that falls outside of my sense-making practices is nonsense. Furthermore, it slurs over the difference between "thinking I have made sense of x" and "making sense of x." (cf. PI § 202). Indeed, someone may think they understand quantum electrodynamics until they have to do a problem-set. Thus, it is clear that my subjective impression and actually having made sense of something can and do come apart.

Two, relatedly, such a piecemeal interpretation of our forms of life and sense-making practice may render *my* bounds of sense as *the* bounds of sense. In turn, this seems to imply that my failure to make sense of, e.g., quantum electrodynamics is a problem for physics and not for me. Needless to say, such a conclusion is rather odd.

Three, pursuant to two, it is unclear how to conceptualize forms of life in the first place. As noted above, I am unable to make sense of quantum electrodynamics because I lack the requisite background, mathematical training, and so on. Does this entail that a physicist who happily chugs along with her research has a different form of life than I do? Indeed, individuating forms of life, determining who shares them,

and so on, is rather opaque. Matters are made even worse by Hutto's insistence on the inexplicability of the forms of life here. Furthermore, if we cannot properly establish who, where, when, and so on, two people share a form of life, it is clear that we cannot rely on assumptions about *our* form of life to underwrite sense-making.

Finally, four, exegetically, it is opaque what role the form of life plays in Hutto's reading of the PI. For example, one might assume that a language-game is a tool later Wittgenstein relies on to re-present sense-making practices. However, Hutto (2005), 114, stresses that language-games serve a variety of rather different functions in the PI. Worse, a language-game's dependency on rules makes them difficult to see as mere re-presentations of a form of life that both underwrites and cannot be expressed in rules. Thus, the primitive forms of life both do not do any philosophical work, and it is unclear what sorts of descriptions of them we should give so that they can do work.

The third, and most intractable, problem with Hutto's account is that there is a profound tension between his insistence that we need not be quietists and his insistence that the form of life is always tacit and unsayable. In effect, if the form of life is unsayable, it is unclear how we can say anything at all about it. However, if we cannot say anything about it, even in the form of a description, as descriptions too presuppose the forms of life, then it is unclear how we can maintain any position over and above a fairly radical TLP-esque quietism-i.e, whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent. Indeed, the link between the TLP and the PI that Hutto attempts to establish seems, in this key, to plunge the PI into very similar sorts of paradoxes as the TLP. To wit, Wittgenstein posits and relies on some unexplained explanatory form- be it logical or life- to do the heavy philosophical lifting that accounts for our sense-making practices. However, when he is pressed on what, exactly, this form is, and how, exactly, it underwrites the sense-making practices, all he can do is try to whistle it. So as Ramsey had it, if you cannot say it, you cannot whistle it either. Conversely, if we attempt not to be quietists and assume that we can give precise descriptions of the forms of life so that they can elucidate our sense-making practices, we have effed the ineffable. So this is untenable.

3.3 The Key Uptake:

The anti-theoretical metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein has several features that, both exegetically and philosophically, make a great deal of sense of Wittgenstein. First, it gives an articulate nuanced, and philosophically robust, account of why Wittgenstein was so hostile to attempts to use scientific methods (e.g., theory construction) in philosophy. Second, it sticks very close to common sense and offers criticisms of philosophy based on worries that my mother indeed shares.

However, the critical problem for anti-theoretical metaphilosophy is that, in both endgames, it misfires in deeply problematic ways. For Horwich, the assumed reduction of philosophical reflection to T-philosophical theory construction seems untenable, is scientistic in precisely the sense Wittgenstein seeks to avoid, and cannot make sense of why Wittgenstein wanted to provoke thought rather than silence it. For Hutto, by contrast, the primitive status he ascribes to forms, logical or life, forces him into the problem the TLP seems faced with. To wit, Wittgenstein either must not speak or else he is, somehow, effing the ineffable. Thus both endgames go misfire.

3.4 Summary:

This chapter examined the anti-theoretical account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. First, it discussed how the account presupposes an invariant diachronic metaphilosophical goal in Wittgenstein. To wit, he always aimed to show that philosophy cannot utilize theory to gain objective knowledge. However, it also noted that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology in the TLP goes wrong by, paradoxically, relying on a philosophical theory to condemn philosophical theories. Second, it discussed Wittgenstein's mature method. Specifically, it focused on Wittgenstein's reminding us of obviously different features that exist between science and philosophy and why this should make us deeply skeptical of theory construction in philosophy. Third, I examined two responses to this realization that philosophy cannot use theory as it is simply different in kind then science. One, Horwich's end-of-philosophy account is based on exposing irrationality and terminating philosophy. Two, we examined Hutto's form of life account. I further argued that both endgames go wrong in various ways.

4 The Grammatical Metaphilosophical Interpretation:

This chapter discusses the metaphilosophical ascription that the grammatical account proffers for Wittgenstein. In many ways, this account rejects the above dialectic as I have characterized it. Specifically, the therapeutic, antiphilosophical, and anti-theoretical accounts all ignore a critical aspect of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, according to the grammatical account. To wit, in addition to his negative goal of addressing and redressing confusion, Wittgenstein also has a positive metaphilosophical goal- conceptual cartography (e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 284). In other words, Wittgenstein aims to explore the interconnections that obtain within our inherently normative conceptual-linguistic framework. In turn, this positive program allows Wittgenstein to avoid the de-coupling of a philosophical problem and his methodology. Succinctly, and in a manner to be developed further, the grammatical account maintains that philosophical problems arise due to us confusing the normative rules and interrelation that partly constitute our linguistic-conceptual schema. By describing the framework properly, the problems dissolve *and* we learn our way about the framework better (cf. PI § 123). Further, Wittgenstein neither aims to end philosophy- by exposing irrationality or nonsense- nor does "philosophy" collapse into rhetoric. Instead, philosophy becomes the exploration of our ways of thinking and talking. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's philosophical method is a form of connective conceptual analysis (e.g., Strawson (1992), 17-28). I note that it is this positive metaphilosophical goal that I focus on as it is the most distinctive feature of the grammatical account.

However, bringing into view the metaphilosophy that the grammatical account imputes to Wittgenstein is a rather complicated task. This is because the grammatical account is sensitive to the complex interdependencies between Wittgenstein's avowed metaphilosophical ends and means, his global philosophical themes, and his engagement with specific issues like rule-following or private language. Ergo, though my focus is on Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, I often find it necessary to draw materials that relate to both particular issues in his actual work as well as examining overall themes in his thought. I also note here that I follow, e.g., Hacker & Baker

(2009), 271-303, and Glock (2017) in focusing on the PI, and use the TLP as a sort of foil or backdrop.

This chapter divides into two sections. In section one, I lay out the metaphilosophy the grammatical account imputes to Wittgenstein and how it interconnects with other aspects of his project. Specifically, the grammatical account takes Wittgenstein's positive metaphilosophical goal as the description of the inherently normative interdependencies that obtain between constitutive rules that govern the use of terms. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is a form of nuanced conceptual analysis that aims to clarify constitutive rules that determine the correct uses of expressions, the interconnections between these rules, and how normative practices underwrite these features. In section two, I criticize this account.

4.0 Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy From a Grammatical Point of View:

This section adumbrates the grammatical account's interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as conceptual cartography. It does so by considering several interdependent aspects of this ascription. Section 4.0a examines the claim that philosophy is non-cognitive and a second order discipline. Section 4.0b links second order conception of philosophy to the project of describing the constitutive rules that determine the correct uses of expressions. Section 4.0c refines this by discussing how shared normative practices, notably correction and explanation, underwrite these constitutive rules. Section 4.0d further develops this account of correction and explanation by examining how they link to "understanding" and "the immanence of meaning." Section 4.0e discusses how the grammatical account avoids an untenable holism that the immanence of meaning seems to carry in its wake by introducing a "perspicuous representation" as a particular form of description. Section 4.0f examines how this form of description enables a positive project of mapping out the interdependencies of grammar. Finally, section 4.0g summarizes the dialectic.

4.0.a Philosophy as Non-cognitive and Second Order:

A leitmotif of the grammatical account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is ascribing to him the viewpoint that "philosophy is not a cognitive discipline" (Hacker (2001), ix. Also see, e.g., Hacker (2009 a), 7-15; Hacker & Baker (2009), 271-76; Glock (1986); Glock (2017), 231-32)). However, "[t]his [non-cognitive] characterization must be qualified in so far as Wittgenstein's philosophy features grammatical descriptions. But we shall see that, first, this renders it 'cognitive' only in a low-key sense" (Glock (1991), 86). I take the 'low-key sense' to mean that philosophical statements that describe grammar are propositionally structured and truth-apt in a particular sense discussed more fully in a moment. Critically, for the grammatical account, philosophical statements are not cognitive because they do *not* describe the world, states-of-affairs, objects, and so on. Rather, philosophical statements describe the linguistic-conceptual schemas we rely on when we represent the world. Thus, unlike "science or common sense, philosophy does not itself describe objects of any kind… Instead, it is a *second-order discipline*" (Glock (2003), 24). First, I discuss why the grammatical account claims that philosophy is not cognitive. Then, I examine how the grammatical account links this non-cognitive gloss to the claim that philosophy is a second order discipline.

The non-cognitive nature of philosophical statements is radical and is perhaps the most controversial of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical insights, according to the grammatical account. Such a non-cognitive account maintains that philosophy is not a discipline that "could result in knowledge expressed by true propositions" (Glock (1991), 69; see also, e.g., Hacker (2009 a)). There are three basic features of philosophical investigation that account for its non-cognitive status. First, philosophy's statements, properly construed, are not "about entities" (Glock (1996 a), 199). For earlier Wittgenstein, this is a ramification of his insistence that "*all* the propositions of logic… are tautologies" (Hacker (1986), 45) and his assumption of philosophy and logic are nearly synonymous (e.g., NB p. 106). Since a claim like "it is raining, or it is not the case that it is raining" can hardly be said to be about the weather, this seems apt. For later Wittgenstein, though rejecting much of the TLP's framework and adding non-tautological 'grammatical connections,' the insistence that philosophy is not about entities is "transformed rather than abandoned... there are no propositions expressing philosophical knowledge" (Glock (2001), 21). Specifically, later Wittgenstein consistently maintained that "(A) philosophy differs in principle from the sciences…[and that] (B) [philosophical] propositions do not depict necessary

states of affairs" (Glock (2017), 237). Thus, the first reason philosophical statements are non-cognitive is that they are not about features of the world.

Second, pursuant to this "radical suggestion [that there are no entities or states of affairs that philosophy describes] excludes the idea that … philosophy has a special subject-matter" (Hacker (2006), 20; See also, e.g., Glock (1997 a), 287-91). This lack of a subject matter can be seen in several interrelated facets of philosophy. One, prima facie, philosophy is utterly odd in that one can have a philosophy of x where x is rather unrestricted- everything from atoms to agape is a topic of philosophy. Two, "[t]he nature of philosophy is itself a contested philosophical issue, and views about this issue are philosophically controversial" (Glock (2017), 249). Three, it is "striking that the later questions [e.g., what is a problem in chemistry] are not themselves problems in their respective disciplines. The question of what is a chemical problem is not itself a chemical problem… But the question of what a philosophical problem is is itself a philosophical problem" (Hacker (2006), 18). Four, "[t]here is no general, agreed body of philosophical knowledge" (Hacker (2009 a), 2). In sum, whereas since Aristotle's *Physics,* we have assumed that whatever else it does, physics should study motion and change in the natural world, philosophy does not have a universally accepted subject matter, set of universally accepted questions, etc. Thus, the second reason philosophy is non-cognitive is that it has no set topics, methods, and so on.

Third, for a cognitive discipline, the problems that vex it often emerge when a theory encounters recalcitrant data.[47] Alternatively, the problems may emerge when some new situation arises. In contrast, the real source of philosophical problems is "a disorder in our concepts. They are to be solved by ordering those concepts… [Philosophical questions often] manifest conceptual unclarity" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 274). Moreover, this is exactly because "philosophy is concerned not with truth, or matters of fact, but with meaning. Philosophical problems are conceptual confusions which arise out of the distortion or misapprehension of words with which we are perfectly familiar outside of philosophy" (Glock (2001), 21-22). Thus, what is responsible for a philosophical problem is not recalcitrant data or unexpected events. Instead, it is, in an interestingly Socratic sense, a lack of self-knowledge or, better put, self-understanding, which causes philosophical problems. Thus, a third reason why philosophy is non-cognitive is that its problems are different than cognitive problems.

[47] E.g., Kuhn (1987) for a case study of the birth of quantum physics from the black-body problem.

In turn, this last point, in particular, connects to the claim that philosophy is a second order discipline. To begin, the grammatical position argues that philosophy is a second order discipline. To begin, prima facie, if a philosophical problem is a product of a disorder of concepts, philosophy should aim remove the disorder. In turn, an apt method to remove a disorder is to describe our concepts in such a way that their inherent order is made clear. Indeed, a disorder of concepts emerges from the simple fact that we do not understand the interdependencies that obtain, i.e., the correct order of concepts, within our conceptual-linguistic framework. By describing this framework properly, the disorder dissolves. Thus, whereas "science describes reality, philosophy is not directly concerned with objects of any kind… Instead, it reflects on the preconditions of our knowing or experiencing the objects" (Glock (2017), 232). In other words, philosophical statements are not cognitive in that they do not describe entities and features of the world. Instead, they are second order in that they describe our linguistic-conceptual frameworks that we rely on to describe or represent the world in the first place (cf. PI § 126). Further, philosophy has no proper topic exactly because all first order disciplines, from astrophysics to art history, involve representing the world in certain ways and, thus, each can be a topic for philosophical investigation. Finally, philosophical statements may be truth-apt in the low-key sense of either accurately or inaccurately describing this framework. However, to reiterate, philosophical statements are *not* about the world, objects, and so on.

Notice too that the Kantian overtones here are not accidental. According to the grammatical account, both Kant and Wittgenstein re-interpret philosophical statements as not being about the world but as being about the concepts that we use to represent it (e.g., Glock (1999)). In other words, both Kant and Wittgenstein cast philosophy as an investigation of the preconditions for us to gain knowledge about or represent the world. However, we must also realize that Wittgenstein makes four critical modifications of critical or second order philosophy. First, whereas Kant "characterized [a priori statements] a*s knowing the truth of a description* of how things necessarily are in nature… [Wittgenstein saw a priori statements as] norms of description. The world has no scaffolding- neither original… nor constructed and imposed. Such (apparently synthetic a priori) propositions *constitute* the scaffolding *FROM which we describe the world*" (Hacker (2013), 35). In other words, a norm of description is arbitrary since it is neither metaphysically nor transcendentally justified.

Second, pursuant to this, Wittgenstein repudiates outright "transcendental psychology [as] at best [it] boils down to an empirical psychological theory; at worst, it is simply a fairy tale" (Glock (1997 a), 295). Indeed, "these preconditions [of representation] no longer reside in a mental machinery which constructs the phenomenal world… but in a system of rules for the employment of signs" (Glock (1997 b), 159). In other words, rather than locating the preconditions of representation or description in the shadowy world of the transcendental subject, Wittgenstein aims to examine the prerequisites involved in using our languages.

Third, Wittgenstein re-imagines the a priori elements philosophy investigates not as synthetic judgments in Kant's sense but as grammatical propositions. "Grammatical propositions *antecede experience* in an innocuous sense. They can neither be confirmed nor confuted by experience… To say that it is logically impossible for a white object to be darker than a black one is to say that given our semantic rules, it makes no sense to apply ‘white' and ‘darker than black' to one and the same object" (Glock (2017), 239). However, to reiterate, such grammatical propositions "*are arbitrary*, not in the sense that they are unimportant, capricious, [etc.]…but in the sense in which a unit of measurement is independent of the length of the objects to be measured, and is not true or false, correct or incorrect, in the way in which a statement of length is" (Hacker (1996), 222-23). In other words, Wittgenstein does not pursue a validator metaphysical description that seeks to vindicate our a priori rules. Instead, all we can do in philosophy is describe the grammar that governs our descriptions or representations of experience.

Finally, fourth, philosophical statements are "*normative* rather than descriptive. They function as… grammatical propositions which are typically used to express… ‘norms of representation [or description]'" (Glock (1997 a), 300). This is one of the most innovative aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and links directly with his thoughts on the necessity (see, e.g., Hacker (2009 b); Glock (2008), (Glock (2013)). For example, the claim "black is darker than white" is necessarily true. However, rather than jumping to either de re metaphysical necessity to account for this claim or trying to hash out the transcendental structure of possible experience, Wittgenstein insists that we ask "what is it for a proposition to *be* a ‘necessary proposition'?" (Hacker (2009 b), 3). He answers that for a proposition to be necessary is "to say that given our semantic rules, it makes no sense to apply ‘white' and ‘darker than black' to one and the same object" (Glock (2017), 239). In other words,

grammatical propositions describe the semantic rules that constitute our norms of description. In turn, the norm of description of colors disables "white is darker than black" not due to some essential features but instead do to the way we have structured our color descriptions. Moreover, these rules, in turn, are displayed in the "human practices of using signs" (Hacker (2009 b), 3).

Thus, we see that philosophical statements are non-cognitive in that they do not describe features of the world, have no particular first order topic, and do not arise from vexation but disorder. Second, pursuant to this, philosophy describes the concepts or terms we rely on when we offer descriptions of various features of the world. In other words, philosophy describes the inherently normative order of our linguistic-conceptual framework rather than natural features of the world. In sum, a philosophical statement is a "descriptions of the normative connections within the web of concepts that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009 a), 23). The next section clarifies what these normative connections are.

4.0.b Rules; Constitutive and Implicit:

In the last section, we discussed why the grammatical account imputes to Wittgenstein a non-cognitive view of philosophical statements. Succinctly, a philosophical statement is non-cognitive because it does not describe natural features of the world but normative features of our linguistic-conceptual schema. In other words, a philosophical statement describes the normative aspects of the framework(s) by which we represent various features of the world. Thus, philosophical statements are "not statements of fact. They are descriptions of the normative connections within the web of concepts that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009) a), 24). In turn, conceptual cartography begins to come into view. In effect, "[a]ll philosophy does is *describe* the topography of the grammatical landscape" (Baker & Hacker (2005), 268). In other words, philosophy "*qua discipline*, is a normative description… of language (Hacker (2012), 4). Granting this, what are the normative features of language that our philosophical statements describe? To address this, first, I discuss the grammatical account's reliance on constitutive rules and their interdependencies. Second, I refine this account further by considering several questions that naturally arise concerning the nature of, and status of, such constitutive rules.

To begin, the grammatical account insists that what we describe with a philosophical statement is "the meaning of an expression [as] determined by rules of its correct use" (Glock (2005), 222). Without going too far afield, the grammatical position is committed to a particular version of the inherent normativity of language thesis (*ibid*. See also, e.g., Glock (2009), Glock (2015)). At a minimum, a normativist about language is committed to what Glock terms the bare normativity of meaning thesis, which claims that, a word w is meaningful only if there are conditions for the correct use of w.[48] However, the grammatical position opts for a stronger version of the normativity- the rule-based normativity of language. This claims that an expression e is meaningful only if there are rules for the use of e. Further, these rules are constitutive in that they determine, rather than regulate, offer helpful guidance for, etc., the correct use of an expression e. Further, and granting that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI § 43), these constitutive rules partly determine the meaning of expression e by determining the correct use of e. In other words, much as the rule "knights move in an 'L' shape" partly determines if some token-wooden-bit is a knight as well as the correct use of a knight, so to do rules for correct use determine what some expression e means as well as how to correctly use e. Thus, what we describe in philosophy are these constitutive rules that determine correct use and, ergo, meanings of expressions.

Notice also that the rules for the use of an individual expression e interdepend with other rules in such a way as to form "[w]hat later Wittgenstein calls the 'grammar' of a language… the system of constitutive rules… which define the language" (Glock (2009), 265). In other words, a constitutive rule that determines correct use and meaning interdepends with other rules in such a way that their normative interconnections define a particular grammar for a portion of our linguistic-conceptual schema. For example, the constitutive rule that determines the correct use of "red" also interdepend with other rules that determine the use of "light," "bright," "not green," "color," and so on. The totality of these interdependencies is the grammar of our color language. Further, these linkages within grammar are themselves normative and conceptual. It is part of how we have normatively structured our grammar of color descriptions, that accounts for why "the ball is bluish red at point p

[48] At this level, the debate often turns on if "correct" is itself a normative notion. See Whiting (2007) for a pro-normativity argument and Hattiangadi (2006) for contra-normative argument.

at time t" is innocuous whereas "the ball is greenish red at point p at time t" is problematic. Again, we just refuse to accept the later sentence as it violates the constitutive rules' interconnections.

Notice, finally, that such a model sets up a very particular set of dependencies. In the first place, there is the semantic content of an expression- i.e., what the expression means. In turn, this content is partly engendered by the use of the expression in language. From here, the use is determined by constitutive rules that are established and maintained by certain normative practices- a point we examine in the next section. Granting this, the rules also interdepend with one another to form a language-game. And Wittgenstein's goal is describing this game and, by doing so, accounting for the meaning of expressions by bringing into focus e's correct use.

With this in view, let us further clarify the nature of and role of these constitutive rules by addressing two questions, in this and the next section. (a) Must the constitutive rules that determine meaning rest on explicit stipulation? (b) Do the constitutive rules have to be an occurrent feature of an agent's mind or intention?

(a) The grammatical account notes that the constitutive rules that determine meaning cannot rest on explicit stipulation. This is because "by pain of regress… [one] cannot explain language [via convention or stipulation]… because articulating a convention presupposes language" (Glock (2015), 848). Indeed, much as a social contract theory seems problematic as it presupposes the legal institution of a contract without laws, so too does the stipulative account of constitutive rules presuppose language in which the stipulations are made, to function at all. Instead of such a stipulative account, the grammatical account insists that "[g]rammatical rules do not somehow follow from 'meanings,' they partly constitute them… we give them meaning by explaining and using them in a certain way" (Glock (2001), 14). In other words, it is not that we 'have' meanings as individual persons and then collectively decide what tokens to use to express them. Rather, it is that the way we use, correct, explain, understand, and so on, our terms, that determines their meanings in the first place. Thus an expression has meaning, not due to explicit stipulation, but instead due to the social practices of correction and explanation, a key point for chapter 4.0c.

(b) The grammatical account also insists that the constitutive rules need not be explicit or occurrent features of an agent's actual current state of mind or intention. This is somewhat like how a competent chess player knows and abides by the rules of chess without continually having to refer to them in her mind or a book before each

move. However, what is critical is that the agent is "*capable of recognizing* the correct formulations of the relevant rules, if only with a little help from their friends" (Glock (2017), 244). In other words, when presented with an abstract rule-formulation[49] prescinded from her normatively guided behavior, the agent will recognize and endorse that this is the rule she is following. For example, someone may learn how to play chess via trial-and-error and correction and never entertain the rule-formulation "knights move in an 'L' shape." When she is told this, however, she will readily agree. Let us call this sort of latent rule but potentially recognizable rule, an implicit rule.

However, as it stands, the idea of a constitutive rule is still under-specified and trades more on intuition, especially with respect to language. Indeed, what establishes and maintains these constitutive rules if they are neither innate nor explicitly stipulated? Further, how can such rules be implicit to an agent- i.e., how can she know-how to follow them without thereby knowing the correct rule-formulations of them? Also, how do correction and explanation factor in? It is to these questions we turn.

4.0.c Convention, Correction, and Implicit Constitutive Rules:

In the last section, we noted that Wittgenstein aims to describe the constitutive rules that determine the use of expressions, according to the grammatical account. However, this account left open several critical questions. To answer them, first, I discuss the grammatical account's conception of a "convention." Second, I discuss how conventions are established and maintained via our shared normative corrective and explanatory practices. Finally, third, I note how this account can make good sense of an implicit constitutive rule that does not rest on an explicit stipulation.

To begin, a critical question for the grammatical account, especially granting that constitutive rules are not products of stipulation, is what establishes and maintains these constitutive rules. To address this, the grammatical account ascribes to Wittgenstein a view that "insists not just on the rule-governed nature of language, but also on the idea that these rules are *conventions*, i.e., rules that are both arbitrary

[49] "Rule-formulation" is a concept from von Wright (1960). We discuss it more carefully in section 4.2a. Suffice to say, a rule-formulation is one possible articulation of a rule such as "shh!" "no talking during the opera" "please be silent during the show" etc., for the rule that one should not speak during a performance.

and inter-subjectively shared" (Glock (2009), 174). In turn, a convention is a "shared arbitrary rule. If members of a community behave in a regular fashion, react to deviations not just with surprise but with disapproval, corrections or sanctions, and if these adverse reactions are generally accepted, then they share a rule" (Glock (2002), 253). This implies that, with specific reference to language, a convention establishes a communal "use that *constitutes* meaning while *individual* use is *responsible* to it" (Glock (2015), 848). In other words, my individual use of an expression e in a natural language, e.g., English, answers to the conventions of the English speaking community. Furthermore, deviant uses, solecisms, etc., are met with social sanctions. And, indeed, when my younger self uttered "Sally and me went to the store," my mother's reaction was "No! Sally and I went to the store! 'Sally and me' is ignorant!"

Second, pursuant to this, these conventions are established and maintained by shared practices. To begin, it is imperative to note that such practices are inherently and irreducibly normative. Indeed, it is these normative practices that establish the internal relations between, e.g., a shared convention, a constitutive rule, and a correct use. Further, such internal relations are "*de dicto*, i.e., they depend on how we describe things…. To insist on internal relations does not introduce any mysterious, supernatural phenomena. Internal relations… are effected by our *normative practice*- the fact that we introduce, teach and explain standards of correctness, and criticize or justify performance by reference to them" (Glock (1996 b), 162-63). In other words, to properly account for what establishes and maintains a convention that engenders a constitutive rule, we must rely on a particular, and inherently normative, framework to even 'see' what is afoot at all. This harmonizes well with Wittgenstein who insists that "[t]here are characteristic signs of it [e.g., being corrected or getting it right] in the players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of someone correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that… even without knowing his language" (PI § 54). Further, notice that these normative practices are precisely what establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine proper use. In other words, my mother's hectoring is, partly, what maintains correct English.

Granting that we must adopt an irreducible normative framework to discuss the social practices that establish and maintain conventions, we can ask which practices establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine correct use of expressions. For the grammatical account, two practices, in particular, are critical.

These are correction and linguistic-explanation.[50] For linguistic-explanation, the grammatical account insists that there is an "*internal connection* of word-meaning and explanation which is antecedent to any empirical investigation. Meaning is what is explained in giving an explanation of meaning" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 29). Indeed, "[m]eaning is what is given by the explanation of meaning… [and we] have a well-established *practice* of explanation" (*ibid* 33-34). Relatedly, a correction relies on the same sort of internal connection between the meaning of an expression and the communal practice of using it in certain ways (e.g., Glock (2005), 228-31). Furthermore "[t]he words with which we learn to do things are, of course, rule-governed. Their rule-governed employment manifests itself in a regularity *that presupposes the recognition of a uniformity* (RMF 348). The normative practices of using words are surrounded by normative activities of correcting mistakes, explaining what is meant, appropriate responses to correct use [etc.]… And it is the normative practices of the speech community that fix and hold firm the internal relation between a word and its application" (Hacker (2009 c), 5). Thus, the constitutive rules that determine the proper use of an expression e are underwritten by our actual and shared normative practices of linguistic-explanation and correction. Indeed, it is exactly these practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine proper use and, ergo, the meaning of various expressions. Intuitively, an expression e means what it does in English because English speakers linguistic-explain e in certain ways- and correct deviant uses of e in certain ways. Notice, as we discuss more fully in section 4.1d, this implies that language is normative all the way down.

Granting this, we can begin to make sense of how a constitutive rule can be implicit. In other words, we can account for how a speaker can rely on and follow a constitutive rule without having occurrent access to a rule-formulation. To begin, consider that many competent English speakers could not "off the cuff, spell out the differences in use between ‘nearly' and ‘almost'… Yet no one would ever say ‘there is not almost enough sugar in the pudding" (Hacker (2009 c), 3). Notice, one, that an English speaker would correct someone who uttered "there is not almost enough sugar in the pudding." Notice, two, that Hacker is quite right in that hashing out the difference between "almost" and "nearly" is difficult and something many people

[50] I call these explanations "linguistic-explanations" to separate them out from, e.g., scientific explanations (e.g., Glock (1996 c), 111-112 for further discussion).

cannot do. Indeed, knowledge of even the basic grammar of one's native language- e.g., when to use the present perfect and when to use the progressive past- is often sorely lacking. Finally, three, nevertheless, we do correct deviant uses because they "sound wrong." For example, "I was studying since October" is a sentence that would be correct. Thus, it seems prima facie plausible but that speakers do, in fact, rely on shared corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices that establish and maintain constitutive rules without thereby having occurrent access to the rule-formulations that describe the normative practices. In other words, the yeoman's work is not done by the rule-formulations but by the normative practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rules. I may not know why a solecism is problematic, but I know when I am corrected for uttering it and I tacitly see a pattern of similarities that allows me to avoid the mistake in the future.

Further, this reliance on practices without a grasp of occurrent rule-formulations seems to simply be part of our form of life. We do follow norms, conventions, do correct each other's English because it "sounds weird," and so on. However, such a reply may seem philosophically unsatisfying. Indeed, the reader may insist that the goal of philosophy is to articulate these rules in some rigorous way, perhaps using variations on game theory to make norms explicit (e.g., Bicchieri (2006), 1-54), to offer some theory of meaning to account for semantic content (e.g., Dummett (1975)), or, at the very least, *try* to dig deeper and *not* simply accept that this is just part of how we do the human being thing. This demand is exegetically unsound in terms of Wittgenstein, unhelpful from the perspective of the actual normative practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rule, and philosophically far more problematic than it appears. Let us examine each repost.

Exegetically, demanding a more robust "philosophical explanation" is anathema to Wittgenstein's avowed descriptive methodology (e.g., PI § 109). Indeed, if these corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices are simply part of the anthropological warp and weft of our ways with languages, trying to "dig below" them can no longer be understood as reconstructing Wittgenstein's position. It seems like this is exactly where "my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'this is simply what I do'" (PI § 217). Further, Wittgenstein would insist that such an attempted explanation deeply misunderstands how deeply interconnected human forms of life, normative practices, and language, are. Thus, Wittgenstein tells us that "[g]iving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat are as much a part of

our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI § 25). In other words, what "children learn is not how to translate their thoughts and wishes into words, but how to request, demand, beg… in short, they learn to be human- not homo sapiens but homo loquens" (Hacker (2009 c), 4). It is striking, further, that this harmonizes with much contemporary cultural anthropology that insists that part of what is 'natural' for human beings is precisely their sensitivity to normative practices (e.g., Greetz (1973), 33-54, for discussion). Thus, exegetically, Wittgenstein would surely maintain that these normative practices, and their anthropological instances, are the "ground floor."

Such an insistence on philosophical explanation of implicit rules, normative practices, and so on, is also unhelpful from the perspective of the normative practices themselves. My mother's correction- e.g., "'Sally and me' is ignorant!"- both corrected my solecism as well as ensuring that I did not make the same mistake in the future. In contrast had my mother said "'Sally and me' is the subject of the sentence. Thus, the case should be nominative. In English, the first person pronoun's nominative form is 'I' and not 'me,' which is dative or accusative," would have left my six year old self completely in the dark.[51] The point is that the corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices are not so much theoretical as practical. They aim not to account for *why* "Sally and me" is problematic but, rather, to ensure that it is not uttered. Furthermore, it is clear that these practical practices of correction and linguistic-explanation do their jobs quite well. And, if it is not broke, why fix it?

Third, the insistence that philosophy should aim to offer a theory aimed to account for implicit rules, normative practices, etc., misunderstands our relationship with language itself. To wit, it rests on the assumption that learning and teaching language is a theoretical endeavor and that we acquire a language in the same way we acquire facts about Napoleon III, say. Pace this, however, "a language like English is not a theory…. Unlike a theory, a language does not predict anything, nor does it fit or face reality, and it cannot be true or false. Rather, it is statements in a language which do so" (Glock (1996 b), 158). In other words, trying to understand a language as some odd set of hypothesis misframes the nature of language itself. Yelling "damn it!" after being burned does not have much to do with a theory of pain or psychology. However, it has a great deal to do with English.

[51] Further, such a grammatical correction is rather tame if compared to a correction that, e.g., tries to go back to the generative grammar that supposedly underlies this.

Notice that this third point further reinforces the exegetical discussion voiced in the first point. Indeed, Wittgenstein is quite keen to insist that learning and teaching a language is nothing like, e.g., hunting for correlations between utterances and things (e.g., PI § 32). Further, this seemingly simple note radically alters both what teaching and learning a language means. For teaching, "unless the natives [or our elders] shared our desire to communicate with foreigners [or teach kids] as well as the language-games of querying and correction, the mutual instruction between explorers and natives would not take place" (Glock (1996 b), 166). Indeed, a point anthropology often makes and that Wittgenstein would readily accept, is that to teach a language is to initiate someone into a culture as much as anything else. For learning, as noted above, by being trained in our first language we acquire a form of life that is "is not uniformly biological" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 220). Indeed, "a form of life is primarily a culture or social formation" (Glock (2000), 70). In other words, by learning a language, we do not so much gain a transparent medium that lets us transmit the intentions (or whatever) that already exist in the mind (or wherever). Instead, we learn what it means to want, intend, dream, etc. In other words, by learning a language, we become enculturated humans rather than homo sapiens.

Thus, our ability to follow implicit rules merely is part of our forms of life. We can all "latch onto" the relevant patterns that correction and linguistic-explanation aim to inculcate into us normatively, we all can learn-how to follow, and so on (e.g., Glock (1996 c), 112 & 124-29; Baker & Hacker (2009), 29-34). Thus, the insistence that we offer a philosophy theory to account for how implicit rules work, why we have them, and so on, are quixotic questions that Wittgenstein would avoid. Indeed, when ‘we look and see' (cf. PI § 66), we see that we do correct and linguistic-explain our words to each other without occurrent access to rule formulations.

Thus, a constitutive rule for language is inherently conventional- i.e., shared by members of a language community and arbitrary. In turn, these conventions are established and maintained not by explicit stipulation but by our human practice of living together with each other in language using communities (e.g., Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a1-18). However, a reader may still be unsatisfied with this account. Specifically, how do correction and linguistic-explanation relate to the person we are sanctioning? Can we account for their effects in non-semantic terms? It is to these that we turn.

4.0.d Understanding, Circles, and the Immanence of Meaning:

Recall that the last two sub-sections discussed the normative features that the grammatical account claims Wittgenstein aimed to describe. To wit, the features that a philosophical statement describes are the often-implicit constitutive rules, underwritten by our normative practices of correction and linguistic-explanation, which determine the correct use of expressions. Further, we noted that these normative practices engender the internal relations that obtain between, e.g., the meaning of an expression and a linguistic-explanation of meaning or a correction of the expression if used incorrectly. That being said, we have held in abeyance what these corrections and linguistic-explanations do to the subject being corrected. Pursuant to this, one may hope that an account of this can help us leave the semantic sphere and account for our ability to use and understand language with something else. Let us take each in turn.

To begin, to account for how linguistic-explanation and correction relate to the person being corrected or linguistic-explained to, the grammatical account introduces a new element to the semantic sphere- "understanding." However, we may worry that such a focus on understanding "is guilty of not separating the psychological from the logical" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 39). In effect, understanding may appear, prima facie, too intertwined with subjective or phenomenological features to do any real work. To obviate this worry, we must bear in mind that "[w]hether someone understands an expression depends on whether he can use and explain it correctly, and whether he can respond appropriately to its use by others" (Glock (2013), 580). In other words, a linguistic-explanation or correction has engendered understanding of the meaning of expression e iff the linguistic-explanation or correction enables an individual to respond appropriately when the e is used, conform her use of e to the constitutive rules that determine the correct use of e, provides her with at least the potential to justify her rule-following behavior, and gives her the ability to linguistic-explain e to others. Thus, understanding is not a subjective or phenomenological moment but "is akin to an ability, not a [psychological] state from which performance flows. The criteria for linguistic understand are of three general kinds: correct use, giving a correct explanation of meaning in context, and responding appropriately to the use of an expression" (Hacker (2001), 24). Thus, a linguistic-explanation or

correction affect the agent by engendering understanding, i.e., teaching her how to use e properly, linguistic-explain or correct e for others, and so on.

Notice that such an account of understanding tracks our ascription practices for "understanding" remarkably well. For example, imagine someone who has memorized a Russian-English dictionary, has perfect theoretical knowledge of Russian grammar, and so on. Further, imagine we give her a drug so that her subjective experience when hearing Russian is identical to a native Russian speaker's experience in every way. Nevertheless, if she cannot respond correctly to a simple question like "как дела?," cannot correct someone who misuses this expression, and cannot linguistic-explain to others when and how to use "как дела" in Russian, we would not ascribe to her an understanding of Russian. Thus, it is prima facie plausible that understanding Russian is different from knowing-that Russian grammatical rules, the Russian lexicon, and so on.[52]

However, the reader, again, may claim that this is not philosophically satisfying. Notice that this account of "understanding" still presupposes normativity, our ability to latch onto patterns of proper use, and so on. Indeed, though we have expanded the semantic sphere, we have not left it by, e.g., accounting for semantics on the basis of something else. Here the grammatical account makes its second, and more radical, move. To get this move into view, we must keep in mind that "some rules, like the rules of cooking, can be justified as correct by reference to the goals pursued in the activity… [but] the rules of grammar are not like that" (Hacker (1996), 234). This is partly a ramification of the arbitrariness of grammar discussed in 4.0a, the constitutive status of the rules determining expressions discussed in 4.0b, and the reliance on normative practices that are simply part of our forms of life discussed in 4.0c. In effect, the rules of grammar answer to nothing, determine, rather than being determined by, meaning, and are underwritten by our normative practices of correction and linguistic-explanation.

In turn, this claim has radical consequences. Most critically is the realization that "language and human practice more generally can only be understood from a normative perspective alien to the natural sciences… even though it [philosophical investigation of these features] does not deal with supernatural entities" (Glock (2013), 588). In other words, we can neither account for language in non-semantic

[52] This example is admittedly similar to Searle (1980) and his famed "Chinese room."

terms nor reduce it to hypothetical imperatives. Indeed, the assumption that language is for something (e.g., communicating intentions, making assertions, etc.) is itself wrong. Language simply is. Thus, "Wittgenstein observed that 'meaning' is a primitive concept" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 154). In turn, such an account simply rejects the attempt to account for semantics in something "lower" or "other than" semantics. Indeed, this desire for a "lower ground" tacitly assumed that there is some lower x- e.g., the intentionality of the mind, reference and truth, semiotics- that can account for the semantic aspects of language. However, this is just wrong. We can illuminate the semantic sphere somewhat by moving in it but cannot leave it without abandoning the very features we seek to examine.

In other words, there is no lower than understanding as conformity to correct use and linguistic-explanation or correction as engendering correct use. Indeed, the grammatical account insists that "a cardinal feature of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is that the immanence of meaning is stressed at every turn… The meaning of a word is not an object of any kind… [Rather] the meaning of an expression is given by an explanation of a meaning. An explanation of meaning is the rule for the use of an expression… to grasp the meaning of a word, to understand what an expression means… is to be able to use the word correctly" (Hacker (1996), 236-37). Further, such a perspective insists that to understand language displays itself when "we have to react to it as subject to a distinction between correct and incorrect, meaningful and nonsensical" (Glock (1996 a) 222). Thus, constitutive rules determine the proper use of an expression. The proper use of an expression engenders its meaning. Correction and linguistic-explanation foster an understanding of an expression's meaning. To understand an expression's meaning is to conform to the constitutive rules that determine proper use. There is no outside of this.

However, this raises another issue. If meaning is profoundly immanent and enmeshed so deeply in our normative social practices, how can he describe it without succumbing to an untenable holism? It is to this worry that we now turn.

4.0.e Perspicuous Representation as Focused Description:

In the previous section, we discussed understanding and an immanent perspective on meaning. However, now we seemed faced with an intractable holism.

Indeed, if understanding an expression requires knowing the constitutive rules that make up the grammar, and knowing this grammar falls back on grasping the anthropological warp and weft of all our normative practices, then it seems as though "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI § 19). To mitigate this holism, the grammatical account notes that Wittgenstein has a particular conception of description- a perspicuous representation. A perspicuous representation, in turn, is a way of arranging philosophical statements that is guided by four key features. In turn, as we shall see, these features allow Wittgenstein to avoid untenable holism.

First, as noted in section 4.0c, we must keep in mind that "it is the normative practices of the speech community that fix and hold firm the internal relations between a word and its application, between explanation of meaning and what counts, in the practice of using the word, as correct use" (Hacker (2009 c), 5). Indeed, internal relations are reflected in "[n]ecessary propositions… themselves rules, norms of representation which partly determine the meanings of words. They function as or are linked to 'norms of description' or of 'representation' which lay down what counts as intelligible description of reality, *establish internal relations between concepts*" (Glock (2001), 17- emphasis mine). Thus, the internal grammatical relations depend on rules and rules fall back on the actual normative practices- chief among these normative practices are linguistic-explanation and correction. This may seem to reiterate the intractable holism. However, it is critical to note that this characterization already gives us some clue of where to search for the normative practices that interest us- i.e., those that engender meaning. To wit, we should look at the corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices of some community. Furthermore, this clue exculpates Wittgenstein from the charge that his musings on learning and teaching are either armchair psychology or genetic fallacies. They are heuristic devices that bring precisely these normative practices into view. Thus, the grammatical account can focus on a particular subset of our normative practices, i.e., those of linguistic-explanation and correction. Granting this, we can focus even more specifically on learning and teaching contexts where these practices are clearly in play.

Second, we must also bear in mind that "the selection of the salient rules of grammar is guided by conceptual problems that arise in the domain in question" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 332). This further focuses our inquiry. Indeed, as Wittgenstein says, "[a]nd this description gets its light- that is to say its purpose- from the philosophical problems" (PI § 109). Thus, part of what guides a perspicuous

representation is the conceptual muddle that someone falls into. Though "I know I am in pain" may have an emphatic use, this use is unimportant provided that the person who says it is trying to argue for an apodicticity concerning her mental states.

Third, it is also critical to bear in mind that a perspicuous representation is "an arrangement of the data we are studying in such a manner that it will enable us to survey it, to see analogies and connecting links" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 319). Indeed, "[w]hat has to be put together in the right way is a judicious selection of Frazer's data [say]" (Hacker (2001), 88). In other words, there are no new ‘facts' that we need to acquire. Instead, what we "should do [in philosophy] is present judiciously chosen examples as centres of variation around which to group the multifaceted use of the problematic concept. The examples selected as centres of variation could be said to be poles of description, not the ground floor of a theory" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 319-20). Thus, giving a perspicuous representation is arranging the philosophical statements (i.e. statements that describe constitutive rules) in such a way that their interconnections become clear.

Notice that this addresses the untenable holism. Wittgenstein's perspicuous representations do not aim to describe the whole hurly-burly of our normative practices, their interdependencies, and their interpolations with languages and forms of life. Instead, Wittgenstein focuses on corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices. Further, by relying on particular philosophical problems, Wittgenstein has clear criteria as to which of these corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices are relevant and which are not. Moreover, the goal of arranging these relevant philosophical statements so that their connections are clearly seen narrows even more which constitutive rules Wittgenstein describes.

However, we seem confronted with another worry. Specifically, this account may imply that the sole criterion for the correctness of a perspicuous representation is its ability to clarify particular philosophical problems. In turn, a reader may think that this introduces a form of problem-relativity. In effect, the only criterion to know if an assemblage of philosophical statements is correct is that it dissolves the particular philosophical problem. However, this seems to mean that "grammatical reminders could do no more than point out new aspects of the use of words employed in philosophical theories, without ever challenging such philosophical usages" (Glock (1991), 83). In other words, all a perspicuous representation can do is present certain arrangements of philosophical statements that highlight certain connections.

However, these connections may simply be a product of "an organizational schema… [One] can represent [Frazer's data, say]… by means of development hypothesis… or… by means of a schema of religious ceremony" (Hacker (2001), 89). Thus, a perspicuous representation is one way of arranging grammatical data so that one set of possible connections emerges. There may be other arrangements that display alternative connections. In turn, this perspective may deteriorate into "'grammatical aspect seeing' for the sake of intellectual acquiescence. This… suggestion has the unpalatable consequence of obliterating the difference between persuasive rhetoric and sound dialectical argument" (Glock (1991), 83-84). Since the sole correctness criterion is that a perspicuous representation dissolves a problem, any unusual arrangement of philosophical statements that achieves this would do the trick. However, the grammatical account insists that this objection rests on a misunderstanding. To rectify it, we turn to the last criterion for a perspicuous representation.

Fourth, a perspicuous representation must give "correct descriptions… [A perspicuous representation] offers us the correct way of viewing things, which is both faithful to the grammar of the problematic expression under consideration and makes evident the philosophical nonsense in which we were enmeshed…. His [Wittgenstein's] definitive solutions are not given by showing us that grammar might be otherwise, but rather by reminding us that it is thus-and-so and showing us the consequences" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 323). In other words, a perspicuous representation is not just a random arrangement of philosophical statements that may happen to dissolve a problem. It must be correct. In turn, this correctness can be seen in two interdependent features.

One, the philosophical statements that make up a perspicuous representation can be neither fabrications of the philosopher nor arbitrarily selected rule-formulations of our normative practices. Instead, they must "express the rules for the use of words" (Glock (2009), 656). In other words, philosophical statements are not simply arbitrary inventions of the Wittgenstein inspired philosopher. Rather, "our system of thinking and speaking may be articulated through propositions but is ultimately constituted by a set of practices" (*ibid* 659). Thus, the philosophical statements that make up a perspicuous representation are internally linked to the grammar they describe and are correct or incorrect, relative to normative practices.

Two, the assemblage of grammatical rules that make up a perspicuous representation are not arranged in an arbitrary fashion that exploits the idiosyncratic foibles of a conversation partner. Instead, "a perspicuous representation brings about the understanding that consists in seeing the connections" (Hacker (2001), 89). In other words, though a particular philosophical problem can help guide a perspicuous representation, its goal is showing us the interconnected and interdependent network of grammar. Indeed, a proper perspicuous representation is a form of connective "analysis… that is, a description of the conceptual connections and exclusions in the web of words… A sentence is completely analyzed, in the new sense, when its grammar is laid out completely clearly" (*ibid*, 23). In sum, "the location of a word in grammar is its meaning- its position in grammatical space" (Hacker (2012), 6).

Thus, the grammatical account avoids the untenable holism that the imminence of meaning carries with it by proffering a very particular kind of description for Wittgenstein- a perspicuous representation. First, perspicuous representation focuses on a community's corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices. Second, a perspicuous representation is focused by a particular philosophical problem to restrict the range of philosophical statements. Third, a perspicuous representation is focused towards arranging the philosophical statements in such a way that they address and dissolve the problem. Fourth, the perspicuous representation must bring the conversation partner to see the real connections that already obtain with grammar. In turn, this allows us fully articulate Wittgenstein's cartography.

4.0.f Metaphilosophy, Mapping Grammar, and Rationality:

In the last sub-section, we discussed the nature of a perspicuous representation in Wittgenstein. We noted that a perspicuous representation must do the following: focus on particular normative practices (those that have to do with correction and linguistic-explanation); be focused by a particular philosophical muddle; be focused towards dissolving this muddle by arranging philosophical statements, so certain internal connections become clear; correctly display the normative interconnections that obtain within grammar. In turn, this conception of perspicuous representation allows the grammatical account to characterize Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy "both

positively and negatively. The positive aims are subservient to the negative. Positively, philosophy aims to attain an overview of a conceptual field… so that the manifold relationships become perspicuous. Negatively, philosophy aims to disentangle conceptual confusions…. It is natural… that Wittgenstein should have invoked the further metaphor of logical or conceptual geography [to describe the positive aspect]" (Baker & Hacker (2009) [Philosophy], 284). So it is here that the grammatical account's positive metaphilosophical ascription to Wittgenstein comes into view. First, I spell out what this cartographic project aims to achieve. Second, I discuss the assumptions that such a project makes about the grammar it is mapping. Third, I note how the methodology that the grammatical account ascribes to Wittgenstein is perfectly rational and does, in fact, dissolve philosophical problems.

To begin, it is clear that perspicuous representations presupposes that our linguistic-conceptual network already has a order- i.e., a set of interdependent nodes and connections that can be properly displayed by a perspicuous representation. Granting this already given order, Wittgenstein can discuss these interdependences apart from any particular philosophical issue. Indeed, a "'correct logical point of view' is achieved… through a quasi-*geographical* 'overview' [i.e., a perspicacious representation]… Insofar as analysis is legitimate, it… amounts to a description of grammar… a version of 'connective analysis'" (Glock (2017), 244). Moreover, this enables a "'a new method'… Skillful philosophers are local cartographers, not meta-physicists or meta-physical cosmologists. They have a journeyman's skill to map the terrain where people lose their way" (Hacker (2009 c), 2-3). Thus, granting that the internal connections within grammatical space are already given, we can map them out independently of particular philosophical problems. Indeed, the grammatical account maintains that mapping out these already given normative interconnections between various constitutive rules, is exactly what "conceptual cartography" is for later Wittgenstein (e.g. Hacker (2001), 66-73). As it were, Wittgenstein maps out the normative interrelations within grammar.

In turn, this positive project of mapping out connections that already given within grammar brings into play two assumptions about the nature of grammar itself. First, it assumes that the relationships that exist between individual constitutive rules that govern the use of individual expressions relate to each other in a coherent, consistent, rational, and systematic way. Thus, grammar is made up of "a *system* of constitutive rules" (Glock (2004), 233). Indeed, "connective analysis… is the

description of the *rule-governed use of expressions*, and of their connections with other expressions by way of implication, presupposition and exclusion" (Glock (2017), 93). In other words, much as several schools of cultural anthropology have maintained that a 'culture' is the coherent whole in which individual practices and traditions are situated, so too does the grammatical account assume that 'grammar' is a coherent and interconnected network that is made up of the interdependencies of various individual constitutive rules.[53]

Second, this project of mapping assumes that grammar has a fair amount of internal stability and diachronic consistency. However, it is critical to note that Hacker's and Glock's account on this point diverges somewhat. For example, Glock (1996 a) is sensitive to the fact that the boundary between the empirical and grammatical can and does shift for all sorts of reasons- cultural developments, scientific discoveries, contestation, and so on. Indeed, "[t]he status of sentences does not just change diachronically. Even when the use of a term is relatively stable, a type sentence can be used either normatively [or empirically] by one and the same person in different contexts" (*ibid* 213). In contrast, Hacker often discusses grammatical connections, and the philosophical statements that make up a perspicuous representation that display such connections, in rather invariant terms. Thus, "a conceptual field may be partially illuminated for a generation or two, only to be cast into shadow again… [N]ovel scientific theories are introduced which cast long shadows over conceptual articulations previously clarified" (Hacker (2009 a), 27). Indeed, these shadows may require "old ground to be traversed afresh from a new angle (e.g., the need to clarify the concept of mind in response to the temptation to conceive of the human mind on a computational model)" (Hacker (2006), 27). However, shadows do not change landscapes and, by analogy, science does not change the grammar. That being said, it seems that this divergence is best understood in terms of focus and emphasis. Whereas especially later Glock has become increasingly interested in 'points of contestation' and 'impure conceptual analysis' wherein we attempt to articulate the dynamic interplay between scientific investigation and conceptual cartography, Hacker seems to be more interested in a Strawsonian project of mapping out the most basic categories and their interdependencies. Both are of one mind in thinking that there are "cases which are

[53] Critically, though, in a point we shall return to in section 4.2, Glock also notes that "the constitutive rules of natural languages do not form a precise and stable system" (Glock (2009), 162).

conceptually linked with notions like ‘reasoning,' ‘thinking,' ‘inferring,' et cetra, such as modus ponens. Of course it is conceivable that these norms of representation might be abandoned. But they are indispensable in the sense that the resulting behavior would not be what we would call ‘reasoning.'" (Glock (1996 a), 217). In other words, though certain philosophical statements do fluctuate and are contestable, there is some subset of philosophical statements whose revision is hard to fathom. It is on these stable grammatical connections that I focus.

In turn, these two requirements on grammar allow the grammatical account to separate "Wittgenstein's *personal ideology*, on the one hand, and his *philosophical methodology*, on the other" (Glock (2001), 213). Wittgenstein's ideology is taken to be an avowed irrationalism- i.e. "his cultural hostility towards aspects of science and the Enlightenment… [and his] anti-intellectual metaphysical doctrine [e.g., the TLP and mysticism], and in particular a pessimistic anthropology" (*ibid* 197). However, the grammatical account insists that Wittgenstein's methodology is "a critical activity… [that] can be entirely rational… criticizing philosophical positions in this way is immanent, that is, does not rely on dogmatic assumptions of one's own" (*ibid* 214). In turn, this depends on the thought that "[p]hilosophical theses would have to be indisputable because they remind us of the linguistic rules with which we are already familiar outside philosophical reflection…. [Grammatical reminders] show that metaphysical philosophers use words according to conflicting rules… philosophical views can be criticized because their tacit assumptions lead to inconsistency" (*ibid* 215). In other words, this sort of imminent criticism rests on the assumption that grammatical connections are presupposed by the philosopher’s seeming claims. In turn, this allows a Wittgenstein inspired philosopher to remind the philosopher of the connections that she both tacitly presupposes and contravenes. For example, a metaphysician is speaking English, say, and given that she is speaking English, her attempt to say something like "the chair has redness" instead of "the chair is red" quickly runs into a deep problem. To wit, we are unsure how to understand "has" or "redness" in this expression.

From here, this is what allows Wittgenstein to use to reveal "the illegitimacy of the positions it [this method] attacks…. The idea is to demonstrate a certain kind of inconsistency in the philosophical positions or questions attacked, an *inconsistency concerning the use of words* [by forcing] *a trilemma*: either their new, technical uses of terms remain unexplained (unintelligibility), or it is revealed that they cross

language-games [e.g., the coherent and stable connections between constitutive rules] by using incompatible rules (inconsistency), or their consistent employment of new concepts simply pass by the original philosophical problem, which is based on our ordinary use [e.g., arises from a muddled understanding of the connections]" Glock (1991), 84).

Notice too that this philosophical methodology does have a positive aspect as well. To wit, in addition to countering philosophical muddles, we are also "clarifying our existing conceptual framework" (Glock (2010), 89). Indeed, these two features move in lockstep. To dissolve a philosophical problem means to offer a perspicuous representation that makes clear the constitutive rules and their inherent interconnections. Furthermore, notice that this means Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and his philosophical methodology are, in fact, internally connected to philosophical problems. In effect, a philosophical problem only emerges when we do not know our way about- i.e., do not have rule-formulations that make clear the constitutive rules and their interconnections. By adducing such rule-formulations, Wittgenstein addresses the problem by showing it rests on misunderstandings as well as clarifying the conceptual schema we have. In sum, "[l]anguage has the same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths and we already know where he will make a turn [etc.]… Therefore, wherever false paths branch off I ought to put up signs to help in getting past the dangerous spots" (BT § 90 p. 312).

4.0.g Summary:

Thus, we have a clear view of what the metaphilosophy the grammatical account ascribes to Wittgenstein as well as some of the methodological consequences, entailed philosophical positions, etc. To sum up, for the grammatical account, philosophy is non-cognitive because there are no facts, objects, and so on, that philosophical statements aim to describe. Instead, philosophy describes the constitutive rules that determine the correct use for expressions. In turn, these constitutive rules are established and maintained by shared normative practices- notably correction and linguist-explanation. In turn, such correction and linguistic-explanations engender understanding which is the ability to conform one's use of an

expression to the correct use, the linguistic-explain the use to others, and to correct deviant uses. Granting this, Wittgenstein aims to perspicuously represent specific normative practices, rules, and meanings, in such a way that philosophical problems dissolve and we are freed from confusion caused by disorder. Finally, the positive metaphilosophical goal of mapping out these connections is just part of this overall ascription. Thus, by describing the already given order of our concepts, Wittgenstein both helps us learn our way about our linguistic conceptual schemas *and* addresses and redresses problems by showing them to rest on semantic confusion- i.e., that a philosopher both relies on and contravenes the proper order of our concepts.

4.1 Normative Descriptions, Constitutive Rules, and Forms of Life:

This section criticizes aspects of the grammatical account. Specifically, it focuses on the assumption that the grammatical account makes that rule normativity of meaning is the proper way to cash out the normativity of language (see 4.0b). In section 4.1a, I discuss the problematic relationship between constitutive rules and philosophical statements that are meant to reflect them. In section 4.1b, I argue that constitutive rules that determine the use of expressions and the semantics of expressions come apart. In section 4.1c, I argue for a bare normativity of meaning to avoid these problems.

4.1.a Philosophical Statements and Constitutive Rules:

This section discusses three possible ways that the grammatical account proffers to make sense of how a philosophical statement and the constitutive rules that determine the use of an expression relate- a descriptive, an expressive, and a ‘fused' gloss. I argue that the descriptive gloss faces what I term a ‘force problem.' I argue that the expressive gloss faces what I term the ‘cartographic problem.' I argue that the fused gloss begs the question by assuming aspects from both.

To begin, let us set the stage. Recall, as discussed in section 4.1b, that the rule normativity of meaning claims that an expression e has a meaning only if there are (constitutive) rules that determine the use of e. Granting this, the grammatical account then assumed that the function of philosophical-as-grammatical statements is to

reflect these constitutive rules that determine the use of an expression and so engender its meaning. However, the grammatical account offers three distinct glosses on how this reflection works. (a) One gloss, the descriptive gloss, claims that philosophical statements are "descriptions of the normative connections within the web of concepts that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009 a), 23). In other words, a philosophical statement portrays the normative connections in much the same way as a description of a room portrays a room being thus-and-so. (b) The second gloss, the expressive gloss, claims that philosophical statements are "'normatively true' in that they *express*—rather than describe… conventions that are actually in place in a particular linguistic community" (Glock (2008), 74). In other words, a philosophical statement is a rule-formulation that functions in conversation as a correction or linguistic explanation. (c) A third gloss, the fused gloss, claims that "grammar… *states* rather than *describes*, the rules of language" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 147). As we shall see, the fused gloss attempts to put together features of both glosses. Let us examine each in turn.

(a) Let us consider the descriptive gloss on grammatical rules. To begin, the descriptive gloss assumes that a philosophical statement describes a constitutive rule that determines correct use of an expression. With this in view, first, I examine how the descriptive gloss would work for games whose constitutive rules clearly do determine the practice. Then, I consider how the gloss relates to language.

To begin, imagine an anthropologist from a culture that has no similar practice to "sport," who goes to live in the US. She finds her 'tribe' is interested in a practice called 'basketball.' Further, she finds that this practice engenders overt tribalism, has religious connotations, etc. In short, the 'basketball' practice is anthropologically interesting and she begins careful observation.

Eventually, she distills from the complex and heterogeneous 'basketball' practice, a set of rules she thinks aptly describes this practice. For example, she realizes that, after being a hit by another priest in the ritual space, a priest is allowed to throw the sphere at the ring.[54] This is, thus, a rule. By contrast, the priest may kiss the sphere before he throws it, but he need not. So this is not a rule. Imagine further

[54] Miner (1956) in a semi-satirical paper (about the habits of the "Nacerima" tribe- flip the word to get the joke), notes how quickly anthropologists use "religion" as a catch-all for any practice their culture lacks. I follow this admittedly problematic anthropological practice as I find it decontextualizes helpfully.

that our anthropologist's list of descriptive anthropological rules for basketball (hereby descriptive rules) is identical with the constitutive NBA rules that actually determine the play (hereby NBA rules). However, there are two critical differences between the descriptive and NBA rules.

First, the descriptive rules cannot in principle cover the possible contingencies that may occur in the ritual space. For example, the anthropologist may never observe a particular sort of foul. When such a foul happens, she begins careful observation and notes the behavior of the participants. In other words, her rules can never be as complete as the NBA rules, and it is always possible that she will *discover* new rules in odd situations that occur on during the practice.

Second, more critically, the described rules do not have the normative force of the NBA rules because the direction of fit is different. For example, if an event on the court occurs that contradicts one of her described rules, she revises her rule accordingly. The direction of fit of her rules is word-to-world. By contrast, the direction of fit of the NBA rules is world-to-word. The players on the court conform their behavior to these rules. It is precisely in this sense that the NBA rules determine the game of basketball. Indeed, if "an agent [or player] follows a rule in phi-ing, the rule must be part of her reason for phi-ing… Rule following is, therefore, a type of intentional… behavior" (Glock (2015), 843). However, the rules that the player intentionally follows are not the descriptive rules that the anthropologist distilled from the practice. Notice three further things follow from this. One, this direction of fit problem has little to do with the rules themselves as both sets of rules can be identical. Instead, it is the role the rules play that determines their status as constitutively determining the practice or describing it. Two, relatedly, the anthropologist could not use the descriptive rules to call ‘foul' or dispute a lousy call. There are several reasons for this inability. For our purposes, the key is that the ‘tribe’ the anthropologist is studying can rightly reject her corrections, as her rules simply do not play the constitutive role for the practice. Three, the descriptive rules cannot function as action-guiding for the player of basketball precisely because the descriptive rules depend on the actions of the basketball players. Thus, any descriptive rules, regardless of how correct or accurate they are, are decoupled from the corrective and explanatory practices that the constitutive rules enable. Let us call this decoupling, *the force problem.*

The grammatical account has several possible responses to the force problem. One is to insist that the internal relations that constitute a basketball game are "*de dicto*, i.e., they depend on how we describe things… The internal relation between a rule and its application is lost if the relata are described… in *preseamntical*, *non-normative* terms" (Glock (1996 b), 162). In other words, the anthropologist's description goes wrong by trying to cash out the normative rules of basketball in terms of, e.g., brute physical movements. Pace this, notice that our anthropologist is not trying to describe her tribe in pre-semantic or non-normative terms. Indeed, she relies on the concept of "rules" and attempts to explicitly describe the basketball practice in terms of the rules that determine the play. However, again, it is precisely because the anthropologist's rules describe the practice that she cannot correct it, call foul, etc. As it were, to describe a practice is not the same as regulating it.[55]

A second retort is to insist that the descriptive rules are "not statements to the effect that certain norms exist" (Hacker (2009 c), 16). In other words, "Wittgenstein insisted that grammatical propositions must be distinguished from empirical statements to the effect that a community follows certain linguistic rules, e.g., 'all Englishmen use these signs in this way.' For they are used normatively, to explain, justify and criticize uses of words" (Glock (2009), 169). Thus, the above account of basketball has confused what von Wright calls a norm-proposition, i.e., an empirical statement concerning what people in a community do, with a rule-formulation that has the proper relationship with the constitutive rules. However, this objection runs together two distinct questions. Specifically, there is: the, broadly speaking, descriptive question concerning what sorts of descriptions allow one to discuss rules and their roles in human practices; the, broadly speaking, epistemic question concerning both access to rules and correction. The anthropologist can grant that the descriptive rules she employs to describe the practice have nothing to do, e.g., statistical regularities concerning what people actually do. Indeed, emic descriptions, i.e., the sort of 'insider descriptions' that participatory observation and fieldwork enable in anthropology, attempt to articulate the rules that govern practices, rather than mere regularities of the behavior of the subjects.[56] Further, much pre-post-modern anthropology assumes that rituals are constituted by rules, that these rules

[55] My thanks go to Glock for this formulation.
[56] There is great debate about what ethnography is and how it should function (e.g., Clifford and Marcus (1986)). Suffice it to say, emic descriptions are not similar to statistics or surveys

have a normative force that does not boil down to empirical claims concerning what people actually do, and that ‘seeing' these rules relies on particular sorts of descriptions. However, what is at issue is the question of how the anthropologist can access these constitutive rules and if her descriptive rules can enable correction and explanation. The access problem harkens back to our first point. Regardless of how complete descriptive rules are, new occasions may always arise. Furthermore, determining what rules actual constitute basketball is a tricky and inherently contestable business (e.g., PI § 562 and § 5624). For example, the NBA has stipulated that players must stand for the national anthem. Is this a rule for NBA basketball? Indeed, Wittgenstein also notes that not all features of play are regulated by the constitutive rules that determine a game (e.g., PI § 68). Even granting that the access problem can be addressed, the force problem persists. She still cannot call ‘foul' with her descriptive rules. And this is not because she is describing statistical correlations as opposed to rules but because she is describing full stop. The direction of fit is wrong for correction.

With the force problem in view, let us turn to the relationship between the anthropologist's descriptive rules and the constitutive rules that make up a language she is studying. To begin, it is critical to note that there is a fundamental dis-analogy between language and basketball that may prevent the force problem and allow descriptive rules to function properly. To see this, notice that "all these characterizations [of human cultures and the varied practices that constitute each]… are dependent upon more fundamental feature- namely, that mankind is unique in nature in possessing a developed language" (Hacker (2001), 56-7). Indeed, to "learn to speak is to learn to act… What children [or anthropologists] learn is not how to translate their thoughts and wishes into words, but how to request, demand, beg, [etc.]… in short, *they learn to be human* [or members of a tribe]- not *homo sapiens*, but *homo loquens*" (Hacker (2009 c), 4). In other words, whereas with basketball, the anthropologist can merely observe the practice, with language, she must actively participate and learn it. Thus, the descriptive rules for a language "presupposes learning for its genesis… It articulates an understanding obtained as part of language acquisition and of enculturation, that is, of the immersion into a shared linguistic practice" (Glock (2017), 85). This point can be further reinforced by the grammatical account’s discussion of “understanding” noted in 4.0d, and the insistence that understanding a language requires that one can linguistic-explain, correct, and so on.

Thus, the only way for an anthropologist to describe a language is by learning it and it is precisely learning it that puts her in a position to correct, linguistic-explain, etc. As it were, language is a contact sport.

Nevertheless, this dis-analogy does not mitigate the force problem for philosophical statements, or so I argue. To see this, it is critical to notice that philosophical statements, for the grammatical account, are meant to achieve very different goals than either classical grammar or the descriptive rules of a language that mothers rely on. To wit, a philosophical statement must allow for correction of specifically *philosophical* misuses. However, a philosophical statement must allow for such a correction in an *intuitive* way- i.e., in the same way that my mother corrected me with "'Sally and me' is ignorant!"- since philosophy "only states what everyone concedes to it" (PI § 599). I argue that these two features cannot be held together. To bring this into view, first, I examine the break between a philosophical statement and classical grammar. Then, I consider the relationship between a philosophical statement and a descriptive rule that my mother's rely on.

The break with classical grammar is a consequence of the goal of a philosophical statement. To wit, a philosophical statement is meant to correct a philosophical misuse. However, such a philosophical statement should not rely on some abstract account of language, e.g., a case system, as this leaves the philosopher who is abusing language room to maneuver. Indeed, the philosopher can simply insist that the philosophical statement rests on a *theory* of language that she denies. Thus, philosophical statements cannot be "codifications, codes of rules [that] impose a system upon the phenomena they represent… When [classical] grammarians began the task of tabulating rules of Latin grammar for foreigners who wish to learn the language [for example], they imposed order upon linguistic usage by complex systems of classification of declensions, conjugations, moods, etc. The rules they then formulated were not rules anyone had hitherto used or enunciated (no Roman mother had ever corrected her child's mistake by pointing out that avis belongs to the third declension)" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 53-4). In other words, not only must a philosophical statement correctly describe the constitutive rules that determine the proper use of an expression in language, it must do so in such a way that *any competent speaker* acknowledges the rules in play (cf. PI § 128) as this ensures that the philosophical statement is recognized at the outset as a trivial reminder. A Roman mother probably does not know that "Magna est domus puella" is wrong because the

feminine "puella" is, in this sentence, genitive and not nominative and so must decline as "puellae." Thus, philosophical statements "are instruments… something is a rule only dynamically, only in so far as it is used a certain way, viz., in normative activities" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 52). Thus, philosophical statements differ from classical grammar in that the latter offers taxonomies those organize a language in a way that is possibly unrecognizable, and possibly contestable, for a native speaker whereas philosophical statements should be more like a mother's correction.

In turn, this may seem to align philosophical statements with descriptive rules. Much as my mother's correction- e.g. "'Sally and me' is ignorant" rested on no theoretical apparatus, no cooked up grammatical system, and so on, so to a philosophical statement's correction also does not rest on any theoretical apparatus. However, there are three critical problems with this motherly account of grammar.

First, the rather philosophically uninteresting corrective practices of mothers and Wittgenstein's philosophical-as-grammatical statements (e.g., "an 'inner process' stands in need of an outward criteria" (PI § 580)) are clearly different. To mitigate this, one might attempt to distinguish "two categories of grammatical remarks. The first comprises truisms about the way words can be used [e.g. "John lost his body" (*)[57]]…[The other] are synoptic descriptions in which such truisms are drawn together and related to a particular philosophical problem" (Glock (1991), 79). The hope here is that these synoptic descriptions can ground PI § 580. There are three problems with such a reply though. One, it is unclear what this drawing together of truisms amounts to. How does one move from "John lost his body" (*) "Sally felt John's pain" (*), and so on, to a claim like PI § 580? Two, even granting that this worry can be addressed, it is as yet unclear how such a drawing together is different from that of a classical grammarian's codification of Latin. In both cases, the internal connections that the classical grammarian or the Wittgenstein inspired philosopher distills from their respective data reflect an organizational taxonomy that necessarily goes beyond the raw data itself. However, as Baker & Hacker are aware of, the problem is that this means that the practices of correction and linguistic-explanation that mothers do, on the one hand, and the taxonomy of internal relations that a philosophical statement rests on, on the other, move out of sync. In turn, this means that the force problem re-emerges as the philosophical statements no longer *function*

[57] I use the standard linguistic practice of marking problematic sentences with '(*)'

in the ebb and flow of corrective and linguistic explanatory practices correctly. Indeed, such a taxonomy runs the risk voiced above- to wit, a philosopher who is misusing language can simply deny that the taxonomy is apt. Three, even if these three worries can be addressed, one can construct Travis-esque cases where matters are problematic. For example, someone who says "Christ lost his body" is not committing a solecism but proclaiming herself to be a follower of the Docetian heresy. We cannot dismiss such cases since Wittgenstein took them seriously (e.g., PO p. 119-155, L&C p. 53-72).

Second, following from this, "if philosophy is to be the guardian of the bounds of sense, it is a referee who can adjudicate only with the consent of the players, who acknowledge the particular rules according to which they use words" (Hacker (1996 a), 240). In other words, the philosophical statements that describe the constitutive rules can acquire the function of correction and linguistic-explanation only when the conversation partners acknowledge them as such. However, without this consent, the force problem re-emerges. In turn, and critically, this belies the metaphilosophical assumption that describing grammar and dissolving philosophical problems move in lockstep. In effect, the ability to *use* a philosophical statement as a *correction* depends not on its *describing* a constitutive rule but on the statement's *acknowledgment* by the conversation partner. In a different key, notice too that the sync problem re-emerges. PI § 580 is not something my mother would recognize or accept.

Third, following from the prior two, it is critical to note that the "status of sentences does not just change diachronically. Even when the use of a term is relatively stable, a type-sentence can be used either normatively [or empirically] by one and the same person in different contexts. And it may be indeterminate whether a token sentence expresses criterial [e.g., grammatical] or empirical relations" (Glock (1996 a), 213). In other words, the sole difference between descriptive rules that reflects the linguistic behavior of a community and a philosophical statement that has the proper force is the *role* the sentence plays in the corrective and linguistic explanatory practices of the community. In turn, this means that a correct description is not enough to determine if a statement is grammatical or empirical as the *role* matters as well. This shows that the descriptive account of philosophical statements based *solely* on description is not viable.

(b) A second gloss conceptualizes the relationship between a philosophical statement and the constitutive rules as expressive. In effect, a philosophical statement

does not so much describe a constitutive rule as express that rule in a rule-formulation. Intuitively, much as the rule *do not talk during the performance* can be expressed in rule-formulations like "Shh!," "Please remain silent during the show," etc., that have the proper normative force, so to do philosophical statements express rules in such a way that they have their force.

To bring the expressive gloss more into view, the grammatical account notes that philosophical statements are "expressions of a convention, and, moreover, one that is partly *constitutive* of (and does not *follow from*) the concepts expressed by the constituent terms of a proposition" (Hacker (2001), 342). Further, once a philosophical statement has this role of expressing a constitutive rule, "it is not an empirical proposition which is falsified… Its dependence on the contingent behavior of Anglophones is indirect" (Glock (2008 a), 33). Furthermore, "Wittgenstein's notion of a grammatical proposition concerns function rather than linguistic form. Accordingly, a grammatical proposition like (1) [i.e., All Bachelors are unmarried men] can both be about bachelors and function as a rule for the use of words" (Glock (2008 b), 71). Furthermore, "[t]he status of a sentence does not just change [from empirical to grammatical and vice versa] diachronically. Even when the use of a term is relatively stable, a type-sentence can be used either normatively [sic.] by one and the same person in different contexts" (Glock (1996 a), 213). Assuming that the missing clause is "or descriptively," it is clear that the sole determinate of the expressive status of a philosophical statement is the role it plays in the conversation. Thus, the expressive gloss on grammar assumes that the *sole* criterion to determine if some contribution to a conversation is a philosophical statement is the *role* it plays- i.e. that it is used as a correction or linguistic-explanation.

Also, recall, as discussed in section 4.0e and 4.0f, that the grammatical account imputes to Wittgenstein the project of conceptual cartography. This project assumes that grammar is coherent, consistent, systemic, and so on, as well as rather invariant diachronically. In other words, grammar is not context or occasion sensitive, is external to particular conversational exchanges in such a way that we can describe it independently of such exchanges, and the normative interdependencies that define a particular grammar already obtain due to the constitutive rules that make up this region of language. In turn, these assumptions make good sense of conceptual cartography- i.e. we map already obtaining connections in grammar that obtain irrespective of context, occasion, and so on. However, I argue the expressive gloss

faces what I term ‘the cartographic problem’ in that its focus on the corrective role of philosophical statements belies the aforementioned conception of grammar. To bring this into view, let us examine two objections.

First, the expressive account insists that, depending on its role, the same type-sentence can be used expressively to correct or empirically to record. In turn, the role of such type-sentence is context or occasion sensitive in that, in one conversational exchange, and when uttered by one particular person, a sentence may be expressive and, in another situation, it may be empirical. In other words, granting that the sole criterion to individuate out a philosophical statement is its role in a conversation and further granting that this role is context or occasion sensitive, it is clear that a philosophical statement depends on the context or occasion of its use. However, this raises two interdependent problems.

One, this degree of context and occasion sensitivity makes the project of mapping rather difficult to fully understand. This is because the context or occasion sensitivity that determines if some type-sentence is descriptive or expressive and non-contextual and non-occasion sensitive status of grammar are difficult to align. For example, assume that "[p]hilosophy is interested in the rules of grammar, rules for the use of expressions, *only in so far as they shed light upon particular philosophical problems*" (Baker & Hacker (2014). Granting this, and the occasion or context sensitivity of expressive sentences, it seems that the expressive philosophical statements in play can and do change, given the nature of the underlying mistake as well as their role. The heretic who says "Christ lost his body" and the cognitive scientist who, convinced that mind is just a program, says "John lost his body" betoken two different mistakes and demand two separate expressive philosophical statements. In turn, it is unclear if the two expressive philosophical statements that correct these solecisms rely on the same grammatical networks to function.

Two, pursuant to one the occasion or context sensitive status of expressive philosophical statements threaten to undermine the conception of grammatical interdependencies as already obtaining in grammar (see chapter 4.0f). Indeed, it seems as though the only access we have to grammar are through expressive philosophical statements whose role is inherently context or occasion sensitive. In turn, this makes it opaque how we can then use these expressive philosophical statements to map anything at all. As it were, philosophical statements are simply to enmesh in, and dependent on, context or occasion to allow for a non-context or –

occasion sensitive, independent of a particular conversation, and so on, account. In sum, the expressive gloss on philosophical statements belies the cartographic project since it individuates out a philosophical statement based solely on its context or occasion sensitive role as a correction in a conversation, rather than its supposed relationship with constitutive rules that it reflects.

However, the expressive gloss has a ready-reply to these objections. In effect, being in a position to offer these sorts of expressive philosophical statements as correctives and linguistic explanations presupposes the ability to speak and understand the language in question. And, though perhaps the boundary is not sharp, we can still rely on using this understanding to map out the internal connections. Indeed, the "what would we say if…" question emerges as a means to articulate exactly this ability and so map out grammar. However, the "what would we say if…" question can be cashed out in two distinct ways. One of them, discussed by Cavell (2002), 1-44, sees the question as a form of invitation to the reader/speaker and grants that it is unable to establish anything without the negotiated consent and mutually forged reciprocity between the speaker and the philosopher. However, this abandons the idea of any external and pre-established normative interdependencies to map. In effect, “what would we say if…” does not explore pre-given normative interdependencies between constitutive rules that determine the use of expressions. Rather, it establishes these interdependencies on a case by case, and conversation partner to conversation partner, basis.

The other way to cash out the "what would we say if…" question is to offer a philosophical articulation of what language, ability, and understanding, amount to. In effect, since correction and linguistic explanation, embedded in philosophical statements, rests on the understanding of the language in question, we should attempt to clarify what this understanding is, how it works, etc. From here, the grammatical account utilizes Aristotelian jargon complete with powers, first and second order potentials, vehicles and manifestations, etc., to make sense of the abilities that such expressive philosophical statements rely on (see, e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 380-85, Glock (2014)). The hope is that, by articulating these complex relationships, we can come to understand how an expressive philosophical statement works fully. And, in turn, this will re-enable the cartographic project as it will allow us to mitigate the context or occasion sensitivity of expressive philosophical statements.

This reply, however, faces two objections. One, such a wheeled in Aristotelian terminology may involve Wittgenstein, and his interpreters, in first order metaphysical debates Wittgenstein strived to avoid. Indeed, someone can just reject the Aristotelian terminology that was wheeled in to clarify "ability" say. Further, this rejection need not betoken stubbornness or irrationality on the part of the rejecter but a different metaphysical theory concerning "ability." And clearly this is problematic as Wittgenstein insists that "[i]f someone were to advance *theses* in philosophy it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them" (PI § 128). Two, it seems to flatly contradict Wittgenstein who claims that the "mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in" (Z § 16). The grammatical account would read this note, and others like them, as a repudiation of the 'meaning-body' myth (e.g., Glock (1996 a), 207). And this is correct. Furthermore, this links back to their discussion of the imminence of meaning noted in 4.0d. However, this also seems to problematize the Aristotelian apparatus that the expressive gloss relies on to make sense of meaning as well. Indeed, "Wittgenstein observed that 'meaning' is a primitive concept" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 154). If meaning is primitive, then I am unclear how Aristotle can help us dig deeper here.

Second, even granting that these worries are unfounded or wrong, there remains a grave problem for the expressive gloss. To wit, "not all rules for the use of a word are essential. And the distinction between what is essential and what is inessential, though guided by considerations of the purpose of the relevant language game is, at least to a degree, a matter of decision" (Hacker (1996), 199). In other words, it is not enough that we correct and linguistically explain various aspects of language. Indeed, if this were all that interested us, then we would have to allow in corrective practices that "seems to have nothing to do with philosophy…. As Moore put it, grammar is the sort of thing one teaches small children at school, e.g. 'you don't say 'three men was in the field" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 57). Thus, we need a criterion to individuate the properly philosophical corrections from the less interesting ones. However, this goes beyond the resources of the expressive gloss that individuates philosophical statements from the ebb and flow of conversation based solely on their corrective or explanatory role. Indeed, it is unclear how parsing out 'boring' corrections like "English plurals get –s" from 'philosophical' corrections like "'to know' implies the possibility of doubt" can be anything but arbitrary- as "decision" in the quote from Hacker seems to hint at. Further, Wittgenstein's reply to

Moore's objection, "what about [the sentence] ‘God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost were in the field or was in the field'" (*ibid*, 58), speaks to this. In turn, this raises the cartographic problem as the map we make may become so rich with exogenous details and so arbitrarily determined by decisions that it ceases to function as a map. Thus, the expressive gloss is unworkable.

(c) The fused gloss attempts to synthesize feature of the above two accounts. To begin, it accepts that "the use of a term is relatively stable [but], tokens of the same type-sentence can be used either conceptually or factually by one and the same person in different contexts. It may even be indeterminate whether a token sentence expresses conceptual or empirical relations" (Glock (2002), 90). It also accepts that "interaction between the conceptual and factual aspects implies that the division of labor between conceptual clarification of philosophy… and factual discoveries… require *dynamic interaction* rather than splendid isolation" (Glock (2017), 241). From here, it attempts to incorporate aspects of both the expressive and the descriptive glosses. In effect, it agrees with the expressive gloss that the role of correction is a (*not the*) critical criterion to identify philosophical statements. It agrees with the descriptive gloss that these philosophical statements can only play this role because they rest on a description of the constitutive rules that determine proper uses. In other words, a philosophical statement can only play the role of correcting when it describes already obtaining grammatical relationships. As it were, I can only use a map to help someone when the map describes the city we are both in.

From here, the fused gloss insists that the above two accounts rest on a flawed attempt to bifurcate expressive and descriptive aspects of philosophical statements. Indeed, "a necessary statement [which we argued in section 4.1a is deeply connected with a normative rule-formulation] cannot *both* be about, e.g., numbers *and* colors and be a rule for the use of words. A look at the rules of chess suggests otherwise, however" (Glock (2008 b), 72). In other words, there are, in fact, clear cases of artifacts, e.g., rulebooks for chess, that do function both as constitutive rules that determine a practice, and so are expressive in our sense, as well as enabling one to map out interconnections independently of errors, and so is descriptive in our sense. Indeed, a similar vein "[t]he so-called central paragraphs of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany are constitutive of the constitution… not *just* in the mereological sense, but also in the sense that they *define* that particular body of law" (*ibid*). Thus, "grammar… *states* rather than *describes*, the rules of language" (Baker

& Hacker (2009), 147). Thus, in point of fact, we do have descriptive rules that overcome the force problem and can function as expressive correctives.

However, this fused gloss rests on a question-begging assumption, or so I argue. Let us begin with the seemingly paradigmatic case of jurisprudence. A lawyer must have both knowledge of the descriptive rules of the law- e.g., what statues, suits, judgments, etc., are in play for a particular question- and can use these descriptive rules to exculpate her client. However, what does the yeoman's work here is not the descriptive rules but the lawyer's *role* in the actual legal practice. And this role cannot just be taken for granted. For example, Wiess has written what a very apt one-volume discussion of Islamic law (Wiess (2006)). However, since Wiess is not a Muslim, neither he nor his work can play any role in Islamic legal theory and practice. In a similar key, a legal historian or anthropologist of law may offer perfectly cogent descriptive rules concerning, e.g., the evolution of civil law or the normative interconnections that define the legal system of a tribe. However, their works cannot be deployed by a lawyer in court because they cannot play the necessary role. Turning to chess, the same exact question begging emerges. Thus, we are told that it "is implausible to insist that the medieval board-game was not really chess, because the pawns could not move tow squares at a time in their first move" (Glock (2008 c), 173). What is telling about this claim is that it depends on the role in a similar way. Indeed, a historian of board games would be remiss if she insisted that this version of chess is not chess. Equally clearly, though, I would demand my money back from a chess-teacher who tried to teach me this dated version of chess as modern chess. Thus, the fused gloss overcomes the force problem is by assuming that the philosophical statements already play the required role. So this begs the question.

Perhaps matters are better regarding language and the grammatical philosopher. However, there are two critical problems here. First, critically, the "margin of tolerance is greater and less well defined in the case of natural languages than in the case of chess. There is a simple though important reason for this: The constitutive rules of natural languages do not form a precise and canonized system" (Glock (2015), 846). This seems to mean that a philosophical statement cannot link to the constitutive rules of language in the way that tightly connected descriptive legal rules and expressive lawyerly uses. Further, this lack of tightness quickly ramifies in a deleterious way.

Let us spell this out more carefully. One, recall that the same type-sentence might be a grammatical or empirical statement, depending on context and occasion. However, it seems that even the location of the same type-sentence within grammar can change given context and occasion. For example, as Cavell (2002), 238-266, points out, "I know I am in pain" may be used to put forward an ethical demand rather than as an epistemic claim. When "I know I am in pain" is used in this ethical sense, pointing out that apodictic and certain knowledge of mental states is problematic, falls rather flat. However, without a clear way to determine if someone's use of "I know I am in pain" is meant ethically or epistemically, the fused gloss simply begs the question. Succinctly, how do we know what the conversation partner means by this claim without negotiation? Two, and even more problematic, it becomes rather unclear what "constitutive" means if the status of language is so flexible and the rules that are thought to determine it are not tightly interwoven. In effect, a constitutive rule, by definition, determines a game/practice. However, if the rules can change positions so readily be altered, be modified or abandoned, and so on, while the language remains *the same* language, it becomes unclear if the changed rules really were constitutive of the language in the first place. Three, related to two, by what criteria do we know when a language has changed? Indeed, Davidson (2005), in an admittedly exaggerated way, calls attention to the problem of individuating out languages, dialectics, slang, etc. Is Shakespearian English still English? Four, pursuant to three, and even worse, if language can be modified in that constitutive rules can be altered and the language continues to be the same language it is, identifying nonsense is deeply problematic. This is because a seemingly nonsensical claim may, in fact, rest on a modification to a constitutive rule or an addition of a new constitutive rule. For example, Hacker (1996 a), 235, claims that Freud's use of "unconscious motive" betokens a new use rather than just nonsense. However, it is unclear why we should grant that that this is so.

Second, the philosopher does not have anything like the clear role that a lawyer has. Indeed, a classical objection to this methodology can, I think, be re-framed at this juncture. Often, the worry makes it appear that any modification of language in terms of jargon, technical use, etc., is somehow problematic. As it stands, such an objection is, at best, a misunderstanding of the grammatical account. However, the underlying worry that may motivate this objection is that the philosopher's role, unlike the lawyer's, is rather unclear. As it were, by what right is

the philosopher the arbiter of correct use? There seem to be two ways to answer this question. One is Socratic. The philosopher's role is totally immanent to the conversation, and her 'authority' rests simply on her careful listening and mischief making in terms of the conversation partner's own words and concepts. This harmonizes well with some aspects of the grammatical account (e.g., Glock (1991)). In this case, however, I see absolutely no reason why fact that "ordinary people use words in specific ways… [implies that] non-philosophical usage excludes certain ways of using words as nonsensical" (*ibid* 84) is relevant. Indeed, a Socratic method can work for an invented rule governed ideoletic that I subsequently learn just as well as anything else. The other is to insist that the role of the philosopher is to give "a synoptic overview… [And in] so doing, one will also often be describing the bounds of sense- characterizing combinations of words that are *excluded* from the language" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 285). Thus, the philosopher aims to "remind us of how we use words, show the bounds of sense were transgressed, offer us analogies and point out disanalogies, or juxtapose the case in hand with imaginary language games... to highlight features we overlooked" (*ibid* 286). However, the key problem with this model is that "if philosophy is to be the guardian of the bounds of sense, it is a referee who can adjudicate only with the consent of the players, who acknowledge the particular rules according to which they use words" (Hacker (1996), 240). In turn, assuming this consent begs the question.

4.1.b Correct Uses and Meanings:

Thus, we see that the relationship between philosophical statements and the constitutive rules that govern the use of expressions is problematic. This section examines a somewhat related problem for the grammatical account. Specifically, it examines the way the grammatical account attempts to coordinate the correct use of various expressions and the semantics of those expressions. It argues that there is no way to relate correct uses and meanings together in such a way that we can read off from the correct use of an expression e, the meaning of an e. Pursuant to this, correct use and meaning can and do come apart in various ways. First, I present a reasonably intuitive conception of the relationship between correct use and meaning- i.e., "meaning=use"- and argue that it is unworkable. Second, I examine the claim that

"use determines meaning" and argue that it still cannot account for semantics. Third, I examine cases where sounds have clear constitutive rules for their use but fail to have meanings.

To begin, one way to understand the relationship between correct uses and the meanings of various expressions is to see them as equivalent. In other words, "meaning is use" is best read as "meaning=use." However, this equivalency quickly runs into problems as use and meaning can and do come apart. For example, following Rundle (1991), 9, in spirit, assume that the use of the term ‘hella' has clear constitutive rules that determine its use. However, the use of ‘hella' can be fashionable, annoying, etc., though the meaning of ‘hella' is not fashionable, annoying, etc. Further, my use of ‘hella' can be improper, e.g., in a formal setting. However, it is rather unclear what it would mean to claim that the meaning of ‘hella' is improper. Indeed, "someone who identifies meaning and use cannot discard these points as minor details. For the reveal that the use of ‘use of a word' *differs* from the use of ‘meaning of a word'" (Glock (1996 d), 208). Thus, the claim that the correct use of an expression and the meaning of an expression are identical is problematic.

Thus, a reformulation of the relationship between meaning and correct use is required. A plausible attempt is to note that "though meaning does not *determine* use, use determines meaning, not causally, but logically… given the use of a word we can infer its meaning without further evidence, but not vice versa" (*ibid* 209). Furthermore, note that "[e]very difference in meaning is a difference in use; but not every difference in use is a difference in meaning" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 157). In other words, for the grammatical account, the correct use of an expression engenders the meaning of an expression in such a way that I can infer from the correct use, the meaning, but not vice versa. Granting this, a corollary is that one must be able to "learn from the use of a word everything there is to its meaning" (Glock (1996 d), 209). In other words, when I know the correct use of an expression I, eo ipso, must be able to "read off" from this use the semantics of the expression in question.

However, this reply is deeply problematic in three interdependent ways. First, it is somewhat unclear that knowing the correct use of an expression e and knowing the meaning of e is such that knowing the use eo ipso means I know the meaning. For example, consider the phrase ‘Allah Rahmet Eylesin' (hereby ARE). I learned the correct use of this expression well before I understood its semantics. In turn, the rule that governs the use of ARE is "say ARE at funerals or after-events, to as many

people as possible, and people will be happy and praise your language skills and when someone says ARE to you, look sad and say ‘sag ol.'" In point of fact, this was how ARE was linguistic-explained to me and how I linguistic-explained it to other non-native Azerbaijani speakers. Further, this linguistic-explanation allows one to both deploy the term correctly as well as respond to it appropriately. And I can follow the rule for this use intentionally. Nevertheless, it strains credulity to ascribe to myself a knowledge of the meaning of ARE based on this knowledge of the correct us of ARE. However, the grammatical account has a ready reply to this. To wit, the grammatical account insists that we should focus on is "the use *as determined by grammar*… And that is the use *as given by explanations of how the word is used*" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 153). In other words, the rules that determined how I used ARE are not the salient constitutive rules nor is my account of the correct use of ARE an apt account of the real correct use of ARE. In other words, there is a distinction between the real correct use, as determined by the constitutive rules of grammar, and coterminous rules that contribute to use but do not engender meaning. Succinctly, knowing that the correct use of “Gesundhiet” in English is to utter it after someone sneezes, does not engender meaning because it is not the real correct use as determined by the constitutive rules.

This reply, however, leads to the second problem. To begin, notice that this reconstruction of the argument grants that there are rules that are coterminous with an expression, e.g., say ARE at a funeral, say "Gesundheit" after someone sneezes, etc., that does not properly determine the meaning. However, it is unclear what criteria let someone know that they have isolated the ‘right' constitutive rules that determine the meaning of an expression, without already assuming the semantics themselves. In this register, the note by Baker & Hacker that it is the grammatical rules we should focus on begs the question. On the one hand, if these grammatical rules are the prior semantics of the expression, apparently we are given no further criteria to individuate them out from rules like "say ARE at a funeral.” Indeed, "say ARE at funerals" is a rule that determines the correct use of the expression, I can linguistic-explain it, etc. Moreover, given our discussion of understanding in 4.0d, it is unclear by what right one can dismiss these rules as not really fostering understanding. Again, I used the term correctly, I could linguistic-explain it to others, I could respond properly, I could intentionally deploy it, and so on. Equally clearly, the rule “say ARE at funerals” does not give me a handle on the meaning.

On the other hand, if we rely on the semantics to individuate out the right constitutive rules, the neat relationship between constitutive rules, correct use, and meaning is problematic. As it were, I rely on the meaning to individuate out meaning engendering constitutive rules. Such a move is clearly circular in a vicious sense. I assume the semantics of a term to isolate the real constitutive rules that determine the right correct use that engender the meaning that I rely on to isolate the real constitutive rules, and so on. Further, it seems clear that if the "use determines meaning" thesis is plausible, such a circle is unacceptable. Again, this leads us back to the above paragraph and the question of how to move from correct use to meaning.

Finally, the grammatical account may insist that the above discussion has ignored the *point* of ARE (cf. PI § 564). In turn, it is exactly the 'point' that allows me to isolate the proper constitutive rules from coterminous rules and make sense of the claim that "correct use determines meaning." This leads to the third problem. To begin, it is clear that this 'point' either itself depends on more rules or it does not. If it depends on more rules, the same sort of problem can be raised for these rules that tell me the point of the original rules. As it were, such rules for the point of the rules hang like signposts (cf. PI § 85). Conversely, if the point is different in kind than the rules, as PI § 564 seems to imply, then some non-rule based x is required to sort out semantics. In turn, this belies the claim that "correct use determines meaning" is a sufficient condition for meaningfulness. We return to this in section 4.1c. Regardless, it is clear that "correct use determines meaning" faces some objections.

Third, in a different key, having constitutive rules that govern the use of sounds does not necessarily engender a semantic value for those sounds. Consider, "tally-ho" or "abracadabra."[58] These sounds seem to have very clear constitutive rules that govern their deployments. One cannot end a lecture on evolutionary biology with "abracadabra!" say. However, it is rather unclear if these terms have a meaning. Indeed, these "show that there are differences between the use of 'the meaning of a word' and the use of 'the use of a word'…Does this mean that it has a use but no meaning? That would be too swift… We might say that it has meaning but not *a* meaning… But they do show the concepts of *the meaning* of a word and *having a meaning* faltering while that of *the use* of a word still holds firm" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 155). Thus, clear constitutive rules that determine the use of a sound simply is

[58] Again, Rundel (1991), 190-98, points this out.

not sufficient to ensure that the sound has a semantic value. Again, we see that the constitutive rules that determine when and how to use a sound/expression and what that sound/expression means, come apart.

4.1.c Bare Normativity of Meaning and Non-Rationalism:

This section argues that the source of the problems discussed in section 4.1a and 4.1b is the rule-based normativity of meaning. First, I briefly set the stage. Second, I argue that replacing the rule-based normativity with a bare normativity of meaning circumvents or mitigates the objections raised above. However, third, I argue that replacing rule normativity with bare normativity requires us to abandon the claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is "rational" and opt, instead, for a "non-rationalism" that is far closer to his "personal ideology."

To begin, recall that the grammatical account insists that the normativity of meaning be understood in a "ruly" way[59]- i.e., an expression e has a meaning only if there are rules for the use of e. Section 4.1a argued that the relationship between these constitutive rules for use and philosophical statements is deeply problematic. Section 4.1b argued that the relationship between the constitutive rules that determine correct use and the semantics of an expression is deeply problematic. Thus, the rule-based normativity of meaning account is problematic. Furthermore, it is unclear if this rule-based account is an apt reading of the PI. For example, Wittgenstein asks "is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them- as we go along" (PI § 83). Instead of rule normativity of meaning, let us see if a bare normativity of meaning can avoid or address these worries. Recall that bare normativity of meaning, and an "unruly" reading of Wittgenstein, insists that an expression e is meaningful only if there are correctness conditions for e.

Granting this weaker bare normativity of meaning, both objections can be met. First, the complaint that knowledge of the constitutive rules that determine the correct use of an expression do not eo ipso give one the semantics of the expressions is avoided. For marginal cases like "abracadabra," the correction conditions accounts for why these sounds are different than the sounds my old car makes. Further, as Baker & Hacker noted, these correct use conditions are not sufficient to ensure that

[59] Glock (2009), 163-65 introduces the categories of ‘ruly' and ‘unruly' interpretations of Wittgenstein

“abracadabra” has a meaning. For more central cases, e.g., cases where the expression clearly has a meaning, the bare normativity of meaning does not claim to capture or account for the meaning fully but merely note a necessary condition for us to treat an expression as meaningful in that there are normative conditions that determine its use. Indeed, here it seems that when Wittgenstein writes the "meaning of a phrase *for us* is determined by the use we make of it" (BLBK 65-emphasis mine), "[w]hat *we call* their meaning [e.g. of a figure in this context] is *not anything* which they have got in them… irrespective of what use we make of them" (BRBK 170-emphasis mine), or, most famously, "[f]or a *large* class of cases of the employment of the world ‘meaning'- though not for *all*- this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI 43-underlying mine), we need to take his hesitancy and restrictions seriously.[60] It is not that knowing the constitutive rules that determine the correct use of an expression can, on its own, allow one to grasp the meaning of that expression. Instead, it is that using ‘use' instead of ‘meaning' is an apt way to avoid various philosophical misunderstandings- as Hacker & Baker (2009), 136-144, note. Furthermore, as noted in section 4.1b, the ‘point’ of various language-games is critical for isolating the proper rules themselves and does not readily reduce to more rules. Thus the correct use of e, and the rules it brings in its wake, is not solely responsible for meaning. Indeed, if we accept meaning is properly primitive, then it cannot be accounted for by correct use and constitutive rules any more than by reference and truth, semiotics, etc. Thus, as Wittgenstein notes, "[i]n giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown… this is enough to show that I can come up only with *externalities about language*" (PI § 120-emphasis mine). In other words, Wittgenstein’s project was never accounting for meaning on the basis of something else- even on the basis of constitutive rules that determine correct uses. The grammatical account may insist that I have misconstrued the tightness of the link between constitutive rules and meanings. However, section 4.1b shows that the two do come apart. In sum, the objection in section 4.1b fall flat as Wittgenstein was not trying to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the semantic content. At best, he

[60] Against this unruly Wittgenstein, Glock (2009), 164-65, offers a set of further quotes that support a ruly reading. However, barring his quotation from RFM, these he refers to all occur during Wittgenstein's ‘transition period' (e.g., Glock (2001), 10-16). In turn, it is rather unclear how much this transitional material can be used to elucidate later Wittgenstein- a point also made against Baker in chapter 1.1f. Further, the quote from RMF is not knock-down evidence as Wittgenstein is talking about language-games and not language per se.

is offering a necessary condition- i.e. sounds have meaning only if there are normative standards for their deployment.

The question of how philosophical statements and constitutive rules relate is addressed by noting that philosophical statements do not aim to reflect underlying constitutive rules that *simply* exist within language. Though philosophical statements do rely on constitutive rules, and these rules are critical for a host of reasons, some of which we discuss in chapter seven, it is imperative to realize that the rules themselves depend on normative correctness conditions. Indeed, this is one way of further radicalizing the grammatical account's discussion of the shared normative practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rules voiced in section 4.0c and the imminence of meaning discussed in 4.0d. These practices are not themselves ruly but, rather, bring into play correctness conditions that are far more flexible, fudge-able, and so on. For example, the English speaking community decided, for a host of reasons, to let James Joyce 'get away with' *Finnegans Wake,* in my mind the best book ever written in English and in all minds a book that goes out of its way to flaunt any and all standards for the correct use of English. This cannot be accounted for by constitutive rules per se but the decision of a language community and this decision does not reduce to rules without setting off the stipulative regress mentioned in 4.1b. In other words, the problem with the grammatical account's conception of the way a philosophical statement and constitutive rules relate is not so much the rules. Instead, it is the assumption that the constitutive rules, and the normative interconnections they have with one another, are self-supporting features of language. Pace this, an unrly account insists that, below these constitutive rules, are communal corrective practices that do not readily reduce to more rules. Granting this, the fact that an expressive philosophical statement can be rationally disputed need not cause us problems. When such a dispute breaks out, we rely on the underlying unrly normative practices to come to a decision concerning the problematic philosophical statement.

This slight shift to an unruly conception, though leaving many insights of the grammatical account intact, modifies other aspects of the grammatical account. Explicitly, we must abandon the claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is "rational" in that it simply describes already-given, stable, and systematically interconnected normative interdependencies that obtain in grammar due to self-supporting rules. Instead, Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is deeply sensitive to the fact that grammar may not form a system in this way and the rules that

define a particular grammar are not self-supporting- i.e. they depend on the unruly normative practices of communities and these often come down to decisions that the community makes. Let us bring this more into view.

To begin, as section 4.0e and 4.0f discussed, the rule-based normativity of meaning allows us to section off Wittgenstein's irrational ideology from his rational methodology. In effect, the methodology relies on mapping out the stable interdependent relationships between various rules and using these rules to check various solecisms whereas his ideology is taken as some form of anti-rationalism. However, notice that the rational/irrational binary excludes a third possibility- a non-rational account. By a non-rational account, I mean that there are certain brute facts that are not properly considered as being either rational or irrational. The fact that objects fall towards the Earth at about 9.81 m/s2 does not strike me as being either rational or irrational. It is merely the case. Similarly, the fact that people cry when they are sad does not strike me as either a rational or an irrational response to sadness. It is simply what we do (cf. PI § 217). In turn, this non-rationalism notes that the anthropological features that account for the internal connections within grammar are not so much based on interdependencies of rules as on "*patterns of behavior,* which in turn presuppose a framework of shared cognitive capacities, needs, emotions, and attitudes" (Glock (2000), 82). Indeed, this presupposed framework is "not exclusively or even primarily cognitive in nature but comprise conative and affective aspects of our lives. Thus, we could not identify assent and dissent unless the native shared certain fundamental preferences with us, such as the acceptance of food or drink, or the refusal of unpleasant things" (Glock (1996 b), 168). In other words, what holds the interconnections of grammar together are not rational rules that form a coherent and interdepend network of grammar but non-rational brute facts about the sorts of beings we are and the sort of world we inhabit. In other words, it is our unruly normative practices that support and maintain the rules. Furthermore, someone who is unmoved by correction, who does not seek to avoid unpleasant things, etc., is just not someone for whom linguistic-explanation, correction, and so on., can work on.

In turn, this means that the interconnections in grammar are underwritten by patterns "which recurs, with different variations, in the tapestry of life" (PI II I § 2). These patterns are no more rational than the speed at which rocks fall. They simply are. Further, this begins to account for Wittgenstein’s seemingly idiosyncratic style, his odd examples, and so on. Wittgenstein’s methodology attempts to bring these non-

rational features to light by allowing the themes he deals with to emerge in a manner that, from a rational point of view, is rather desultory and shambolic. Indeed, the basic point is that clear logical presentation is a post hoc rational reconstruction of how thinking, conversation, reasoning, etc., actually work in human life, a point we return to to some extent in chapter six. And Wittgenstein "writes poorly" is to display these human features clearly.

4.2 The Key Uptake:

The grammatical account is a nuanced metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Indeed, it has several features that, both exegetically and philosophically, make a great deal of sense of Wittgenstein. First, the insistence that philosophy's distinction from science is best construed along a first and second order discipline divide is apt. Indeed, this distinction avoids the upsetting consequence that "philosophy" is some inherent mistake or irrationality. Second, and more critically, the insight that we must adopt an immanent perspective on meaning and that such a perspective is necessarily normative is precisely right. Third, consequently, a straight naturalistic reduction of language to some x is slightly problematic. However, this is not because there are abstract meanings that hang out in Platonic heaven. Instead, it is that these features are inherently normative. Finally, fourth, pursuant to this, and most important, is the insistence that all of this depends on our forms of life- the sorts of creatures we are and the things we do. As the grammatical account insisted in section 4.0c, we simply are the sorts of creatures that respond to normative pressure.

However, the critical problem for the grammatical account is that its focus on a rule-based normativity of meaning, and the related assumptions that these rules are self-supporting features within language that normatively interconnect with one another in a coherent and consistent way and that we can describe these normative connections without any reference to philosophical problems, particular investigations, or patterns in our non-rational form of life, is deeply problematic. As argued above, such a rule-based conception cannot account for how philosophical statements and constitutive rules relate. Further, it is unclear how the rules that determine the correct use of an expression and the meaning of an expression relate.

4.3 Summary:

This chapter has attempted to lay out the grammatical interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as well as how this metaphilosophical interpretation goes wrong. In section 1a, we note that, according to the grammatical account, a philosophical statement is non-cognitive, in that it does not describe features of the world, and second order in that it describes the inherently normative features involved in representation or description. In section 1b, we linked these normative features to constitutive rules. In section 1c, we discussed how these constitutive rules depend on normative practices- notably linguistic-explanation and meaning. In section 1d, we added "understanding" and noted that, once understanding is added, the semantic circle cannot be escaped from. In section 1e, we discussed how to avoid intractable holism by depending on perspicuous representation. In section 1f, we noted that this enables conceptual cartography.

However, in section two, I argued that the philosophical statements and the constitutive rules they reflect couldn't align. I also argued that the constative rules, the correct uses they determined, and the semantics of expressions, couldn't align. Finally I claimed that a bare normativity of meaning is a more apt account.

Part II

"*Without philosophy* thought are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" TLP 4.112- emphasis mine.

"I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible to *stimulate* someone to *thoughts of his own*" PI *preface* 4- emphasis mine.

5 Chapter Five: Clear Thinking: The Philosophy of Philosophy in the Tractatus:

This chapter offers an engagement with the metaphilosophical points Wittgenstein proffers in especially TLP 4.111-4.116.[61] By doing so, it aims to achieve two goals. First, it gives a consistent, coherent, and apt account of these points. Second, it shows that aspects of this metaphilosophy are quite different than either the four metaphilosophical readings of Wittgenstein discussed in Part I, or contemporary metaphilosophy more generally.[62] I should note here that, though I engage with the secondary literature at various points- e.g., a "resolute"[63] account in section 1 and a more "classical," [64] one in section 2- my goal is not adjudicating the debates between the classicists and the new Wittgensteinians. Ergo, I use the literature somewhat sparingly and with an aim more to elucidate Wittgenstein than offering a battle-cry.

This chapter divides into four sections. First, I engage with the first few mentions of "philosophy" in the TLP. I develops a "straightforward reading," partly inspired by Russell's (in)famous introduction to the TLP (cf. especially TLP (*Introduction*), x, xiii & xix), that promises to make good sense of the Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. However, this reading is then shown to be unworkable. From here, I begin to develop an "alignment reading." As I discuss more fully later, “the alignment reading” interprets the philosophical activity (cf. TLP 4.112) as a procedure that ensures that abstract logical forms like P(a) or aRb and specific, particular semantic content like <John is nice> or <Sally loves John> align properly. To articulate the alignment reading properly, second, I examine several nuances that the straightforward reading ignored or elided. With these in view, third, I turn to Wittgenstein's most sustained metaphilosophical discussion- TLP 4.111-4.116. I present an interpretation of them that relies on the distinctions drawn in section two. Finally, I discuss the implications of metaphilosophy so understood as well as setting

[61] Wittgenstein would object to the use of "metaphilosophy." I use it as a, perhaps problematic, shorthand for Wittgenstein's discussions of philosophy and philosophical methodology. Circumspect readers beware

[62] E.g. (Williamson (2007), ix-x), (Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013), 1-12)

[63] The locus classicus is (Diamond (1995), 179-204) and (Conant 1989). See also, e.g., (Goldfarb (1997)), (Rickets (1996)), (Read and Hutchinson (2006)), (Kuusela (2011)), (Floyd (2007)).

[64] e.g., (Anscombe (1971)), (Hacker (1986), 1-145), (Glock (1996), various points), (Fogelin (1976), 1-104), (Pears (1988)).

the stage for other chapters in Part II. Specifically, I discuss how the alignment reading's interpretation of the philosophical activity relates the activity to clarity in such a way that doing philosophy *is* just clarifying thoughts.

5.0 A Straightforward Reading and Straightforward Problems:

This section attempts to develop a straightforward reading of the early metaphilosophical remarks of the TLP- i.e., the preface, TLP 3.324, 3.3421, 4.003 and 4.0031. The goal of the straightforward reading is to present an initial and intuitive reading of these points that promises to make good sense of them, their interrelationships, and their ordering in the work. I begin with such a reading for both interpretive and exegetical reasons. Concerning interpretation, over the past thirty years or so, so much of the TLP has become contested and disputed that it is challenging to know how to begin to read and interpret the book.[65] Proffering a straightforward reading, I hope, avoids several of these debates by attempting to read the TLP with fresh eyes, as though one has only just encountered the book. Concerning exegesis, a constant temptation, especially when engaging with the TLP- a book that is both so pregnant with insight and so terse and laconic in presentation- is that one begins with a theory and then cherry-picks gnomic remarks that support it. By attempting to just read the book, as far as one can, I hope to mitigate this unfortunate tendency.

First, I present the straightforward reading. I note how it both makes good sense of the aforementioned philosophical remarks as well as how well it aligns with Russell explicitly and Frege somewhat implicitly. However, I argue that such a reading cannot be sustained as Wittgenstein flatly contradicts it. Finally, I examine a resolute response and discuss some ramifications. [66]

To begin, the preface to the TLP claims that "the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather- not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit

[65] Indeed, it may not be wrong to ask if one can even read the book in the first place, a point we touch on later in this section.
[66] We discussed a "resolute reading" in chapter 1.2a,b, and 1.2i, j. I should note here that though resoluteness and therapy often move in lockstep, they need not. Prima facie one can read the TLP resolutely but deny that the overall metaphilosophical aim is excising philosophy.

thinkable (i.e., we should have to think what cannot be thought)" (TLP *preface*, 3). This sentence seems to encourage us to assume a sharp distinction between thoughts and the expressions of them. Indeed, it is natural to move from this to the assumption that the real focus of the TLP is not on thought per se, but the medium in which thought is expressed, i.e., natural languages. Moreover, this assumption seems confirmed by the claim that "only… in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense" (TLP *preface,* 4). Thus, the straightforward reading begins with the working assumption that thought as such is in order and that it is the medium in which thought is expressed that is problematic.

Granting this, the straightforward reading turns to the first mentions of "philosophy" in the TLP. These mentions seem both to confirm this straightforward view as well as to refine and to deepen it. The straightforward reading begins by noting that the first reference to philosophy within the TLP's text, occurs in section 3 of the work. This section elaborates the claim that "a logical picture of facts is a thought" (TLP 3). Wittgenstein has already told us that a logical picture is the most abstract possible isomorphism possible between a possible fact and a picture or representation of it. Indeed, a picture or a representation constitutively depends on this logical isomorphism in such a way that for x to be a representation of y necessarily implies that x and y share a logical form (e.g., TLP 2.181-2.2). He also tells us that "[t]hought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically" (TLP 3.03). To interpret this, the straightforward reading assumes that, if a thought is a picture, then "to think" is "to depict." In turn, this means "to think illogically" is "to depict illogically." However, "[w]hat a picture… must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it…. is logical form" (TLP 2.181). In other words, per definition, "x depicts y" implies that x and y share a logical form. This means that "to depict illogically" is a contradiction in terms as for any relation to count as a depicting relation, there must be a logical isomorphism in play. This further strengthens the straightforward reading as it implies that not only can we not have illogical thoughts, we cannot think illogically.

From here, the straightforward reading notes that per definition, a thought cannot be illogical. Further, per definition, a thought is a logical picture. Three, per definition, a logical picture represents a possible fact by sharing a logical form with it (e.g., TLP 2.16 & 2.161). And finally, per a seemingly innocuous assumption the straightforward reading makes, to have a thought that p is ipso facto to have grasped

the content <p> of the thought. As it were, thoughts are transparent. Granting these definitions and the seemingly innocuous assumption, there is no room for confusion, philosophical errors, etc., to enter into the relationship between a thought and the possible state of affairs it represents. Succinctly, to have a thought that p is to know the content <p> of the thought. In turn, the content <p> is a logical picture, and this picture shares the same logical form as a possible state-of-affairs p. There is no room for confusion, nonsense, etc.

Next, the straightforward reading seems further confirmed when Wittgenstein turns to metaphilosophy proper. Indeed, "[i]n *everyday language* it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification- and so belongs to different symbols" (TLP 3.323-emphasis mine) and "[i]n this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them)" (TLP 3.234). In other words, philosophical confusions, nonsense, and so on, only emerge when one attempts to convey a thought in a natural language. Indeed, the straightforward reading goes on to claim that "philosophy is a 'critique of language'" (TLP 4.3001) indicates precisely this. In other words, philosophical nonsense, muddles, etc., emerge only due to the defective nature of the medium in which we express thought.

In turn, the straightforward reading ascribes to Wittgenstein a clear metaphilosophical goal, a robust methodology to achieve this goal, a clear and articulate sense of how elucidation fits into this, and a deep harmony with Russell and Frege. To begin, clearly if natural language is what generates nonsense, confusion, etc., then the goal of philosophical work should be to replace it with an artificially constructed ideal language. Indeed, Russell's Introduction seems to confirm that this is Wittgenstein's goal. Thus, Russell notes the TLP lays down "the condition which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language… Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language… the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language" (TLP *Introduction* ix-x). For example, the "is" of English might best be broken up into the "is" of identity, and the "is" of predication (e.g., TLP 3.323). The methodology Wittgenstein relies on is that of logical analysis. This methodology promises to present the real logical form a thought has independently of the "surface grammar" that natural language presents it in. Indeed, the methodological goal is to strip thought of its ill-fitting clothing and present it

naked, in all its sharpness (e.g., TLP 4.002). On the straightforward view, an elucidation is logical analysis carried through (cf. TLP 4.111). A thought, in virtue of being a thought, already has a distinct logical form. It is natural language that distorts it, and philosophy aims to strip this away and offer an ideal language that displays clearly the real logical form. In effect, we elucidate a proposition by relying on logical analysis that re-presents the thought shorn from misleading natural language. And the harmony with Russell (e.g., (1996), 42-65) and Frege (e.g., (1997), 48-52) is fairly obvious. For all three, natural language is just too ambiguous, accidental, downright irrational, etc., to convey thoughts clearly.

Alas, however, the straightforward reading is quickly vitiated by an equally straightforward set of problems. First, Wittgenstein is keen to insist that "all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order" (TLP 5.5563). This quote has substantial implications for how to interpret the TLP. Regardless, it directly contradicts any interpretation of the TLP that seeks to locate the source of philosophical confusion and nonsense in ordinary or everyday language. Indeed, whatever Wittgenstein's concerns are, a straightforward account that locates the problems of philosophy solely and squarely within natural language is not viable. Second, and more damningly, Wittgenstein explicitly claims that "[p]hilosophy aims at the logical clarification *of thought*" (TLP 4.112- emphasis mine). Under the straightforward reading, this point is nearly unintelligible. A thought is already a logical picture, a thought already shares a logical form with a possible fact, and the content of a thought, by the seemingly innocuous assumption, is already entirely transparent to the thinker. There is, quite literally, nothing to clarify.

In turn, there are at least two reactions to the failure of the straightforward reading. One of them is to be resolute. In effect, the problems that emerge for the straightforward reading are a consequence of its taking Wittgenstein's points as propositions. And this is already to misunderstand the text. Though the resolute reading has become a myriad set of overlapping unique interpretations- e.g., concept-script and sans-concept-script[67], Jacobins and Girondins[68], etc., I focus the discussion by taking Diamond and Conant at their word. To wit, "[t]here are two interrelated general features that suffice to make a reading ‘resolute'… The first is that it does not take those propositions of the Tractatus about Wittgenstein said, at §6.54, that they

[67] E.g. (Kuusela (2011), 127-32)
[68] E.g. (Read and Deans (2011), 149)

are to be recognized as ‘nonsensical' to convey ineffable insight. The second feature is a rejection of the idea that what such a recognition requires… the application of a theory of meaning that has been advanced in the body of the work… It is a corollary of the second of these features that a resolute reading is committed to rejecting the idea that the Tractatus holds that there are two logically distinct kinds of nonsense: the garden-variety kind… and a logically more sophisticated kind" ((2004), 47-48). Granting this, the tension that the straightforward reading stumbled upon is merely a result of not being resolute. Wittgenstein's points do not offer us a theory of philosophy, say. These points are just nonsense, and nonsense cannot "contradict itself."

To bring this further into view, let me remind the reader of the work done in chapter 1.1a. In effect, and provided that one is still interested in doing philosophy, the TLP divides into two kinds of points- frame-propositions and faux-propositions. The former are instructions on how to work through the book- methodological notes Wittgenstein offers the reader. The latter are merely attractive nonsense that we are meant to work through and expose as nonsense. As it were, we use the method the frame-propositions offers to expose the faux status of faux-propositions. Perhaps most critically, the resolute reading also insists on the fact that nonsense is monistic- i.e. all nonsense is the same from a logical point of view and all nonsense is caused by a failure to assign meaning to terms. In other words, we may feel like "the world is all that is the case" (TLP 1) is distinct from "piggly wiggle tiggle" (Diamond (2000), 151). However, this is psychology, not logic. Let us examine this response at the metaphilosophical level.

To begin, it seems to me that such a resolute view runs into problems when applied to the (seeming?) metaphilosophical propositions of the TLP. To see this, consider how the metaphilosophical tension arose. In the preface, Wittgenstein said that "the aim of this book is to draw a limit… not to the thought, but to the expression of thoughts…It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn" (TLP preface 3-4- emphasis mine) paired with, e.g., philosophy "must set limits to what can be thought: and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought" (TLP 4.114). There seems to be a tension here. Specifically, Wittgenstein seems to change targets. The preface insists that we cannot limit thought as this implies we would have to think illogically. Indeed, this is what motivated the straightforward reading. By contrast, TLP 4.114 indicates that philosophy works at the level of thought and does, in fact, limit it.

Further, notice that prima facie pinpointing this tension does not depend on any "theory" at work in the faux-propositions of the TLP- no "picture theory" is needed, no saying/showing distinction, etc. Rather, the prevarication between thought and language seem to be something "pre-theoretical." Notice, further, that such a tension cannot just be ignored or explained away. Again, for the straightforward reading, it is nearly definitional that thought cannot have any un-clarity, confusion, etc. However, Wittgenstein seems emphatic that thought can be unclear. In turn, this raises a host of issues concerning how logic, thought, language, and states of affairs relate, what sort of work elucidation does, and so on.

However, let us assume that there is underlying nonsense is driving this. Indeed, a resolute reader may insist that my conception of "thought", "language", or "philosophy" is philosophically loaded in such a way that it is faux-propositional. Granting this, a resolute reading of the metaphilosophical points of the TLP can, it seems, make one of three moves. It can take: the preface to be faux-propositions that we are meant to expose using the TLP method of elucidation and leave TLP 4.112 as a frame-proposition; TLP 4.112 as faux and the preface as the frame; she can go the whole way and take both as faux. Let us examine each in turn.

The most plausible way for a resolute reader to go is to argue that the preface is made up of faux-propositions. Indeed, the business about drawing a limit, the distinction between thought and expression, the insistence on the truth of the TLP, etc., are all just nonsense we are meant to see through. There is nothing we cannot think/say, and so the idea of a limit is silly (e.g., Diamond (1995), 179-204).[69] However, this faces two interrelated objections. One, there are other points of the preface a resolute reader wants to maintain are frame-propositions. Indeed, the claims that TLP is "not a textbook" (TLP *preface* 1) and that "[t]he book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows… the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood" (*ibid*). However, it becomes unclear by what right we can argue that some points in the preface are frame and others faux. Indeed, since there's no numbering system here, it seems like the only responsible exegetical way to deal with the preface is to take it as a unit. Two, if Wittgenstein begins his book with faux-propositions, without telling us what he is up to, then the

[69] Better said, it needs to be treated with a great deal of care- (e.g., Conant and Diamond (2004))

reader is slightly unsure how to proceed. Indeed, if the preface is not a frame then what is?

A second response is to claim that TLP 4.114 is nonsense. However, this is problematic as the claim seems to follow from the claim that "[p]hilosophy aims at the logical clarification *of thought*. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112-emphasis mine). Indeed, TLP 4.112 introduces the metaphilosophical tension noted above in a more implicit way. Regardless, perhaps TLP 4.114 and the first sentence of TLP 4.112 are nonsense. However, without the first sentence of TLP 4.112, the sort of activity philosophy does is left critically undefined. Perhaps Lacan punning on his own name should count as philosophy? Furthermore, the metaphilosophical points from TLP 4.111-116 seem required for making sense of the sort of methodology Wittgenstein is engaged in and is trying to teach us. Succinctly, if Wittgenstein's comments on his own methodology are nonsense, then it is slightly opaque how we can learn it.

The third is to interpret both as faux-propositions. In turn, this involves the resolute reader in a "self-mate" (e.g., Geach (1965), 460). Wittgenstein literally says nothing- not about philosophy, methodology, etc. In effect, the entire content of the book is just nonsense, and there are no frames. In turn, such a “enragés-ist” reading is clearly antiphilosophical in that Wittgenstein’s sole concern is best cast as convincing us to abandon philosophy- by hook or crook. Such a reading, in turn, falls prey to the objections I voiced in chapter 2.1a and b.

The second possible reaction is to admit that the straightforward reading failed. However, this is not due to being taken in by faux-propositions but due to the straightforward reading's ignoring nuances of the TLP. Ergo, let us bring those into view.

5.1 Distinctions, Differences, and Definitions; Oh My!:

Thus, we see that the straightforward reading is untenable for straightforward exegetical reasons. This section offers an alternative reading, the "alignment reading." Succinctly, the alignment reading argues that the causes of philosophical problems and confusion are neither due to logical form nor (defective) natural languages. Rather, confusion and philosophical problems arise from a misalignment between

logical form and semantic content. Pursuant to this, the goal of philosophy is ensuring that the alignment between them is correct. We develop this in far greater detail as we work through the chapter.

To begin, alignment reading is far more intricate than the straightforward reading in that it takes seriously the myriad distinctions the TLP introduces. First, I outline some critical points that the alignment reading insists we keep in mind. Second, I describe a three-stage account of the nature of "thought" that helps make sense of the TLP. As we shall see, this three-stage account is key to making sense of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. However, I stress here that this account is heuristic rather than philosophical.[70] In other words, the aim of the account is not proffering a rational reconstruction of the TLP per se but, rather, presenting certain salient aspects of the TLP in such a way that the metaphilosophical points can be brought into view. Further, the heuristic stages I present offers a "bottom-up" approach. In effect, we begin from the simple name-‘object' denotation, move to a “formal level” of thought, and then project this formal thought onto the world and, by doing so, impute semantic content to the thought. To reiterate, I use this three-stage heuristic because it helps brings aspects of the metaphilosophical points fully into view, as we shall see in the section 3.2.

To begin, the alignment reading calls into question one of the premises of the straightforward reading. Explicitly, the straightforward reading assumed that the thought that p and the content of the thought <p> are transparent and unmediated. Indeed, it was this that allowed the straightforward reading to maintain that, at the level of thought, error, confusion, etc., are impossible. Succinctly, to have a thought is to have a representation and I ‘automatically’ know what the thought represents. Heterodox as it sounds, the alignment reading maintains that this is deeply problematic. Specifically, the alignment reading follows Glock in assuming that "[t]houghts are not entities beyond language, and language is not merely a medium for transmitting a pre-linguistic process of thinking" (1996 c), 358). In other words, the alignment reading rejects any sharp division between thoughts and natural language. Indeed, consider Wittgenstein's claim that "thinking is a kind of language" (NB p. 82). Further, "I don't know *what* the constituents of a thought are, but I know *that* it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language" (NB

[70] In this, I follow (Kuusela (2008), 55-65) and (Kuusela (2011)).

p. 130- underlying mine) and "'[d]oes a Gedanke consists in works?' No! But of psychical constitutes that have *the same sort of relation* to reality as words" (NB p. 131-emphasis mine). Indeed, in many ways, it seems that Wittgenstein has anticipated a dilemma and accepted one horn.[71] To wit, assume that language requires convention to function. Also, assume that thought is inherently representational and non-conventional. Granting these, a "language of thought" is either not a language as it does not rely on conventions or it does not have thoughts defined as non-conventional representational content. Wittgenstein rejects the latter and insists that some aspect of thought requires convention too.

Pursuant to this, the alignment reading also follows Glock in assuming that Wittgenstein "uses ‘thought' (Genanke) in two different roles" (1996 c), 357). However, these uses are not a latent equivocation between the logical and the psychological (cf. *ibid* and *ibid* 247-50). Instead, Wittgenstein has analytically separated out two aspects of thought for heuristic purposes. More specifically, Wittgenstein isolates a formal aspect of thought and a content aspect of thought. To bring this fully into view, let us turn to the three-stage bottom-up heuristic account to clarify how "thought" works in the TLP.

The first stage is the simple name-‘object' denotation relationship. At this level, "[a] name means an object. The object is its meaning" (TLP 3.203) and "[i]n a proposition a name is the representative of an object" (TLP 3.22). However, it is critical to ask what, exactly, the simple names capture of the ‘objects.' To answer this, it is critical to note that "[i]f I know [by acquaintance] an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs" (TLP 2.0123) and "[t]he possibility of its occurring in a state of affairs is the form of an object" (TLP 2.0141). Further, "[a] picture *can* depict any reality whose form it has" (TLP 2.171- emphasis mine). Taken together, these mean that what the denotation relationship, and knowledge-by-acquaintance of ‘objects,' grasps for the simple names are formal combinatorial possibilities of the ‘objects.' Thus, though it is critical to also keep in mind that ‘objects' do have form and content (e.g., TLP 2.021 & 2.025)[72], the content part is left out of the simple names and what remains are combinatorial possibilities. Notice two further things. First, these combinatorial possibilities should not depend on the

[71] This argument is spelled out in much greater detail, and with far more force, in Glock (2009) and Glock (2010). This brief treatment does not do justice to the matter.
[72] This caveat will be critical in a moment.

content of the ‘objects' the simple names denote. Indeed, "[i]n logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign" (TLP 3.33). Second, at this level, thought as such is entirely out of place. This is for several reasons. One is that we refer to, and do not describe, ‘objects' (e.g., TLP 3.221). In sum, and most critically, a simple name that denotes an ‘object’ reflects *only* the *formal combinatorial possibilities* of the ‘object’ and *not* its content.

At the second stage, the combinatorial possibilities of the simple names combine with each other in such a way that "the elements of a picture are related to one another in a *determinate way*… Let us call this connexion of its elements the *structure of the picture*" (TLP 2.15- emphasis mine). In turn, the form an object has is the possible structures it can enter into. Indeed, "[f]orm is the possibility of structure" (TLP 2.032). Thus, the simple names have formal combinatorial possibilities, and, at the second stage, the simple name concatenates with other simple names in such a way that they manifest to particular structures or interdependencies. However, following Anscombe, there are "two distinct features belonging to a picture… first, the relation between the elements of the picture; and second, the correlations of the elements in the picture; and as we have seen, the first feature must belong to a picture before the second one can; only if significant relations hold among the elements of the picture can they be correlated with objects outside so as to stand for them" ((1971), 68). The focus of the second stage is on the purely intra-pictorial elements that obtain within the picture. The alignment reading stresses that these intra-pictorial elements are governed solely by combinatorial possibilities of the formal aspects of simple names and are, ergo, also contentless. In other words, a logical picture presents a particular structure, an arrangement of some simple names in such a way that they display definite dependencies with one another and are "governed" solely by logical syntax. Indeed, "[l]ogical pictures *can* depict the world" (TLP 2.19- emphasis mine). However, such logical pictures are, as yet, contentless and not about anything. I note here that I follow Wittgenstein in calling these intra-pictorial dependencies a logically determinate structure. Also, I call this logically determinate total structure of intra-pictorial elements the "formal aspect" of thought. In sum, for the second stage, simple names that reflect the formal combinatorial possibilities of ‘objects’, concatenate with one another in such a way that determinate logical structures manifests itself.

Let us examine the formal aspect of thought further. First, the seemingly innocuous assumption about the transparence of thought is correct for the formal aspect of thought. In other words, to have a thought that p is to, eo ipso, know the determinate logical structure the thought has. Indeed, "[i]n a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic" (TLP 5.473). However, second, I cannot go wrong here because the formal aspect of thought cannot properly be said to be about anything at all. Logical syntax, and the determinate logical structure that the intra-pictorial elements manifest, have no semantic content at all. Thus "logic must take care of itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying. Everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Let us remember… why 'Socrates is Plato' is nonsense. That is, because we have not made an arbitrary specification, not because a sign is, shall we say, illegitimate in itself!" (NB p. 2. Also, see TLP 5.473). In other words, the reason 'Socrates is identical' is not nonsense at the formal level is because, simply, these 'words' are mere dummies[73] that have no semantic content whatever. Indeed, at this stage, McGuiness (2002), 82-94, and Ishiguro (1969) are quite right to insist that "[i]t is inconceivable that anything which can function as a name at all should lack a bearer, jut because the bearer is given with its semantic role" (McGuiness (2002), 89). However, third, pace McGuiness and Ishiguro, logical syntax, and a sign language or concept script that displays it cannot be the end of the story. Indeed, for both readers, there are two critical problems. One, Wittgenstein insists that it is only in a *certain sense* that we cannot make mistakes in logic. It is rather unclear what this caveat is meant to accomplish on this "linguistic view."[74] If an 'object' is simply a sort of dummy abstraction from the formal aspects of a proposition, we cannot make mistakes in any sense. Indeed, Ishiguro's example of such a name/object- "Let a be the centre of a circle…" makes this point very well. We simply cannot be wrong with "Let a be the centre of a circle," "let phi be a first-order predicate," and so on. Two, more damningly, if we abandon "the realm of reference," (McGuinness (2002), 94), then it becomes unclear what sort of elucidatory work the TLP can achieve for us. Simply put, if formal logic can only operate in a frictionless formal void, how can it help clarify the propositions of natural language? Indeed, Wittgenstein insists that "[i]f the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether a proposition was true" (TLP 2.0211) and that "[i]n that case we could not

[73] Ishiguro (1969), 45, makes this point as well
[74] Glock (2005), coined this term as far as I am aware

sketch any picture of the world (true or false)" (TLP 2.022). In other words, if we remain at the formal level, we abandon the representational role of language; logical syntax, dummies names, and so on, are not about anything at all. In turn, it becomes opaque how a proposition can represent anything apart from its logical form at all. Moreover this lacuna undermines the linguistic reading as Wittgenstein is both keen to address how propositions and states-of-affairs relate (e.g., TLP 2.1511) as well as keen to insist that truth and falsity are critical features of propositions that are of critical importance for him (e.g. TLP 2.223). Most critically, these points make it clear that, though the formal aspect of thought is essential, it cannot replace natural language. Simply put, the formal aspect of thought is *not* about anything and so does not have any semantic content off its own bat. Indeed, the sole source of meaning is our arbitrary specification, a point we address presently.[75]

At the third stage, we rely on the "method of projection… to think of the sense of a proposition" (TLP 3.12). Let us continue to follow Anscombe and note that "objects outside [the logical picture are linked to intra-pictorial elements] so as to stand for them. The correlating is not something that the picture itself does; it is something we do" ((1979), 68). Indeed, "[t]he connection between sentence and possible state of affairs is *conventional* rather than iconic… [It is] due to our stipulating [the relationship]" (Glock (2006), 357-emphasis mine). In other words, for a logically determinate structure to be about something, i.e., to have semantic content, we must stipulate that intra-pictorial features stand for various features of (possible) states-of-affairs. Thus, what 'fills' a determinate logical structure with semantics is the fact that I project the former onto the later by meaning assignment. Let us call the stipulated semantic values for the intra-pictorial elements, semantic content. Let us call this level of thought "the content aspect" of thought. Notice, critically, that the method of projection, and the semantic content it engenders, requires that the (possible) state-of-affairs be a particular and specific combination of 'objects'- i.e., a fact (TLP 2 & 2.01). This is because a proposition can only be true or false of such particular and specific combinations. Roughly[76], consider the determinate logical structure, P(a). This structure has a mathematical multiplicity (TLP 4.04) that allows

[75] Regardless, separating out the syntax of the concept script from proper semantics strikes me as a critical innovation of Wittgenstein. Goldfarb (1979) notes how logic in the twenties was infected by an inability to distinguish syntax from semantics adequately.

[76] We discuss this more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say, since the TLP does not give us any example of what a simple name is, almost all concrete examples are problematic. Circumspect readers should keep this in mind.

it to be projected onto states-of-affairs like *Dan's being fat*, *Mars's being red*, *London's being lovely*, etc. However, clearly the truth or falsity of the proposition <Dan is fat> has *nothing whatever* to do with *London's being lovely*. <Dan is fat> is about, i.e., true or false of the possible fact of *Dan's being fat* precisely because I assign the semantic value "Dan" to "a" and "__ is fat" to "P(_)."[77] In sum, at the content level of thought, I correlate a formal aspect of thought with a (possible) state-of-affair by a projection that assigns semantic values to 'parts' of the determinate logical structure.

Granting this, it is critical to notice that this projection relies on extra-logical features to function. As it were, nothing in a determinate logical structure tells me what semantic values to assign to it. Indeed, Wittgenstein notes that "[t]he tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated" (TLP 4.002) and, further, that "[w]hat signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their application says clearly" (TLP 3.262). These points are critical in the next section.

Thus, the alignment reading proffers a three-stage bottom-up heuristic account designed to bring into view how "thought" works in the TLP. At ground floor are simple names-'objects.' These are preconditions for thought but not properly thoughts. At this stage, a simple name denotes an 'object' and, in virtue of this dentation, reflects the formal combinatorial possibilities of the 'object' (though *not* the content of the 'object). At the second stage the formal combinatorial possibilities that the simple names reflect concatenate with one another in such a way that they manifest determinate logical structures. This is the formal aspect of thought. We cannot go wrong here. However, there's no content at all. At the third stage, we project these formal features onto a state of affairs via assigning the 'parts' of the structure to 'parts' of specific and particular states-of-affairs. When this is done, the proposition is true or false of the fact I have projected the determinate logical structure onto. With this in view, let us turn to the metaphilosophy of the TLP.

5.2 Learning How to Think Clearly:

[77] Another possible reading, drawn from Sellars (2007), 103-125 is 'Jumblese' where '_is fat' is, as it were, built into the concept-script's representation of 'Dan.' Though interesting, I bracket this.

With the alignment reading's more nuanced view of the TLP, we can turn to how it interprets Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Specifically, we examine TLP 4.111-4.116. The alignment reading, as we shall see, makes good sense of the exegetical placement and progression of these remarks, enables an interpreter to distill some impressive philosophical arguments from the gnomic remarks, and betokens a profoundly innovative metaphilosophy. I note here that, in this section, I move "top-down"- e.g., from already given semantic content to the formal aspect of thought.

To begin, the major metaphilosophical discussion in the TLP occurs in section 4, the elaboration of "[a] thought is a proposition with sense" (TLP 4). The alignment reading begins by stressing that the "with sense" clause is not pleonastic. Wittgenstein is indicating that we are dealing with both the formal and content aspect of thought. Thus, the alignment reading notes that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy only begins when semantic content is taken as a given. Further, this accounts for why Wittgenstein says so frustratingly little about "projection" in the TLP. Projection must be taken as already given- a sort of transcendental requirement for language that must be assumed and cannot be talked about (cf. p. NB 51-55).[78] Indeed, Wittgenstein is best read as claiming that we necessarily assume this precondition and cannot talk about it.

Next, the alignment reading notes that the metaphilosophical discussion is a further elaboration of the claim that "[p]ropositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs" (TLP 4.1) and that "the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science" (TLP 4.11). Point 4.1 is somewhat of a reiteration of bipolarity- i.e., that all propositions are capable of being true or capable of being false- already broached in TLP 4.023. It is TLP 4.11 that is more critical for the alignment reading. Notice that this point stresses that truth (and falsity) fall under the purview of science. In other words, once a thought-with-projected-content is clear, the truth or falsity of the picture that thought encodes is established by science. Thus the alignment reading assumes that philosophy only begins when semantics is taken as given for either a thought or a natural language sentence and that philosophy may be distinct from science in that the latter aims at truth.

This assumption that science is distinct from philosophy is quickly confirmed by the TLP. Thus, "[p]hilosophy is not one of the natural sciences (The word

[78] As, e.g., Glock (1999), 427-37) notes, this places Wittgenstein within the critical tradition of Kant

‘philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them)" (TLP 4.111). This quote emerges fairly clearly from the above. Indeed, if science is concerned with establishing if some possible picture actually describes an obtaining fact in the world, philosophy's concerns are sui generis. Notice, first, that this means that the idea of a "scientific philosophy" implies a category mistake (cf. Russell, e.g., (1914)). Second, pursuant to this, it is best to read Wittgenstein's own points as not offering a paradoxical theory of language. Indeed, Kuusela is quite right in insisting that Wittgenstein's "logical insights don't find their expression… in theoretical true/false assertions. Rather, they are embodied… into the notation… whereby it is important that to be in possession of a notation- i.e., certain linguistic or logical tools- is not yet to make a statement… about anything" ((2011), 134). In other words, the points are heuristic devices meant to teach us philosophy. Third, the parenthetical comment in TLP 4.111 is interesting for two reasons. One, the spatial metaphor in play further stresses a radical break between science and philosophy. Two, the alignment reading emphasizes that this quote should be paired with the claim that Wittgenstein "found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems [of philosophy]… [And] the value of this work consists is that it shows *how little is achieved* when these problems are solved" (TLP preface: 4- emphasis mine). The alignment reading stresses that this seems to mean that Wittgenstein places philosophy below science in that the problems of philosophy are not factual matters that can be solved. Instead, they betoken confusions and nonsense. As it were, philosophy cleans up messes. Further, Wittgenstein is quite derisive here and often suggests that many of these messes are themselves products of philosophy poorly done.

This derisive attitude, in turn, explains the few examples of philosophical confusion Wittgenstein mentions. He stresses confusion concerning the ‘is' of identity and predication (TLP 3.323) and treating adjectives as nouns (TLP 4.003). It is critical to notice that both problems are neither the result of some problem with the determinate logical structure per se- indeed, there can be no problems with the formal aspect of thought- nor, more critically, with natural language semantics per se. As it were, no woman-on-the-street understands the sentence "Sally is nice" as some bizarre identity statement between Sally and some abstract x. Rather, this sort of confusion emerges as a direct result of trying to do philosophy badly. E.g., consider Wittgenstein's acerbic review of Coffey's work on logic. Wittgenstein flags Coffey's

confusion of "the copula ‘is' with the word ‘is' expressing identity. (the word ‘is' has *obviously different meanings* in the propositions- ‘twice two is four' and ‘Socrates is mortal')" (PO 3- emphasis mine). Thus, Wittgenstein finds this confusion about ‘is' to be both familiar in philosophy and absurd for anyone outside it. Indeed, Wittgenstein closes by noting that the "worst of such books as this is that they *prejudice sensible people* against the study of Logic" (*ibid*- emphasis mine). The point here is that the work of philosophy is not establishing truth or falsity but cleaning up messes. However, this leaves unclear both how these confusions arise as well as how philosophy dissolves them.

In turn, both find an answer in TLP 4.112. I note that this point is the heart of the alignment reading's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Ergo, I divide the examination of this quote into several paragraphs. To begin, "[p]hilosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts" (TLP 4.112). Recall, as noted in section 4.0, this quote problematizes the straightforward reading. The work of philosophy clarifies thoughts as much as natural language. To make sense of this, the alignment reading relies on its distinction between the formal and content aspects of thought proffered in section 4.1. The former, again, is perfectly in order and clear to the thinker as it has no content, is not about anything, and so cannot be true (or false) of anything. However, where things go wrong is when someone confuses the correlated determinate logical structure that is projected onto the possible state of affairs. Specifically, she may attempt to correlate a determinate logical structure, though not the one the proposition really has, with the features of the (possible) state-of-affairs that do not share the same logical multiplicity (e.g., TLP 4.04-4.041). For example[79], the problem with the sentence/thought that "the present king of France is kindly" is not a formal aspect of thought per se- e.g., F(a)- nor with the semantics of the sentence in natural language- as though we did not really know what the sentence means. Rather, the problems emerge when I take the proposition to have the formal aspect F(a) and then try to correlate F(a) to "the present king of France is kindly" by assigning to "a" "the present king of France" and "F" "is kindly." In turn, this mismatches generates "deep" confusions. We may say, with Meinong and Guns N' Roses, "welcome to the jungle!", we may try to deny that the sentence really makes sense, we may argue that there are truth-gappy sentences, etc. In any case, the critical cause of philosophical confusion is

[79] See (Russell (1968), 39-56).

when we misalign or, better said, misconstrue the semantics of a thought and the determinate logical structure of a thought. So philosophy's job is clarifying this. Notice, before moving on that the alignment reading insists that such a misalignment is just a more "sophisticated version" of trying to pair to "Sally is nice" and the logically determinate structure a=b. However, this leaves open how philosophy promises to clarify such misalignment and so eliminate it.

To address this, Wittgenstein insists that "[p]hilosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112). This sentence has two interdependent roles here. First, it further clarifies how philosophy is distinct from the sciences. Philosophy is not in the business of establishing true results that could make up a body of doctrine. Second, philosophy is an activity we engage in. For the alignment reading, it is critical to recall that projection and meaning assignments are also things we do. Indeed, "[a] propositional sign, *applied and thought out*, is a thought" (TLP 3.5-emphasis mine) and, further, that "[t]he correct method in philosophy would really be the following… whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (TLP 6.53). In turn, these quotes suggest that philosophy is an activity we engage in that assures us that our signs have been given meaning (i.e., projected properly). Thus, philosophy aligns the formal and content aspects of thought. However, it is still unclear how exactly philosophy achieves this.

Wittgenstein's next sentence answers precisely this point. Thus, "[a] philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations" (TLP 4.112). To understand this, the alignment reading notes that Wittgenstein has already introduced the concept of "elucidation." Thus, "[t]he meaning of primitive signs can only be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known" (TLP 3.263). Further, "I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol)…An expression is the mark of a form and a content" (TLP. 3.31). First, notice that keeping with the alignment reading, these quotes suggest that philosophy can only begin when the semantic content of a thought is taken as given. We can only elucidate a proposition when we have grasped the semantic content of the proposition. Second, pursuant to this, these two quotes give a very particular role to elucidation. The best way to see this is in terms of the lexical priority of the content aspect of thought over the formal aspect of thought. We begin from symbols that

already have projective relationships with the world. We then abstract from this semantic content signs. However, we must not be misled. A sign is not to be taken as a token- e.g., sound waves or scribbles. This is because, simply, tokens do not have logical-combinatorial possibilities. Rather, a sign is an abstraction from the form and content of a symbol to the form alone and the combinatorial possibilities therein. Indeed, tellingly, Wittgenstein calls simple names that denote objects, signs and not symbols (e.g., TLP 3.201). Granting this, third, a philosophical elucidation is moving from the already-given semantics of a natural language sentence or a thought to the determinate logical structure it has. We prescind or sublimate out of, the logical structure out of the presupposed semantics. To return to our example, we begin with the semantics "the present king of France is kindly" already has. From this, we begin elucidating. First, we notice that the definite description "the present king of France" is not the same as a referring noun like "Sally." Granting this, we then move to the determinate logical structure $\exists x(P(x) \wedge \forall y(P(y) \rightarrow y=x) \wedge Q(x))$. Moreover, this structure, which the semantics of the natural language really must have for the projection to work, moots all the above worries. There are no subsisting beasts, no gappy truth-values, and no real reason we do not understand the sentence. These only arise when we try to pair "the present king of France is kindly" with F(a) since the logical multiplicity of F(a) is wrong. Critically, we see this all this in one go.

The next sentence reinforces all of the above and adds some new features. Thus "[p]hilosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions,' but rather in the clarification of propositions" (TLP 4.111). First, again, it reminds us that philosophical activity is not science. Second, it reiterates that formal aspects of thoughts are not about anything at all. Indeed, $\exists x(P(x) \wedge \forall y(P(y) \rightarrow y=x) \wedge Q(x))$, F(a), etc., are, as it were, dead. They are bereft of all semantic content. Thus, ‘philosophical proposition' is a misnomer, as Wittgenstein notes via quotation. Third, what the process of moving from the already given semantics of the symbols up to the signs and their combinatorial possibilities and multiplicities does is clarify the proposition. "The cheese is soft" or "Jen is loving" require determinate logical structures for the projection to have worked. So we simply distill that structure from the sentences.

The last sentence claims "[w]ithout philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" (TLP

4.112). First, critically, Wittgenstein does not think that philosophy is merely a cause of confusion. To understand this, the alignment reading stresses that Wittgenstein's "as it were" caveat is best read as him indicating that it is not that the thoughts or natural language sentences, either their formal or content aspect, which are cloudy or indistinct in themselves. Rather, it is we who confuse ourselves about it, we who see them through a mirror darkly. Further, this tendency to confuse ourselves about thoughts and sentences is not always a product of philosophy done badly. Indeed, race, class, sex, gender, nationality, etc., can lend themselves to the same sort of confusion that "nothing," "for all," or "the griffin" do.[80] Further, by making the determinate logical structure clear, we thereby clarify what sort the inferential and deductive role of sentences can really have. As it were, to confuse "the American man" with a referring name leads one to draw all sorts of bizarre, and possibly problematic, inferences and deductions. Only philosophy as elucidation can help rectify this (cf. TLP 4.0031). Second, the activity of philosophy does not produce results in that philosophy does not create new thoughts. Rather, philosophy is the activity that clarifies thoughts. Finally, third, the elucidatory activity is simply part of clear thinking itself. Indeed, had Polyphemus the Cyclops studied under Russell, Odysseus clever trick with "nobody" would not have worked as Polyphemus would simply see that "nobody" is not a proper name, despite appearances. Also, he would not have lost his eye either. Thus, though my presentation has made it appear as though there are discreet stages within this process, this is an artifact of the presentation. Ideally, when we are thinking clearly, we simply see that "the American" is not like "Sally," that "nobody" is not like a proper name, and so on.

However, by insisting that we take the semantic content as already given, and assuming that this content carries with its coloring, non-logical associative connections, etc., then don't we run the risk of psychologism in logic? Wittgenstein answer is that "[p]sychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science… Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought-processes, which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my method too *there is an analogous risk*" (TLP 4.1121-

[80] Following Janik and Toulmin (1996), 67-91 & 120-201, it seems to me that, in this key, Wittgenstein is interested in a form of cultural-political criticism. Misconstruing these concepts is often deleterious and lead to odd essentialist claims about groups, strange inferences about class, and so on.

emphasis mine). Notice that Wittgenstein accepts the above concern. If philosophy necessarily assumes the semantics of the propositions it elucidates, and these propositions possess "essential and accidental features" (TLP 3.334), then we are always in danger of confusing the accidental for the essential. However, since a proposition or thought "cannot… depict its pictorial form" (TLP 2.172), such a risk cannot be avoided. As it were, we cannot "step outside of language" to ensure that the projection and the determinate logical structure align. We must do so from within.

From here, we are told that "Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science" (TLP 4.1122). The alignment reading sees this rather odd note as naturally following from the above. Specifically, if clarification of thoughts depends on assumed semantics and this assumed semantics does bring psychological features- that we should try to guard against- in their wake, perhaps biology can help us as undoubtedly our psychology depends on us having brains. The terseness of this reply shows Wittgenstein thinks this is a mad category mistake. If psychology has no role in logic, then biology is beyond the pale.

The last four points close out the section by reflecting on the overall metaphilosophy. We are told that "[p]hilosophy sets the limits to the much disputed sphere of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.113). The alignment reading views this quote as emphasizing that confusing philosophy and science is a profound mistake. Specifically, the attempt to expand these sciences into the realm of logic, and ergo ignoring the limits of the sphere of natural sciences, deteriorates into a gingersnap view of numbers (i.e., Frege (1980), vii). Further, and worse, it mistakes intrinsic and extrinsic kinds of inquiries. We want to do good science provided that we are interested in establishing which logical pictures actually obtain. However, one can imagine people who are not so interested and, for them, science would be a waste of time.[81] By contrast, thinking is not something we can opt out of. Granting this, and that philosophy has no aim other than the logical clarification of thoughts, doing philosophy may not be something we can avoid. Indeed, as we discuss further in section 3, the philosophical activity and clear thought are internally related.

Next, we are told that "[i]t must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by

[81] For example, Pyrrhonism and the goal of "suspending judgment" is probably not something that science can help achieve.

working outwards through what can be thought" (TLP 4.114). Again, the alignment reading makes sense of this in terms of the formal and content aspects of thought. In effect, we begin from what can be thought- i.e., propositions in their projective relationship with possible facts- we distill formal aspects of these- i.e., the determinate logical structure that the simple names manifest in concatenation with other names- we run through all the permutations of these formal aspects using the recursive definition Wittgenstein offers (TLP 6.01), and, voilà, the limit of the formal aspect of thought is set from within.[82]

From here, we are also told that "[i]t will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said" (TLP 4.115). The alignment reading takes this as further evidence of the deep interdependences between thought and language. In effect, this point follows from the previous one since by showing the structure of thought, we have also shown the structure of language.

The final point recapitulates the argument. Thus "[w]hat can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly" (TLP 4.116). First, language and thought are deeply intertwined. Second, thought-in-projection needs both a meaning assignment and a determinate logical structure. Third, these two aspects are always already in place for philosophy to begin and can only be separated for heuristic purposes. Fourth, the role of philosophy is just distilling the correct formal aspect of thought from already-known semantics.

Thus, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in the TLP relies on a heuristic conception of thought that has both a formal aspect and a content aspect. However, such distinctions are heuristic and meant to teach us to think. The sentence "the unicorn is majestic" necessarily has a particular determinate logical structure to have the semantics it does. However, there are two related temptations. One of them is that we misinterpret the depth grammar. The other is that we think that the "depth grammar" just hangs out happily in Frege-space and has nothing whatever to do with actual propositions. So Wittgenstein tries to undermine both while trying to teach us to think using logical tools. Moreover, this "goal" of teaching us to think is merely learning self-care (e.g., CV p. 6). We are already thinking, we already know the semantics of sentences, etc. Wittgenstein only helps us do what we must do to be human, better.

[82] I follow (Horwich 2012), 84-88), and his interpretation of the "N-operator" to a large extent.

5.3 The TLP's Metaphilosophy: Simple Clear Thinking:

With this in view, I close by both proffering a gloss on the metaphilosophy discussed above that further focuses on the process of clarification as well as setting the stage for the following chapters. To begin, a metaphilosophical approach that emphasizes process in earlier Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy must make sense of the relationship the process has with clear thinking. Specifically, I argue that, for earlier Wittgenstein, the process of philosophy results in clear thought and, more importantly, that without the philosophical process, one cannot have clear thought. First, let us discuss the 'internal relation' between clear thoughts and the philosophical activity more carefully. Second, let us discuss an objection to this view. Third, let us set the stage for the next chapters by noting the preconceptions that earlier Wittgenstein's account of the philosophical activity rests on.

First, the most critical quote for the my metaphilosophical interpretation of the TLP is the claim that "[w]ithout philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and give them sharp boundaries" (TLP 4.1121). Notice that this quote clearly relates clear thought and philosophy together in a manner that is internal. Indeed, if one grants that a plausible paraphrase of this is "if there is no philosophy, then thoughts are unclear," by contrapositive, we have "if thoughts are clear, then there is philosophy." Thus, philosophizing (when it succeeds) simply produces clear thoughts and without philosophizing, clear thoughts are not produced. In turn, this has profound ramifications. First, I examine how ascribing a clarifying metaphilosophy to earlier Wittgenstein helps make good sense of several parts of the TLP as well as Wittgenstein's biography. Then, I argue that the implication of this gloss, i.e., that if someone does not do philosophy, they do not think clearly, is defensible and compelling.

For earlier Wittgenstein, the claim that philosophy and clear thought are related in such a way that the success of philosophizing is the clarity of thought makes sense of several exegetical puzzles. One, Wittgenstein's dismissive attitude to the supposed 'problems' of philosophy can be explained in a rather straightforward way (cf. TLP *preface* 4). Such 'problems' only emerge when one is not thinking clearly, which is to say, when one is not engaged in the activity of philosophy or else one is

failing to do the activity properly. In other words, it is only when philosophizing fails to succeed that one is left with the sort of muddles that plague 'robust' philosophy. Indeed, this point makes sense of Wittgenstein's Janus-faced use of "philosophy" in the TLP. To philosophize is, as it were, an accomplishment verb. When it fails to work properly, philosophy engenders confusion in much the same way that a failed explanation engenders confusion. From there, and as discussed in chapter three, philosophy may make matters worse by attempting to be 'robust' or 'T-philosophical.' In contrast, when philosophizing succeeds, we grasp the "depth" determinate logical structure that a sentence already must have to have the semantic content it does. Two, pursuant to this, the silence at the end of the book (TLP 7) is neither the nihilistic destruction of philosophy nor a sort of mystical moment. It is simply the realization that when philosophizing has succeeded in clarifying a thought, one has a clear thought: when one has a clear thought, the task of philosophizing is over. Indeed, the now clear thought passes over into science and we pass over into silence. Three, the 'only correct method' is strikingly Socratic. Specifically, let us focus on how we "demonstrate to him [someone whose thinking is not yet clear] that he had failed to meaning to certain signs in his proposition" (TLP 6.54). One way to make sense of this method is to bring in a radicalized version of the Fregean context principle, make stipulations concerning the nature of nonsense, and so on. However, a far more intuitive way to interpret the correct method is that it is a method that simply asks a conversation partner to spell out her claims- i.e., *clarify her term*. In turn, this may force her into an aporia wherein she realizes that her thoughts are not clear or else it can help her better grasp her own thoughts by helping here sublimate the determinate logical structure and the meaning assignments the semantics of her expressions depend on. In any case, such a method "would not be satisfying to the other person" (*ibid*) and may result in drinking hemlock, it clarifies the other person's thoughts by either helping her grasp the place of her term in determinate logical structure her thought already has or else showing her that something has gone wrong. Four, related to this, both methods rely on *ignorance* to function properly. Earlier Wittgenstein claims *no* insight into, e.g., the nature of nonsense. Instead, he and Socrates simply ask that someone spell something out to them- i.e., that they clarify a term by exhibiting the 'part' of the determinate logical structure and the semantic value they have assigned to it. Thus, philosophy has nothing whatever to do with knowledge per se (TLP 4.111).

In addition to this, ascribing a metaphilosophy that focuses on the philosophical process to earlier Wittgenstein makes sense of biographical oddities in his life. Monk points out that "[*E*]*verything* in his life [Wittgenstein's] was subordinated to the twin search- the single search, as I would claim- for philosophical clarity and ethical *Anstaendigkiet* (decency)" (Monk (2001), 12. See also Glock (2001), 213). Indeed, Wittgenstein's fanatical obsession with "clarity" is so well attested to that they do not require much comment. Critically, the method earlier Wittgenstein used to engender clarity is philosophy as an activity. And, conversely, his commitment to clarity requires his commitment to the philosophical activity.

However, be this as it may, the reader may insist that the paraphrase of TLP 4.1121 and the contrapositive, are indefeasible. Indeed, such a view implies that if someone is not doing philosophy (i.e., engaged in the clarifying activity), then they do not have clear thoughts. Though extremely bold, I argue that the contention can be supported on historical, psychological, and philosophical grounds.

Historically, let us begin with Wittgenstein and then move to our own time. To begin, as Janik & Toulmin (1973), note, it is imperative to keep in mind that, in Wittgenstein's time, certain un-clarities in thought/language- e.g., those concerning "Race," "the Nation," etc.- as well as the first systematic use of mass propaganda[83] on the part of governments, allowed for the construction of dreamscapes of words unattached from any concrete reality and yet powerful enough to motivate millions to die and kill in the conflagration of two world wars. Suffice it to say, the assumption that without some sort of clarifying activity, ghostly pseudo-names like "the Nation," and ghastly ersatz-essentialism concerning "the X Race," lead people to the very gates of hell, must have appeared as a simple and undeniable fact, not only to Wittgenstein but most intellectuals of that time.[84] Turning to our time, it seems to me, at any rate, that exactly these traps (and the horrifying consequences of falling for them), still exist today. Indeed, such systematic un-clarities are depressingly common, as a glance at a paper or the nightly news show. Indeed, it is striking how readily people rely on terms/concepts without any clear idea of what the mean, what follows from them, what can support them, and so on. Without being clear on these matters, we run substantial risks. Notice that this historical note seems to repudiate the assumption

[83] Welch (2014) discusses this at length.
[84] Indeed, this hypothesis seems well confirmed. Modernism in art, literature, analytic philosophy (e.g., Matar (2015)), etc., shows a fanatical quest to invent modes of expression that prevented the emergence of these sorts of psudo-abstractions.

that ‘the Folk’ are clear and that only philosophers muddy the waters. In point of fact, ‘the Folk’ are not clear and we do not ‘fall from grace’ when we begin studying philosophy, a point we turn to more fully in the next two paragraphs. In any case, this explains Wittgenstein’s fanatical obsession with philosophizing and clear thought. Getting clear is not merely ‘academic’ as words are the first weapon we reach for in war and the best salve to bring about peace.

Pursuant to this, psychologically, it has been fairly well established that ‘the Folk,’ without some sort of training in a clarifying activity, are *terrible* at even basic inferences, deductions, and so on. To take one well-researched example, consider Wason selection tasks and their endless iterations and variations (e.g., Wason (1966), for the original paper).[85] A standard version is as follows. Imagine you are presented with four cards marked with E, K, 4 and 7. You are told that the letter cards have numbers on the opposite side and that the number cards have letters on the opposite side. You are then asked to select all and only the cards that can show if the following rule is true or false: if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other. Clearly, this is a material conditional and so, by modus ponens, we should select E and, by modus tollens, we should select the 7. Shockingly, a recent meta-analysis of 300 studies claims that, on average, 5% of participants get it right (e.g., Ragni, Kola & Johnson-Laird (2017), 981). Without philosophizing, it seems, 95% of us *do not* think clearly.

Finally, the claim that, without philosophy, people do not think clearly can be supported on purely philosophical grounds, as the argument I reconstruct from parts of the TLP shows. To bring this into view, recall that, for the TLP, the cause of un-clarity is our tendency to misalign the determinate logical structure a thought/sentence has and its semantic content. Indeed, it is our tendency to confuse ourselves about thoughts that gives rise to the problems.[86] Thus, much as objects are “cloudy and indistinct” not due to features of the objects, but our perspective on them, so too thoughts are “cloudy and indistinct” not due to some problem with them, but how we construe them. In turn, our tendency to misconstrue our thoughts arises from the fact that a human being “possesses the *ability* to construct languages capable of expressing every sense *without having any idea* how each word has a meaning or what its

[85] As with all social sciences, there is an ongoing debate concerning the methodology of the study, the meaning of the results, the phrasing of the question, and so on.
[86] I thank Ms. Nicole Rathgeb for this formulation.

meaning is- just as people speak without knowing how individual sounds are produced" (TLP 4.002-empahsis mine). In other words, practically speaking, people know-how to use, understand, and so on, language (e.g., TLP 3.326). *However*, people go wrong in that they do not have a proper theoretical grasp on the determinate logical structure, and its inferential relationships with other thoughts, that the thought's semantics presupposes to function. Notice that this makes sense in that understanding a claim like "if a card has a vowel, then it has an even number on the back" is different than seeing that P->Q (TFTT) is the same as ¬Q-> ¬P (TFTT). Further, if one grants that there is a break between knowing-how to do something and being able to articulate it or give a theoretical account (e.g., Ryle (1946)), then there is sound philosophical reason to maintain that we there is a constant tendency confuse ourselves on these basic points as we have no properly grasped the determinate logical structures and their interrelationships. In turn, philosophizing (when it succeeds) "gives thought sharp boundaries" by making sure that we just *see* the determinate logical structure *and* the inferential relations it has with other clear thoughts.

Thus, a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's TLP that focuses on the process of philosophy seeks to establish an internal connection between the philosophical activity and clear thoughts. Specifically, that philosophizing (when it succeeds) engenders clear thoughts and that *only* philosophizing can do this. Though a bold claim, I have argued that it both helps make sense of the TLP and Wittgenstein's biography as well as being defensible on independent grounds. However, there is still a lurking problem. To see this clearly, consider that in "the course of our conversations Russell would often exclaim: 'Logic's hell!'- and tis *perfectly* expresses the feeling we had" (CV p. 30e). Granting this, it may be that the price of the philosophizing is simply too high. Indeed, given the above paragraph's claim that we already know-how to use and understand language, coupled with the claim that, for earlier Wittgenstein, we must take semantic content as already given, it may be that such an endeavor is not worthwhile. Climbing a mounting is certainly 'internally related' to being on the peak but maybe the peak isn't worth getting to. To address this worry, let us examine "thought" first and then turn to "clarity."

For the "thought" portion, the key is that we have no 'opt out' ability here. We may decide we are no longer interested in building structurally sound bridges. In that case, engineering is useless. However, when we turn to thinking, the relationship is

different in kind. To stop thinking requires a thought that one stops thinking or else death, which is to say, ceasing to be human at all. This point can be buttressed further by recalling the tight interdependency between thought and language noted in the last section. Indeed, if one grants that thought and language are deeply interwoven, we can say that one cannot opt out exactly because one cannot choose to not understand a language one already knows.[87] We hear *English*, not sounds, see *words* on blinking neon store signs, not flashing colors, and trying to get to the sounds or colors requires a great deal of work. Furthermore, clearly the TLP's method of taking semantics as already given presupposes that one already understands the semantics in question. Indeed, to engage with the TLP at all presupposes that one is reading, understanding, and thinking in the first place! Finally, in a slightly different key and to presage a bit, the PI and its discussion of "thinking" (PI § 466- § 470), hint at precisely this. We do not think because it pays. It is merely part of the sorts of beings we are. Thus, especially when given a linguistic twist, thinking is simply not the sort of thing we can stop doing, anymore than we can stop understanding someone's English because what-is-said is unpleasant, say. As it were, we are stuck with it.

With this in view, we turn to the "clarity" part. Though we know-how to think and understand already, I have argued that, for various reasons, we always risk confusing ourselves concerning the thoughts/sentences. From here, if we further that that clarity is preferable to confusion as to have a confused thought is not to understand the thought properly, then it follows that "clarity" for thinking is just an internal good. Thus, even if logic or philosophy is hell, we are stuck with them.

In closing, it is critical to notice that the internal relationship between the philosophical activity and clear thinking depends on a particular conception of both the semantics of natural language expressions as well as a particular sort of philosophy of logic.[88] To wit, an expression has the semantic content it does because it is constitutively related to a possible fact via a determinate logical structure. Indeed, as common wisdom has it, thought/language and the world relate solely by a logical isomorphism. In turn, philosophizing is the process of sublimating out of this

[87] Kenny (1989) calls this sort of relationship a "one way power."

[88] I use "philosophy of logic" as a catch-all for any inquiry that attempts to understand the relationship between, e.g., sentences and propositions, "John" and logical objects, etc. This is a relatively standard way of thinking about the philosophy of logic; it seems to me. For a general account, see Wolfram (1989), 2-6. For application to this Wittgenstein see, e.g., Maddy (2014), Greve (2017), Kuusela (2014).

semantics a theoretical grasp of the determinate logical structure in play. As we shall see, for a host of interconnected reasons, later Wittgenstein came to view the preconceptions at work in both the TLP's philosophy of logic and its account of the semantic content of expressions as indefensible. In turn, this realization forced him to reimagine the nature of the philosophical activity and the ways clear thinking works. It is to this we turn.

5.4 Conclusion:

This chapter has presented an alignment reading of the TLP. Specifically, it relied on a three-stage conception of thought to make sense of what the philosophical activity is, how it relates to clarification, and how it engenders clear thought. Succinctly, it argued that all confusion emerges as a result of a misalignment between a determinate logical structure and semantic content. It also linked together clarity and the philosophical process together in such a way that doing philosophy results in clear thoughts. It further contended that without philosophy, one does not have clear thoughts.

Alas, however, this account misfires, or so later Wittgenstein argues. Specifically the underlying assumption that all forms of confusion, muddles, etc., arise from one, and only one, sort of mistake, is something that the later Wittgenstein rejects problematic (see Kuusela (2008), 65-73 for a similar account). Indeed, there is *not* one problem, but a host of them, each demanding rather different methods. The next two chapters spell out how Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy of logic and description repudiate the TLP and reject several of its preconceptions. This sets the stage for chapter 8.

6 Chapter 6: Desublimated Logic and Pragmatic Representation:

In the last chapter, we put forward a reading of the TLP that argued that a determinate logical structure is partly constitutive of an expression's semantic content. In other words, the meaning of a proposition is its determinate logical structure combined with its content (i.e., the projective relationship between the structure and the world). This chapter examines later Wittgenstein's reimagining of the nature of logic and its relationship to language and semantics. It focuses on PI § 89- § 108. I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, a critical shift is how representation works. In effect, and in a rough way for now, for later Wittgenstein, logic is not a constitutive feature of meaning but, instead, a way of representing sentences as propositions for specific purposes. I stress here that by "logic" I mean formal calculi or 'concept-scripts' of the sort that, e.g., Russell and Whitehead (1967), 216-223, or Frege (1967), 1-82, utilize. Especially given that 'middle' Wittgenstein often uses "logic" as a synonym for "grammar," circumspect readers should keep this in mind. First, I set the stage and discuss the TLP's philosophy of logic as well as why PI § 89- § 108 arise where they do in the PI and why the TLP's philosophy of logic seems so irresistible (e.g., PI § 103). Next, I examine later Wittgenstein's response to the TLP's conception of logic in terms of a diagnostic investigation that aims to make a tension between the crystalline purity of logic and the cloudiness of natural language intolerable (e.g. PI § 107). Finally, I examine later Wittgenstein's corrective response to the TLP. I argue that later Wittgenstein does not dispute the TLP's understanding of logic per se, nor does he attempt "bargaining any of its [logic's] the rigor out of it" (PI § 108). However, he radically alters how logic and language relate to one another. Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein shifts from a constitutive account of logic to a representational one that sees logic as one way of representing language. In turn, this paves the way for our discussion of "description" in the next chapter and our engagement with "semantics" in chapter eight.

6.0 The Formal Aspects of Thoughts and Ghosts of the Third Realm:

This section examines later Wittgenstein's discussion of the TLP and its insistence that the semantics of natural language expressions depend on a determinate logical structure. To begin, I set the stage by reminding the reader of the TLP's philosophy of logic. Second, I examine why the PI's philosophy of logic emerges where it does in the text. Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein's fundamental question- i.e. "[i]n what way is logic something sublime?" (PI § 89)- emerges as a direct consequence of several interdependent attacks Wittgenstein launched on the preconceptions that ground the TLP's philosophy of logic. Finally, I discuss how this preconception of how logic and language relate seems to force an irresistible picture on us. Specifically, that it makes it seem as though "the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there" (PI § 101), just below the “surface grammar.”

To set the stage, recall that earlier Wittgenstein insisted that the semantic content of any and all expressions necessarily have a determinate logical structure. This, in turn, is grounded in Wittgenstein's assumption that: the sole function of language is asserting propositions (e.g., TLP 4.5); the content of an asserted proposition is a picture (e.g., TLP 4.06); this picture relates to a possible facts by both sharing the same logical form (e.g., TLP 2.2); such picturing is constitutive of the semantics of natural language in that the content of expressions just are these pictures (e.g., TLP 4. See Foglin (1987), 20-25, for an apt summary). Thus, succinctly, language and the world stand in a 2-place representing relationship that depends on logic. In other words, and as conventional wisdom has it, the TLP assumes that a logical isomorphism necessarily obtains between a proposition and a possible fact.[89] As it were, a proposition has the semantic content it does because it "pictures" a possible fact and this picture is partly constituted by the determinate logical structure the picture shares with the possible fact (e.g., TLP 2.2).

In turn, this made elucidation a process of prescinding from, or subliming out of, the solid and assumed semantics of natural language, the determinate logical structure that the semantics already has. It also gave the TLP an intuitive and compelling answer to the question of how logic and language relate. To wit, "younger Wittgenstein argued that such formal languages articulated the covert underlying structure of ordinary thought and language" (Williamson (*forthcoming*), 6). Finally, it

[89] This claim must be handled with care. As chapter five argued, the determinate logical structure between a proposition and a possible fact is best thought of as a "scaffolding" (e.g., 4.023) as it has no semantics off its own bat.

made philosophy exactly what the TLP claimed it should be- an activity whose aim is clarifying a thought/sentence/representation by ensuring that the determinate logical structure the representation presupposes, and our understanding of this structure, align. The key uptake is that "[w]he we say, *mean*, that such-and-such is the case, then, with what we mean [i.e., a determinate logical form], we do not stop anywhere short of the fact, but mean: *such-and-such—-is -– thus-and-so*" (PI § 95).

With this in view, we can turn to the placement of later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of logic. These emerge, as PI § 89 implies, as a response to Wittgenstein's sustained attack on several of the preconceptions that the TLP relies on to justify its philosophy of logic. Though these attacks are complicated, multifaceted, often hard to isolate or rationally reconstruct, etc. exegetically, I focus on three reasonably independent strains in this assault. These are: (a) the PI's repudiation of the simple name-'object' relationship; (b) the PI's assault on the supposed exactness and determinacy of the logical structure; (c) an apology for the 'haziness'[90] of natural language and criticism of clarity. Let us take each in turn.

(a) First, a critical preconception of the TLP's philosophy of logic is that a proposition can be analyzed down to simple names-'objects' relationships. It is this that ensures both that a "proposition has one and only one complete analysis" (TLP 3.25) and that "a proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts" (TLP 4.061 See Maddy (2014), 37-48, for an apt account the implications). In effect, analysis or elucidation will 'bottom out' in these simple name-'object' denotations, and this ensures both that there is only one determinate logical structure and that we understand it without knowing if it is true or false (see NB p. 60-63 for Wittgenstein's discussion of this). Later Wittgenstein offers three intertwined criticism of this account. One, later Wittgenstein problematizes the denotation relationship by noting that there's no good way to philosophically account for how this name-'object' relationship is supposed to work. A major target is ostensive definition (e.g., PI § 35). Succinctly, even pointing requires a context and, it seems, the only way to make sense of context is within language. However, the basic point of the later Wittgenstein's attack is that simply assuming such a denotation relationship is in place (e.g. TLP 3.221) strains credulity as we have no clear individuation criteria to determine if a

[90] I use 'haziness' as a catch-all term that applies to vagueness, ambiguity, polysemy, homonymy as well as various pragmatic infelicities.

simple name "links with" an ‘object' and begs far too many questions (e.g., PI § 46-roughly § 52). Two, Wittgenstein problematizes the idea of ‘objects' or ‘metaphysical atoms' by insisting that the distinction between simple and complex is inherently contextual and cannot be made sense of in absolute terms (e.g., PI § 60). For example, there are some contexts where a broom is one object and others where it is composed of a brush and a stick. Three, Wittgenstein problematizes the simple name relationship by arguing that there is no way to ensure that they get the logical multiplicity right. For example, Wittgenstein forcefully argues in the game PI § 48. And his comments on it (e.g. § PI 53), that it is unclear if "R" refers to a red as such or a red-square. Moreover, this quickly causes problems both for individuation and for the relationship between "R" and the squares they describe. For example, is a red square really two red triangles? In turn, these three attacks cast profound doubt on the assumption that analysis will terminate in a set of simple concatenated names that denote ‘objects' or ‘metaphysical atoms' that constitute a possible fact. In turn, the end point of analysis, and the assumption that we reach a determinate logical structure is vitiated.

(b) Second, and naturally following from (a) three, even granting that we isolate out the determinate logical structure in the elucidatory manner the TLP proposes, Wittgenstein problematizes the assumption that such a structure is "determinate" or "exact." He does this in three interrelated ways. One, he argues that, much like ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are inherently contextual, so too are exactness and determinacy (e.g., PI § 96). In other words, a logical picture is determinate or exact only provided a contextual standard that accounts for what "determinate" or "exact" means (e.g., PI § 69). Two, Wittgenstein presages a bit here and hints at the rule-following objection and the problems that emerge by trying to insist that certain rules or logical structures simply explain themselves to us (e.g., PI § 85). Three, Wittgenstein insists that we understand many features of the use of natural language in spite of their "inexactness" or "indeterminacy." For example, "the ground is quite covered with plants" (PI § 70) is a sentence whose semantic content is clear, even when the speaker has not defined what "plant" is or what she is willing to count as a plant. In turn, this casts doubt on the assumption that the determinate logical structure is "exact," immune from any sort of misinterpretation and required to make sense of our actual practices and ways with words.

(c) Third, and perhaps most interesting, Wittgenstein insists that the TLP's conception of clarity is, in point of fact, a profoundly problematic philosophical dogma. Indeed, the TLP's assumptions about semantic content and the elucidatory method earlier Wittgenstein employs assume that there is only one type of philosophical mistake and only one set method of excising it (Kuusela (2008), 54-73, makes a similar point). Later Wittgenstein, by contrast, is skeptical of such a preconceived linkage. To bring this into view, it is best to examine later Wittgenstein's apology for the haziness of natural language, carried out on two interdependent lines. One, as, e.g., Cavell (1979), 168-190, Mulhall (2001), 52-70, and Travis (2006), 10-40, forcefully point out, Wittgenstein focuses our attention on the flexibility of language and our ability to project it to cover novel cases or new contexts (e.g., PI § 42). To take an example that I hope convinces the reader that this sort of projection is as much a part of physics as 'everyday' language consider the term/concept "entropy." From a philosophical point of view, the term/concept is a tragi-comic farce.[91] It has no clear extension, we are not in agreement about its sense (i.e., what its intension is), and, even defining the term clearly is incredibly tricky and inherently contested. However, critically, it is exactly this lack of a precise definition that allowed "entropy" to move, by halting analogies, utterly bizarre associative links, and von Neumann-y rhetorical flourishes (i.e., "You should call it entropy [i.e., the uncertainty function that Shannon discovered], for two reasons. In the first place, your uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it already has a name. In the second place, and more important, *nobody knows what entropy really is, so in a debate, you will always have the advantage*" (von Neumann-Quoted by Shannon (1971)-emphasis mine), from Carnot's concerns with steam engines through state equations about gases, into statistical ones, and to find a good home in information theory and a rather odd one in sociology. The point is that insisting on a certain inflexible form of logical clarity wherein all terms are regimented, all extensions clear, etc., seems to simply kill off essential aspects of the "logic of discovery" like analogies (e.g., Maxwell (2005), 157; see also Hesse (1963), 101-129), metaphors (e.g. Loettgers (2013)), abduction (e.g. Peirce (1998), 226-43), and so on. It is exactly because, strictly speaking, we have not defined, explicated,

[91] Indeed, the classic study of early thermodynamics in named 'a Tragicomic History of Thermodynamics' (Truessel (1980)). For the difficulties with the term philosophically, see, e.g., Jaynes (1983), 77-86; Haglund, Jeppsson, and Stromdahl (2010).

presified, or whatever other operation one wishes to use to ‘clarify' science's theoretical terms, "entropy" that it can "move" into seemingly unrelated areas and structure research in shockingly productive ways. Haziness is, thus, not always a problem for scientific research, but often may be a precondition for it. Two, even if "entropy" and related terms can be given an explication that avoids these worries and captures the "real meaning" of the term, there are features of natural language that simply do not function like this. For example, presifying "stand roughly here" ends up losing the role that the command plays in language (e.g., PI § 88). In turn, these two features should make us wary of the overly hasty assumption that clarification is always logical analysis or elucidation and always terminates in a perfectly sharp and sublimely determinate logical structure. Indeed, clarifying what one means by the order, "stand roughly there," is completely different than the sort of clarification that the TLP insists is properly philosophy.

These attacks strike me as persuasive assaults on several tacit, and not so tacit, preconceptions at work in the TLP. However, this forces a problem on us. To wit, what is the relationship between logic and language? Can we maintain that logic is rigid, a priori, etc., and avoid the problematic aspects of the TLP's philosophy of logic? Above all, "[w]ith these considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: In what way is logic something sublime?" (PI § 89). Indeed, in spite of these attacks, the conception of logic as something sublime- something with diamond-like purity (e.g. PI § 107), perfect hardness (e.g. PI § 437) and, above all, as the "essence of language, of propositions, of thought" (PI § 92)- seems forced on us. This is for three interdependent reasons. One, and in spite of the above, we may still insist that a constitutive precondition for a semantic content is exactly its logical isomorphism between a proposition and a possible fact. In other words, x represents y *only* in virtue of the fact that x and y *share* a determinate logical structure. Indeed, without this, we run the risk of not having any account of how P(a), <Dan is fat>, and *Dan’s being fat* relate. Two, any attempt to modify the TLP's ‘picture of logic' may bargain "its [logic's] rigour out of it" (PI § 108), something that is simply unacceptable. As it were, anything that counts as "logic" necessarily has exactly the essential interconnections between true and false, "&" and "v," and so on, that the TLP insisted

on.[92] Without these connections, whatever we are talking about, simply cannot count as logic. Three, rejecting the TLP's philosophy of logic seems to resurrect a ghost that earlier Wittgenstein sought to silence- the very idea of thinking "illogically."

6.1 A Diagnostic Examination of the TLP's Philosophy of Logic:

Thus, we seem faced with a deep tension. On the one hand, later Wittgenstein has offered us a battery of arguments that seem to undermine the preconceptions that the TLP's philosophy of logic rests on. On the other hand, it seems as though we are, nevertheless, committed to the TLP's account as abandoning it raises a host of worse issues. To adequately address this, Wittgenstein engages in a diagnostic investigation that seeks not to mitigate this tension, but to worsen it. In effect, Wittgenstein aims to make "[t]he conflict [between logical requirements and language as we find it] becomes intolerable" (PI §107). By doing so, as we shall see, he achieves two things. First, he helps us realize that a drastic reimagining is required as we cannot simply 'live' with this tension or blithely claim that, 'really' logic is in language, it is just so 'deep' that excavating it takes a terrible amount of work (e.g., PI § 102). Second, he begins to bring the actual "workings of our language" (PI § 109) into view by emphasizing aspects of language that the TLP account elided, ignored, or even condemned as outright nonsense.

To begin, on the one hand, Wittgenstein notes that "logic seemed to have a peculiar depth- a universal significance. Logic lay… at the foundation of all the sciences.- For logical investigation explores the essence of all things" (PI § 89). As Shulte and Hacker note (PI endnote p. 249), the use of "essence" is critical here. Wittgenstein has used the word three times before this (PI § 1, PI § 46, PI § 65), and has a fairly standard definition in mind, it seems. To wit, by "essence" Wittgenstein means a set of independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that is constitutively required for something to be count as something else. And, indeed, this is exactly what the TLP's conception of the determinate logical structure and the projected relation seemed to give us. An utterance has a meaning because it is a

[92] Of course, this is somewhat megalomaniacal on Wittgenstein's part. However, I do think that later Wittgenstein would simply reject modifications of logic like 'fuzzy logic,' paraconsistent logic, etc., as just not being logic.

representation of a possible fact and it is a representation of a possible fact because the fact and representation share a determinate logical structure and we have assigned semantic value to the 'parts' of the structure. In turn, it is exactly this hunting for the essence that makes the TLP's philosophy of logic seem so irresistible. Thus, "[w]e think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there" (PI § 101). Indeed, the "strict and clear rules for the logical construction of a proposition [i.e., the determinate logical structure prescinded from the semantics] appears to us as something in the background… I *already* see them… for I *do understand the sign, I mean something by it*" (PI § 102- emphasis mine). In sum, granting the preconceptions of the TLP, the essence of language is the logical picture and what wears the constitutive pants is the logical isomorphism between words and world. Meaning/representation *is constituted* by logic!

However, on the other hand, this leads us to conclude that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentences" (PI § 98). Such an unjustified insistence is problematic for several reasons. First are the criticisms of the TLP that noted above. For example "stand roughly here" does not seem capable of functioning properly if its logically determinate structure is sublimed out of it in a manner the TLP would accept. Second, Wittgenstein has taken great pains in the preceding sections of the PI to point out how heterogenic and multifaceted our conceptual-linguistic practices actually are. In turn, this should lead us to be very pessimistic that such a unified account of all language can be culled from the depth (Horwich (2015) makes this point with great force). Third, Wittgenstein notes that our quixotic quest for a determinate logical structure in even the vaguest sentences leads us to "become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called 'sentence,' words,' 'signs.' The sentence and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And now we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign" (PI § 105). Indeed, from this commitment to sharpness in vagueness, "it seems we have to describe extreme subtleties, which again we are quite unable to describe… We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers" (PI § 106).

In turn, this terminates in the odd situation where the "more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement [that semantics presupposes a determinate logical form]" (PI § 107). In other words, our preconceived demand that the essence of semantic content be its isomorphic logical relation with a possible fact, and the simple fact that I know what

someone yelling "damn it!" means after she burns herself, even though it is unclear what ‘possible fact' this relates to, cannot be reconciled with one another.[93] Indeed, attempting such a reconciliation, for later Wittgenstein, quickly leads into utter ad hocery where we posit ever finer-grained distinctions, characters, contents, indices, worlds, etc., to make a vague sentence conform to a preconception. In turn, such ad hocry becomes harder and harder to maintain as it leads us to insist that this baroque mathematics and byzantine complexity of ever-more ‘sophisticated' logic, is properly ascribed to a three-year-old who is ‘tacitly' grasping it when she understands or utters that "there are many more apples in this basket!"[94] And, indeed, at this point, the tension between our pre-established condition that semantics requires determinate logical structure, and our realization that ascribing set theory, model theory, modal logic, etc., to three year olds is wildly off the mark to account for our ordinary ways with words, threatens to either leave logic spinning in a frictionless and idealized void or else leave us with no account whatever of the semantics of a natural language.[95] Notice, in closing, that I have explicitly, and Wittgenstein somewhat implicitly at this juncture, changed gears. The focus on language has shifted from a sole concern with semantic content to ascription practices and various other ‘pragmatic' features.

Thus, we see that, over the course of PI §89- §108, Wittgenstein seeks to make the tension between the preconceived requirements the TLP’s philosophy of logic places on language, and the way we use, ascribe, etc., language, unbearable. Indeed, he helps us realize that we are torn between the Scylla of imputing extremely advanced math to extremely young children to account for the semantic content of their sentences and the Charybdis of leaving our ways with language mysterious and letting logic spin in a void.

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[93] The oft-told story of Sraffa and his gesture fits in here (e.g., Monk (1991), 260-61)

[94] I hasten to add here, a point I make with more care in a moment, that the problem is not modeling, e.g., a graded adjective like "many" in such a rigorous way (Romero (2015) gives one such eloquent formalization). Instead, the problem is what we are trying to do with it. If we are trying to build a computer program, this might be the only viable option. However, if we are trying to account for child's ability to use and understand such a sentence, positing pre-doxastic computational processes that take mathematicians and logicians years to master is rather odd.

[95] The reader may demur and insist that such ‘depth grammar’ is not “wildly off the mark.” Linguistics, like physics, has a right to posit theatrical terms, mind/brain modules, and so on. However, critically, such a scientific program does *not* capture the normal ways we get by with language, how we ascribe understanding to people, and so on. As it were, we do not make a three year old do modal logic to prove she understands a claim like “if you had eaten your veggies, you would be allowed to have cookies” (cf. Horwich (1998 b), 87, for a similar point).

6.2 The Corrective: The Pragmatics of Representation:

In turn, this naturally raises, again, later Wittgenstein's question. To wit, how do logic and language relate? How is logic something sublime? This section argues that Wittgenstein reimagines not logic, and its hardness, but representation. In effect, I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, logic is one way of representing specific features of language. This attributes to Wittgenstein a conception of representation that is far more fluid and less rigid than the isomorphic account the TLP presupposes. To begin, I set the stage and lay down some conditions that any account of later Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic must meet. From there, I examine how he reimagines representation. Finally, I close with two examples.

Before beginning, I lay down one exegetical assumption and two adequacy conditions that I believe any apt account of the PI's philosophy of logic must respect. First, I exegetically assume, following Greve (2017) and Kuusela (2014), and against Maddy (2014), 51-61 and 81-100, as I understand her, that Wittgenstein's understanding of logic itself remains genuinely consistent, stable, and unified throughout Wittgenstein's work. Second, I assume that any adequate account of later Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic cannot ascribe to logic as formal calculi a constitutive role that accounts for semantics. Indeed, "[i]n giving explanations, I already have to use language full blown… this is enough to show that I can come up only with *externalities about language*" (PI § 120- emphasis mine). Finally, third, this new philosophy of logic cannot bargain out any of the rigor, rigidity, a priority, etc. out of logic. Indeed, though attractive in several respects, Maddy's account badly misfires by attempting to ascribe to later Wittgenstein a conception of the empirically contingent status of logic (e.g., Maddy (2014), 79).[96]

With these assumptions and requirements in view, let us turn to Wittgenstein's gnomic remarks on how to expunge the tension. To begin, Wittgenstein insists that the only way the "preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning out whole inquiry around" (PI § 108). This quote is difficult to understand fully and

[96] Maddy is aware of this. She argues that it is a product idiosyncratic biographical move that has no philosophical justification (e.g., Maddy (2014), 101-125). Regardless, for Maddy, a fundamental assumption seems to be that if a claim is revisable or fallible, then it is empirical. Pace this, as Glock (1996 b) argues, the fact that we can and do revise our conceptual schemas in no way entails that they are made up *solely* of empirical propositions. Indeed, such an assumption conflates empirical revision with conceptual revision, a move that later Kuhn, among others, warns us against (e.g., Kuhn (1990))

the secondary literature is strikingly heterogenic and varied on how best to read it (e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 266-270, Mulhall (2001), 87-93, Glock (1996 b), 202, etc., all give their own gloss). For our purposes, part of what the quote calls attention to is the preconception of how representation itself works in the TLP. Indeed, notice that Wittgenstein claims that a critical confusion in the TLP is that it "predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation" (PI § 104). Thus, the TLP's conception of logic "is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off" (PI § 103). Furthermore, such an interpretation of what "turning our whole inquiry around" means harmonizes the quote with the work done earlier in this chapter. Wittgenstein's central target has been the preconception that a representation of x and a represented x share a determinate logical structure. Indeed, it is only when we re-imagine how representation works that we can maintain both logic's rigor, a priority, etc., and not predicate on language the crystalline purity that logic has. Thus, let us examine how later Wittgenstein shifts what and how representation is and works.

To begin, it is critical that Wittgenstein insists that we need to take into account a "means of representation" (PI § 50) and keep in mind that "[w]hat we call ‘descriptions' are instruments for particular uses" (PI § 291- presages in PI § 24). We return to this in chapter seven, as it is critical for Wittgenstein's novel methods. Granting this, a plausible view is that a representation is not always a logical isomorphism between a proposition and a possible fact. Instead, it is a pragmatic relationship that both requires a particular purpose, a specific though sometimes implicit audience, and a set means to function. Thus, a more apt account of representation for the PI is ‘S represents x as y to A for some purpose p'[97] where S is a person or group, x is some feature of the world, y a model of it, and A is a possibly implicit audience. Notice, first, that this pragmatic account of representation makes good sense of Wittgenstein's increasing interest of the "x as y" clause seen most clearly in PI II xi. Second, it gives considerable flexibility as to what "representation" means and, in turn, helps us make sense of, e.g., the language-game methodology Wittgenstein relies on.[98] For example, clearly, PI § 2 is meant to represent or describe the Augustinian picture of language proffered in PI § 1. However, equally clearly, how PI § 2 represents Augustine’s picture is *hard* to make sense of, especially

[97] This formulation is taken, with slight modification, from Giere (2004), 743
[98] Kuusela (2014), makes a similar point. We return to this in chapter 7.2.

granting the TLP's preconceptions. In point of fact, Augustine's picture and PI § 2 do *not* seem to share the right 'mathematical multiplicity' (TLP 4.04). There is *no* determinate logical structure that Augustine's picture and PI § 2 shares. Augustine's picture proffers a child ostensibly learning her first language whereas PI § 2 stipulates a builder and an assistant who 'just know' "brick," "slab," and the proper responses. Augustine's picture seems best thought of as an 'indicative language game' wherein a child learns to correlate words and things by listening to assertions and the like whereas PI § 2 is 'imperative' in that the builder yells "Slab!" and the assistant fetches it. We return to this in chapter seven. For now, notice that the relationships between PI § 2 and Augustine's picture is unworkable in terms of the TLP's preconceptions concerning "representation." Third, pursuant to this, "later Wittgenstein's carefully described language games [are] partial models of language" (Williamson (*forthcoming*), 7; See also Kuusela (2014)). Notice, as the above makes clear, these models represent in a manner that is quite different than the TLP's account.

Let us spell out this pragmatic account of representation further. To begin, let us take our cue from Williamson- specifically his overall linkage between scientific models and philosophical models. To begin, both later Wittgenstein and the natural and social sciences are confronted with a similar striking problem- the problem of complexity. For Wittgenstein, he reminds us that when we represent language "[w]e're talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity" (PI § 108-box). Indeed, much of the PI is meant to show how complex, multifaceted and heterogenic this phenomenon of language is. I can be interested in prosodic features of language, syntactic rules, the intertwinement of language-culture-identity-nationalism, etc. However, such complexity threatens to overwhelm any attempt to proffer any representation of the phenomenon of language, be it in philosophic, linguistic, literary theoretic, etc., terms. As it were, such a representation either becomes vacuous (e.g., PI § 107) or arbitrary (e.g. "language is always deferred desire!"). Similarly, consider a red brick thrown out my office window on a particularly windy day. Notice that the brick is not a uniform mass distribution, the wind is continuously affecting air resistance in somewhat erratic ways, the earth has a bulge at the equator, and so it too is not a uniform mass distribution, the orbit of the moon exerts a slight pull in the brick, etc. Indeed, if we grant the plausible view that all material things are causally related to all other

material things, the fall of the red brick needs a total understanding of everything else afoot in the universe. In turn, such complexities threaten to preclude representing the brick in terms of classical physics as there's too much going on.

To solve this problem of complexity, scientists utilize a pragmatic theory of representation that rests, at base, on models.[99] To begin, by "model" I do not mean a mathematical "structure which satisfies the axioms of a theory" (van Fraassen (1980), 43). Rather, I include a far wider range of what scientists actually call models. Balls and sticks are models of molecules in chemistry, differential equations are models inherently discreet population growth in evolution, etc. Indeed, a surprising feature of scientific practice is how promiscuous the use of the term "model" is and how heterogenic their relationships with what they represent is. As it were, a ball-and-stick model does not represent a molecule in the same way that a differential equation model represents a population. Examples of modeling and the different ways they represent can be expanded nearly indefinitely.[100] Granting this, a physicist deals with the complexity of our brick by representing the brick and the earth as if they are point particles of mass, as if the only salient causal relationship in play is the earth's gravitational pull on the brick, as if there's no air, etc. In turn, this model of two points of mass interacting only with each other allows us to apply classical physics to the situation without ado. Thus a scientist represents the brick-system as an idealized two point particles of mass model for the purposes of, e.g., calculating when the brick hits the ground. Notice three further things. One, there are multiple possible and unrelated models that represent the same thing(s) differently. Indeed, even for our humble brick, I might be interested in, e.g., optics and the red color of the brick, rather than its fall. In that case, I will represent the brick in a very different way. Two, pursuant to this, as Williamson (*Forthcoming*), 10, is forced to admit, and as Toon (2012), 34-61 celebrates, modeling often has more to do with a sort of tacit know-how than an algorithmic 'plug and chug' theory. Knowing what simplifying idealizations to introduce is not something we can compress into a set of clearly defined rules. Three, how idealized representations, and models, relate to the world, is an outstanding and highly contested issue. Fortunately, given Wittgenstein's strictures on explanation, it need not concern us. How we make models and how they relate to the world is not an

[99] Giere, e.g., (1999) (2004) and (2009) is a champion of just such a view, and I rely heavily on him.
[100] The Philips pipes-and-colored water model represents the economy in a different way than a computer simulation model represents a possible alternative universe in cosmology, in a different way than a rational agent model represents the Mutually Assured Destruction in political science, etc.

issue, that we do so is what matters (e.g., PI § 139 box-b).[101]And if we ‘look and see' we realize that we use dishware to represent geography, myths to represent morality, etc.

Let us tarry a bit longer and make three additional notes to this model based pragmatic representation. First, this method does not bargain out any of the rigor of classical mechanics. Indeed, once I enter the ‘model-world,’ the mathematical architecture of Newton's theory unfolds in a precise, well-defined, perfectly systematic, etc., way. Second, this model cannot be taken as literally depicting the system. Indeed, in much of scientific practice, taking a model as a literal depiction, literally falsifies it.[102] The brick is not a point particle of mass, and it does us very little good to rack our brains over if "point particle" is even coherent- e.g., how does something with no dimensions have mass?! Pursuant to this, the truth or falsities of models tend not to interest us.[103] Instead, what is critical is that they be useful for some purposes or other. Indeed, and pace Maddy (2014), e.g., 123-25, a model could be considered ‘a priori' in that they are not ‘descriptions of the phenomena’ but, rather, possible ways to represent the phenomena so that certain patterns become salient. As it were, how we model something is a priori and up to us. Third, and pace Williamson (*forthcoming*), 1-3, this model-making does not strike me as a useful heuristic to get by when ‘real science' is swamped by intractable complexity. Rather, model-making strikes me as a scientific elaboration and refinement of representation itself. The world is simply too complex to deal with ‘directly' and to get by, we all make idealizing assumptions, construct mental models, etc.

Granting this, and returning with these fruits to the PI, later Wittgenstein's reimagining of the philosophy of logic becomes at once eloquently simple and profoundly innovative. To begin, the problem with the TLP is not its conception of logic per se. Instead, as Wittgenstein stressed, the problem is that we predicated on the real phenomenon of language our way of representing it. In turn, this leads us to "misunderstand the role played by the ideal in our language" (PI § 100). In effect, "[w]e take the possibility of comparison, which impresses us, as the perception of a highly general state of affairs" (PI § 104). In other words, we confuse the

[101] This is, suffice it to say, a slight dodge on my part. And in point of fact, I do think Wittgenstein has more to say. However, we cannot discuss this further.
[102] The locus classicus of this point is Cartwright (1983), esp 54-73. She, among others, has continued to develop her account in, e.g., Cartwright (1999), esp 23-34
[103] This point is, rightly due to preconceptions about what science should be, emphasized ad nauseum in the literature. See, e.g., Morison (1999), Frigg (2012), Cartwright (1983), Wiesberg (2013), etc

phenomenon of language, with all its intractable complexity, with a model of language as propositions. In effect, we take a representation of x to, somehow, have sublimed out the essence of x. Indeed, the logical isomorphism between language and the world seems to force this on us. By contrast, now later Wittgenstein is keen to emphasize that "it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon [e.g., language] in a variety of ways" (PI § 108-box). Indeed, especially granting that "language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses" (PI § 18) and that there is no core feature of language that makes it into language (e.g., PI § 23), we should realize that we can represent language in multiple, orthogonal ways, each of which ignores some features and each brings some features into view. In other words, logic is a model of language, a means by which we represent language as a set of deductive and inferential relationships, not *the* constitutive feature of language. Further, and more critically, this pragmatic account of representation- i.e., that we represent sentences as propositions for logical purposes- is endorsed by Wittgenstein in several places in the *Nachlass.* For example, "[w]e are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules… *We consider language from one point of view only*" (PG § 32 p. 68- emphasis mine). Furthermore, and even more explicitly, "[n]ow however it [logic] plays a different role. What used to be a prejudice concerning reality [i.e., that it must have a determinate logical structure] has turned into *one* form of representation. Where has its crystal clearness ended up? It has turned <u>into a form of representation, nothing else</u>" (Notebook 157a as quoted in Schulte (2006), 46-7,- underlying mine).

The critical point is that, for later Wittgenstein, logic is one way of representing language. Certainly, if one represents a sentence as a proposition with determinate logical structure, then one relies a sharpness of sense, clearly defined bipolar truth values for classical logical models, etc., in the same way that if one represents the brick's fall in a classical mechanical model, one relies on point particles of mass and two objects in the universe. Further, in both cases, none of the rigor or crystalline purity is lost. However, bricks aren't point particles and sentences aren't propositions. Confusion on this simple point led, e.g., Cartesian physicists to rack their brains about how weight can 'fall out' of Descartes representation of matter as extension (Duhem (1982), 39-54, gives a lovely account) and, e.g., Wittgenstein to

rack his brain over how "damn it!" has a determinate logical form. Logic is a means of representation, and it is often an apt one. However, confusing the model and the assumptions it makes- the sharpness of sense, well-defined truth conditions, etc.- with the thing modeled, is the height of folly. In sum, succinctly, whereas the TLP insists that logic is constitutive for semantic content, the PI insists that we can represent sentence as propositions for certain purposes. In closing, let us examine two examples to further this interpretation.

First, consider the famous sentence "I have a pain." This is a sentence in the indicative mood, and it is often uttered as an assertion. And it clearly enters into normal deductive and inferential relationships, when one represents it logically. For example, we can move from it to "There exists someone who has a pain." However, as Wittgenstein powerfully argues, taking this logical representation as literally depicting what's afoot, leads one to an untenable philosophical position wherein we seem both forced to posit an odd inner object, *pain*, and then have no real account of how such an object and the word "pain" relate to each other (e.g. PI roughly § 244-§ 265). Indeed, our ability to represent "I have a pain" in a logical model impresses us, and we are quickly led into hopelessly dark places with inner worlds and mind's eyes. Notice, critically, that the problem is not the logical representation but the attempt to take it literally, e.g., as giving us some constitutive account of how "I have a pain" and the *pain* in my head, relate. Again, the best analogy here is with a physicist who, because her model demands point particles of mass, starts shaming bricks in an attempt to find them. Indeed, how mysterious that bricks have point particles of mass in them and how magical that we have *pain* in us! And the cure is, as Wittgenstein said, to avoid a one-sided diet (PI § 593). Less prosaically, the key is reminding ourselves that "I have a pain" can function as, e.g., an ethical demand (Cavell (2005), 238-66), an avowal, etc. Again, we can represent "I have a pain" logically, and there may be a good reason to. However, "I have a pain" is not simply a proposition.

Second, consider Wittgenstein's note that "[u]nderstanding a sentence in language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one might think" (PI § 527). One, Wittgenstein is empirically quite right- the prosody of spoken languages directly affects if I understand some utterance as a question, a sarcastic quip, etc.[104] Two, apparently, the prosodic features of natural languages have no role

[104] E.g., Crystal (1976), for a classic anthology on English tonal and prosodic features.

in logic per se. Indeed, if any part of language is tokening rather than what-is-said, surely it is how I utter a sentence. Three, and most critically, the way I understand and respond to a sentence shifts depending on how I hear the "music" of it (*ibid*). For example, consider a flirtatious exchange between Jen and Sally. We can assume that they are uttering indicative mood sentences and often making assertions. However, missing the tone of the conversations leads to some deep misunderstandings. For example, Jen may have an interest in violating the maxims of relation and manner by casually mentioning that she lacks a lover and Sally might want to dispute an established presupposition (in common parlance, tease Jen). We can happily grant that the point of this exchange is that Jen and Sally are looking to score. But this is somewhat different than what, e.g., Lewis (1979), has in mind. Of course, much of these features are ‘pragmatic factors' but, as Travis (2006), 1-9, argues, the pragmatic/semantic divide, especially in the manner we attempt to draw it today, is totally foreign to Wittgenstein. In any case, understanding Sally and Jen's exchange relies on more than following the inferential and deductive interrelationships of their claims. Again, such a view might be useful for some purposes. However, an alien who could only grasp what-is-said will miss the point of the exchange (cf. PI § 564).

Thus, the PI does not alter Wittgenstein's conception of logic. Logic is still independent of experience, perfectly clear and rigorous, still governed by the same basic operations, etc. However, what he insists on is that logic is not genuinely constitutive of the phenomenon of language. It is, instead, one way to represent it. As it were, sentences do not simply express propositions. Rather, logicians represent sentences as propositions for the purposes of, e.g., clarifying inferential relationships. In turn, the determinate logical structure that the TLP insists on is now recast as something like the physicist's point particle of mass. In both cases, it is a prerequisite to begin doing either logic or physics. However, much as it would be absurd for the physicist to move from her indispensible assumption about point particles of mass to the claim that a brick really is just a point particle of mass, so too is it absurd for the logician to move from her indispensible assumption that a sentence has a determinate logical structure to the claim that a sentence really is just a determinate logical structure. I should note that the reader may find my analogy between Wittgenstein and science prima facie absurd. Wittgenstein, we are told, hated science or some

vaguely defined thing called scientism. I discuss this at length in chapter eight. For now, I merely note that what matters is the *purpose* of the tool we are using. In science, models function as, e.g., means to render certain causal patterns salient within a phenomenon that is too complex to study otherwise (e.g., Woodward (2003), 315-349). In contrast, for later Wittgenstein, models function as a means to bring about understand after a breakdown, a point we discuss in chapter 8 at length. Regardless, the basic point is that the *same* tool can be used for *very different* jobs.

In closing, notice that this pragmatic account of representation is far more catholic than the TLP's picture. At an abstract level, this provides later Wittgenstein a considerable degree of latitude concerning how one can study language. Some people want to get the deductive and inferential relationships that propositions have right, others want to talk about how language and culture relate, still more want to discuss the weird stuff that goes on in jokes or Freudian slips. All of this is fine, and may provide insight. However, one must have a clear purpose in mind, ensure that the model is apt, relative to that purpose, and, above all, avoid confusing the model and the thing modeled. It does little good to fight wars over claims like "all language boils down to differed desire" or "all language boils down to propositions." At an exegetical level, as we take up in chapter 7, and as Kuusela (2014) hints at, this begins to explain the medley of representations, or descriptions, that make up the PI. Reflections on logic and the role of truth (e.g., PI § 136), fictional language games concerning tribes (e.g., PI § 6), discussions of early childhood training (e.g., PI § 5), and so on, all have a proper place as representations, or descriptions, that bring into focus aspects of the incredibly complicated phenomenon of language. Finally, at the level of Wittgenstein scholarship, such a pragmatic account allows us to harmonizing seemingly antithetical positions. Specifically, one can maintain that normative rules are indispensible for Wittgenstein and, I would claim, representations of language generally, just as point particles are indispensible for physics. However, one can also remain agnostic about if these rules are 'really' parts of language.[105]

6.3 Summary:

[105] Kuusela (2008), 120-148, makes a similar point. However, he does *not* take the indispensability seriously enough and often makes it seem as though we can get by fine without rules and the models that give them life. As I hope the above makes clear, such a view strikes me as *not* tenable. Language is simply *too* complex to just 'talk about it' without models.

This chapter has argued for a pragmatic account of representation to make sense of later Wittgenstein's way of reimagining the role of logic and its relationship with language. In effect, the TLP took the relationship between language and logic to be constitutive and the fundamental nature of representation to be a logical isomorphism between a proposition and a possible fact. Pace this, later Wittgenstein insists that logic is one way to represent language. In the form of a slogan, sentences do not expression propositions. Rather, we represent sentences as propositions for specific purposes. Granting this pragmatic account of representation, the hardness of logic is understood in the correct manner as a feature of the model and not the thing-modeled. However, this opens the question of what semantic content is for later Wittgenstein. To address this, however, we need to examine the nature of "description" in later Wittgenstein's methodology. It is to this we turn.

7 Chapter Seven: Description Alone! The Method of the PI:

The last chapter discussed the PI's rejection of the philosophy of logic of the TLP. Specifically, it argued that whereas the TLP endorses an isomorphic theory of representation where a proposition represents a possible fact only in virtue of a shared determinate logical structure, the PI has a far more pragmatic and open conception of representation. In turn, this links up nicely to Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology in the PI. To bring this descriptive methodology into view, I proffer an account that addresses both what Wittgenstein aims to describe, his target, as well as how he does so.[106] Specifically, following Gert (1997), I argue that Wittgenstein aims to describe the frameworks in which we give descriptions and, following Kuusela (2008), 74-95 and 142-148, to some extent, that he does this by relying on "models" and "objects of comparison" (PI § 130).

First, I set the stage. I examine two popular accounts of the descriptive methodology in the PI and argue that both are problematic in certain respects. Second, I examine Wittgenstein's must sustained reflections on what his descriptive methodology is in the PI part one- i.e., PI § 291. I then abstract from this both a target of description for Wittgenstein (i.e., what Wittgenstein aims to describe) as well as the method by which he can describe it. Finally, third, I briefly examine PI § 109. I argue that, far from an unjustifiable quietism, Wittgenstein's emphasis on description is merely putting first things first. This sets the stage for chapter 8.

7.0 Setting the Stage:

It is quite clear that for later Wittgenstein, description and philosophical investigation are intimately connected. Indeed, consider that "[a]ll *explanation* must disappear [in philosophical investigation] and description alone must take its place" (PI § 109), "[p]hilosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it" (PI §124), and so on. However, "description" and its methodological role in philosophical investigations have a rather odd place in the secondary literature. Specifically, it often is either discussed solely in

[106] This way of framing matters is taken, to some extent, from Martin (2016), 80.

terms of contrasts with, e.g., explanation (e.g. PI § 109), the project of constructing an ideal language (e.g., PI § 133), the TLP (e.g., PI § 49), etc., as in the rule-based account[107], or else attempts are made to assimilate it into some different methodological category as in an aspect account.[108] I argue that both glosses have some problems. First, I examine the rule-based view. Then I argue that its tendency to view description solely in terms of its contrast with other features, leads it to ignore or under-examine features of the descriptive methodology simpliciter. Second, I examine the aspect view. I argue that its attempt to assimilate the descriptive methodology into its own understanding of "perspicuous representation" misfires primarily for philosophical reasons. This sets the stage for section 7.1.

For the rule-based view, discussions of description tend to focus on contrasting it with some science, earlier Wittgenstein's musings, and so on. For example, the chapter on "Description" in Baker & Hacker (2009), 65-80, focuses on contrasting the TLP's account of sentences with the PI's. Turning to the Baker & Hacker's comments on "description" in metaphilosophical remark PI § 109, this focus on contrast continues. Here, Baker & Hacker (2005), 245-248, discuss "description" mainly in contrast with theory and explanation- i.e., "[t]he task of philosophy is not to explain anything… Philosophy should only describe" (*ibid* 246). In turn, this focus on contrast naturally leads the rule-based account to characterize of "description" in fairly negative terms- i.e., a description is *not* explanation, *not* theory, *not* metaphysics, *not* the sole function of language, and so on. However, this focus on contrast naturally leads the rule-based account to hold the in abeyance what Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology simpliciter might be. And indeed, Glock's very systematic and helpful *Wittgenstein Dictionary* (Glock (1996 c)), does not mention "description" as an independent entry. Moreover, a glance at the index of Baker and Hacker's, and then Hacker's, seminal commentary (e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), (2014)), shows that the term to appear on its own about 18 times in total on its own- roughly 0.133%[109]

[107] This account is deeply connected to the overall grammatical account discussed at length in chapter 4.
[108] The "aspect account" has its origins in Baker (2006), 22-52, and stresses the importance of seeing aspects- a point we discuss further in a moment.
[109] This figure takes the mentions of "descriptions" in the index that do not occur in footnotes, 18, and divides it by the total number of pages, about 1349.

Thus, the Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology simpliciter is seldom directly discussed by the rule-based account. However, there are a few remarks that the rule-based account proffers concerning both Wittgenstein's target for description as well as his method of description. For target, the rule-based account claims that "what it [philosophy] should describe is the use of words, the grammar of language… we are examining our rule-governed used of words" (Baker & Hacker (2005), 246). For method, as discussed in chapter 4.0e, the rule-based account imputes to Wittgenstein a method of conceptual cartography. Given that we have discussed the method at length, I focus my criticisms on the target the rule-based account imputes to Wittgenstein.

Specifically, the target of description that the rule-based account imputes to Wittgenstein has three major problems. First, such a target sets up a fairly natural exegetical expectation. To wit, if Wittgenstein aims to describe the rule governed uses of our words, we should find him describing how constitutive rules, normative patterns of linguistic behavior, and so on. However, the PI, on the whole, dashes this expectation. Indeed, as Williams (2015), 9-12, notes, Wittgenstein rarely gives descriptions of the uses of our words, or the underlying constitutive rules, in a manner akin to Austin, say. In turn, this makes it rather difficult to make sense of the claim that Wittgenstein's descriptions aim at rule-governed uses of words. What he seems to describe are either language-games or else he seems to target strikingly non-linguistic things like faces or moods.

Second, following from the last point, when we examine the sections of the PI wherein Wittgenstein explicitly notes the targets of description he would like the reader to reflect on, they have very little to do with rules, uses, or even language *directly*. Thus, consider:

> "[r]emember how many different kinds of things are called "descriptions": description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates, description of a facial expression, description of a sensation of touch, of a mood" (PI § 24).

> "I see a picture: it represents an old man walking up a steep path and leaning on a stick.—How? Might it not have looked the same if he had been sliding downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so" (PI § 139)

> "[c]ouldn't someone describe an unfamiliar shape that appeared before him just as accurately as I, to whom it is familiar? … his description will run quite differently [than mine]" (PI II xi § 142).
>
> "If someone searches in a certain figure (call it figure 1) for another figure (call it Figure 2) and then finds it, he sees figure 1 in a new way… he [can] give a new kind of description of it [figure 1]" (PI II xi § 153).
>
> "Then is the copy of a figure an incomplete description of my visual experience? No.- After all, whether, and what, more detailed specifications are necessary depends on the circumstances." (PI II xi § 156).
>
> "What does it mean to say that I 'see the sphere floating in the air' in a picture? Is it enough that for me this description is the most suggestive, natural one? No; for it [e.g., the description] might be so for various reasons." (PI II xi § 169).

Though these quotes all play different roles in the contexts of the sections that they are drawn from, the critical point is that Wittgenstein's targets clearly have little to do with uses or rules. Indeed, in "none of these passages is Wittgenstein advocating either that philosophers describe the uses of particular terms, or that we engage in describing the things to which those terms refer" (Gert (1997), 226). However, a reader may object that, in especially the metaphilosophical parts of the PI, Wittgenstein *describes* language. To this, I make two replies. One, granting this very reasonable point (especially given, e.g., PI § 120), it is still imperative to get clear on what Wittgenstein general descriptive methodology is *before* we can understand how he "describes language." Two, somewhat pursuant to one, the metaphilosophical mentions of "description" in the PI do not target constitutive rules or uses *directly*- a critical point for 7.1.

Third, Wittgenstein notes that "[w]hat we call "*descriptions*" are instruments for particular uses" (PI § 291). We discuss this quote at great length in the next section. For now it is best paired with "description gets its light- that is to say its purpose- from the philosophical problems" (PI § 109) and with "I [Wittgenstein] describe a room to someone, and then get him to paint an impressionistic picture from this description…Now he paints the chair which I described as green, dark red; where I said 'yellow', he paints blue.- That is the impression which he got of the room. And now I say: 'Quite right! That's what it looks like.'" (PI § 368). Notice that these quotes contextualize the accuracy of the description as well as making them purpose-relative. However, this purpose-relativity is difficult to harmonize with the claim that

Wittgenstein targets the constitutive rules that determine correct use. This is because, simply, constitutive rules do not seem purpose-relative. The rules of chess are the rules of chess, regardless of why, with whom, etc., I play chess. In turn, these objections render the target the rule-based account imputes to Wittgenstein rather problematic.

In contrast to the rule-based view, the other account of Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology that we consider is the aspect view. This view is often paired with a pure therapeutic reading of the PI as discussed in chapter 1.2e, 1.2f, 1.2i and 1.2j. To begin, the aspect view insists, pace the rule-based view, that we cannot describe language in terms of the uses of words and the underlying constitutive rules. This is because language is not "some discrete item, or 'entity' to which we might appeal in our adjudications" (Hutchinson (2007), 701). Indeed, according to the aspect view, the rule-based view "implies (i) what John McDowell (1998b, 207) has termed the (fantasised) ability to 'view language from sideways on' and (ii) linguistic conservativism" (Hutchinson and Read (2008), 156). However, this seems to leave the aspect view with a profound problem. If we cannot describe language, as language is not the sort of 'thing' that can be described, how are we to read PI § 109 and related quotes? Indeed, if we cannot target language for description, it becomes unclear what Wittgenstein aims to describe in the first place.

To address this concern, the aspect view assimilates Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology into "perspicuous representation" as well as offering a very distinctive interpretation of "perspicuous representation." To begin, a "perspicuous representation" is understood as "anything which has the function of introducing 'perspicuity' into some aspect of the use of some of 'our words' (i.e. anything which manifestly helps somebody to know his way about by dissolving some philosophical problem which bothers him)" (Baker (2006), 31). Indeed, "[w]hat a perspicuous presentation can, in fact, achieve, according to Baker, is to exhibit a further hitherto 'neglect aspect of the use of an expression'" (Martin (2016), 83). Granting this, what Wittgenstein "describes" are "less 'factual descriptions' of grammar than pictures and analogies" (Morris (2006), 2). Thus "[t]he application of this concept [i.e., perspicuous representation] to what he called 'descriptions of grammar' bears on what he understood by the remark that he advanced no theses, gave no explanations and avoided dogmatism in philosophy. If 'perspicuous representations' are connected with exhibiting aspects of 'the use of our words,' then they do not conform to many of the

features of fact-stating discourse. On the contrary, they more closely resemble descriptions of possibilities" (Baker (2006), 45). In other words, for the aspect view, what Wittgenstein aims to describe are not features of language or constitutive rules, but possibilities. Further, these possibilities are not determined by the constitutive rules and the 'bounds of sense', but rather, are "nothing more and nothing less than different possible ways of looking at things" (*ibid*).

In turn, the aspect view ascribes to Wittgenstein a person-relative methodology that helps make further sense of what sorts of possibilities Wittgenstein aims to describe. To wit, the possibilities Wittgenstein describes function as devices that are "facilitating our interlocutor's aspect shift" (Hutchinson (2007), 702). In other words, Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology is one wherein he describes possibilities whose sole function is to break the spell of a grammatical illusion, which a conversation partner both is under and has come to acknowledge, and thereby relieve her mental cramp (e.g., Baker (2006), *passim,* Hutchinson and Read (2007)). Notice that this implies that any description that does this is in good order. Indeed, strictly speaking, the description need not target any feature *real feature* of language at all.

In my view, such a viewpoint suffers from several deep problems. To begin, as we noted in chapter 1.2f, 1.2h, 1.2k, such person-relativity may be untenable. Bracketing this worry, there are three additional ones.

First, such an account of Wittgenstein descriptive methodology ignores the grammar of "description of x." Specifically, a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. A description of a room as being red is true only if the room is red. Further, this grammar of "description of x as being y" is not, pace a rather odd set of arguments (e.g., Read and Hutchson (2007), 145-48), affected by the fact that I can describe a target in a myriad of different ways (Hutto (2008), 635-37, offers a similar criticism). For example, certainly, the London Tube map describes London in a very different way than a sightseeing map or a historical map. However, a London Tube map that describes *Elephant and Castle* station as being next to *Russell's square* is false as *Elephant and Castle* is not next to *Russell's Square*. Further, certain descriptions come out false regardless of the way I describe the x in question. Any map that describes London as having the Sea of Serenity in the city center is false. However, if a "description" is simply a sort of presentation of possible ways of looking at things, this grammatical relationship becomes far harder to understand as it

is no longer clear if a description of x as being y need have anything to do with the fact that x is y (or not).

One response to this is to attempt to follow Baker and claim that Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology describes possibilities and not in a fact stating discourse. Emphasis can be placed here on 'describing possibilities' or on 'not a fact stating discourse.' Let us take each in turn. If we emphasize that description describe possibilities, we require some further account to make sense of this. What does it mean to describe a possibility? To take an example, to describe the possibility where Danton defeated Robespierre and wrested control of the Revolution from the Committee of Public Safety is, intuitively, to describe a possible world where "Danton" rigidly designates some fellow, "Robespierre" rigidly designates some other fellow, etc. And it is a short step from this to full-blown essentialist metaphysics a la Kripke that Wittgenstein would surely abhor. However, without an alternative conception of how to think about 'described possibilities,' it is opaque what 'describing possibilities' amounts to. Alternatively, we may emphasize 'not a fact stating discourse.' This simply abandons the relationship that claims that a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. However, it then becomes unclear how a description of x and the supposedly described x relate. In other words, it is no longer clear how or why a purported description of x is "of x" or "about x" in the first place.[110]

Second, pursuant to this, it becomes unclear what sorts of expressions count as descriptions of x. Specifically, if we jettison the assumption that a description of x as being y is true only if x is y, and insist on person-relativity, then it seems as though any contribution to a conversation that someone is willing to accept as being a description of x as being y is eo ipso a description of x as being y. To see this clearly, consider two cases. One, someone says that "the description of London in my guidebook says that the Sea of Serenity is lovely this season." Given that we have abandoned the thought that a description of *London as having the Sea of Serenity* is true only if London has the Sea of Serenity, it is no longer clear if I can condemn this guidebook as being in error. Indeed, it seems as though if one accepts this guidebook's description of London as having the Sea of Serenity, then everything is

[110] The devil here is working out what phrases like "of x" "about x" etc. clause really amount to. Yablo (2014) gives an idea of how many little demons live in this big devil.

fine. This is a rather counterintuitive result. Two, worse, consider someone who offers a description of London as "quickly five-ing pudding pops," and a conversation partner who accepts that this is a description. Again, this seems to mean that things are in good order. In both cases, the aspect view must accept that, provided someone is silly enough, or mad enough, to accept a purported description x, then this *is* a description (e.g., Baker (2006), 41, Hutchinson and Read (2007), 152-58). In turn, this seems to mean 'anything goes!' in principle for the aspect view as any 'possibility' I can proffer, and convince someone to accept as a description, can be a description of x.

A possible retort is that I have ignored fictional or metaphorical/poetic descriptions. Indeed, for the case of London and the Sea of Serenity, one may claim that this is a description of a *fictional* London. The problem with such a reply is that, again, it either leads us to metaphysics (cf. van Inwagen (1983)) that Wittgenstein would find deeply problematic or else some more robust discussion of how the fiction-London and the real-London relate. For the second case, the description of London as quickly five-ing pudding pops, someone might claim that this is a metaphoric or poetic description akin to Romeo's description of Juliet as the sun. Indeed, Juliet is not a hot ball of gas at the center of our solar system! However, such a retort is far too flippant with metaphors and poetic discourse. For metaphors, as Lakoff and Johnson (2003), 3-13, point out, there is an internal coherence that governs most metaphorical expressions and these do not solely depend on someone accepting that x is a metaphor. For poetry, Cavell (2006), 73-96, notes, that poetic descriptions rely on the ability of the reader or listener to 'catch on.' We understand what Romeo means by his description of Juliet as the sun because we can elaborate on it- e.g., Juliet is the sun, she is the light of my world, she is what my entire life orbits around, etc. Again, it is opaque how to elaborate the "description" "quickly five-ing pudding pops."

Third, the attempt to assimilate Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology into 'aspect seeing' may, in fact, contradict Wittgenstein at a brute exegetical level. Consider that "aspect-seeing is 'voluntary'… in that it makes sense to ask somebody to look at things differently, to say that a person has complied with the request, [etc.]" (Baker (2006), 46). In turn, and granting that "description" is just a sub-type of perspicuous representation and aspect seeing, we should expect this to hold for any and all descriptions. However, Baker ignores that Wittgenstein writes both that this

volunteerism does not make sense for claims like "'Now see this leaf green!'" (PI II xi § 255) and that, pursuant to this "[t]wo uses of the word 'see'. The one: 'What do you see there?' – 'I see *this*' (and then a description…)" (PI II xi §111- underlying mine). In turn, this, this should make us deeply skeptical of any attempt to assimilate the descriptive methodology into 'aspect seeing' and presenting possibilities. Indeed, over the course of PI II xi, Wittgenstein tends to use "description" much more for what-is-seen than likenesses, connections, *bringing out aspects*, etc.

Thus, we see that two popular accounts in the literature have trouble making sense of Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology simpliciter. Though the contrasts that the rule-based view offers between description and, e.g., theory, are surely correct, this leads them to neglect description, and the descriptive methodology, in the PI. By contrast, the aspect view attempts to assimilate Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology into its own rather unique conception of "representation." I have argued that this attempt misfires for a host of philosophical and exegetical reasons. In either case, it is clear that a discussion of description alone is in order. It is to this we turn.

7.1 Described Descriptions:

In the last section, we noted that a descriptive methodology is clearly critical for Wittgenstein in general and his metaphilosophical views in particular. We also noted that two popular interpretations of this descriptive methodology face some challenges. Ergo, a new account is required. In this section, I argue that what Wittgenstein targets for his descriptions are the frameworks in which a description is given. This harmonizes with the grammatical account's claim that philosophy is properly second order. What Wittgenstein aims to describes is how we describe, i.e., the parameters we rely on when we proffer descriptions (see chapter 4.0a). Second, the method Wittgenstein utilizes to bring to the fore the terms that a description relies on is his stunningly innovative use of models. This harmonizes well with Kuusela as discussed in chapter 1.2g as well as aspects of Horwich as discussed in chapter 3.3a.

To begin, first, I set the stage by examining PI § 291 in some depth. I do this because PI § 291 is the most sustained discussion of "description" in part one of the investigation and so is critical for any attempted interpretation of Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology. From this close reading, second, I distill both what Wittgenstein targets with his descriptions as well as how he describes his target.

Third, I examine Wittgenstein's method of description in some detail. I argue that it is *indirect* and relies on a stunningly innovative use of "models" or "objects of comparison" (PI § 130). Fourth, I briefly discuss two possible misunderstandings of the method of indirect description. Finally, fifth, I summarize.

Let us begin by examining PI § 291 in full:

> "What we call "*descriptions*" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls, which seem simply to depict how a thing looks, what it is like (these pictures are, as it were, idle)"

Notice, first, that Wittgenstein introduces description with italics and double-quotation marks. This is somewhat striking as Wittgenstein often uses either italics or quotations but rarely both together, especially in the case of singular words. For the italics, Baker, commenting on italics in Wittgenstein in general, flags this sentence precisely as an instance where Wittgenstein "indicates the focus of a remark" (Baker (2006), 227). He further notes that a related use of italics is to stress "a point that is apt to be neglected, or even expected to give rise to objections" (*ibid*). This seems apt. Intuitively, we take a description not to be a tool for a particular purpose, but something like depiction. By "depiction" I mean a sort of iconic relationship between the picture and the thing-pictured. In other words, a depiction is like a "word-picture… one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls, which seem simply to depict how a thing looks" (PI § 291). Notice also that Wittgenstein's emphasis on the purpose-relative status of descriptions further belies the word-picture conception. Intuitively, a depiction, or word-picture, is a depiction; regardless of the purposes I have in mind or put it to.

Notice, further, that this idea of depiction and a "word-picture" clearly echoes the TLP and the "picture theory of propositions." Indeed, as discussed in chapter 5, for the TLP a proposition describes a possible fact in virtue of each sharing a determinate logical structure. Pace this, later Wittgenstein is here keen to emphasize that such a conception has "something misleading about it" (PI § 291). Indeed, the claim that pictures are "idle" supports the claim made in chapter 6 that later Wittgenstein endorses a pragmatic account of representation. Indeed, such an account is committed to the idea that x does not simply represent y due to some iconic

relation, a determinate logical structure, and so on. Rather, it requires that S represents x as y to A purpose p. As it were, no representation is 'automatic.'

The function of the quotes around description is equally fascinating. First, they are double quotation marks. For various reasons, the use of double quotes in the PI seems to be different than single quotes. To wit, single quotes tend to be used in the same way as italics (cf. Backer (2006), 234) and so double quotes probably play a different role. Further, and regardless of how much weight we should give the typographical conventions of the PI, it is clear that double quotes do play a fairly standard and distinct role in written English. To wit, they are often used to characterize that some term is being used in a specific sense- e.g., "By 'adult,' this car rental agency means someone over 25 years old." And, indeed, this fits PI § 291 perfectly as Wittgenstein seeks to characterize "description" in the sense of instruments. In sum, it seems likely that, in PI § 291, Wittgenstein is characterizing "description" in a specific way, hence the double-quotes, and is inviting the reader to reflect on this characterization, hence the italics. Let us take up this invitation.

To reflect on Wittgenstein specific use of description, it is best to turn to the examples he offers us- those of a machine drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements. First, it is striking that all three examples are taken from engineering. This furthers the point from chapter 6.3 that later Wittgenstein seems happy to take over certain tools from sciences- models, machine drawings, and so on- and deploy them for very different ends. Second, within this scientific, specifically engineering, context, each of the examples is, indeed, a tool for a particular purpose. For example, an engineer who wants to know the size of the front door of a house will use an elevated drawing with measurements. Alternatively, if the engineer wants to know the interior layout of the house, she will use a cross-section. Third, related to this, it is clear that these descriptions can be orthogonal to one another. A description of a house in terms of a cross-section cuts away precisely the features that a description of a house as an elevation with measurements focuses on. However, fourth, each description of the house as being thus and so is true only if the house is thus and so. In other words, the engineer's use of such drawings is still firmly routed in the grammar of description- i.e., a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. Thus, a cross-section that describes two rooms upstairs is true only when the house has two rooms upstairs. Fifth, trying to give a 'total description' of the house is a rather odd prospect. Indeed, a description that tries to blend together both a cross-section and an elevated

drawing may lose the very perspicuity of the features each made clear individually. In turn, sixth, this implies that, for Wittgenstein, descriptions are not ‘additive' (e.g., Baker (2006), 43). By ‘additive’ Baker means that one can always blend or harmonize various orthogonal descriptions into some more complete description. Pace this, such a blended drawing may loose the very perspicuity Baker insists on. Finally, and most critically, seventh, the selection of which sort of drawing an engineer will use is different matter than assessing the accuracy of the drawing that the engineer proffers. Indeed, it is exactly here that purpose-relativity is appropriately considered (Kuusela (2008), 79-81, makes a similar point). An engineer chooses to use a cross-section because she wants to figure out where an interior wall should go whereas she uses an elevated drawing to figure out if the front door is too narrow. In both cases, she selects the sort of diagram she will draw based on her overall project at that time.

Abstracting from this, we can isolate both a target of description as well as a method for description in the PI. Let us take each in turn. For the target, let us follow Gert and assume that what Wittgenstein claims is that "philosophers should describe the description that people give of the things they talk about" (Gert (1997), 226). For PI §291, this seems apposite. Wittgenstein calls our attention not constitutive rules per se, or to ‘possibilities,’ but, rather, to various actual descriptions we can give of a house. Further, this is echoed by the passages concerning “description” given in chapter 7.0. In each case, Wittgenstein does not describe constitutive rules, uses, or possibilities, but, rather, the frameworks by which we describe moods, faces, rooms, and so on. Ergo, Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology targets the frameworks by which we proffer various (first order) descriptions. Let us discuss what a “framework for description” means more carefully.

To begin, a framework for description is the terms or parameters by which I describe a phenomenon. Again, the engineering example is very helpful. A cross section and an elevated drawing both utilize different parameters by which to describe a house. Second, framework for description I select is arbitrary from a metaphysical or logical point of view. In other words, the house does not ‘tell’ the engineer how to describe it. Indeed, though there may be more ‘natural’ descriptions of phenomenon, these are not simply ‘built into’ the phenomenon in question. For example, Spengler describes mathematics not in terms of progressive discovery, novel constructions, truth, necessity, and so on, but “as a historical phenomenon and historical creation” (Hacker (2009 a), 5). Third, the purpose-relative aspects that Wittgenstein stresses

concern exactly this selection of a framework. The terms or parameters I select to describe the house depend on the purposes I have for proffering first order descriptions. Further, critically, my choice of a framework can be "apt," i.e., the framework I select and the purpose I have in mind for proffering descriptions align, or "inapt," i.e., they do not. For example, an interior designer who selects an elevated drawing has made an inapt choice as such a drawing does not present her with the salient features she needs to figure out if a couch is too big for a room, say. Fourth, and in line with the grammatical account (see chapter 4.0a), the framework for description is normative in two senses. One, given a certain framework, an attempted description in that framework's terms can be "correct," i.e., the proffered description and framework match, or "incorrect," i.e., they do not. For example, someone who claims to describe a house in terms of color and then gives us the area of various rooms has offered an incorrect description in that spatial measurements and color are orthogonal. Two, a framework for description is not 'empirical' in that I do not discover it, it does not simply 'arise' from the phenomenon, and so on. However, a framework is also not logical in the TLP's sense as the color exclusion problem, and Wittgenstein's focus on it, shows (e.g., PO 29-35, LWVC 64-66). Rather a framework for description is *normative* in that the interconnections between the terms that make it up are constitutively interdependent. For example, the terms that make up a color framework for description, e.g., "red," "light," "green-ish," "colored," are related in such a way that I can move from "the object is light red," to "the object is red," "the object is not greenish" and so on. Again, I can be "correct" if I my first order description conforms to these normative connections within the framework and "incorrect" if not. Finally, fifth, a framework for description and certain practices interpolate with one another in systematic ways. For example, someone who sets out to describe a room's color may take a color chat but will certainly not take a meter stick. Indeed, the parameters that I select directly determine *how* I measure the phenomenon in question and this selection is *not* trivial.

Granting that Wittgenstein targets these frameworks for description, let us turn to the method he utilizes to describe them. To begin, especially granting that the above account followed the grammatical account in viewing a framework for description as made up of inherently normative terms/concepts and their interrelations, one might expect that Wittgenstein describes the frameworks *directly*- i.e., by citing rules, examining uses, and so on. However, such a direct methodology

faces at least four objections. First, as argued in chapter 7.0, it does not seem confirmed by the PI's use of "description." Second, it runs to risk of setting off a regress. To see this, assume that all descriptions require frameworks for description. Intuitively, the command "describe your room!" can only be done when I, or the orderer, selects some terms/parameters by which to describe the room- e.g., space, furniture, color. Granting this, a description of a framework for description either itself rests on a framework or it does not. If it does, then it seems as though I must also describe this framework for the description of a framework for description of a described x, and so on. If it does not, then we are faced with the same problem we saw with the bare command "describe your room!" I can describe a framework for description by, e.g., examining its historical or genealogical evolution, considering its function, musing on its structure, and so on. A repost here is that what blocks such a regress is the normative status of the rules that constitute the frameworks. However, as argued in section 4.1a, such an account is problematic in that to describe a rule is to change the direction of fit and the rule looses its normative force. If this is so, then the rule just hangs, like a signpost, and does not block the regress (PI § 85). Third, PI § 291 is adamant that descriptions are purpose-relative. Further, PI § 109 is best read as insisting on the same point. If this is so, it becomes unclear how this can be harmonized with the project of *directly* describing constitutive rules as these are not purpose-relative. Finally, fourth, Wittgenstein insists that, when describing language, he "can come up only with externalities about language" (PI §120). This quote, and PI § 120 generally, support the claim that Wittgenstein does not attempt to describe language directly.

Granting that Wittgenstein does not, and perhaps cannot, describe a framework for description directly, let us examine how one might describe them *indirectly.* Specifically, let us examine how an indirect description may relate to "models" or "objects of comparison" (PI § 130 & § 131). I note here that, though I disagree with several aspects of his account, I am following Kuusela (2008), 74-95, in this change to an indirect focus. I also remind the reader that, in chapter 6.3, we followed Williamson, Kuusela, and several others, in seeing, e.g., language-games as models. Granting all this, let us expound what an "indirect descriptive method" is.

To begin, one feature of a model is that it rests on certain stipulative features. For Wittgenstein, and language-games in particular, these stipulative features are stipulated rules that define the game. In turn, and critically, the stipulated rules

Wittgenstein puts forward can *match* the constitutive rules that determine a framework. For example, Wittgenstein notes that Augustine "gives us a particular picture of the essence of human language" (PI § 1). Under this reading, a 'picture' is a framework for description- i.e., the parameters by which Augustine describes language in terms of name/thing correlations. Granting this, and bracketing the complexities at work in PI § 1, Wittgenstein then instructs us to "imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right" (PI § 2) followed by some stipulated rules concerning two individuals and various stones. The point of this imagined language-game is that it *exhibits* the parameters that Augustine's framework relies on to describe language as a model. As it were, Wittgenstein foregrounds the normative interdependencies that determine a framework for description by re-presenting them in the form of simplified games whose stipulative rules match the constitutive rules. Moreover, this way of describing a framework is *indirect* in that, rather than citing the rules or examining the uses of words, Wittgenstein offers us language-games that are designed to reflect the framework.

Notice that such indirect procedure moots the above criticism of direct descriptions. First, Wittgenstein rarely cites rules, notes uses, etc., in the PI exactly because his descriptions are indirect. Indeed, if the indirect account is apposite, we expect to find, and do find, Wittgenstein offering all sorts models with stipulated rules that are meant to reflect the parameters of various frameworks by which we might describe faces, language, and so on. Second, the regress worry is avoided; Wittgenstein has no need to constantly step back onto yet higher levels of descriptions of descriptions. Rather, once the framework is exhibited in a model, we can describe the model in the same way we do anything else. Third, this proffering of models enables exactly the sort of purpose-relativity that Wittgenstein insists "description" as a methodological category has. To see this clearly, notice that Wittgenstein asks "[w]hat is the relation between name and thing named?- Well, what *is* it? Look at language-game (2) <u>or some other one</u>" (PI § 37- underlying mine). This quote implies that one can offer any number of models that indirectly describe Augustine's framework for description. And, indeed, Wittgenstein offers at least two distinct models that indirectly describe Augustine's framework: the primitive-language-game model(s) (e.g., PI § 2, PI § 7) and an ostensive-definition-game (*not* ostensive teaching of words!) model(s) (e.g., PI § 28, § 48). Further, selecting *which* to utilize has to do with the purpose of dissolving philosophical problems as well as the

preconceptions and assumptions that are at work in the audience. For Augustine, as Wittgenstein understands him, the primitive-language-game models are apt in that Augustine is likely to grant the underlying assumptions of the model- i.e., that language is inherently social, that learning/training is key, and that our language community is what correlates names and things. Indeed, by building these assumptions into the primitive-language-games, Wittgenstein is then able to explore them, a point we return to in a moment. By contrast, for the author of the TLP, such a primitive-language-game model is inapt as this author would reject these assumptions- i.e., the author of the TLP is the only language user (TLP 5.62), he has little time for training (TLP 5.632), and the name/thing relation is properly primitive (TLP 3.221 and 3.23). Thus a different model is required to indirectly describe the *same* framework in such a way that it can help dissolve these problems. In sum, describing a framework for description indirectly allows one to construct distinct sorts of models, for different purposes or audiences, to exhibit *the same* framework in different ways. Finally fourth, PI § 120 seems to endorse such an indirect method as such models are 'externalities' about language.

Granting this, let us examine indirect description, and its methodological implications, more carefully. Specifically, I focus on three features of indirect description. These are: (a) first, such a method allows us to explore frameworks for description from *within*; (b) second, such a method helps to check our philosophical bad habit of making over-generalizations and overextensions (cf. BlBK 17); (c) third, and most critically, they make sense of how analogies might work, a point critical for chapter 8. Let us examine each in turn.

(a) First, the use of models allows Wittgenstein to both explore the nature of, and limits to, various frameworks of description internally. To begin, it is imperative to keep in mind that, Augustine "does describe a system of communication; only not just everything that we call language is this system" (PI § 3). Indeed, Wittgenstein further emphasizes that "the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*" (PI § 43) after his seeming assault on this very idea of name/thing correlation. Abstracting a bit from the case of Augustine, we are also told that "[t]he picture [i.e., a particular framework for description] is there; and I do not dispute its *correctness*. But *what* is the application" (PI § 424). In other words, Wittgenstein does not repudiate frameworks for description per se. Instead, he focuses our attention on both phenomenon for which they are innocuous as well as places where their

application becomes inapt or incorrect. Indeed, the enrichment of the primitive-language-game model that occurs from PI § 2 to, say, PI § 18, fulfills both functions. Positively, Wittgenstein's elaborations of the primitive-language-game model help us realize that Augustine's framework does a fine job with proper names, labels we attach to items, and so on. Further, this elaboration clarifies how the parameterization Augustine's framework relies on affects the proffered first order descriptions. Negatively, this process of enrichment of the primitive-language-game brings into focus where the framework is inapt and may be incorrect. For example, it becomes clear that such Augustine's framework for description will struggle with questions (e.g. PI § 6). Thus, by stipulating and elaborating models that indirectly describe frameworks, Wittgenstein can explore the nature of, and limits to, the frameworks indirectly by enriching the model(s) from within.

(b) Second, in turn, indirect description also helps us to check our philosophical bad habit of overgeneralizing or over-extending our frameworks. To begin, if we return to the engineering example of PI § 291, it is quite clear that different diagrams are useful for different purposes. Furthermore, the question of which diagram is 'best' or captures the house's 'essence' are simply misguided in that each diagram can bring certain features of the house into view and occlude others. Finally, for the engineer, this is all very clear in that her diagrams are quite clear about what they can do aptly and inaptly. However, when we turn to describing in philosophy, Wittgenstein notes that we often want to claim that some particular framework for description gives us "the essence of human language" (PI § 1). By constructing and exploring models that exhibit these frameworks, Wittgenstein helps us realize that any given framework for description will be apt for some purposes and inapt for others. In turn, these indirect descriptions should remind us that insisting on some 'essential' framework is rather odd. Notice too that this harmonizes with our discussion in chapter 7 concerning how Wittgenstein reimagines the relationship between logic and language. The framework of logic that describes sentences in terms of propositions (i.e., determinate logical structures), their inferential relations, and so on, is one among other ways to describe language. It is apt for figuring out what follows from what and inapt if we want to know if Jen's attempt to seduce Sally is going well or not.

(c) Finally, and most critically, this use of indirect description can help make sense of analogies in the PI. To see this, consider that "*objects of comparison*…

though similarities and dissimilates… throw light on features of our language" (PI § 130). First, these similarities and dissimilarities work can work in all sorts of ways. For example, I might compare the primitive-language-game model to the ostensive-definition model. In turn, this comparison suggests analogies, based on the two games' similarities, concerning, e.g., how names and things relate, as well as dis-analogies, based on dissimilarities, concerning, e.g., how assuming that the imperative mood is basic and how taking the indicative mood as basic alters all sorts of preconceptions, assumptions, and so on, in telling ways. Alternatively, I may compare the primitive-language-game to particular regions of language. In turn, again, such a comparison helps me analogically understand the role of proper nouns in language as akin to labels stuck on objects in the game. Further, the dissimilates between the primitive-language-game and another region of language, e.g., adverbs or numerals, helps me realize that there are fundamental dis-analogies between names and these uses of language (a point, e.g., Horwich (2012), 1-18, makes with force). We return to the role of analogies at length in chapter 8. For now, it is imperative to notice that, if this picture is correct, Wittgenstein does not normally make (dis-)analogies concerning the individual uses of words but rather between frameworks.

Thus, we have examined what "indirect descriptions" are as well as the methodological uptake of them. Before closing, I want to briefly address two possible mistakes. First, one might take rules, the stipulated rules that define the models or the constitutive rules that determine a framework for description, to be mere heuristic devices. Indeed, Kuusela (2008), 132-140, views rules in this manner. However, such a view suffers from two problems. One, the relationship between a model and a framework is *not* arbitrary in the manner such an account suggests. Indeed, the danger with such a view is that it makes it seem like the relationship between a model and the constitutive rules it reflects are mere inventions of Wittgenstein. In turn, this raises many problems, some of which we discussed in chapter 1.1h. Two, the heuristic view of rules struggles to make sense of incorrectness as we discussed it above. Recall that "incorrect" means that the framework for description and a proffered description conflict with each other in that the later does not rely on, or correctly use, the framework. In turn, this leads to the somewhat awkward situation wherein someone who claims to describe a room in terms of color and then says it is five meters squared cannot be corrected. In both cases, the critical point is that the rules, stipulated or constitutive, are not features that we can simply "drop" (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 249).

Second, one may nevertheless insist that a direct description is a far better way to go. Indeed, such a protestor may claim that, though Wittgenstein does not seem to give direct descriptions in the PI, this has to do with his eccentric style rather than some deep philosophical issue. For example, Hacker (2009 a), 23, seems to have such a view. However, such a view suffers from two philosophical problems, in particular, voiced above. One, it is rather unclear how direct description and purpose-relativity can be harmonized as the likely target of direct description, constitutive rules, belies purpose-relativity. Two, PI § 120 seems exegetically against it.

Thus, we have an interesting account of what Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology in the PI amounts to. Specifically, I have argued that Wittgenstein's target for description in the PI is frameworks for description- i.e., the terms or parameters we rely on when we proffer description. This harmonizes with the grammatical accounts claim that philosophy is properly second order. I have also argued that Wittgenstein's method for description is innovative and unique. Specifically, I have argued that Wittgenstein proffers us indirect descriptions that exhibit the normative features of frameworks for descriptions in models that we can then use as objects of comparison. In closing, it is critical to keep in mind that this account of indirect description has three distinct accuracy conditions. First, there is grammatical relationship between a description of x and the x described. Specifically, a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. Second, there are correctness conditions. These have to do with either a conflict between a framework for description and the proffered first order description or with a misuse of the terms that make up the framework for description when proffering the first order description. Finally, and most critically, there are aptness conditions. These are purpose-relative and depend in part on analogies and similarities, a critical point for chapter 8.

7.2 PI § 109 and Describing in Philosophical Investigation:

With indirect description in view, we can begin to make sense of the opening part of the metaphilosophical aspects of Wittgenstein. In this section, I seek to offer a reading of the first part of PI § 109. I argue that Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy "merely" describes, far from trivializing philosophy or forcing it into an untenable quietism, betokens a fundamental metaphilosophical insight on

Wittgenstein's part. To wit, that "description" is lexically prior to, and critical for, both "explanation" and "interpretation." First, I examine explanation and why it necessarily rests on description. Second, I make similar case for interpretation. Finally, third, I briefly examine some lessons that we should take from these discussions. This paves the way for a proper philosophical investigation and the last chapter of this dissertation.

To begin, the opening of PI 109 claims:

> "It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones… And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All *explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets it light- that is to say its purpose- from the philosophical problems."

Notice, as the italics indicate, Wittgenstein is stressing a contrast between "explanation" and "descriptions." Indeed, this contrastive characterization, and others like it, is what led the rule-based account to discuss “description” the way it did. Regardless, it is clear that Wittgenstein is keen to emphasis, with the TLP (TLP 4.111), that philosophy is different in kind than science and, pursuant to this, that descriptions are different in kind than explanations. However, this still leaves “explanation” somewhat under-defined.

Granting this, a more robust account of “explanation” is required. In most of the secondary literature on this passage, a general consensus has emerged. Such a consensus claims that Wittgenstein’s concept of “explanation” is best thought of as a sort of deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation (for the locus classicus see Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). Hereafter ‘the DN account’). At the most basic level, the DN account claims that to explain a phenomenon is to offer a set of explanantia propositions that include nomic regularities and initial conditions. In turn, these explanantia should allow one to logically deduce the explanandum- a proposition that *describes* the event, state, etc., one aims to explain. Thus, an explanation is a logical relationship such that the explanandum is shown to be a deductive consequence of the explanantia. As it were, I explain a phenomenon by showing that it is a logically follows from ‘natural law’ and ‘initial conditions.’ Though it is unclear to me if imputing the DN account to Wittgenstein is apropos, especially given later Wittgenstein’s admittedly inchoate though deeply interesting reflections on the important role of causality in science and life (e.g., PO p. 371-426;

PI § 89), let us accept the conventional wisdom. In other words, I assume that by the term "explanation" in PI § 109 is best interpreted in terms of the DN account.

In turn, it is critical to notice that the explanandum I aim to explain *is not* and *cannot be* a phenomenon in the world. Rather, it is a propositional description of the phenomenon. Thus, "[by] explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (*not that phenomenon itself*)" (Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), 137- emphasis mine). Without this seemingly innocuous note, the DN account's reliance on deduction becomes rather hard to make sense of as worldly stuff does not readily lend itself to logical deductions. However, this raises the question of *how* we are to describe the phenomenon in such a way that we get a explanandum proposition. Further, this question is pressing in terms of both normal scientific research *and* in light of our discussions in the above sections. It is pressing in normal scientific research as selecting the parameters I rely on to describe phenomena is often devilishly hard.

Granting this question, I argue that describing the phenomenon so that it is expressed in an explanandum neither readily reduce to more DN style explanations nor can be simply taken as a given. It does not reduce to more DN style explanations because, as discussed in the last section, descriptions are *arbitrary* from both an empirical and a logical perspective (also see, e.g., PI § 497). Granting this, it is difficult to know how one could derive a description. The explanandum cannot simply be taken at face value because, again as discussed in the last section, "description" is, in reality, quite complex and we can not simply assume are in order. Further, from a scientific perspective, selecting the proper parameters by which to describe a phenomenon does not readily reduce to algorithms, is not something that the phenomenon 'tells' me, and so on. Thus, the DN account presupposes that we have an explanandum (a description of a phenomenon) and can neither derive this description nor should it be taken for granted.

Thus, the DN account of explanation depends on having a description of the phenomenon it targets and cannot account for this description by proffering more DN style explanations. Critically, it follows that description is critical for DN style explanation and it cannot itself be explained in the DN style. In turn, this means that Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy "merely" describes is him putting first things first. Pursuant to this, our discussion in the previous sections can easily suggest various ways to explore how one might describe the phenomenon one wants to

explain. Specifically, one should ensure that the description one relies on is true in that if a description of x being y is false as x is not y, clearly explanation miscarries- e.g., trying to explain why a sample is x* C STP when it is y* C STP clearly goes wrong. One should also ensure that the descriptions are correct in that one does not misuse the parameters that make up a framework to draw absurd conclusions- e.g., that the sample has a boiling point of 120* C STP and that x is boiling at 90* C STP- or rely on a framework for description and then proffer first order descriptions that run against it- e.g., to claim to describe a sample's temperature by discussing how it affects one's mood. Finally, and most critically, the description must be apt. This point, in particular, is critical as selecting the framework for description is deeply important for how the DN style explanation unfolds. In all cases, it is quite clear that Wittgenstein is right to insist that description is different in kind than, and lexically prior to, DN style explanation. In turn, this sets the stage for philosophical investigations as DN style explanation, and science generally, just cannot help us here. Regardless, it is also interesting to note that this seemingly trivial note about description being first is critical for philosophy of explanation today. Thus, if Wittgenstein is correct, it is neither "no explanation without understanding" (cf. e.g., de Regt abd Dieks (2005) *nor* is it "no understanding without explanation" (cf. e.g., Strevens (2013)). Rather, it is that we can have neither with description!

Turning to interpretation, matters are *strikingly* similar. To begin, by "interpretation" I mean a sort of inquiry that engenders "Verstehen." Thus, a hermeneutical approach to a text, the ethnographic methods anthropologists rely on, and so on, all count as "interpretation" and are meant to engender some sort of appreciation for the meaning of a practice, a text, and so on. Further, let us accept the idea that this sort of inquiry is distinct from, cannot reduce to, and so on, DN style explanation (e.g., Taylor (1971)). Granting this, one might expect that our discussion of description and explanation have little to do with how description and interpretation relate.

However, I argue that this is not so. To begin, as with the DN style explanation, it is clear that interpretation as practiced by historians, anthropologists, and so on, relies on describing foreign practices, different times, and so on. Furthermore, these descriptions are almost always done in terms of language. Granting this, I argue that the descriptions that an interpreter relies on to put forward her interpretation cannot, themselves, be reduced to interpretations. This is for two

main reasons. One, the grammar of "interpretation" is best construed as interpretation of x presupposes an x that is independent of the interpretation. Bracketing some niceties, this raises the question of the status of the x. It is clear that if the x is itself another interpretation, then a regress comes into view as each interpretation grammatical demands some other 'thing' that it interprets. Pursuant to this, the most likely regress stopper is that x is a *description* of the practice, period, etc., in question. And, indeed, this seems correct as an anthropologist can only interpret the meaning of a practice once she's described it, say. Further, to accuse an anthropologist of misinterpreting a practice often merely shows allegiance to a different interpretive approach whereas to accuse her of misdescribing a practice depends on the critic also observing the tribe. Two the attempt to assimilate "description" into "interpretation" engenders a sort of 'postmodern' semantic skepticism wherein the token marks on a page can be read/interpreted in any way one pleases. Indeed, "there is no outside-text" (Derrida (1976), 220).[111] In both cases, interpretation, as with DN style explanation, presupposes description and cannot account for it in 'internal' terms.

Further, again, our discussion of indirect descriptions above can offer some helpful guidance of how description works. Specifically, for a description to engender interpretation, the description must be true of the text, practice, etc., described as clearly if an interpretation of tribe imputes to them a practice they lack, the interpretation is false. Second, it must be correct in that selecting a framework for description that assumes a 'tribes' behavior is rational and than proffering descriptions that make their practices appear mad is incorrect (cf. PO p. 125). Finally, a description must be apt for a particular interpretive purpose. If I select a proto-scientific framework for description- i.e., one that emphasizing causes, hypotheses, and so on- and then apply it to magic, things may become problematic (Winch (1964) makes a similar point).

Thus, we see that both the DN style explanation and interpretation as Verstehen presuppose description to get off the ground. If this is so and both interpretation and DN explanation assume and cannot account for "description," then

[111] Deploying this quote in this fashion is admittedly quite unfair of me. Specifically, what Derrida has in mind with this quote, as the passage makes clear, are patterns of inferential and deductive relationships that only make sense within linguistic/logical systems. His claim, at its most basic, is that 'support' 'follow from' etc. are *only* senseful within language/logic and that, pursuant to this, the idea that 'facts say that…,' 'the evidence (on its own as a magical worldly object) supports…,' etc., are absurdities. His criticism of 'logocentrism' is, further, best read in this light. Regardless, both Derrida's apologists and his critics tend to read the quote in the manner I use it above.

a focus on description, far from being some unfair and crippling stricture on philosophy, is giving philosophy pride of place. Indeed, Wittgenstein's note that "[t]he name 'philosophy' might also be given to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions" (PI § 126) is best read in this light. What "philosophy puts… before us" (*ibid*) are, among other things, the available frameworks for description we have and that can proffer various first order descriptions.

In closing, notice that if this account of "description" as being lexically prior to both DN style explanation and interpretation, then Wittgenstein has not forced philosophy into a sort uncomfortable quietism. Nor, even more importantly, has he set out the destroy philosophy by showing it to be nonsense, irrational, etc. Rather, he has helped us come to realize what philosophy can fruitfully do. Philosophy can describe. And given that description is bedrock for explanation and interpretation, such a task is of paramount importance. Furthermore, given that neither explanation nor interpretation can reduce description to themselves, a radically new sort of inquiry, a *philosophical investigation* that is different in kind than physics, anthropology, and so on, is demanded. It is to this we turn, at last.

7.3 Conclusion:

This chapter has discussed Wittgenstein's characterization of "description" within his philosophical investigations. First, we noted that two attempts to characterize "description" in Wittgenstein go wrong for various reasons. We then examined Wittgenstein's indirect method of describing our frameworks for description. Finally, we closed by noting that this characterization, far from diminishing philosophy, may give it a critical role. In turn, this sets the stage for the last chapter.

8 Chapter 8: Later Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy: Finding Homes for Words:

In chapter six, we argued that Wittgenstein's reimagining of the relationship between language and logic is best understood as Wittgenstein endorsing a far more pragmatic account of representation. In effect, for later Wittgenstein, a sentence does not simply have a determinate logical structure that is constituted by a logical isomorphism with a possible fact. Instead, a logician represents a sentence as having such a structure for particular purposes. In chapter seven, refined this pragmatic account by examining how it affects later Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology. In effect, the TLP assumed that description is a form of depiction that, again, constitutively depends on a determinate logical structure. In contrast, later Wittgenstein is keen to emphasize the heterogeneity and purpose-relativity of things we count as "descriptions." Pursuant to this, later Wittgenstein also focused on exhibiting in models various frameworks for description under which we offer descriptions as well as their structures, limitations, and interconnections.

With these points clearly in view, we now turn to later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy. Specifically, I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, as for earlier Wittgenstein, the verb, "to philosophize," should be given pride of place and that this verb is an accomplishment verb whose 'internal' result is clarity (now understood as 'perspicuity'). In other words, for later Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a research program, a mental illness, bad rhetoric, an irrational attempt to do science badly, or a high-powered version of connective analysis. Instead, philosophy is a set of methods designed to help us understand each other and ourselves. Succinctly, I argue that philosophy is conceptually connected to understanding in such a way philosophizing (when it succeeds) engenders perspicacious understanding- i.e., an understanding that enables us to see connections in a sense we develop further over the course of this chapter.

First, I set the stage. I return to the TLP and discuss how earlier Wittgenstein's preconceptions lead him to view semantic content as a picture of a possible fact. Second, I discuss how later Wittgenstein problematizes this account as well as how this leads him to reconsider the relationship between meaning and understanding (see also .g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 357-86). Third, I examine Wittgenstein's new

conception of "understanding." I argue that, for Wittgenstein, it is inherently polysemic (PI § 531) and briefly discuss various aspects of it. I focus, in particular, on "understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'" (PI § 122) and link it to (dis-)analogies and (dis-)similarities as discussed in chapter 7.1. With all this in view, fourth, I proffer an account of what "philosophical investigations" is for later Wittgenstein as well as how it functions. Finally, fifth, I offer a close reading of PI § 133. Specifically, I argue that the peace Wittgenstein seeks for philosophy is not the peace of the dead but a peace from a certain set of scientistic demands. In turn, if my arguments are plausible, then for later Wittgenstein, understanding perspicuously is simply the end-result of philosophical investigation (when it succeeds) and such investigations are critical to ensuring that we can make sense of each other and ourselves.

8.0 Semantic Content, Picturing Facts, and the Pneuma of Understanding:

This section proffers an account of how the TLP conceptualizes the semantic content of various sentences. First, I proffer a nuts-and-bolts discussion of the basic account of semantic content at work in the TLP. Second, I argue that this account of the semantic content of sentences engenders a "pneumatic conception of thinking" (PI § 109)- i.e., a very particular conception of how meaning and understanding relates. Finally, third, I examine how this picture account of semantic content and pneumatic thinking affects earlier Wittgenstein's overall conception of language.

To begin, it is quite clear that, for earlier Wittgenstein, the semantic content of a sentence is best thought of as a picture of a possible fact. Indeed, "[a] proposition [or sentence as "Satz" can mean either] is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having its sense explained to me" (TLP 4.021). Furthermore, "[w]e picture facts to ourselves" (TLP 2.1), such a picture is "a model of reality" (TLP 2.12) and such a picture "can depict any reality whose form it has" (TLP 2.17). In turn, we can see that the meaning of a sentence is the picture of a possible fact that the sentence displays (TLP 2.127). More formally, the meaning of a sentence is constitutively dependent on its sharing a determinate logical structure with a possible fact and a correlation between elements of the sentence and elements of the possible fact (see

chapter 5.1 and 5.2 for the full account). Notice that this account of the semantic content of a sentence as a picture, naturally leads one to a certain preconception about how meaning and understanding relate. To wit, to understand what a sentence means is to 'see' or 'grasp' the picture that the sentence displays (e.g., TLP 2.172). Thus, "if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents" (TLP 4.021). However, it is critical to keep in mind that the represented situation, the picture, need not depict a fact that actually obtains (TLP 2.22). This is because the structure of the picture and the structure of the possible fact arise from concatenated 'objects' or simple names and, though the 'objects' and simple names must always already exist and connect (TLP 2.022), their configurations with each other can and do change in all sorts of ways (cf. e.g., Glock (2006), for a similar account).

In turn, I argue that this preconception concerning semantic content and understanding is, at least in part, what later Wittgenstein calls the "pneumatic conception of thinking" (PI § 109). To begin, Schulte (2006), after a very careful set of exegetical arguments, notes that the most plausible interpretation of "pneumatic conception of thinking" is " a conception according to which thought obeys the directions enshrined in the crystalline structure of the scaffolding of rules inherent in our language. And the directions implicit in the structure can be obeyed by thought because it itself participates in the same substance as the logical structure of thought" (54). Notice, first, that Schulte's interpretation makes good sense of the placement of PI § 109 in the PI. Later Wittgenstein has just finished "turning our whole inquiry around" (PI § 108) by radically reformulating the way logic and language relate (see chapter 6.2). Granting this, we should expect to find, and we do find, one of Wittgenstein's key concerns in PI § 109- § 133 to be excising the remaining ghosts of the TLP and trying to focus our view not on preconceptions about how language *must* be, but on how it actually *is* (e.g., PI § 116).

Second, and further following Schulte, let us link his interpretation to "'[l]angague (or thinking) is something unique'- this proves to be a superstations (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems" (PI § 110). To begin, it is imperative to realize, especially given that Wittgenstein tends to use the word "superstition" for accounts that go wrong by mistaking their way of describing something as *the* way to describe it (cf., e.g., PO p. 129, CV p. 57), that later Wittgenstein thinks aspects of the TLP's account of semantics get something right. We return to this in chapter 8.2.

Two, notice that Wittgenstein explicitly links “thinking” and “language” together in a manner that further supports Schulte’s reading. Whatever pneuma Wittgenstein aims to expel, it seems to haunt (public) language as much as thought. Finally, three, the retreat Wittgenstein speaks of, it seems to me, is best thought of a withdrawal into “the mind… [as] conceived as a queer medium, and the mechanism of the mind, which we do not quite understand, can effect remarkable things, by means of thinking” (Baker & Hacker (2005), 247). In other words, the super-concreteness of the TLP’s logical isomorphism, the earlier Wittgenstein’s denial that thinking is some sort psychic event (e.g., NB p. 80e, TLP 5.631), and so on, all collapse in a last ditch effort to place the thinker at the center of the picture, as the person who, by her own magical actions, coordinates the isomorphism. Suffice it to say, this picture comes under heavy fire throughout the PI.

In turn, third, we can fully articulate what the “pneumatic conception of thinking” is for later Wittgenstein as well as how “understanding” worked for earlier Wittgenstein. To see it, recall that, for later Wittgenstein, the superstition concerning the uniqueness of thought is that "[t]hought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each" (PI § 95). Critically, this is exactly how the TLP links together meaning and understanding. Language, meaning, thought, and the world, all stand together in a grand and pre-established harmonic determinate logical structure. And one can understand a sentence’s semantic content precisely because the psychic elements in my head (or wherever) “participant in” the same logical structure that allows a sentence to display its logical picture, and ‘objects’ to concatenate thus-and-so. Logic is constitutive of thought, language, meaning, and the world, in equal measure. All are, from a logical point of view, governed by the same structures and to “understand” is simply to have one structure align with the others. It is exactly for this reason that “we understand the sense of a propositional sign without its having been explained to us” (TLP 4.02). Hence, the pneumatic conception of thinking claims, among other things, that to understand is to see the picture, which is to say the semantic content, a sentence displays. To ‘see’ means that the structure in my head (or wherever) and the structure in the sentence and the structure in the world align and a projection occurs.

In closing, notice that this picture account of semantic content, and the pneumatic conception of thinking, effects how earlier Wittgenstein understands

language as a whole. To begin, Wittgenstein claims that "[t]he totality of propositions is language" (TLP 4.001). This claim has several implications. First, it takes for granted that the sole function of language is representing possible facts (e.g., TLP 4.5). Pursuant to this, uses of language that seem to do different work must either be assimilated to this picturing use or else discarded as nonsense. For example, "[w]hen the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does not exist" (TLP 6.5) seems to presage some work in philosophy of language that aims to show that a meaningful question depends on the range of possible answers that address them properly. Second, the use of "totality" is important. Granting Wittgenstein's metaphysical atomism and his insistence on the radical independence of facts from one another (e.g., TLP 2.0122, TLP 6.37), totality is best understood as an indifferent collection. In other words, the elementary sentences that make up a given natural language have no non-logical relationships with one another (e.g., TLP 4.001. Hacker (1986), 108-113, notes that this explains why the color-exclusion problem was so devastating for the TLP). Third, pursuant to this, a complex sentence can always be shown to reduce to elementary sentences put together with truth-functional operators (Horwich (2012), 84-88, outlines this). Fourth, the semantic content of an elementary sentence can be understood without any knowledge of the other sentences that make up the language. Indeed, the possible fact-semantic content relationship is such that a more comprehensive knowledge of language is irrelevant Finally, fifth, this leaves the nature of semantic content in a somewhat precarious position. Perhaps this can most clearly be seen in the TLP's instability concerning what symbols and signs are (e.g., Glock (1996 c), 345-47, notes the amount of intricate work earlier Wittgenstein tried to get this distinction to do). Indeed, the relationship between a token (marks or sound-waves), a sign (the abstraction logical-combinatorial possibilities), a symbol (form and content (e.g., TLP 3.31)), a type, and semantics are somewhat difficult to account for in the TLP fully.[112]

In sum, semantic content of an elementary sentence is the ‘picture’ that the sentence presents me with. I can understand this picture, and so know what the elementary sentence means, without any knowledge of other sentences in the language, the states-of-affairs that really obtain, and so on. Further, this account

[112] The reader may object that tokens and types play no role whatever in the TLP. This is undoubtedly true but, it seems to me, is grits to my mill as Wittgenstein appears to use, e.g., a sign to be both a token (e.g., TLP 3.32) and a sort of logical abstraction (e.g., TLP 3.362).

implies that "understanding" is best thought of as "grasping" or "being shown" an already-given picture.[113] And it is this partly account for what a pneumatic conception of thinking is. As it were, the 'breath' that allows for the creation of possible facts also allows for the creation the picture a sentence displays, and the creation of thought and understanding in my head. Indeed, "to understand" is just an alignment of all these.

8.1 Reified Pictures and Pneumatic Problems:

With this account in view, part of what PI § 109- § 132 aims to do is expel this "pneumatic conception of thinking" (PI § 109). First, I rationally reconstruct three attacks from the later Wittgenstein that show that the pneumatic conception of thinking, and the picture account of semantic content and understanding it rests on, are deeply problematic. Second, I examine how later Wittgenstein begins to drastically alter his concept of "understanding," and, as we shall see, what "meaning" is as well. As we shall see, he begins to refocus on language as a "spatial and temporal phenomenon" (PI § 108) and tries to clarify how we use and ascribe "understanding" rather than rely on preconceptions of how it *must* be.

To begin, recall that the pneumatic conception is a view wherein understanding a sentence is seeing the possible fact it pictures. Granting this, later Wittgenstein launches three interrelated attacks on this conception. These are: (a) an attack on how such a picture and a sentence in a natural language can be align; (b) a discussion of how we access such a picture in the first place; (c) an insistence that we turn back to the real "workings of our language" (PI § 109) rather than an effervescent cloud of determinate logical structure. Let us take each in turn.

(a) First, Wittgenstein notes that this superstition of pneumatic thinking suggests that "it's not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow one can buy with it" (PI § 120). Notice that this quote harks back to the odd position of semantics in the TLP. Indeed,

[113] Clearly "grasp" is Frege's metaphor (Frege (1979 [around 1879]), 2-8). I follow him, rather than Wittgenstein, because I want to avoid heated debates about what "showing" is in the TLP. Regardless, in both case, the point is that the semantic content of an utterance is something that is independent of both us and language and that our relationship to it is akin to our relationship to rocks.

earlier Wittgenstein seemed to want a sign to be both the same as a token (e.g., marks) and different from a token (e.g., a logical abstraction with combinatorial possibilities). From here, it seems that the quote implicitly brings into play three intertwined criticisms of such an account. One, later Wittgenstein is keen to emphasize that the relationship between the word and the meaning is terribly unclear on the TLP's account. Indeed, such an account seems to imply that "the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use" (PI § 117; also see PI § 549). In turn, it becomes hard to know either how words manage to carry this aura with them or how we manage to glean it from mere token physical marks or sounds. This is made worse by later Wittgenstein's assault on the supposed denotation relationship between a name and an ‘object,' discussed in chapter 6.0. Two, pursuant to this, there is a lurking category mistake here. Indeed, the claim that a word is both the same and different from, its meaning, speaks to this. Further, trying to get the token-marks-or-sounds and the meaning together seems to be an outstanding problem. Three, pursuant to this, there is a real temptation to try to posit some sort of third x to mediate dead signs and live meanings (cf. PI § 432). Indeed, philosophers have posited many such x's- e.g., mind or intention; an abstract realm that we access; particular theories of reference; behavioral conditioning; and so on. Much of the firepower of the PI is directed at showing that each of these x's has intractable problems and cannot do the work we require- i.e. cannot align token marks and ghostly meanings. Thus, the first criticism of the pneumatic way of aligning understanding and meaning is that it leads one to impute shadowy meanings to concrete tokens.

(b) Second, Wittgenstein notes that such a reified account of semantics most naturally lends itself to the thought in "Tractatus Logico-Pilosophicus (4.5): ‘The general form of a proposition is: this is how things are.'--… One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (PI § 115). This harmonizes with the work done in chapter 6.1. However, it also brings into play other parts of the PI- specifically PI § 22- § 24 and Wittgenstein’s attack on the TLP's preconception that assertoric force ‘wears the pants.' To begin, Wittgenstein claims that "Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted [i.e., a what-is-said sentence-radical- PI § 22 box], really rests on the possibility, found in our language, of writing every assertoric sentence in the form ‘It is asserted that such-and-such is

the case.'" (PI § 22). However, Wittgenstein argues there is a deep dilemma here concerning what this sentence-radical really amounts to. On the one hand, one might assume that a sentence-radical is bereft of any force operator. Such an assumption, in turn, gives us a very simple way to explain what is common to, e.g., 'the window is closed' and 'is the window closed?' To wit, they both share the sentence-radical *that-the-window-is-closed*. However, such an assumption clearly implies that "the assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting (assigning truth-values or something of the kind)" (*ibid*). In turn, this raises three problems. One, it is unclear what we entertain before we assert as the parenthetical comment implies. Indeed, if the sentence-radical only becomes truth-apt when it has been asserted, and one assumes that truth-conditions and semantic content are deeply intertwined, then it becomes opaque what it is we entertain before we assert. Moreover, Wittgenstein's discussion of the boxer picture (PI § 22-box) furthers this point. The picture of the boxer can show us: how a particular man stood; how boxers generally stand; how one should stand; etc. Two, as Wittgenstein's comments on music emphasize, it may betoken a category mistake where the tone of my voice makes a logical difference. Three, the sentence-radical that-p clause is "*not* a sentence in our language- it is not yet a *move* in the language game" (PI § 22). Again, this raises the question of what the sentence-radical is and how we can do anything with it independently of various forces.

On the other hand, one might insist that the assertoric force is, somehow, inherent in the sentence-radical and that other forces derive from or modify it. As noted above, this seems to be the way the TLP attempted to go. To this Wittgenstein retorts that "it is possible to substitute the usual form of a question the form of a statement or description: 'I want to know whether' or 'I am in doubt whether…'-but this does not bring the different language games any closer together" (PI § 24). Specifically, what such a paraphrase loses is exactly the force that a question has. To say "I am wondering when John will come" is just as easily understood as a report on my psychology as an inquiry about John's arrival. And Wittgenstein is now quick to emphasize that simply assuming that one knows the force begs the question. Further, pursuant to this, he also insists that paraphrases cut both ways. Thus "[w]e might very well also write every assertion in the form of a question followed by an affirmative expression" (PI § 22). Thus, we might paraphrase the sentence "John is coming at 6" with "Is John coming at 6? Yes!" Thus, another critical problem of the pneumatic

conception of thinking is that that the picture the sentence supposedly already has is rather hard to bring into view, let alone understand-by-grasping it.

The third criticism of the pneumatic conception of thinking is gleaned from Wittgenstein claim that "[p]hilosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our intelligence *by [durch] means of* our language" (PI § 109-emphasis mine. Anscombe's translation). It is critical to ask what the role of language is here and how to understand "by." One reading would see the bewitchment of our understanding as caused by language. In other words, it would translate "durch" as something like "owing to" or "at the hands of." In turn, this would render the PI deeply harmonious with Frege (1997), 50, who claims that "it is the task of philosophy to *break the power of words* over the human mind, by uncovering the illusions that *through the use of language* often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations of concepts, by *freeing* thought from the *taint of ordinary linguistic means of expression*" (emphasis mine). However, though I think this quotation from the PI is meant to call to mind this passage in Frege, it is clear that such a reading is not viable. Indeed, such a reading is precisely a pneumatic conception of thinking that insists that the semantics content of a sentence, the picture, is at once different from the ordinary linguistic media we use to express them and, somehow, embedded in them at a 'deeper' level. Further, this sort of account leads to a profound prevarication, seen in the TLP, concerning the nature of semantic content. On the one hand, the TLP seems to want natural language to be essential for semantics (e.g., TLP 5.5563). On the other, it seems to want natural language to be the source of confusion about the real semantic content of natural language expressions (e.g., TLP 3.323 & 3.324).

The alternative emphasizes that "durch" is best translated as "by means of" or "by the use of." Indeed, Hacker and Schulte's slight modification of Anscombe's original translation- i.e. "[p]hilosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language"- emphasizes this. In turn, this means that expelling the pneumatic conception of thought is best accomplished by careful examination of actual language and its uses. In effect, we combat confusion not by 'escaping language' but by scrutinizing how language actually works. In turn, this harmonizes both with the above criticism as well as the work done in chapter 6. Wittgenstein insists that to understand semantic content, we examine the actual use of language rather than our preconceptions about how language must be.

Metaphorically, we expel the pneumatic conception of thought by examining the solid and open-to-view "working of our language" (PI § 109).

In turn, this insistence on the workings of our language changes later Wittgenstein's conception of meaning. As conventional wisdom has it, Wittgenstein ceases to think of meaning as a logical picture that we grasp by a sort of pre-established harmony and begins to relate meaning to use (e.g., PI § 43 for the most famous account). In other words, the semantic content of a sentence is not due to some picturing relationship between it and a possible fact, but due to the role that the expression plays in a language game. What "breathes meaning" into dead signs is their use (e.g., PI § 432). In turn, to understand a sentence is to grasp, not its picture, but its concrete use. Indeed, as Schulte rightly emphasizes, "[u]nderstanding is not a pneumatic process [in the PI and related]: it is not dependent on partaking in the substance of a logical structure" (Shulte (2006), 47). In other words, to understanding is to learn the correct use of a sentence. Thus, in the form of a truism, to know what an expression means is to understand it and to understand an expression is to know what it means. Notice further, that such an account explicitly rejects the TLP's insistence that a language is simply a sum of indifferent propositions that have no non-logical relationships with one another. Rather, a language becomes an interconnected network of roles that various words have in virtue of their uses and these uses interpolate with each other both at a practical level and conceptually. In other words, far from being able to grasp a proposition in splendid isolation from everything else in the language and life, later Wittgenstein insists that "[t]o understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique" (PI §199).

In sum, later Wittgenstein attacks the picture account of semantic content and the pneumatic account of thinking the TLP along three lines. First, he notes that it becomes unclear how token marks or sounds and ghostly meanings relate. Second, he notes that the preconception that assertoric force is somehow basic is deeply problematic. Third, he notes that, much as the TLP's account of the philosophy of logic, the TLP's account of semantics insists that language, semantic content, and understanding, must be one way rather than another, in a manner that is wholly unjustified. In turn, later Wittgenstein insists that adequately accounting for the meanings of various expressions relies on understanding the roles that various expressions play in life and language. Understanding is, thus, critical. However, we

have left it under defined. It is to this we now turn. I should note here, in keeping with the spirit of Wittgenstein, I attempt to examine "understanding" not, in the first instance, philosophically, but practically. In other words, I try to bring into view the medley of interconnected ways we use, deploy, and ascribe "understanding" as we go along in our lives.

8.2 Understanding(s):

In the last section, we discussed how later Wittgenstein repudiates the TLP's conception of semantic content as a picture that we simply grasp. We further noted that later Wittgenstein begins to reimagine the nature of semantics by insisting that meaning and understanding are conceptually connected in a fundamentally different way. However, we left "understanding" rather undefined. This section examines "understanding" and various interrelationships at work in it.

In this section, first, I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, "understanding" is an inherently polysemic term/concept that cannot be reduced to a single concept.[114] By "polysemic term/concept" I mean that the term/concept brings into play distinct, though fundamentally related, senses that interdepend with each other in various ways. Granting this, second, I heuristically distinguish[115] between three different senses of "understanding." These are: (1) understanding as grasping combinations; (2) understanding as a technique; (3) understanding as seeing connection. I elaborate each sense of understanding in turn as we go. I note here that, I focus, in particular, in distinguishing (2) from (3) and examining (3) in its own right. I focus on (3) because later Wittgenstein it is "of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters" (PI § 122). Thus, clarifying understanding as seeing connections is critical for making sense of Wittgenstein's conception of the role of philosophy and the nature of philosophical investigation.

To begin, "understanding" in the later Wittgenstein is used in a fairly diverse set of ways. Indeed, Wittgenstein notes that "[w]e may speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but

[114] A reader might wonder if the term is, therefore, a family rebalance concept. Though an interesting question, I do not explore it here.
[115] It is *critical* to keep in mind that such a distinction is heuristic. In point of fact, I do think that, to varying degrees, each 'sub-type' of understanding is required in varying degrees to make sense of our ascription practices. Circumspect readers must keep this in mind.

also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other" (PI § 531). He further notes that "[t]hen has ‘understanding' two different meanings here? – I would rather say that these two kinds of use of ‘understanding' make up my concept of understanding. For I want to apply ‘understanding' to all this" (PI § 532). Thus, Wittgenstein fairly clearly endorses a polysemic account of "understanding" that sees the concept as having several interrelated senses. Further, it seems that these quotes have deep resonance with PI II xi and Wittgenstein's somewhat inchoate exploration of ‘meaning blindness,' ‘second sense,' etc., as Mulhall (2001), 163-182, rightly notes.

Granting this gloss on "understanding" as a polysemic concept, let us, as much as possible, separate out various strands that make it up to help further comprehend it. Recall that there are three that interest us.

(1) The first sense of understanding is understanding as grasping combinations. Though a reductive account of understanding based solely on the grasping the semantics content of individual terms, their various contributions to the meaning of an expression, and various combinations, is off the table, it does play a critical role when properly reformulated in terms of a minimalist account of compositionality.[116] For example, Wittgenstein emphasizes that "the combination ‘milk me sugar'… [is not] an order to stare at me and gape, even if that was precisely the effect I wanted to produce" (PI § 498). In other words, part of understanding an expression relies on understanding the meanings of the individual words as well as their combination and the various semantic contributions they make to the whole expression. "Milk me sugar" does not mean STARE AT ME AND GASP, even if that is what I want the person to do. Further, as noted in section 8.0 and hinted at in section 8.1, this accounts for why the TLP’s conception of understanding as grasping is a superstition, *not* a mistake. Clearly the fact that understanding relies, at least partly, on knowing what words mean and how they connect up properly, is a fairly open to view feature of our lives with language. The superstition is inflation.

(2) The second sense of understanding is understanding as a technique (e.g., PI § 150). In this key, and as discussed in chapter 4.0 at length, to understand an expression is to know the correct use of an expression as determined by a set of interdependent constitutive rules that make up the language-game or ‘grammar' of some part of language or other and determine the meaning of the expression. Further,

[116] Horwich (1998 b), 143-83, offers a powerful articulation of this approach.

understanding as a technique should also enable one to correct deviant behavior, intentionally follow the rule in question, cite the rule as a justification for an action, linguistically-explain the expression by inculcating someone into the game, and so on. Indeed, in this case, to understand is akin to an ability (*ibid*). Thus, much like understanding calculus is being able to integrate expressions, so too understanding language is being able to speak and respond to it properly. Further, as Hacker and Glock, often and rightly point out, this means that language is far more than an indifferent collection of individual propositions. Indeed, Wittgenstein's note that "[w]hen philosophers use a word… and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?" (PI § 116), in part brings precisely this fact into play. The meaning of a word is its role in a language-game, and that game is determined by a set of interdependent constitutive rules that make it up. Reminding us that a word is not being used according to these rules is a powerful corrective to some philosophical misconceptions in that it attempts to remind us that meaning, far from being a sort of shadow words carry with them, is a ramification of words having set and normative uses. A horse-shaped-token without a game of chess can be anything or nothing, it is only within the context of a game of chess that it can function as a knight (cf., PI § 6). In sum, the meaning of an expression is determined by constitutive rules that determine its correct use. We understand as a technique the meaning of an expression by being able to use, respond to, etc., an expression following these rules.

However, it is critical to realize, I argue, that understanding as a technique is not the end of the story. This is because understanding as a technique relies on particular frameworks for description and determining if some framework for description is apt is a different task than ascribing understanding as a technique, learning the abilities it relies on, and so on. To bring this into view, consider that the criteria for ascribing understanding as a technique are: the ability to conform one's use of an expression to a shared correct use; the ability, based on the shared correct use, to correct solecisms; and the ability to linguistically-explain the meaning of an expression to someone that relies on shared correct use. Further, it is often also assumed that the shared correct use is established and maintained by the normative practices of a community, a point made in chapter 4.0c. Finally, also assume that the internal connections that obtain between, e.g., meaning and understanding as a technique, shared correct use and normative practices, and so on, are "*de dicto*, i.e.,

they depend on how we describe things…. To insist on internal relations does not introduce any mysterious, supernatural phenomena. Internal relations… are effected by our normative practice- the fact that we introduce, teach and explain standards of correctness, and criticize or justify performance by reference to them" (Glock (1996 b), 162-63). Hence, ascribing understanding as a technique rests on shared correct uses that are established and maintained by normative practices and discerning these practices and shared uses is a description-sensitive matter.[117] In other words, understanding as a technique requires that the first order descriptions that are proffered rely on very particular frameworks for description that can bring these normative practices into view.

Granting this, it is clear we need some principled way to determine if a framework for description is apt, as defined in chapter 7.1. Further, a framework being apt is neither simply the phenomenon 'just tells' me nor is it a trivial matter. Let us, ergo, focus, precisely, on the aptness of a framework. Recall from chapter 7.2, that a framework for description is apt or inapt relative to a purpose, background context, audience, and so on. In turn, it is critical to notice that several features that determine the aptness of a framework for description are not readily incorporated into understanding as a technique. First, as noted at several points before, whereas understanding as a technique is not purpose-relative, clearly aptness is. Second, granting that a type-expression can shift between reflecting a constitutive rule for the meaning of a term and being a coterminous 'symptom' of the use (e.g. Glock (1996 a), 209-217), an apt framework should give us a way to "distinguish between the essential and inessential rules in a game to" (PI § 564). Further, an apt framework does so by emphasizing "not only rules but also *a point*" (*ibid*). In this key, Wittgenstein himself insists on a distinction between rules and point. Third, pursuant to this and noting Wittgenstein's use of the indefinite article, "a point," various frameworks for description ascribe to games different points. Fourth, relatedly, as both von Wright (1971), 132-35, and Winch (1958), 40-65, note, for descriptions concerning agentive behavior, the same practice, event, utterance, etc., can be described under orthogonal frameworks for description that discern different sorts of conceptual interconnections, emphasis different normative features, and so on, given

[117] This harmonizes with Anscombe (2000), e.g., 84-89, and (1979). Ford (2011) offers a careful reading along similar lines.

ascription of different points. In other words, changing our conception of a point of a practice alters the sorts normative features we focus on. Finally, fifth, as Mulhall notes "his behavior, [i.e., a Crusoe we stumble on in isolation who is marking his hut with arabesque patterns] might… be mapped onto an endless list of different kinds of activity- perhaps the floor pattern is a short-hand record, and the wall markings a more elaborate transcription, of his hunting successes and failures, or perhaps the of a sonnet sequence composed on his previous trip across the island; or perhaps the floor pattern summarizes the rules for a game whose move he enacts on the wall; or perhaps it is a religious ritual" (Mulhall (2001), 133). Granting this, describing Crusoe as recording days, as writing poems, as doodling to amuse himself, as following an mathematical rule, and so on, all impute to him different normative practices, distinct constitutive rules, and different ways of correction, arabesque-explanation, conforming our arabesque marks to his Crusoe-ian standards, and so on. In sum, how I initially describe a practice (e.g., what framework for description I select based, in part, on what I take the point of the practice to be) partly constitutes what normative practices, rules, and so on, I ascribe to it. Further, selecting between frameworks is not the same as understanding as a technique for the simple reason that the latter presupposes a framework to function. Let us bring this more clearly into view by considering two further examples that show how aptness, the point of a practice, and selecting a framework for descriptions are different projects that constitutive rules, correction and linguistic-understanding, and understanding as a technique.

Example 1: Consider one thread in Wittgenstein's somewhat inchoate remarks on Frazer (PO p. 119-155) and his focus on the inaptness of Frazer's framework. To begin, Frazer's framework for description is one that describes his groups in terms of rules, is sensitive to the normative practices that underwrite the rules, and so forth. Indeed, Frazer's framework does not deploy "*presemantical, non-normative terms*" (Glock (1996 b), 162; Frazer (1990), e.g., v). However, the specific framework for description Frazer relies on is one that describes his groups in terms of an analogy with science. Thus, "their [the groups Frazer examines] errors were not willful extravagances or the ravings of insanity, but simply hypotheses, justifiable as such at the time when they were propounded" (Frazer (1990), 264). In turn, this framework for description in terms of science leads Frazer into some very dark waters. For example, assume that the practice of uttering a particular incantation, say, rests on a hypothesis concerning the causal relationship between the weather and human action.

Assume further that the group is misled into thinking that the hypothesis is well verified, "because, for example, an incantation that is supposed to bring rain certainly seems efficacious sooner or later. But, then it is surely remarkable that people don't realize earlier that sooner or later it's going to rain anyhow" (PO p. 121). In turn, these sorts of 'remarkable' oversights lead Frazer, despite his avowed aims, to describe many practices of his groups as "a sort of childish make-believe" (Frazer (1990), 69; also see, e.g., 14, 75). In turn, it then becomes opaque how such 'child-like savages' in their fantasy worlds can manage to survive long enough to procreate and perpetuate their culture. Thus, by misconstruing the *point* of magic, Frazer *mis*describes his tribes practices, imputes to them the *wrong* constitutive rules, and ends up flabbergasted at how people survive. Frazer's framework is inapt and, though his descriptions may be true and correct, they occlude the behavior's meaning.

Example 2: Consider that "[i]t is… imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the mental accompaniments. And if *we* were to see it, we'd say that they were playing chess" (PI § 200). To begin, the italics stress a distinction between how we, with our custom of board games (e.g., PI § 199), and how the 'tribe's people' describe what is afoot here. For us, describing the behavior as "a game of chess" is fairly obvious and leads us to impute very specific constitutive rules, chess-corrections, chess-explanations, and so on, to the tribe. However, by stipulation, this tribe does not have our custom of board games generally or chess specifically. Thus, by stipulation, however they describe this activity, it cannot be as "a game of chess." In turn, this shift radically alters what sort of corrections, 'chess'-understandings, and so on, we can offer and they can make sense of. For example, to attempt to correct a player by saying "a queen cannot jump over a rook" cannot work, as the player *does not* have the background required for to make sense of such an utterance. Again, by stipulation, they lack board games in general and chess specifically. Notice, critically, that this means that even if their token actions are *identical* to a game of chess, this does *not* necessarily mean that the framework of chess rules is apt to describe them. Again, and even more clearly, how I take the point of this behavior affects what framework for description I rely on, what rules I impute, and so on. Critically, none of this is something the token behavior 'tells me' and it does not reality reduce to rules as the rules of chess presuppose the description "a game of chess."

Thus, the above argument, and the two examples, should make us wary of any attempt assume that the rules I impute to a practice, the behavior or utterances, and the framework I rely on, are necessarily related with one another, are 'natural,' or that we can reduce selecting a framework for description to constitutive rules and understanding a technique. As it were, understanding as a technique presupposes a framework for description. And selecting a framework for description depends on a host of factors including the purposes I have, what I take the point of the practice to be, background, context and so on. In other words, selecting a framework depends on *seeing* connections in between an incredibly complex set of factors. It is to this we turn.

(3) The third sense of understanding, understanding as seeing connections, emerges naturally from our above discussion. Given that understanding as a technique depends on particular frameworks for description, and given that selecting these frameworks is a different matter that correction, linguistic-explanation, and so on, the question is what guides us in selecting a framework. And later Wittgenstein's answer is by proposing that we examine both the foreign practice, odd expression, and so on, as well as "appeal to a tendency in ourselves" (PO p. 127) and "the surroundings of a way of acting" (PO p. 147). Less prosaically, it seems that what Wittgenstein is emphasizing that understanding as seeing connections is finding or inventing analogical connections between certain practices, expressions, and so on, that we are familiar with and then relying on these to redescribe a practice, expression, etc., that strikes us as problematic (cf. PI § 122). In other words, we find an analogy between a region of language we already understand as a technique and the problematic utterances, practices and so on, in terms of their respective points, the surroundings of them, and so on. From there, we exhibit the rules that govern the region of language we know in, e.g., a language-game. Finally, we use the language-game as an object of comparison that helps us redescribe the problematic expression, practice, and so on (e.g., PI § 130 and § 132). In other words, we come to understand a foreign practice, strange utterance, and so on, by comparing and contrasting it with a model that exhibits something we already understand. Notice, critically, that this relates understanding as a technique and understanding as seeing connections together in a particular formation. Understanding as a technique is intra-language-game and engendered by training, correction, and so on. Understanding as seeing connections is inter-language-games that "finding or inventing intermediate links" (PI § 122) that

analogically connect language games one already know to ones that are, at present, opaque. Let us examine understanding as seeing connections more carefully.

To begin, it is critical to realize that understanding as seeing connections rests on a form of " projection." (e.g. Cavell (1979) e.g., 168-190 , Mulhall (2001) e.g., 81-93, Baz (2008), Travis (2006) e.g.,10-40).[118] For our purposes, and in a very truncated and deliberately schematic way, a projection has four steps. (a) An observer stumbles across a behavior, expression, etc., she finds confusing in that she cannot understand the role that it is playing (e.g., PI § 123). (b) She begins moving through a complex network of similarities and differences that this behavior or expression may share with other behaviors or expressions whose shared correct uses are clear and whose point she is familiar with. In other words, she tries to find some region of language she already understands as a technique and that strikes her as relevantly similar to the problematic expression, practice, and so on (e.g., PI § 66, §122). (c) Granting that she finds such a region, she then stipulates rules for a language-game, say, that exhibit the constitutive rules by which she describes her ability to conform her use to shared correct use, correct, etc. (e.g. PI § 82- § 83). (d) She uses this language-game as an object of comparison to redescribe the confusing expression, foreign practices, and so forth, in terms of the unproblematic region of language (e.g., PI § 130). In doing so, ideally, the expression is rendered transparent as its rules of this 'foreign practice,' the meaning of the 'odd utterance,' and so on, are made clear, and so the confusion dissolves. Thus, a "perspicuous representation" is engendered by using an object of comparison to redescribe a problematic expression, odd behavior, and so on, in such a way that its role because clear and that it is thereby clarifying the problematic expression. Granting this, some other features of understanding as seeing connections follow.

First, exegetically, it is quite telling that this the relationship between intra-language-language-game understanding as a technique and inter-language-game understanding as seeing connections aligns with Wittgenstein's claim that there are "uses of the word 'see.' The one: 'what do you see there?'- 'I see this'… The other: 'I see a likeness in these two faces'" (PI II xi § 111). For understanding as a technique or the first use of sight, we are focused on a single language-game or object. By contrast,

[118] As with all philosophy, there's further debate about what lessons we should learn from this that place, e.g., Cavell and, e.g., Travis, on opposite sides.

understanding as seeing connections and the second use of sight focuses on noticing likenesses or similarities between faces or games.

Second, pursuant to this, it is entirely imaginable that someone is ‘blind' to the likenesses understanding as seeing connections relies on or the second use of seeing relies on (e.g., PI II xi § 257- § 272; Mulhall (2001), 153-182 elaborates). In other words, seeing the inter-facial relationship is different from recognizing a face, knowing how to reproduce it in a drawing, and so on. By analogy, “[w]hat a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time!” (PO p. 125). In other words, Frazer’s key failing is that he is unable to find apt connections between non-scientific practices ‘enlightened’ British people have, such as kissing a beloved’s picture (PO p. 123), and his tribe’s practices.

Third, understanding as seeing connections is not subjective. This is for at least two reasons. One, a critical mark of understanding as seeing connections is "'fine shades of behavior'- when my understanding of a theme is expressed by my whistling it with the correct expression, this is an example of such fine shades" (PI II xi § 210). For example, someone who understands as seeing connections between [*i carry your heart with me(i carry it in]* and sonnets will read the poem differently, respond to it differently, and so on, than someone who cannot overcome the solecisms, errors, violations of English syntax, orthography, and so on, that the poem produces. Moreover, this is not unique to poetry. For example, realizing that a verbal expression is a sarcastic quip, a genuine question, a joke, and so on, rely on noticing that the tokening of the expression has connections with other expressions in terms of tone, facial expression, and so on. Two, a critical aspect of understanding as seeing connections is that it can be intersubjectively seen. Someone who claims to see a boat in the duck-rabbit, or see a mathematical equation in *[i carry your heart with me(i carry it in]*, and who cannot elaborate further, has not really seen the connections she claims to. Furthermore, granting this, it is also clear that the projections that understanding as seeing connection utilizes are not mere will-of-the-wisps or fancies of a philosopher but require us noticing fine shades of behavior as well as intersubjective verifiability. For instance, a projection of chess into shouts-and-stomps rather difficult to make full sense of (e.g., PI § 200).

Fourth, extending language, redescribing practices, and so on, is somewhat different from being conditioned to conform one's use to the shared correct public use.

Indeed, a striking thing about projection is that it does not easily reduce to the sort of training, or conditioning as I would translate ‘Arbrichten,’ that techniques and corrections do. Indeed, recognizing salient patterns of similarities and differences between various language-games, practices, and so on, requires a degree of creativity and ingenuity, a point we return to in the next section. Regardless, it is also clear that, unlike training and correction, understanding as seeing connections and projections quickly reaches a point where our reasons give out (PI § 1), and we will say both "this is simply what I do" (PI § 217) and ask, exacerbated, "don't you see it?!" (cf. PI § 72). Thus, as Baker & Hacker (2009), 212, note, and as Cavell (2005),192-212, fully exploits, the best we can do when elaborating a projection is introduce irreducible metaphors or "mythological statements"- e.g., "family resemblance", "seeing-connections", etc.- and use these in a way that we hope the person will catch on. Indeed, this partly accounts for how we are able to expand, re-apply, and so on, old concepts to new contexts, objects, and so on.

Fifth, understanding as seeing connections has no ‘hard and fast' guarantees. Perhaps this can be most clearly seen in our practices of helping someone come to understand as seeing connections. To bring this into view, in my reading, Wittgenstein instructs us to ask "[h]ow does one lead someone to understand a poem or a theme? The answer to this tells us how one explains the sense here" (PI § 533). Fortunately, Wittgenstein also offers us an answer. "I had an experience with the 18th century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him was to stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put *-* (etc.) in front of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I said: ‘Ah-ha, now I know why he did this.' What happened here? I had read this kind of stuff and had been moderately bored, but when I read it in this particular way, intensely, I smiled and said: ‘this is *grand*'… the important thing was that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely, and said to others: ‘Look! This is how they should be read.'" (L&C p. 4-5). Rhees's notes go on to claim that Wittgenstein said "[i]f we speak of the right way to read a piece of poetry- approval enters, but plays a fairly small role in the situation" (*ibid* 5).

Notice, one, that certainly reading a poem in a new way is somewhat different from grasping the semantic content of the stanzas of the poem (if poetry is best construed in these terms) or knowing the rules that determine the uses of the terms in the poem. Indeed, the poem is the same poem read in the old way or the new way. Two, understanding the poem required seeing a connection between the poem,

Klopstock's marks, and an irregular meter. Indeed, Wittgenstein stresses that what matters here is the rhythm of the poem. Three, pursuant to this, "[w]hy this pattern of variation in intensity and tempo? One would like to say ‘Because I know what it means.' But what does it mean? I'd not be able to say. As an ‘explanation,' I could compare it with something which has the same rhythm… How does one justify such comparisons? There are very different kinds of justifications here" (PI § 527). Four, as PI § 527 stresses, linguistic-explanation and training give out in these contexts. Further, what justifies reading the poem in this way cannot be an appeal to rules or shared correct uses. Rather, it has to do with helping someone to come to see what makes a poem grand, say. Five, helping one see the connections between language-games, poems, and so on, relies on offering tips (cf. PI II xi § 355), offering characteristic marks and trying to draw attention to the ‘ring' of the expression (PI § 454), giving examples of similar poems, language-games, etc., and trusting the student will catch on (e.g. PI § 72), and so on. Indeed, a patient teacher may help someone realize why the type-sentence "he sang his didn't he danced his did" in *[anyone in a pretty how town]* betokens a beautifully optimistic and hopeful view on living. For instance, a teacher may stress the finality and completion of the English simple past tense "did" and its link to joyous actions, she may focus on the typically human view of life as an ever-increasing amount of closed doors, missed opportunities, and regretful moments, she may show her student the film *Zorba the Greek* as an example of someone who danced his did, and so on. Though these teaching heuristics all make sense, none of them may achieve the goal of helping someone find cummings grand. Finally, six, in all cases, dissecting this type-sentence with standard English syntax, noting solecisms and attempting to correct them, and, indeed, even wading into depth grammar linguistics (e.g., Cureton (1980) gives an admirable attempt to use Chomsky tools to make sense of the type-sentence), grossly misfire. To understand the type-sentence requires seeing connections and bringing someone into this is a touch-and-go affair.

Finally, sixth, understanding as seeing connections rests, at base, on a factual assumption concerning the sorts of animals we are and the sorts of ways we live. Indeed, pace Cioffi (1990), part of why Wittgenstein instructs us to appeal to similar tendencies in ourselves is the thought that we share certain biological, emotional, and human realities (e.g., Glock (2001)). By making this, admittedly unjustified, assumption, Wittgenstein can attempt to redescribe aberrant behavior, odd utterances,

‘irrational practices,' and so forth, in a manner that can clarify them for us. In turn, this connects to the next section.

Thus, this section has examined "understanding" in later Wittgenstein. It argued that "understanding" is a polysemic concept that, for our purposes, can be examined in terms of three distinct senses. The first sense, understanding as combination, has to do with seeing how the meanings of individual terms, and their configuration, contribute to the meaning of a whole sentence. The second, understanding as a technique, focused on being trained in the correct shared uses of terms, learning the constitutive rules, correction, and so on. The third, understanding as seeing connections, focused on finding, inventing, etc., analogies between language-games (or whatever) in such a way that one can redescribe a problematic games in terms of a game one already understands. With this in view, we turn, finally, to later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy proper.

8.3 Understanding and the Role of Philosophy:

With this linkage between meaning and understanding laid out, I turn to later Wittgenstein's discussion of the role of philosophy. Specifically, I focus how philosophical investigations and understanding as seeing connections relate. To begin, first, I note the aspects of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy that remain invariant from the TLP to the PI. Second, I sketch an account of how philosophy, understanding as seeing connections relate, and perspicuity relate. Specifically, I argue that Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations rely on projection- specifically a negative and a positive role for analogies. In turn, the negative role of analogies is to disabuse us of overhasty generalizations, over-scientistic assumptions, and so on. The positive role for analogies is to help us see the connections between problematic expressions, unclear regions of language, and so on, and regions, expressions, etc., we know already, so that we can redescribe the former utilizing the later. In both cases, further, it is clear that philosophical investigation’s inherent result (when it succeeds) is engendering understanding as seeing connections, as PI § 122, BT § 89 p. 307e, PO p. 133, and so on, claim.

To begin, it is critical to keep in mind that later Wittgenstein agrees with earlier Wittgenstein in two key respects. First, he maintains that philosophical

investigations into the nature of meaning, and bringing about understanding, are different in kind that scientific investigations into the nature of electrons. Succinctly, and slightly simplistically, this is because philosophical investigations (re)describes what is already open to view (PI § 126) whereas science research discovers and explores new realms. Thus, "[i]t was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that'- whatever that may mean- could be of no interest to us… problems are solved, not by coming up with *new* discoveries, but by assembling what we have been long familiar with " (PI §109). I also note here that the break between scientific research and philosophical investigation is something that Wittgenstein maintained throughout his career (NB p. 106; TLP 4.111; LWVC p. 130; BLBK p. 5; BT § 86; etc.). " (PI §109- emphasis mine).

Second, Wittgenstein continues to link together philosophical investigation and clarity. Indeed, in the TLP Wittgenstein claims that "[p]hilosophy is the logical clarification of thought" (TLP 4.111) and in the PI Wittgenstein states that "the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity" (PI § 133). We discuss what this "clarity" is in section 8.4. However, it is critical to realize that Wittgenstein continues to maintain that the philosophical activity (when it succeeds) still engenders clarity.

With this in view, let us examine the role of philosophical investigation and its relationship with understanding as seeing connections. Recall, as noted in chapter 8.2, that understanding as seeing connections relies on projections. These projections are a means of clarifying problematic expressions, confusing (from our perspective) practices, and so on, by comparing and contrasting them with object of comparison that exhibits the rules that describe the ability to use an unproblematic expression in a relevantly similar region of language. In other words, we find an analogy between a problematic expression, an unclear practice, and so on, and a language-game that reflects a region of language that we understand as a technique. We then use the language-game to see the connections between the problematic expression, unclear practice, and so on, and something we already understand as a technique.

Granting this, a reasonable exegetical expectation is that Wittgenstein's focus should be on the role that analogies play in these projections. And, indeed, Wittgenstein notes that "[m]isunderstandings concerning the use of words [can be] brought about… by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language" (PI § 90). Further "language-games stand there as objects of

comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language" (PI § 130). Indeed, granting that Wittgenstein is concerned not so much with disputing descriptions per se, but the ‘pictures' they engender (e.g., PI § 1, § 423), it is striking that Wittgenstein notes that "there is something else that I'm prepared to call a ‘solution,' to which I'm prepared to apply such-and-such picture, such-and-such an analogy" (PI § 140). Thus, a key focus in the PI is on analogies and how they guide us in describing phenomena.

In the *Nachlass* and other writings, the focus on the role of analogies is, if anything, more explicit. Thus, "[w]e may say that we are led into puzzlement by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on- And this also happens when the meaning of the word ‘now' appears in a mysterious light" (BRBK 108). Further, "[w]hen words in our ordinary language have prima facie *analogous grammars* we are inclined to try to interpret [or describe] them analogous; i.e., *we try to make the analogy hold throughout*" (BLKB 7-emphasis mine). Moreover, the entirety of BT § 91 focuses on the importance of analogies. To take but one quote, "[p]hilosophers often fare like little children who first scribble random lines on a piece of paper… and then ask an adult ‘what is that?'- here's how this happens: the adult draws something for the child… [and says] ‘that's a man,' ‘that's a house,'… and the child draws lines too and asks: ‘now what's that'" (BT § 91 p. 315e). Finally, if our interpretation of Wittgenstein's comments on Frazer is correct (see chapter 8.2), clearly the origin of seeing connections, and perspicuity, emerge from Wittgenstein trying to make sense of how and where certain analogies led Frazer astray. Thus, Wittgenstein is keen to both stress the importance the role of analogies in philosophical investigations.

Granting this focus on analogies, I argue that there are two complementary roles Wittgenstein assigns to analogies in philosophical investigations. To wit, there is a negative role wherein Wittgenstein discerns, foregrounds, and "deconstructs" a latent analogy that may compel us to misdiscribe an expression, practice, and so on. However, there is also a positive role for analogies by which Wittgenstein attempts to find homes for our words (e.g., PI § 116). Metaphorically, the teacher tells the child both that her scribbles is not a house and tries to figure out some way to interpret the scribbles so that they are, in fact, a drawing of something or other. Let us examine each role in turn.

The negative role of analogies in philosophical investigations has been adroitly elaborated by Horwich (e.g., Horwich (2012), 19-73; Horwich (20156)). In

this negative key, Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations attempt to discern, foreground, and deconstruct, the latent, and problematic, analogies that guide us in to select a framework for description that is inapt. In other words, I may, based on superficial surface grammatical features of expression1 and expression2 try to make an analogy between them. Specifically, I may attempt to utilize the framework for description I rely on to make sense of expression1 and reapply to expression2. And this reapplication may well lead me into darkness. In turn, Wittgenstein's interventions attempt to foreground the initial analogy between expression1 and expression2 in such a way that I realize that trying to describe expression2 in the terms I use for expression1 is both optional and a tad bit mad.

For example, consider the word "this." We may begin by noting that "this" is surface grammatical similar to proper names as in "this is good" and "John is good." Indeed, in both cases, "[i]t is quite true that in giving an ostensive definition… we often point to the object named and utter the name. And likewise… we utter the word 'this' while pointing to a thing" (PI § 38). Granting this, we may try to describe "this" as a sort of proper name. In turn, this attempt to describe "this" as a proper name brings into play a framework for description predicated on a particular denoting relationship between a proper name and its bearer. Such a framework naturally leads us to try to figure out what 'this' could denote and "[w]here our language suggests a body and there is none: there we should like to say, is a *spirit*" (PI § 36). In other words, given that "this," described as a proper name, *must* have a bearer of some kind, we are quickly led into an entire mythology about 'immediate experience' as the denoted 'thing,' (PI § 38), a particular sort of apodictic certainty and knowledge (e.g., OC § 8 & § 21), the idea of privacy of sensation (e.g., PI § 253), and so on. Indeed, the deleteriousness of this simple misdescription of "this," and the speed at which it ramifies in philosophy, is well attested to in, e.g., Russell (1968), 178-203, who unfolds what appear to all the world as airtight *musts* concerning "this" as a proper name.

From here, Wittgenstein seeks to disabuse us of this tendency by bringing the latent analogy to the fore and criticizing it. For example, if "this" is a name like "John," how can it be that "this" can also name a cat, a color property, etc.? More importantly, how do I know what "this" really denotes if it varies so wildly and can select colors, shapes, and so on, out of 'immediate experience' (e.g., PI § 33)? Further, what does "this" name in an expression like "this is it" or "this is here" (PI §

117)? Notice, critically, that all the questions flow from trying to follow the name/"this" analogy and they put increasing pressure on the supposed link between them. Furthermore, in addition to this 'internal' elaboration, Wittgenstein will also call our attention to "[t]he decisive movement in the conjuring trick" (PI § 308) and point out exactly where surface grammar led us to posit souls (see, e.g., Horwich (2012), 19-73, for a detailed elaboration). In all cases, the role of these negative analogies in Wittgenstein is to show that framework we have selected to describe some expression, practice, and so on, in its terms, is untenable. "And now the analogy [that originally guided us] which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces" (PI §308).

However, it is critical to realize that this is *not* the end of the story. Indeed, as PI § 308 makes clear, the key problem with a one-sided negative role for analogies is that it leaves us in a state of deep perplexity. As it were, the practice, expression, and so on, remain opaque to us. To rectify this, later Wittgenstein has also has positive role for analogies that complement the negative role, or so I argue.

To bring this positive role into view, let us begin with a passage from the BT. Consider:

> "[s]omeone has heard that a ship's anchor is hauled up by a steam engine. He thinks only of the one that powers the ship…. and cannot explain to himself what he has heard…. Now we tell him: No, it is not *that* steam engine; besides it, there are a number of others…. I believe his confusion has two parts: what the explainer tells him as fact the questioner could easily conceived of as a possibility by himself, and he could have put his question in a definite form instead of a simple admission of confusion… however, reflection couldn't instruct him about the facts. Or: no ordering of his concepts could free him from the uneasiness that comes from not having known the truth.
>
> The other uneasiness and confusion is characterized by the words 'something's wrong here', and the solution is characterized by (the words): 'Oh you don't mean *that* steam engine'" (BT §89 p. 306- underlying mine).

Notice that the first part of confusion Wittgenstein mentions is exactly what Wittgenstein's negative role for analogies achieves. In effect, we simply point out that "this" is not a name or that what raises the anchor is not the ship's engine. However,

this does not help with the second part of the confusion, the uneasiness or perplexity of still being unclear about what use "this" has or what raises the engine. To resolve this second confusion, we need to provide the person with a different analogy that helps him redescribe the problematic expression, practice, and so on, in such a way that it is clarified and no longer causes perplexity. In sum, it is not enough to deconstruct flawed analogies; we must also replace them with more apt ones. In other words, we must "find the path from error to truth" (PO p. 119). And this positive role of analogies, this path from error to truth, is "leading back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI § 116). In other words, we attempt to find analogies that can make sense of seemingly problematic expressions, (for us) confusing practices, and so on. Let us examine this more closely with four textual examples. Then, let us abstract from these the positive role Wittgenstein assigns to analogies and how this role enables us to make sense of how philosophical investigation engenders clarity.

Example 1: Let us begin with "this." Assume that we have convinced someone that "this" and cannot play the role of a name in a sentence like "this is here." Assume further that she is still perplexed in that "this is here" seems to be in order in a way that "bu di be" is not. From here, what Wittgenstein instructs us to do is ask "in what special circumstances this sentence ['this is here'] is actually used. There it does make sense" (PI § 117). In other words, Wittgenstein instructs us to try to imagine uses for "this is here" that are not problematic. For example, one might imagine a person who has been hunting for a lost item all day and exclaims, after finding it, "ah! This is here!" In turn, and keeping in mind that a projection need not be "correct" or "true," I may further stress that this role is similar to expressions like "I found this!" or "I remember this now!". So this gives "this is here" a fairly clear role and a reasonably clear meaning. The point of this procedure is trying to find a home for expressions, rather than merely dismissing them outright as misguided or flawed. Less poetically, we attempt to ascertain the role that the expression is (supposed to) play by describing a possible use for it in a different language-game with alternative stipulated rules that exhibit the description of an ability to use a related expression in a similar area of language.

Example 2: Consider Wittgenstein's reflection on the builder game in PI § 15 and PI § 42. In PI § 15, Wittgenstein stipulates that Assistant-B is trained or conditioned to fetch a specific tool, t, when Builder-A shows B "t." However, in PI § 42 Wittgenstein asks what happens if A shows "X" to B, even though B has not been

trained to link "X" to a specific tool and even though, in point of fact, "X" does not link to a tool in the rules given in PI § 15. In turn, one might expect that “X” is, almost per definition, nonsense in PI § 15 and § 42 as there are no stipulated rules for “X” that determine its correct use. *However*, Wittgenstein stresses that "even such signs [i.e., "X"] could be admitted into the language game, and B might have to answer them with a shake of the head. (One can imagine this as a kind of amusement for them)" (PI § 42). Notice that finding a home for "X," and the positive role of analogy does not depend on the stipulated rules Wittgenstein laid down in PI § 15, as the "might" stresses. Rather, it depends on B seeing the connections between "X," the situation, A's behavior, and so on. For example, B may be tempted to describe A's use of "X" as determined by the same constitutive rules that govern A's use of "t." In turn, she may then try to hunt for the missing X-tool. However, imagine she talks herself out of this. She then tries to imagine the role that "X" could play. To begin she knows that A knows that there is no X to which "X" refers, she knows that A knows she has not been trained for this situation, she notes that A has a big smile on his face, she knows that both A and herself share enough of a form of life that they both enjoy fun and jokes. And she concludes that the role of "X" is that it is a joke. She then replies playfully by shaking her head. This does, in fact, give "X" a home in PI § 42. However, it does not rest on the stipulated rules for PI § 15. Moreover, B's redescription of "X," and PI § 15, is innovative and not readily assimilated into the rules for PI § 15. Again, we see that B uses an analogy between the use of "X" in A's hands and the use of jokes and playful behavior (e.g., PI § 83), and then redescribes "X" as a joke and responds by playing along.

Example 3: Consider many of the rather strange examples, objections, discussions, and so on, which Wittgenstein takes deadly seriously throughout the PI. To take a personal favorite, Wittgenstein has a voice note that "'But in a fairy tale a pot too can see and hear!' (Certainly; but it *can* also talk). ‘But a fairy tale only invents what is not the case; it does not talk nonsense does it?'- It's not as simple as that…. Even a nonsense poem is not nonsense in the same way as the babble of a baby" (PI § 282- underlying mine). Notice, one that Wittgenstein does not simply dismiss such a seemingly silly objection. Rather, he reminds us that part of why we ascribe vision or hearing to rocks or pots in fairy tales is that they talk as well. Two, Wittgenstein also stresses that nonsense is not simply an ‘all or nothing' matter. Indeed, a nonsense poem is different from babbling. Three, Wittgenstein goes on to

try to imagine an occasion wherein ascriptions of sight, vision, pain and so on, make sense for inanimate objects. Thus "[w]e do indeed say of an inanimate thing that it is in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one" (*ibid*). Though PI § 282 is deeply fascinating for many reasons, I call the reader's attention to a simple fact. If only the negative role of analogies featured in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, then his response to the fairy-tale objection is rather difficult to grasp. Indeed, he does not simply note, as we might expect him to, that describing the real world in fairy-tale terms is borderline mad. Rather, he seeks to both problematize the analogies that lead the objector here (i.e., "but it can also talk") as well as finding a home for the objector's worry (i.e., "we do indeed…") by redescribing the objection by an analogy with our play with dolls. To this example, one can add: painted pots and the question of hidden boiling water (PI § 279); lions who speak languages and who we yet do not understanding (PI II xi § 327); perplexed aliens who see people sliding down hills (PI § 139- box (b)); people who speak in tongues, without lexical or syntactic standards (PI § 529); the nearly endless way(s) to contextualize and redescribe language-games (e.g. Cavell (1996); Mulhall (2001), 52-58, and so on); etc. The primary point is that were Wittgenstein's sole aim to display and deconstruct flawed analogies that lead us to misdescribe our words, these further procedures just make no sense. In each case in the PI, Wittgenstein attempts to find homes for our words.

Example 4: Most powerfully of all, consider Wittgenstein's way of contending with Heidegger's (in)famous "the nothing noths." For this sentence, Wittgenstein instructs us to ask "[w]hat did the author have in mind with this proposition? And where did he get this proposition from?" (VoW p. 69). From there, Wittgenstein invents a home for this expression in terms of a poetic story about a vast ocean of nothing that is constantly moving (i.e., it is noth-ing) and being as a sort of island (*ibid* 70). This is, from one point of view, absolutely shocking. Wittgenstein does not simply dismiss Heidegger's seemingly bizarre claim. Indeed, in spite of the fact that this sentence- unlike "this is here!", joking builders, and talking pots in fairy-tales - seems to have no home in language, Wittgenstein attempts to *give* it one. Notice, further, that if Wittgenstein's primary concern is displaying flawed analogies, this trying to give a home to "the nothing noths," i.e., his poetic story, is hard to account for fully. Indeed, if all Wittgenstein aims to do is point out flawed analogies, surely Carnap (1959) is a far easier, and more transparent, way to go. Clearly, Heidegger is

trying to make a negative existential quantifier do very naughty things by an utterly odd analogy. However, even in this extreme case, Wittgenstein is as interested in figuring out a home for the expression as discussing where the expression may go wrong. Thus, Wittgenstein seems willing not only to draw language-games out of real descriptions of the uses of expressions but invent them wholly for the purposes of redescribing a problematic expression.

Abstracting from these textual examples, we can characterize the role of positive analogies in their own light. To begin, it is quite clear that the positive role of analogies in philosophy for Wittgenstein is making sense of problematic expressions by trying to redescribe them in a manner that their role is clear, they are determined by constitutive rules, etc., and everything runs smoothly. In other words, the goal is finding, constructing, inventing, and so on, analogies between a problematic region of language, expressions, and so on, and ones where the uses of expressions that are relevantly similar are already known to us. This positive role is necessary because it is *not* enough to point out to the fly that it is stuck in a bottle: we also need to lead it out (cf. PI § 309). Further, if we find such an analogy, we redescribe the problematic expression in terms of the clear one. This clarifies the problematic expression by giving it a use in a language-game that we already have the ability to understand as a technique. In sum, the positive role of analogies for Wittgenstein is utilizing them to bring into view alternative framework for description, or pictures, that we already know or have access to (PI § 126), and then trying to describe the opaque language game in terms of this old and familiar framework. Poetically, he brings words home from their idle holidays into language-games where they do an honest day's work.

It is important to notice two further features of the positive function of philosophical investigation. First, I stress, and as BT, § 89 p 306 implies, that this positive aspect of philosophical investigations takes a great deal of work, innovation, and creativity. Indeed, this accounts for the odd use Wittgenstein makes of "discovery" (e.g., BT § 89 p. 307; PI § 119; PI § 133). Though we have not made a new discovery in the same way we might discover a new compound in chemistry, we have made a discovery in that we have invented, found, etc., a new projection that can help us redescribe a problematic language-game, expression, etc., in a new way.

However, we must also keep in mind that such a 'bloody hard'[119] procedure only begins when an expression is problematic. For expressions that are unproblematic, for language-games, we already understand as a technique, and so on, such a procedure is unnecessary. Indeed, "description gets its light- that is to say, its purpose, from the philosophical problems" (PI § 109). Further, "[w]hen we do philosophy, we are like savages… who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this" (PI § 194). Thus, we only should utilize this procedure when we find an expression confusing or problematic.

Second, we may fail to redescribe the expression in such a way that we can understand it. For example, in PI § 42, if A holds up "X" in complete earnestness and becomes enraged when B fails to fetch the non-existent tool X, B may very well be dumbstruck. In this case, B is unable to understand what "X" means exactly because she cannot find an analogy to help her understand a use of "X." In turn, B can rightly condemn A's use of "X" as senseless because there is no description she can think of that would allow her to ascribe to "X" a role. Thus, we may discover that some expression is senseless. However, notice how difficult this discovery of nonsense is. Indeed, the "results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (PI § 119). Under this reading, "running up against the limits of language" simply means trying, and ultimately failing (thus "results"), to find the home for a problematic expression, which is to say, to make coherent sense of the tokens, seeming practices, and so on. Further, pursuant to this, such a realization should lead us to "exclude it [e.g., "X"] from the sphere of language, and thereby bounds the domain of language… [However, third] when one draws a boundary, it may be for various kinds of reasons… So if I draw a boundary-line, that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for" (PI § 499). Thus, when we find we cannot see an analogy between the role some problematic (pseudo-)expression, faux-game, and so on, and an expression, game, and so on, whose role we already know, we should indeed rule it out of bounds. However, even this ruling is provisional.

In sum, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation and understanding as seeing connections are deeply interconnected. Specifically, Wittgenstein's

[119] The phrase is taken from Conant (2002). It links up to Wittgenstein's fear of being unjust or overhasty (e.g., PI 131; Kuusela (2008),275-86, elaborates). I cannot discuss it further here.

philosophical investigations utilize analogies- in both a negative and a positive role. The negative role of analogies, for Wittgenstein, is that he discerns foregrounds and deconstructs bad analogies that lead us to describe language-games, expressions, and so on, in an inapt framework. This, however, is not enough. As it were, the words are still on holiday, the flies are still in their bottles, and the child is upset because her pretty-picture *has* to mean *something*. In turn, the positive role for analogies is that Wittgenstein seeks to construct, discover, invent, etc., analogies between a problematic expression, region of language, etc., whose use is unclear and a region of language, expression, and so on, and one we already know. If we can discover such an analogy, we can then construct a language-game as an object of comparison and redescribe the problematic language game in its terms. Ideally, this clarifies the problematic expression by describing its use in terms of constitutive rules that we understand as a technique. If we cannot discover such an analogy, we may rule out the expression out as senseless. However, this boundary line is provisional. In any case, such a procedure shows that philosophical investigations (when they succeeds) engender perspicuity as we can understand the expression clearly now. As it were, the problematic expression on holiday is given a job and has an honest use we can understand as a technique, the fly is freed, not by smashing the bottle, but by tracing out escape paths, and the child is made happy as she is told that her picture is something called “abstract expressionism.” We *lead words back* (PI § 116).

8.4 Philosophy, Clarity, and Peace- a Close Reading of PI § 133:

In the last sections, we discussed how philosophical investigations, understanding as seeing connections, projection and analogies, and coming to terms with the meaning of philosophically problematic expressions related. However, we left open both the nature of the "clarity" this process engenders as well as the sort of "peace" it gives us. In other words, we left the end game of the projective procedure. It is to this we turn.

To bring this into view, I focus on PI § 133. This is for two reasons. One, it is one of only two explicit mentions of "clarity" in the PI. Two, it is the point in the investigations where Wittgenstein most explicitly discusses the ends he ascribes to philosophy. First, I examine an exegetical problem that some otherwise antithetical

interpreters have noted. To wit, "clarity" as Wittgenstein deploys it in PI § 133 and, indeed, through most of his career, is strikingly odd if read as some sort of external aim of philosophy, rather than an internal result. Second, I examine PI § 133 at some length to dissolve this conundrum. Specifically, I argue that "clarity" is not an external goal of philosophy, but the inherent end result of the activity of philosophy (when it succeeds). I also argue that the activity of philosophy begins whenever there is a breakdown in understanding. I also point out that such breakdowns of understanding are not always a consequence of robust philosophy. Instead, they arise as a consequence of us being finite rational intellects. Thus, much as I argued in chapter 5.3 that the TLP does not view philosophy as a sort of 'fall from grace,' but an important procedure to rectify certain inherent tendencies, given the sorts of beings we are, so I argue for the PI.

To begin, Wittgenstein's conception of clarity is strikingly odd, especially if read as am external goal towards with philosophical inquiry should strive. This is because, if clarity is a goal, it is left critically underdetermined. To see this, consider that "Carnap pursued clarity for the sake of scientific theory building… By contrast, Wittgenstein regarded conceptual clarity as an end in itself" (Glock (2001 a), 213). Notice, first, that the contrast between Wittgenstein and Carnap is very apt and telling here. Whereas Carnap has a very clear idea of the sort of clarity he is after- e.g., explicating "temperature" so that it can be properly used in science (e.g., Carnap (1950), 8-15)- it is rather unclear what "clarity" is supposed to be for Wittgenstein. Second, pursuant to this, Glock's essay implicitly links this clarity to Wittgenstein's alleged irrationalism and mysticism. Indeed, it seems that the "clarity" Glock imputes to Wittgenstein seems akin to mystical clarity. Specifically, in both cases, the clarity is so clear that we simply 'see though' the problems of philosophy. Tellingly, Read (1995), 365, takes up exactly this thread and notes that, if this is so, "should we not be… willing to entertain the thought that the conceptions of 'complete clarity,' of the complete disappearance of philosophical problems, even of '[giving] philosophy peace,' may themselves be… thoroughly- problematic?" However, Read admits also admits that, under this interpretation, it then becomes rather unclear how we should read the PI or why Wittgenstein wrote it. In either case, "clarity" is a somewhat unclear concept in later Wittgenstein.

To rectify this, and by doing so bring into view later Wittgenstein's most stunning metaphilosophical innovations, let us examine PI § 133. Note that I divide it into five parts to enable clear exegesis:

> "[1] We don't want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
> [2] For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.
> [3] The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to.- The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question.- [4] Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off.—[5] Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem." (underlying mine)

To begin, it is clear that [1] brings into play three interdependent features. First, as Baker & Hacker (2014), 41-67, and Glock (2015) emphasize, Wittgenstein is reminding the reader of his attack on the idea of rules as often-deployed in linguistics or certain parts of philosophy of language. In particular, Wittgenstein can be read as arguing against three such accounts. One, Wittgenstein clearly has in mind ideal language philosophy and the thought that we can replace natural language with some regimented formal calculi. He shares this target with earlier Wittgenstein and I refer the reader to chapter 5.0 and 5.1. Two, he is also targeting the TLP's preconception that a determinate logical structure is 'buried' in the depth grammar and that we simply need to sublimate it out. We discussed this in chapter 6.1 and so I refer the reader there. Three, Wittgenstein can fruitfully be read as objecting to certain contemporary approaches that try to cash out "rules" as, e.g., pre-doxastic computational processes that a speaker tacitly carries out when she grasps the semantic content of an expression (hereby "tacit rules"). If Wittgenstein is read in this light, it is imperative to realize that Wittgenstein does not need to claim that such tacit rules do not exist. Perhaps they do, and perhaps such rules are helpful for certain purposes. However, Wittgenstein would surely insist that such rules couldn't play a role in philosophy. There are many reasons for this. Chief among them is that, per definition, such rules cannot allow for the perspicuity that Wittgenstein insists is inherent result of philosophy. Indeed, if a philosophical "problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.'" (PI § 123), being told that there are tacit rules cannot

help- any more than telling someone lost in a city that there is a complicated, and secret, mathematical formula that determines the locations of various streets.

Second, Wittgenstein's claim that he does not want to "complete" the system of rules links to Wittgenstein's claim that:

> "[i]f you want to say that they [i.e., language-games (2) and (8)] are incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete- whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notations of infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in to it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses" (PI § 18).

Notice that this quote emphasizes that the very idea of a complete language is prima facie problematic. Indeed, as PI § 23 says explicitly, language is a constantly changing and a diachronic phenomenon that alters as human practices, scientific discoveries, technological innovations, etc., occur. Further, pursuant to this, the idea of "refine" is rather hard to make sense of- a point Horwich (2015) argues forcefully. This is because refinement requires that one has a set goal and, given this goal, can modify or improve the means to realize it. In contrast, the maze of the ‘old city' of language, the interconnections and complexities it displays, are non-rational in the sense that our linguistic-conceptual practices did not evolve for a singular goal, but a myriad of functions- ordering, praying, telling stories and jokes, etc. Granting this, it is unclear what sort of refinement we can impose on all aspects of our messy and a-rational linguistic-conceptual practices. Yelling "damn it!" after burning oneself is undoubtedly using language, but I am hard pressed to know how to refine this.

Third, Wittgenstein's note about "the system of rules" clearly stresses that rules are of critical importance. As stressed in both chapter 7.1 and chapter 8.2, understanding as a technique rests on constitutive rules, their conceptual interdependencies, and the normative practices that underwrite them, to function. Indeed, Wittgenstein is stressing, again, that such constitutive rules do, pace Kuusela (2008), 132-140, and with Baker & Hacker, Hacker, and Glock, play a critical role in philosophy.

[2] claims that "[f]or the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely*

disappear." This sentence is critical for several reasons. Chief among them is the relationship it proffers between philosophical problems and clarity. To bring this into view, recall that for Wittgenstein, a "philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don't know my way about'" (PI § 123). However, as it stands, PI § 123 cannot serve as the sole criterion determining if a problem is philosophical. Indeed, there are many ways of failing to know our way about that, prima facie, are not philosophical. Intuitively, not knowing one's way about in a foreign city is not a philosophical problem and rectifying this is not best addressed by philosophical investigation. To supplement this, two additional criteria should be added that determine what counts as a philosophy problem. One, the sense of not knowing our way about that interests Wittgenstein betokens a breakdown in understanding (Shear (2013) notes this a well). In other words, I do not know my way about when I fail to understand a philosophically problematic expression, an unclear region of language, and so on. Indeed, chapter 8.2 and 8.3 relied on this criterion implicitly when discussing where and how philosophical investigations begin. Two, this breakdown makes us "uneasy owing to its [i.e., a different cultural practice's] peculiar meaninglessness, irrespective of any interpretation (Which shows the kind of basis such uneasiness can have)" (PO p. 151). In other words, a philosophical problem is not knowing our way about due to a breakdown of understanding wherein we cannot ascribe a meaning to some practice, expression, etc. and we feel uneasy because of this inability.

Second, pursuant to this, this conception of a philosophical problem reimagines the scope of philosophical investigations. To begin, Himly is right to note that "Wittgenstein's… ‘tormenting questions'… do not at all seem to be exclusively comprised of what might be called traditional, grand, metaphysical questions" (Hilmy (1991), 99). In other words, Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophical problem as a particular breakdown of understanding, and a list of canonical philosophical questions are rather distinct from one another. Indeed, part of Wittgenstein's philosophical genius is noticing philosophical problems that do not, at first glance, relate to "orthodox" questions. However, further, it is also important to note that breakdowns of understanding may not be a consequence of philosophy done badly or philosophers' metaphysical-izing. For example:

> "One human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is

> more, even though one has mastered a country's language. One does not understand the people (and not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can't find our feet with them" (PI II xi § 326).

In this case, being lost has to do with a breakdown of understanding where we just cannot find the meaning of another culture and its ways of doing things. Such a breakdown does not rest on any flawed attempt at philosophical theory construction, metaphysical distortions of language, etc. Indeed, such breakdowns may not even count as "philosophical" if viewed through the lens of canonical questions and set schools that make up departments of philosophy. However, clearly, such breakdowns meet the criteria listed above for a philosophical problem and so, for Wittgenstein, should count as such. To buttress this further, as Sandis (2015), notes, these sorts of 'life' breakdowns, were, for Wittgenstein, relatively commonplace and of grave concern to him.[120] Alternatively, one can support this novel conception of philosophical problems by noticing that later Wittgenstein's "fundamental concept" of perspicuous representation emerged not from his musings on the misuses of metaphysics, but his engagement with Frazer's struggles to make sense of other people's words and deeds (e.g. PI § 122; Hacker (200), 75, traces the origin of the concept back to Wittgenstein's engagement with Frazer). Thus, a philosophical problem, i.e., not knowing one's way about because we fail to understand some expression, practice, etc., is not always or necessarily a consequence of an attempt to put forward a (flawed) metaphysical theory.

Third, counting such 'life' breakdowns of understanding as philosophical problems is, far from being an idiosyncratic or problematic move, deeply insightful on Wittgenstein's part. There are several reasons for this. Chief among them is that such breakdowns are strangely independent of empirical investigation and facts. Perhaps this is most clearly seen in Wittgenstein somewhat inchoate attack on many of the supposed explanations in the social sciences of his day (e.g. PO, e.g., p. 127; L&C e.g., p. 42-43; CV e.g., p. 54). At base, what seems to bother Wittgenstein most about these explanations is that they easily foster a form of dogmatism and injustice (cf. PI § 131) as well as engendering more heat then light. For example, Frazer simply assumes that he, and British society, stand at the absolute apex of cultural 'evolution'

[120] Sandis attempts to make a distinction between the "official" version of understanding in the PI and the "unofficial" version in the PI II and OC. I find this distinction profoundly unhelpful and, instead, follow Mulhall (2001), in seeing these as interdependent aspects.

and so dismisses, or, worse, casts in the worst possible 'British' light, practices he finds problematic, expressions he finds silly, and so on. Indeed, his descriptions make his subjects look like madmen or day-dreaming children. Further, such 'explanations' led Frazer to posit a shallow synchronicity between Greek myths and African practices that, for Wittgenstein and modern anthropology (e.g. Leach (1958)) muddy the waters rather than helping foster any deep grasp of what is afoot. In all cases, the critical point that Wittgenstein seems to have realized is that providing Frazer more 'facts,' amassing more 'evidence,' and so on, will not help. Frazer's problem is not the 'facts' *but* the framework by which he describes them. As it were, Frazer has selected the *wrong* parameters and breaking this spell cannot be a matter of simply giving him *more* things to mis-measure. In other words, when a breakdown in understanding occurs, how we *take* or *interpret* the facts, what sort of evidence counts as support for a conclusion, and so on, are exactly what is at issue. And dissolving this breakdown is different than replacing ignorance with knowledge (cf. TLP 6.4321; WiC p. 450, BT § 89 p. 309). Indeed, what is needed here is a philosophical investigation that can help us reimagine the role of the practice, the problematic expression, and so on, in such a way that, rather than madmen or fools, we have people we can understand. From there, if one wishes, one can begin a debate.

Fourth, pursuant to the second and third points, Wittgenstein's extreme pluralism furthers this novel conception of philosophical problems. To begin, Hilmy (1991) points out that the plural, "philosophical problems," is best read as indicating that there are different sorts of philosophical problems. Intuitively, this is because there are different ways that we can fail to know our way about and different ways to rectify it. Indeed, this is simply a consequence of our discussion in section 8.3 concerning the positive role of analogies. Thus, Wittgenstein contends that "[t]here is not a single philosophical method, thought there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were" (PI § 133- box). Furthermore, this helps explains how Wittgenstein's seeming idiosyncratic style and philosophical method relate. Trying to understand a problematic utterance, an opaque person, and so on, is far more akin to a shambolic and desultory conversation than it is to proofs and refutations. Indeed, the medley of voices in the PI and the polyphonic structure of the text are best read as reminding us that how we come to understand each other, how we come to see the connections, is often an inherently responsive form of engagement (cf. Cavell (1979), *passim*). Though there are sustained methods- e.g., listening carefully, trying to find

language-games that redescribe odd utterances, trying to follow someone's seeming nonsense as far as one possibly can, and so on- these do not readily reduce to a series of clear steps and algorithmic procedures.

Fifth, following from this, the disappearance of a philosophical problem and the link to complete clarity is what occurs when we rectify the breakdown. Indeed, a philosophical problem is solvable “without reminder, in contrast to all others” (BT § 89 p. 310) exactly because when we restore understanding, we know our way about again and there is no problem anymore. In other words, “what calms us is that we see a system that (systematically) excludes those structures that have always made us uneasy, those we were unable to do anything with” (BT § 89 p. 307). Thus, when understanding is restored and we can see how a problematic expression, an opaque practice, and so on, is systematically connected with what’s afoot, we understand it, and then we can go on. Critically, to reiterate, this sort of clarification is connected with understanding as seeing connections. For example, Wittgenstein notes that "[o]nce such a phenomenon [i.e., a radically different cultural practice] is brought into connection with an instinct which I myself possess, this is precisely the explanation wished for; that is, the explanation which resolves the difficulty" (PO p. 139).Thus, it is critical to realize that "clarity" is not an external goal of philosophical investigations but an inherent result of it. Again, philosophical investigation (when it succeeds) engenders clarity as I now have redescribed the practice, utterance, etc., so that it is no longer opaque.

Sixth the idea that clarity is a result of philosophical investigations naturally links up with "[t]he results of philosophy is the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense" (PI § 119). Part of what philosophical investigations achieves, and part of how it rectifies breakdowns in understanding, is by discovering pieces of nonsense that prevent us from coming to understand the role of an expression, practice, etc. Notice, further, such discoveries are a two ways street. Sometimes we discover that our conversation partner's expressions or behaviors simply do not make sense. However, sometimes we discover that our descriptions of the role of these behaviors or expressions do not make sense. The problem with the private linguist is that she and we, at the end of the day, cannot make sense of what she means (PI § 258- § 272). We cannot find a role for her "S," and so we bar it. However, the problem with Frazer is that he is so convinced of the rectitude, superiority, and ‘enlightened status' of "a present day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness" (PO p. 125) that he

systematically misdescribes the behavior of others and their words and then is shocked that they do not make sense- i.e., that they are not the same as English parsons. It is exactly Frazer, not his groups, who is the source of confusion and nonsense (e.g., PO p. 131). Further, in both cases, this hunting for nonsense- be it odd behaviors, problematic utterances, and so on, of a conversation partner or be it due to preconceptions, biases, and other priors on our part- is the soberest way to understand Wittgenstein's strange notes on "resistance" (e.g., CV p. 33) "working on oneself" (e.g., BT § 87), etc.[121] A breakdown in understanding is a two-way street, and part of the point of a philosophical investigation is undermining our prejudiced descriptions as much as the other person's (seeming) nonsense.

In sum, to reiterate, it is critical to keep in mind that philosophical problems are not necessarily a consequence of a bad philosophical theory, a metaphysician misusing her words, etc. Instead, a philosophical problem emerges whenever there is a breakdown in understanding and these can arise for a myriad of circumstances. Notice three further things. One, this alters the mandate of philosophical investigation in a strikingly Socratic way. In effect, the goal of philosophy is helping people come to terms with the things they say and do. Once this is done, once the problematic expression is understood, the opacity vanishes and we restore understanding. Two, as Hacker (2009 a) and Glock (2017) rightly note, this conception of philosophy does not produce cognitive results in a manner akin to science. Understanding a poem, ascribing meaning to a practice, seeing someone's humanity, etc., are indeed laudable and very important goals. However, they do not have much, if anything, to do with a sort of systematic theory construction and a hunt for objective knowledge. Indeed, if the role of philosophy is just clarification, then it is barren in precisely Socrates's sense. Three, this sort of clarification is the unique task of philosophy. For example, consider some leitmotifs from the PI: seeing that someone in pain (e.g., PI § 281); realizing that another's face is human (e.g., PI § 583). Helping someone clarify things and guiding her to hear the pain in another's sounds or the humanity in another's face, cannot be brought about by more facts. Indeed, "'I believe that he is suffering.'- Do I also *believe* that he isn't an automaton?" (PI II iv § 19). It is not my *belief*, or the facts, or whatever, that matters here but my "attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul" (PI II iv § 22). If one does

[121] Baker (2006), 205-222, offers a compendium of such remarks

not hear the screams of a child as a sign of pain and an instance on shared humanity[122], if one does not realize a face is human and betokens a soul[123], then facts will not do the job. Only philosophical investigation can help clarify things.

[3] notes that "[t]he real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to.- The one that gives philosophy peace so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question." To begin, it is critical to notice a shift from the plural, "philosophical problems," to the singular, "the real discovery." In other words, Wittgenstein's concern here, and the peace he seeks for philosophy is distinct from the sort of clarity that inherently results from philosophical investigations (when they succeed). Indeed, whereas the complete clarity that emerges from overcoming breakdowns in understanding and is internal to the philosophizing, Wittgenstein here insists that an element of choice is involved concerning if and when one should being and end philosophizing. However, this distinction cannot be a difference in kind between "first-order philosophical investigations" and "metaphilosophy" (e.g., PI § 121). To make sense of this, it is necessary to proffer an account of "the real discovery" which is district from clarification and which "gives philosophy peace."

To bring this into view, it is necessary to reflect on Wittgenstein's anti-scientistic stance (perhaps most evident in *PR preface*). However, "scientism" is a rather unclear term and a definition like "the worship of science" does little to help. For Wittgenstein, it seems like a key problem with "scientism" is that it insists that all authentic problems be amenable to scientific investigation (e.g., TLP 6.4321). Indeed, if one follows, e.g., Kuhn (2012), 36-42, we can say that scientism is the assumption that all problems are puzzles that can be solved by skilled technocratic experts in a particular subject.[124] Notice that Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophical problem is anathema to this conception. Coming to understand someone is not akin to solving a puzzle if, for no other reason, the latter has a set solution and the former does not.

In turn, Wittgenstein's claim that what the real discovery is, is "[t]he one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring

[122] See Dass (1996)'s elaboration of Wittgenstein and this theme in her anthropological description of the violent separation of India and Pakistan to see how diaphanous, thin, and tragically difficult hearing sounds as cries can be.
[123] "Simply put, we see them [other human beings], not as physical systems, but as human beings" (Krikpe (1982), 123)- a very neglected passage.
[124] It is interesting to note that this conception of problems-as-puzzle may not be viable even within science, a point that Popper (1970), 51-58, makes forcefully.

itself in question" makes perfect sense. What torments philosophy is not philosophy (pace, e.g., Cavell (2005), 192-212). Instead, what torments philosophy is our own, admittedly contingent and admittedly cultural, insistence that there are only puzzles and technical solutions to them. In turn, this means that the sorts of breakdowns of understanding that are the hallmark of philosophical problems, and the philosophical investigations that aim to dissolve them, just cannot occur. And, since philosophy's problems are no longer taken as licit, serious, important, and so on, philosophy begins a desperate and herculean task of trying to prove its work and ground itself (Baker & Hacker (2009), 281-84, make a similar point). And Wittgenstein's goal, what he seeks to give us control of, what he wants to be able to stop, is exactly "the turbulent conjectures and explanations" (BT § 92 p. 316) that this quixotic quest engenders. Given the above, it is more fruitful to see this quest for grounds as an external imposition forced onto philosophy by a culture obsessed by scientism and unwilling to accept that not all problems are puzzles. Indeed, if philosophy is internally connected with wonder- be it manifested in a breakdown of understanding or amazement at the world (e.g., Plato *Theaetetus* 155c-d; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 182b[125]; CV p. 5e; PO p. 41), then the demand for a self-grounding sort of philosophy is rather misplaced (TLP 6.522). What disrupts philosophical investigations, and the understanding and clarity it engenders, is the demand that it accounts for itself in scientistic terms. Far from seeking to end philosophy, Wittgenstein seeks to give it peace by rejecting this cultural ideal.

[4] notes that "[i]nstead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off." Notice that this harmonizes very well with the BT point mentioned above. Rather than assuming that breakdowns in understanding and philosophical problems are puzzles, and rather than beginning the game of wild and endless just-so speculation about how to solve them, a method is demonstrated. This method is using philosophical investigations, specifically projections and seeing connections, to dissolve confusion by exposing nonsensical aspects of the interaction- be these preconceptions, utterances, etc. as well as helping redescribe the problematic expression in a way that it is clear. The series of examples can be broken off simply because philosophy is not an attempt to construct a "theory of understanding."

[125] This understanding of Plato and Aristotle's conception of "wonder" and the fact that it is a laudable state that cannot reduce to speculation is admittedly deeply influenced by Heidegger (1962) and admittedly very contentious.

Instead, it is an attempt to work through various moments where a breakdown in understanding occurs and how it can be rectified. In this key, philosophy is much more practical than theoretical, again in line with a mad brick-layer who took to haranguing Athenian gentlemen some 2,300 years or so ago.

Finally, [5], "[p]roblems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem" further emphasizes this fact. There is no one type-problem "breakdown in understanding" and no set way to address it. Instead, Wittgenstein insists that we work in a piecemeal fashion to resolve various breakdowns of understanding when they occur. Thus, just as one can fail to know one's way about for a myriad of reasons, and just as one can solve this with a medley of methods, so too in philosophy.

In sum, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is merely a set of systematic methods that engender an understanding of opaque persons, problematic expressions, and so on, in such a way that the inherent result is clarity- i.e., we know what she means, is doing, and so on. Further, pursuant to this, philosophical investigation emerges when there is a breakdown in understanding; philosophical investigations ends when it has laid, open to view, the various nonsenses that caused it and found homes for the problems, which is to say rendered them rationally coherent. It is not cognitive in that the understanding as seeing connections does not result in knowledge, but restores understanding by (re)describing the role of a problematic expression so that it becomes clear. Thus, in sum, “[w]hen I say: Here we are at the limits of language, that always sounds as if resignation were necessary at this point, whereas on the contrary, complete satisfaction comes about since *no* question remains” (BT § 89 p. 310). This is so because clarity and restoring understanding are internally related.

8.5 Summary:

Thus, I have argued that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the PI maintains, with the TLP, that philosophy is an activity or process. I have further argued that, as it were, the verb “to philosophize” is an accomplishment verb whose inherent end result is perspicuity of understanding- i.e., seeing the connections. Thus, in both cases, what is critical is that philosophy is not something external to thought or understanding, but an activity that aims to help us learn to do both better.

To summarize, we began by discussing the TLP and its conception of semantic content as pictures and a pneumatic conception of thinking. From there, we examined later Wittgenstein's assault on this conception and his attempt to realign meaning with understanding. Next, we argued that "understanding" is inherently polysemic and examined three senses. Specifically, we focused on understanding as seeing connections and the projections that engendered it. Next, we examined these projections in terms of a positive and a negative role for analogies and how this is what “philosophical investigation” amounts to for later Wittgenstein. Finally, we closed by discussing the sort of peace Wittgenstein seeks and how this aligns with clarity and philosophical investigations.

9 Conclusion: The Ends of Philosophy and To “Begin” Again (and Again):

This dissertation has argued that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is unique, innovative, and compelling. Specifically, I have argued that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy is best construed as an activity or a process. Pursuant to this, I have also argued that this process is a sort of accomplishment one wherein the inherent end result, when the process succeeds, is clarity. To make this case, I broke the dissertation into two parts. In Part I, I considered four popular characterizations of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as having external metaphilosophical aims at set methods to achieve them. I argued that each is unworkable. In turn, this should make us skeptical of reading Wittgenstein's comments on philosophy in terms of set goals and fixed methods. In Part II I examined both the TLP and the PI. I argued that, for both, a critical and consistent insight of Wittgenstein's is that the philosophical activity or philosophical investigations are a conceptual correlates of clear thinking or perspicuous understanding. In other words, I put forward a reading wherein the philosophical activity engenders clarity as an internal result.

In turn, this finally allows us to make sense of Wittgenstein's strangest remarks that we mentioned in the introduction as well (chapter 0.0). To wit, Wittgenstein claimed that "I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV p. 28). From the process perspective, this claim makes good sense. Specifically, and granting that Wittgenstein assumes that poetry, like philosophy, emerges when language, thought, and so forth, do, learning to do philosophy is akin to learning to write poetry. In both cases, they do not so much have external end goals but inherent results when the process succeeds. Moreover, in both cases, they seem to merely be part of the things we do with our words and our lives. Further, ideally, both remind us of things. Poetry reminds us of how tragic, and beautiful, life can be. Philosophy reminds us of how difficult, and essential, clear thinking or perspicuous understanding, can be. Finally, in both cases, asking what justifies them, why they exist, and so on, simply misunderstands what they are and our relationship with them. As long as people are struck by beauty, there will be poetry. And as long as understanding falters, either due to amazement at the insane thing called the world

and our life in it or due to the fact that people say and do bizarre things, there will be philosophy.

However, three outstanding and interrelated questions should be addressed. If Wittgenstein is correct and philosophy is a process, then what implications does this have? Specifically, what implications does a process view of philosophy have for Wittgenstein scholarship? What implications does such a view have for philosophy more generally? And what implications does it have for the broader intellectual world? Let us take each in turn.

For Wittgenstein scholarship, one may object that I have ended the game. In effect, if Wittgenstein's sole aim is teaching us how to think clearly or understand perspicuously, and once we learn this lesson we can kick him away, what good is studying Wittgenstein? This, it seems to me, profoundly underestimates both the difficulty of teaching and the travails of learning. For the difficulty of teaching, Wittgenstein, much like Socrates and Kierkegaard, realized that training someone in the art of thought or understanding is sui generis. Learning to think critically is a different sort of thing than being trained in our times tables or being taught to do physics. As Wittgenstein himself notes, "[c]an one learn this knowledge?... Can someone else be another man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives the right tip—This is what ‘learning' and ‘teaching' are like here" (PI II xi § 355). And understanding many of Wittgenstein's tips are, from my perspective, still very much open and critical questions for adequately learning how to conduct philosophical investigations or learning to think clearly. Thus, consider a random assortment of examples: what is secondary meaning and how does it relate to aspects and understanding? What is the proper role and function of nonsense? What is the x that is not an interpretation and that underwrites our rule-following practice? These are neither trivial questions for Wittgenstein scholarship nor can they remain unanswered if we hope to learn the activity or investigations Wittgenstein seeks to teach properly.

For learning, it seems that Wittgenstein, with Kierkegaard and Socrates, would find nothing more gratifying than us, eventually, throwing him away and thinking clearly or understanding perspicuously on our own. Indeed, for all three, the best result of a study of them is that one goes out and thinks more carefully. One considers if prosecuting one's father is a pious act (e.g., Plato *Euthyphro* 2a-4b); one dwells on the question of if technological progress and the mastery of nature necessarily implies moral progress and a more human (not *humane*) life (e.g., Kierkegaard (2009), 301-

326); one reflects on how much of our ways with language are building cities of words that may idle in the sky. Indeed, it seems that such a desire that a learner ends her tutelage and begins again- is critical to becoming human.

For philosophy generally, one may object that I am, in fact, proposing that we shut philosophy departments down. Indeed, what possible roles can philosophy as a discipline play? Further, how can we justify it to the taxpayers? Let us take each in turn. The role that philosophy as an academic discipline should play does change when one adopts a process view of philosophy. Specifically, what philosophy, as a discipline, should do is invent new tools, methods, and so on, which can further help us learn to think clearly or to understand better. Indeed, at the most basic level, learning what follows from what, learning what evidence supports what, and so on, are laudable and critical features of learning to think clearly and understand. Furthermore, to the real credit of analytic philosophy, it has insisted on maintaining a point that many have abandoned or elided. To wit, it is merely part of the logical idea of assertions that the asserter can be wrong, regardless of how it makes her feel. This seemingly trivial note is critical to accurately understanding how to respect others, acknowledge them, come to understand them, and so on. Indeed, we treat dogs and children differently than adults precisely because we assume the former cannot be held responsible for their words or deeds. Abandoning such a minimum standard for responsibility, far from lionizing "otherness," infantilizes the individuals and groups one claims to respect. Again, being taught how to take responsibility for one's claims, and how to hold other's accountable for their claims, is a critical part of clear thinking and understanding and something that the discipline of philosophy inculcates very well. Thus, the discipline of philosophy should, and does, build tools that assist us in understanding and thinking clearly as well as teaching us how to converse reasonably- i.e., how to take responsibility for our assertions and hold others responsible for theirs, and so on.

However, there are parts of philosophy that, on a process view, are best abandoned. As mentioned in chapter 3.3b, one would have to be a form of metaphysics whose explicit aim is theory construction akin to science. Another would have to be a particularly reprehensible way of misreading certain interesting ‘French’ thinkers and using them defend a banal version of ‘anything goes!’ relativism. A third is perhaps more difficult spell out. Philosophy would need to modify its self-image. It is not, and cannot be, a super-science that cuts to the core the world. However, it

seems to be that process philosophy, and the clarity it promises us, are noble ends in themselves.

For the later, justifying our existence to taxpayers, matters are quite straightforward. What philosophy seeks to teach and learn is how to understand and think. Given that so much of our world is utterly opaque, that so many cultural clashes do not just go away when we scream "tolerance!" that so many questions currently forced on us by the social moment we are in do not easily reduce to policy puzzles, etc., justifying philosophy is a rather easy prospect. You want to understand why people violently reject their host societies, turn on them, and seek to kill innocent people? You want to understand why large parts of the western world feel so disenfranchised and alienated that they would just as soon burn it all to the ground as anything else? You want to think through what ramifications the fact that we are biological creatures that evolved has for human rights? You want to know what justifies a claim, by what criteria news is not fake, why we value truth, how we know that a statistics is a reliable way to assess some features of the world, what it means to say that "facts prove that…," how we know what our words mean, why they mean that, in virtue of what they do so? And yes, even wanting to know why some claims are necessary- e.g., why we are so struck by Orwell's invective against totalitarianism by pointing out that "2+2=4" is not negotiable or subject to Big Brother's demands; Why we are so moved by Dostoyevsky's protest that "2+2=4" is a way of denying human freedom and agency?[126] Then fund philosophy!

The cultural ramifications of the process view of philosophy have already been hinted at above. If learning to think clearly and finding a better way to understand people, expressions, and so on, are necessary correlates of being political animals, speaking, and so on, then learning philosophy is inherently important. The world is a very confusing place and we often make matters worse by confusing ourselves. Learning a set of methods that can engender clarity and teach one to be critical is certainly culturally important. Indeed, if the mad bricklayer's program was so helpful for even a homogeneous culture, it is critical for us.

[126] There is an entire book to be written on the use of mathematical necessity in political-cum-literary discourse.

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